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Abstract
This thesis examines the structure and function o f the English //-cleft configuration 
within the framework o f construction grammar. My analysis begins with the claim that 
//-clefts are a subtype o f specificational copular sentence. After identifying problems 
with previous accounts, I outline my own, original analysis o f specificational NP be NP 
sentences. I argue that specificational meaning involves an asymmetric predication 
relation and is dependent upon the inherent semantics o f definite noun phrases (rather 
than syntactic movement). I treat nominal predication set theoretically, as a semantic 
relation between members and sets. I claim that specificational meaning is brought about 
by a reinterpretation o f the class-membership relation involving definite NP predicates, 
whereby the referent is identified as the unique member o f a restricted and existentially 
presupposed set.
As a member o f the family o f specificational copular sentences, the //-cleft 
inherits properties from the more basic construction. From this, it follows that //-clefts 
should also involve a nominal predication relation, containing a definite NP predicate. 
This leads me to argue in favour o f a non-derivational extraposition-from-NP analysis of 
//-clefts, in which the pronoun it and the cleft clause (analysed here as a restrictive 
relative) function together as a discontinuous definite description. My analysis improves 
on similar accounts o f this type in two ways. First, since my analysis explains the role 
that definite descriptions play in the creation o f specificational meaning, I am able to 
explain, rather than simply identify, the numerous similarities between //-clefts and 
definite noun phrases. Second, my analysis o f specificational sentences as involving a 
nominal predication relation allows for a straightforward account o f the relationship 
between specificational and predicational //-clefts.
The thesis also examines the historical development o f the //-cleft construction. I 
show that (a) much o f the //-cleft’s structure is reminiscent o f an earlier stage o f the 
language and (b) the construction has become increasingly schematic and productive 
over time, sanctioning instances which override inheritance from the more basic 
specificational schema. In this way, the historical evidence provides an explanation for 
the //-cleft’s idiosyncratic properties. Together, my synchronic and diachronic analyses 
add up to a maximally explanatory account o f the //-cleft construction.
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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
1.1 An outline of the project
This thesis examines the synchronic structure and diachronic development o f the English 
//-cleft within the framework o f construction grammar. It-clefts are interesting for a 
number o f reasons. For one thing, they have a non-standard structure which appears not 
to conform to the general rules o f the language. If  we take a look at the example in (1), 
we can see that //-clefts have four main components: the introductory pronominal it, a 
form o f the copular verb be, a postcopular phrasal element and a sentence-final clause.
(1) [It] [was] [Howard] [that left]
From this example, we can see that the //-cleft’s syntactic configuration is difficult to 
make sense of. The that-clause is structured internally like a restrictive relative.
However, proper names, such as Howard, are full noun phrases. As such, they cannot 
normally be modified by restrictive relative clauses. So how does this clause relate to the 
postcopular element, if  at all? Can we really call this a restrictive relative clause? If so, 
what does it modify? If not, are we dealing with a clausal structure that is unique to the 
//-cleft? Equally problematic is the role o f initial it. Is this an expletive dummy subject 
and if  so, why is it there? Does it operate as a syntactic placemarker and if  so, for which 
element? Or is the constituent it related in a different way to other elements in the 
sentence?
In addition, //-clefts have a number o f unusual semantic, pragmatic and 
discourse-functional properties. These are particularly interesting since it is not 
immediately clear which elements in the cleft structure contribute to the meaning o f the 
construction. For example, the //-cleft is a focusing construction. The primary 
informational content is placed in the syntactically marked postcopular focal position 
and is often given primary stress (see (2)). However, it is not at all obvious why this
particular syntactic configuration should be chosen as a focusing device. Is this its 
primary function?1
(2) It was Howard that left
A further property o f the /¿-cleft is that it exhibits an exhaustiveness implicature. For 
example, in (2) we assume that Howard  was the only person that left on that occasion. 
They are also presuppositional; the information in the sentence-final clause is not 
asserted and is preserved under negation. For instance, in example (3), we are told that 
Howard d idn ’/ leave but we are left with the presupposition that somebody (else) did  
leave. This begs the question, where do these pragmatic meanings come from? Which 
elements contribute to them?
(3) It wasn’t Howard that left
Cleft sentences also have a specificational (or identifying) meaning. For some authors 
specificational meaning involves a ‘value-variable’ relationship (see especially Declerck 
1988). For example, (2) identifies Howard  as the value for the variable x  in the 
proposition expressed by the sentence-final clause, x  left. However, for others, 
specificational meaning is attributed to a special use o f the copular verb. So does be 
have a specificational meaning in the //-cleft? If  not, where does the specificational 
meaning o f //-clefts come from?
To a large extent, how these questions are answered (and perhaps whether they 
are even asked at all) depends upon how we think //-clefts relate to other constructions, 
or configurations, in the language. Most approaches to //-clefts fall into two broad 
categories: those that understand //-clefts in relation to simple subject-predicate
1 I use the term ‘focus’ to refer to a unit of information structure where the assertion differs from the 
presupposition (see Lambrecht 1994; Vallduvi and Engdahl 1996; Erteschik-Shir 2007). Although focus is 
often marked by intonation, Lambrecht (1994: 208) observes that “accent placement and focus marking 
are not to be equated”. Where focus marking is unclear or ambiguous in my examples, I make use of small 
capitals to indicate the marking of focus by intonation.
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sentences, such as (4), and those that relate /7-clefts to other specificational copular 
sentences, such as (5).
(4) Howard left
(5) The one that left was Howard
I discuss these two approaches and the analyses that result from them in § 1.2.
Essentially, justification for the first approach comes from the truth-conditional 
equivalence between /7-clefts and simple subject-predicate sentences. From this 
perspective, /7-clefts are viewed primarily as a means o f marking focus syntactically.
The second approach, on the other hand, builds on the fact that the /7-cleft is a copular 
construction with a specificational meaning. So which is the right approach? The answer 
to this question depends upon what we think is the primary function o f /7-clefts and 
asking which perspective can best explain the range o f properties that /7-clefts display.
There are also different varieties o f /7-cleft which are sometimes regarded as 
separate structures. One domain o f variability involves what can occur in the focus 
position. Although, most frequently, the focal element is a noun phrase, /7-clefts permit a 
range o f elements as the complement o f be, such as the prepositional phrase in (6). 
Should these examples be analysed in the same way as those with nominal foci or do 
they require a separate analysis? Can the sentence-final clause still be analysed as a 
restrictive relative if  the immediate antecedent is not nominal?
(6) It’s in December that she’s coming
Another domain o f variation concerns the discourse status o f the sentence-final 
clause. The sentence-final clause in /7-clefts is typically associated with expressing 
discourse-old information, shown in (7). In this example, we know from the prior text 
that a woman has been murdered by someone, so the open proposition someone killed  
her is given information. However, in other cases, such as (8), the underlined 
information is not given in the previous discourse and the proposition, that someone
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once said  'laws are silent at times o f  war ’, does not even have to be known to the 
intended audience. Are these two functions related, or are they so divergent that we need 
to provide different sources for their origins?
(7) A: Is he the murderer?
B: No. It was the therapist that killed her
(8) (Start o f  lecture)
It was Cicero who once said, ‘Laws are silent at times o f w ar’
A further domain of variation concerns the relationship between specificational 
and predicational clefts. As I noted above, ¿/-clefts have a specificational meaning. 
However, superficially similar proverbial sentences, such as (9), have a predicational 
meaning. For example, (9) is most closely paraphrased by the predicational copular 
sentence given in (10). In these examples, the postcopular element describes rather than 
identifies the referent. How does this structure relate to the specificational //-cleft, if  at 
all? Can proverbial sentences, such as (9), really be called clefts? //-clefts also resemble 
extraposed sentences, such as (11). Do clefts share more than just an apparent likeness 
with this structure?
(9) It is a long road that has no turning
(10) A road that has no turning is a long one
(11) It is a miracle that he survived
This thesis provides answers to these questions by examining //-clefts within the 
framework o f construction grammar (cf. Croft 2001; Fillmore, Kay and O ’Connor 1988; 
Goldberg 1995, 2006; Kay and Fillmore 1999; Lakoff 1987). Construction grammar was 
developed with a view to providing full and explanatory accounts not only of broad 
generalizations but also o f specialized linguistic patterns. In this model, constructions 
are not considered the epiphenomenal byproducts o f a combination o f componential 
meaning and highly general rules. Instead, aspects o f form and meaning can be encoded
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by the construction itself. Since much o f the //-cleft’s structure and use cannot be 
predicted from more general patterns o f correspondence, it is well-suited to treatment 
within a constructional approach. I come back to this issue in §1.3.
In addition to providing a synchronic account, this thesis also examines //-clefts 
from a diachronic perspective. Relevant questions here include: What is the origin o f the 
//-cleft? How did the different varieties o f //-cleft emerge? Can historical evidence 
provide support for our synchronic analysis? And can an understanding o f the history o f 
English help to explain some o f the highly specific properties o f //-clefts? Most versions 
o f construction grammar are usage-based theories and as such they are specifically 
designed to intersect with theories o f acquisition, processing and language change 
(Goldberg 2006: 214). This study therefore provides a useful insight as to whether 
construction grammar and grammaticalization theory can be usefully integrated. I 
discuss this idea in more detail in §1.4.
This section has identified some o f the phenomena that are the subject o f this 
thesis and some of the questions that are addressed throughout. In the next section, § 1.2, 
I provide an introductory background into the literature on cleft sentences. § 1.3 asks 
why construction grammar is helpful in the treatment o f //-clefts. Here, I present a brief 
outline o f my own synchronic analysis and compare this to other constructional accounts 
proposed in the literature. In §1 .4 ,1 present some o f the findings o f previous historical 
studies o f the //-cleft and my alternative diachronic construction grammar account is 
sketched in brief. §1.5 provides a note on the methodology employed in this study and 
an outline o f the thesis is given in §1.6.
1.2 An overview of the literature on cleft sentences
As I noted in § 1.1, authors tend to view //-clefts either from the perspective o f their 
relationship to truth-conditionally equivalent subject-predicate sentences or from the 
perspective o f their relationship to other specificational copular constructions. In this 
section, I outline these two approaches and the analyses that result from them. Although 
the individual proposals differ, these opposing viewpoints lead to two different kinds of 
analysis: those that treat the postcopular phrase as the preposed argument o f the
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proposition expressed in the sentence-final clause and those that consider the sentence- 
final clause to be associated in some way with the initial element it. The purpose o f this 
section is not to provide an exhaustive and comprehensive review of the literature, but 
simply to highlight intellectual trends in the history o f the analysis o f the construction.
1.2.1 The expletive approach
For many authors, //-clefts are considered primarily as information structure variants of 
syntactically more basic sentences. From this perspective, //-clefts do not differ 
dramatically in their semantic content from canonical subject-predicate sentences, but 
are marked by the way that this informational content is presented (Ward, Bimer and 
Huddleston 2002). Unlike their canonical counterparts, //-clefts have a fixed information 
structure; information that is to be foregrounded is placed in the postcopular focal 
position while the remaining semantic content is backgrounded into a sentence-final 
clause (see (12)).
The analyses resulting from this approach assume that the focal element in //-clefts 
enters into a predication relationship with the information in the sentence-final clause; 
this accounts for their truth-conditional equivalence with simple subject-predicate 
sentences. From this, it follows that the initial element it and (in most accounts) the 
copular verb be are semantically empty, serving only to introduce, or foreground the 
postcopular element. As a result, in the cleft literature, these analyses are referred to 
cumulatively as the ‘expletive’ approach; common to all such accounts is the assumption 
that the initial pronoun it does not play an essential role in the interpretation o f the 
sentence.
An early example o f an expletive account is detailed by Jespersen (1937: 83-89). 
He suggests that //-clefts are syntactically identical to their noncopular counterparts 
except for the addition o f a “lesser subject and verb” and a “connective word” . So, for





instance, the elements it, be and that in (14) are semantically empty, with Howard  and 
left entering into a predication relationship. This example is formalized, using 
Jespersen’s notation, in (15).2
(14) [It was] Howard [that] left
(15) [sv] S [3C] V
According to Jespersen, this analysis explains why /i-clefts are used as a means of 
marking focus syntactically. He notes, “A cleaving o f a sentence by means o f it 
is., .serves to single out one particular element o f the sentence and very often, by 
directing attention to it and bringing it, as it were, into focus, to mark a contrast” 
(Jespersen: 1949: 147f).
A number o f similar analyses were developed within the generative tradition of 
the 1980s. The details o f these analyses differ. For example, Chomsky (1977) proposes 
that the postcopular element and the sentence-final clause represent a type of 
topicalization construction, while for Williams (1980) and Heggie (1988), these 
components are coindexed at the level o f surface structure by a predication rule. 
Delahunty (1982, 1984) converts the sentence-final clause into a function (via lambda 
abstraction) which takes the postcopular element as its argument; after a reduction 
operation, the Logical Structure o f cleft sentences is equivalent to that o f their 
noncopular counterparts.
Although they use different mechanisms to accomplish it, these authors assume 
that zY-clefts and truth-conditionally synonymous sentences must share a level o f 
representation. Common to all o f these accounts then is the treatment o f the initial 
pronoun it as an expletive element, the analysis o f the sentence-final clause as being in 
some way related to the postcopular element, and the understanding that the primary 
function o f zY-clefts is as a focusing device.
2 In Jespersen’s (1937: 86) analysis, the information in square brackets is not part o f the sentence proper. 
Here, 3C represents a “tertiary connective”.
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1.2.2 The extraposition approach
For others, //-clefts are considered foremost as specificational copular sentences. From 
this perspective, //-clefts are analysed in relation to corresponding pseudocleft sentences 
and sometimes to noncleft copular constructions with an identifying function. The term 
‘pseudocleft’ is commonly used to encompass both w/7-clefts, which are introduced by 
w/z-words, and //z-clefts, which are introduced by the definite article and one o f a small 
number o f semantically general head nouns such as the one or the thing}
(16) It’s orange soda that I like best [//-cleft]
(17) What I like best is orange soda [w/z-cleft]
(18) The thing that I like best is orange soda [//z-cleft]
(19) My favourite drink is orange soda [noncleft specificational]
Each o f these examples has the function o f identifying (or specifying) the postcopular 
focal element orange soda. Like the //-cleft in (16), the pseudoclefts also contain clausal 
elements. However, in (17) and (18) these clauses are in subject position. This suggests 
that the //-cleft is an extraposition construction: the sentence-final clause is not 
connected to the focal element; instead, it is related in some way to the initial it.
Again, an early example o f such an approach is provided by Jespersen (1927). 
Prior to his 1937 account, outlined above, he proposed a “transposition analysis” o f //- 
clefts. In the following passage, Jespersen suggests that //-clefts are paraphrased most 
closely by other specificational copular constructions. Here the sentence-final clause is 
analysed as a restrictive relative, modifying the constituent it. He notes, “ ...it is not 
really the antecedent (or what looks like the antecedent) that is restricted by a relative 
clause. When we say “it is the wife that decides” or “it was the Colonel I was looking 
for” what we mean is really “the wife is the deciding person” and “the Colonel was the 
man I was looking for” : the relative clause thus might be said to belong rather to “it” 
than to the predicative following after “it is”” (Jespersen 1927: 88f).
3 My use o f  the term ‘//¡-cleft’ is from Collins (1991a, b). This term is used in a different sense in Ball 
(1977) and Hedberg (1990, 2000) to refer to cleft sentences introduced by demonstratives, such as this or 
that.
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Other accounts that view //-clefts in relation to specificational copular sentences 
can be found in the transformational analyses o f the 1970s, which derive //-clefts from 
pseudoclefts (see Akmajian 1970; Gundel 1977), or from the same source as 
pseudoclefts (see Wirth 1978). For these authors, the clausal element in subject position 
is extraposed, leading to the manifestation o f it as either a placemarker or a pronominal 
copy. Again, the details o f these analyses differ. For example, Akmajian and Wirth 
derive //-clefts via extraposition rules particular to cleft sentences, whereas Gundel 
suggests that this process is an instance o f ordinary right-dislocation. For Gundel, the 
initial it is a pronominal copy o f the right-dislocated clause, whereas for Akmajian, it is 
an expletive element.
Bolinger (1972) takes an approach that is more in line with Jespersen’s (1927) 
original proposal, in which the relative clause restrictively modifies the constituent it. He 
suggests that analytic compound relatives, such as (20) “provide an ideal source” for //- 
clefts (Bolinger 1972: 110). Such sentences can undergo “inversion” (extraposition- 
firom-NP), whereby the restrictive clause is extraposed but the nominal head remains in 
situ, as in (21). For //-clefts however, this “inversion” is obligatory rather than optional. 
In this analysis then, the constituent it is neither a placemarker, nor a pronominal copy, 
but a restrictively modified pronoun.
(20) That which he stole was money [analytic compound relative]
(21) That was money which (that) he stole [“inverted” compound relative]
(22) It was money which (that) he stole [//-cleft]
(examples from Bolinger 1972: 109)
Consequently, for these authors, there is little consistency as to the exact role o f 
it or how the relationship between //-clefts and other specificational sentences works. 
Nevertheless, what these extraposition analyses share is a concern for recognizing //- 
clefits primarily as specificational copular sentences.
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1.3 A constructional approach to clefts
So which o f these approaches is the right one? From the perspective o f construction 
grammar, the choice is straightforward. In this section, I explain why construction 
grammar is a useful framework for representing and accounting for the unusual 
properties of //-clefts and why an approach that examines clefts in relation to 
specificational sentences is more compatible with the principles o f construction 
grammar. I go on to provide an overview o f my own account o f //-clefts before showing 
how this improves on the previous constructional analyses proposed in the literature.
Construction grammar is a non-derivational, monostratal model o f language. In 
this model, linguistic patterns are understood as form-meaning pairs, much like 
individual lexical items. Since complex constructions are made up o f smaller 
components, which are also form-meaning pairs, constructions can have compositional 
meaning. However, in construction grammar, these correspondences are internal to the 
construction and can therefore be construction-specific. In addition, the construction 
itself can encode meaning that cannot be attributed to its individual components. From 
this, it follows that construction grammar tolerates idiosyncratic linguistic patterns that 
cannot be predicted from highly general rules o f the grammar. Within this framework, 
all aspects o f form and meaning, including pragmatic and discourse-functional 
properties, make up a speaker’s grammatical knowledge. Consequently, a constructional 
approach allows all o f  the //-cleft’s properties, including idiosyncratic ones, to be 
represented in the grammar, facilitating a detailed and explanatory account.
The explanatory power o f constructional accounts comes from the requirement 
that each construction must be motivated; that is, there must be some explanation 
provided for why this particular construction should exist in the language (Goldberg 
2003: 120-1). For the most part, the motivation for a construction comes from within the 
grammar. In constmction grammar, grammatical knowledge is represented as a network 
o f constructions (form-meaning pairs). Specialized linguistic patterns inherit properties 
from more general patterns. The more properties a construction inherits, the more it can 
be said to be motivated by the language system. Constructions that are related to one 
another are shown to inherit properties from the same general pattern, forming a
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“family” o f constructions. A more detailed introduction to construction grammar is 
provided in chapter 2.
The organization o f grammatical knowledge in construction grammar predicts 
that analyses o f //-clefts based upon their relationship to noncopular subject-predicate 
sentences will have less explanatory adequacy than an approach that views //-clefts in 
relation to other specificational copular sentences. Goldberg (1995: 108) says that 
inheritance links are only posited between constructions that are formally related in 
terms o f surface structure: “The intuition is that the existence o f a given form with a 
particular meaning in no way motivates the existence o f a different form with a closely 
related meaning”. Consequently, although noncopular sentences can often be used to 
paraphrase //-clefts, this truth-conditional synonymy is not expressed in the grammatical 
system. As predicted, accounts that view //-clefts in relation to structurally less complex 
sentences leave a number o f questions unresolved: Why should focus be marked using 
this particular structure? Why do //-clefts have so many semantically empty elements? 
Where do the existential and exhaustiveness presuppositions come from?
In this thesis, I view the //-cleft foremost as a member o f the family o f 
specificational copular constructions, //-clefts, w/z-clefts, //z-clefts and noncleft copular 
sentences all inherit properties from a more general, schematic, specificational copular 
construction. But what is a specificational copular construction? And where does 
specificational meaning come from? Unfortunately, the answers to these questions are 
not obvious and a number o f different analyses have been proposed in the literature. In 
order to understand the larger schema, or category, o f copular constructions, I provide 
my own analysis. I argue that in specificational copular constructions, specificational 
meaning results from a special kind o f nominal predication involving definite noun 
phrases. I treat nominal predication set theoretically, as a semantic relation between 
members and sets. I conclude that this analysis has a number o f advantages over 
alternative accounts o f specificational sentences and is more successful at explaining the 
data.
My analysis shows how a number o f the //-cleft’s properties are motivated. Like 
the extraposition accounts o f Jespersen (1927) and Bolinger (1972), I analyse the
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sentence final clause as a restrictive relative, modifying the initial it. In line with the 
proposals o f Hedberg (1990, 2000), Percus (1997) and Han and Hedberg (2008), I argue 
that it and the relative clause together operate like a discontinuous definite description. 
Since definite descriptions contain exhaustiveness and existential presuppositions, this 
analysis explains why these properties are found in /7-clefts. It also reduces the number 
o f semantically “dummy” elements. For example, initial it is shown to perform an 
important quantifying function. However, where my own analysis represents an 
improvement on the literature is in providing an explanation as to why definite 
descriptions are crucial for creating the specificational meaning o f /7-clefts as well as 
other copular constructions. As I explain in chapter 5, the analysis of specificational 
sentences that I advance allows for a straightforward account o f the relationship between 
specificational and predicational/proverbial /7-clefts.
Alternative constructional accounts o f /7-clefts have been proposed by Lambrecht 
(2001) and Davidse (2000). However, neither o f these authors makes use o f  a system of 
inheritance. Consequently, both present highly idiosyncratic analyses. For example, 
Lambrecht (2001) examines /7-clefts in relation to noncopular subject-predicate 
sentences. As a result, his analysis suffers from the same lack o f explanatory adequacy 
as other expletive accounts. Davidse (2000), on the other hand, analyses the /7-cleflt as a 
highly complex structure involving two clauses (one o f which is unique to cleft 
constructions) which enter into different semantic relationships with the postcopular 
element. Again, this structure is not shown to be motivated by the language system.
The constructional approach provided in this thesis is therefore superior to the 
accounts o f Lambrecht (2001) and Davidse (2000) since it makes full use o f the tools 
exploited in construction grammar for making generalizations. By examining /7-cleflts in 
relation to the taxonomy o f specificational sentences and exploiting an appropriate 
inheritance hierarchy, I maximize the motivation for the /7-cleft construction. Only after 
examining /7-clefts in relation to the rest o f the grammar are the exceptional or truly 
construction-specific characteristics isolated. As Goldberg (2003: 118) observes, “a 
given construction often shares a great deal with other constructions that exist in a 
language; only certain aspects o f its form and function are unaccounted for by other
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constructions”. As a result, the constructional approach advocated in this thesis has 
much greater explanatory power.
1.4 The grammaticalization of the cleft construction
We have seen then that construction grammar tolerates (but nevertheless seeks to limit) 
idiosyncrasies in the language system. However, ideally, even exceptional properties 
should be provided with an explanation o f some sort. According to Goldberg (2003:
121), in such cases, motivation can be provided by factors external to the grammar. In 
this section, I ask whether historical evidence can provide motivation for, and therefore 
explain, the construction-specific properties o f the zY-cleft.
From my synchronic analysis o f the //-cleft as a type o f specificational copular 
construction, certain structural aspects remain a puzzle, such as the modification o f it by 
a restrictive relative clause and the extraposition o f the relative clause. By exploring the 
history o f the English language, I show that although these properties are no longer 
motivated by the language system, they are likely to have been inherited from formally 
related constructions existing at earlier periods o f the language. In this way, the //-cleft 
shows how the retention or ‘entrenchment’ o f once-motivated form-function pairings 
can lead to construction-specific properties which are no longer productive in other areas 
o f the grammar. For most types of //-cleft then, the seemingly idiosyncratic structure can 
be shown to be motivated by the language system at least at the point o f origin.
However, there are subtypes o f //-cleft which exhibit properties that cannot be attributed 
to inheritance at any period o f the language.
In §1 .1 ,1 introduced two types o f //-cleft which are sometimes treated as separate 
constructions from the //-cleft prototype: those with non-nominal foci and those with 
new information in the sentence-final clause. The particular range o f //-cleft foci is not 
shared by other specificational copular constructions. Likewise, other kinds of 
specificational sentence cannot express totally new, but factually presupposed 
information. For example, the th-cleft in (24) seems strange when occurring in 
discourse-initial position and suggests that we should already know that someone once 
said 'laws are silent at times o f  w a r\
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(23) (Start o f lecture)
It was Cicero who once said, ‘Laws are silent at times o f w ar’.
(24) (Start o f lecture)
#The one who once said ‘Laws are silent at times o f w ar’ was Cicero.
As a result, the range of non-nominal foci and the ability to express hearer-new 
information are properties which are not inherited from the wider specificational 
construction. This begs the question, where did these more idiosyncratic types o f //-cleft 
come from? Do they have a separate source from //-clefts with nominal foci and given 
information in the relative clause? Are they in fact separate constructions from the //- 
cleft proper?
In a previous historical study, Ball (1991, 1994a) found that //-clefts with non- 
nominal foci and examples with new information in the relative clause originated at a 
later date than NP-focus //-clefts expressing discourse-old information. Although Ball’s 
study is exclusively diachronic, she emphasizes present-day structural and functional 
differences between //-clefts with NP and non-NP foci and between //-clefts with given 
and new information in the relative clause. As a result, Ball argues that these different 
types o f //-cleft derive from separate sources. She suggests that over time the existing //- 
cleft tokens merged with an increasing number o f different configurations to form a 
structurally distinct ‘non-NP focus //-cleft’ and the ‘informative-presupposition (IP) //- 
cleft’.
In contrast, my own synchronic analysis o f //-clefts can incorporate instances 
with different focal categories and with either given or new information in the relative 
clause; these do not require a distinct structure and their functions are shown to be 
related. Using data from the Penn Parsed Corpora o f Historical English, I show that the 
less-prototypical //-cleft subtypes have emerged gradually via extension from the 
existing //-cleft prototype. These emerging subtypes involve mismatch phenomena: that 
is, they contain construction-specific mappings o f form and meaning. The development 
of the //-cleft therefore involves a change from a configuration which is fully motivated 
by inheritance from more general patterns o f correspondence, to one that encodes
21
meaning which is no longer necessarily predictable from the meanings associated with 
its component parts. As Langacker (1991: 295) comments, such “extensions from the 
prototype” occur because o f the “pressure o f adapting a limited inventory of 
conventional units [or constructions] to the unending, ever-varying parade o f situations 
requiring linguistic expression”.
In addition to showing how general principles o f language change can provide 
motivation for the more idiosyncratic properties o f the zY-cleft construction, I also 
discuss whether the construction grammar framework is useful for theories o f language 
change. I examine the development o f the zY-cleft in relation to grammaticalization 
theory. Although grammaticalization is usually said to apply to individual lexical items 
which become more grammatical over time, I investigate whether changes to more 
complex constructions, such as the zY-cleft, exhibit properties consistent with 
grammaticalization, such as gradualness and unidirectionality. I ask whether 
grammaticalization theory should be extended to larger constructions and whether the 
construction grammar model o f grammatical knowledge could change 
grammaticalization theory for the better.
1.5 Methodology
This thesis examines the English h-cleft from both a synchronic and a diachronic 
perspective. My analysis begins by integrating //‘-clefts into an original account of 
specificational copular constructions. In these chapters, I rely largely on examples that 
are either invented or taken from the literature. I have chosen to exemplify my 
discussion in this way for several reasons. First, I am engaging with a literature where 
the use o f invented examples is common practice. Also, since the issues surrounding the 
data are often complex, I have made an effort to keep examples brief and to choose 
examples that highlight the relevant features without requiring unnecessary explication. 
In this part of the thesis, the focus o f my discussion is on the prototypical zY-cleft 
subtype. As a result, I am not interested here in detailing qualitative differences between 
individual instances. Instead, the data are intended purely to exemplify the discussion. 
My choices in response to these issues mean that although this thesis adopts a usage-
22
based construction grammar framework, there is perhaps less actually occurring data 
than in similar studies o f this type.
My analysis concludes with an examination o f the historical development o f the 
z7-cleft construction, in which I make use o f data from the Penn Parsed Corpora o f 
Historical English. My investigation focuses on the Late Middle and Early Modem 
periods o f English. The Late Middle English data is taken from the Penn-Helsinki 
Parsed Corpus o f Middle English second edition (PPCME2). From this corpus, I 
extracted a subcorpus o f  894341 words containing texts composed between 1300 and 
1500 with which to conduct my search. The Early Modem data comprises all 1794010 
words o f the Penn-Helsinki Parsed Corpus o f Early Modem English (PPCEME) which 
contains texts written between 1500 and 1710. Both o f these corpora were searched 
using the specially designed CorpusSearch2 program. Since these corpora are from the 
same series, they are comparable in terms o f syntactic annotation, size o f the corpus, size 
o f text samples and range o f genres. In addition to my historical data, I also discuss 
some o f the more interesting present-day English examples found in the British 
component o f the International Corpus o f English (ICE-GB).
I use these data both to elucidate my discussion and to provide qualitative and 
quantitative evidence o f diachronic change. However, since /7-clefts are not a high 
frequency construction and the historical corpus data is limited, it is to be understood 
that quantitative data is not always reliable. As a result, I ensure that my analyses are 
supported by qualitative data and by well-attested theories o f language change.
I undertake a corpus-based rather than a corpus-driven study; my synchronic 
analysis informs my diachronic investigation and, in turn, the diachronic evidence is 
used to support my synchronic account o f /7-clefts.4 One o f my reasons for approaching 
corpus study in this way is that /7-clefts are notoriously difficult to identify and separate 
from superficially similar but functionally distinct examples, such as extraposed 
sentences (see Haugland 1993). As a result, it is important to understand these often 
subtle differences before extracting the relevant data. Furthermore, since there are so
4 See Tognini-Bonelli (2001) for an outline of the differences between these two approaches to corpus 
study. While I advocate a corpus-based approach in this thesis, Tognini-Bonelli discusses the merits o f a 
corpus-driven approach.
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many different analyses o f /¿-clefts, linguists may differ over which examples count as 
clefts. Regardless o f whether a linguist has fully developed, or settled on, an analysis, 
they inevitably bring such assumptions with them when they come to sorting through the 
data. I believe that it is impossible to be completely theory neutral and as a result I am of 
the opinion that it is better to know what your criteria are outright and from the very 
beginning, so that at least the approach is consistent. This also means that I can address 
the issue o f how well my theory accounts for the data.
1.6 An outline of the structure of the thesis
In the present chapter, I have sketched a brief overview of the issues that this 
thesis addresses, provided some introductory background material and summarized the 
main arguments that I propose. In the following chapter, I lay out the theoretical model 
o f construction grammar, the mechanisms which I make use o f in my account and the 
theoretical assumptions on which the rest o f the thesis is based.
My analysis begins in chapter 3 with a justification o f the position that /7-clefts 
should be examined in relation to other specificational constructions. After finding 
various faults with the existing accounts o f specificational copular sentences, I provide 
an original, constructional analysis. My argument is situated as a response to the 
‘inverse’ accounts formulated within the minimalist tradition. While I agree that 
specificational sentences involve mismatch, whereby the syntactic subject functions as 
the semantic predicate, I do not assume that specificational meaning is the product of 
syntactic movement. Instead, taking a set-theoretic perspective, I claim that 
specificational meaning results from a special type o f nominal predication relationship 
involving definite noun phrases.
In chapter 4 , 1 integrate /7-clefts into my analysis o f specificational copular 
constructions. I explain that motivation for the /7-cleft is maximized if  we adopt a (non- 
derivational) extraposition-ffom-NP analysis o f /7-clefts in which the initial it and the 
sentence-final clause operate together like a discontinuous definite description. From 
this perspective, many o f the seemingly idiosyncratic properties o f the /7-cleft are shown 
to be inherited from the more schematic and general specificational copular
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construction. Together, chapters 3 and 4 represent the most fundamental components of 
this thesis, since many of the arguments presented in the remaining chapters arise out of 
the analyses o f specificational copular sentences and zY-clefts proposed here.
In chapter 5 , 1 examine whether my ¿/-cleft analysis can be extended to 
accommodate all o f the different types o f //-cleft outlined in §1.1, including 
predicational and proverbial clefts, //-clefts with non-nominal foci and informative- 
presupposition (IP) //-clefts. I show that from my analysis o f  specificational sentences as 
involving a special type o f nominal predication, the relationship between specificational 
and predicate nominal sentences, and consequently the relationship between 
specificational and predicational (including proverbial) //-clefts, becomes 
straightforward. This represents an important advantage to my analysis. For non-NP 17- 
clefts and IP //-clefts, on the other hand, I show that while the analysis o f //-clefts 
outlined in chapter 4 can accommodate these subtypes into a unified analysis, they 
contain construction-specific properties which are not inherited from more basic 
constructions. I suggest that a historical investigation into the //-cleft construction may 
help us to understand where these idiosyncratic properties came from. I come back to 
this issue in chapter 7.
My synchronic analysis ends with a discussion about the constructional 
framework I adopt. In chapter 6 , 1 outline what is constructional about my account o f //- 
clefts and show how it compares favourably to the other so-called constructional 
analyses proposed in the literature. Finally, after explaining what the advantages are to 
examining the //-cleft within the framework o f construction grammar, I provide a 
constructional taxonomy o f cleft and specificational sentences based upon the 
inheritance relations posited so far.
Chapters 7 and 8 comprise a historical investigation into the //-cleft construction. 
In chapter 7 , 1 make use o f historical evidence to provide an explanation for the //-cleft’s 
idiosyncratic characteristics. I show that many o f the //-cleft’s construction-specific 
structural properties are remnants o f once regular patterns in the history o f English. I 
conclude that these properties were originally inherited from constructions which no 
longer exist in the present-day language system. Using corpus data, I go on to show how
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zY-clefts with non-nominal foci and IP //-clefts have emerged via extension from the 
existing /7-cleft prototype, according to general principles o f constructional change. My 
analysis o f the origin and subsequent development o f the English //-cleft contrasts with 
Ball’s (1991, 1994a) account. As I explain, there are a number o f problems with Ball’s 
argumentation.
In chapter 8 ,1 show how the diachronic data provides a useful insight into the 
nature of the present-day //-cleft construction and explains the subtle ways in which it 
differs from other types o f specificational copular sentence. As part o f this discussion, I 
ask what the historical development o f the //-cleft tells us about the nature o f 
constmctional change and whether grammaticalization theory is applicable to changes 
involving complex constructions rather than atomic lexical items. I conclude this chapter 
by showing how the historical evidence can be used to both inform and support my 
synchronic analysis o f the present-day //-cleft, resulting in a maximally explanatory 
account. A summary o f the thesis is given in chapter 9 along with my final conclusions.
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2. CONSTRUCTION GRAMMAR AS A MODEL OF LANGUAGE STRUCTURE 
AND LANGUAGE CHANGE
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I introduce the principles and concepts that are specific to a usage-based, 
constructional theory o f grammar. The purpose o f this chapter is to outline some o f the 
basic claims that underlie this thesis and to explain the machinery that I make use o f in 
my analysis o f cleft sentences. In this section, I provide some historical background into 
why the construction grammar framework was developed and what it was hoped to 
achieve. I also explain the principles behind the usage-based model o f change that 1 
adopt. In addition, I distinguish between the different variants o f construction grammar 
and explain which set o f theoretical assumptions I adopt in this thesis and why.
Construction grammar was developed as an alternative to the componential 
model o f grammatical knowledge proposed by theories o f generative grammar (see Croft 
and Cruse 2004: 225). In a componential model, each type of linguistic knowledge 
(syntax, semantics and so on) makes up a separate component. Aspects o f meaning and 
form are mapped on to one another by general linking rules. The only idiosyncratic and 
item-specific mappings between these components are found in lexical items. Croft and 
Cruse (2004: 227) illustrate this model with the diagram given here as Figure 2.1. Note 
that the lexicon is represented as the only vertical component, combining information 
from the other horizontal components. Constructions do not have theoretical status in 
this model; they are purely epiphenomenal products o f componential meaning and 
general mles o f the grammar (see Chomsky 1995: 170).
The way that the grammar is organized in the componential model suits the 
generative theory that syntax can be studied independently from semantics and other 
aspects o f meaning, such as pragmatics and discourse function. As a consequence o f this 
assumption, “functional differences between formal patterns [are] largely ignored” 
(Goldberg 2006: 4). Within generative grammar, constructions are simply syntactic 
configurations; the fact that constructions may encode noncomponential meaning is 
either not recognized or is deemed to be outside o f the scope of the “core” phenomena
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that are regarded as the focus o f linguistic study. This notion o f “core” language arises 
from the generative assumption that such phenomena result from innately programmed 
linguistic knowledge, forming part o f Universal Grammar. Other linguistic phenomena, 
such as discourse-functional properties and (oftentimes) pragmatic properties, are 
learned inductively from experience. As such they are relegated to the “periphery” o f 
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Figure 2.1 The organization of grammatical knowledge in a componential model (Croft and 
Cruse 2004: 227)
For construction grammarians, on the other hand, all aspects o f language are the 
proper objects o f linguistic study. In this framework, constructions are given a 
theoretical status as symbolic form-meaning pairings, much like lexical items. Unlike in 
componential models, which map separate components o f linguistic knowledge onto one 
another by general linking rules, in construction grammar, the form-function mapping is 
represented as internal to the construction. From this, it follows that that syntax cannot 
be studied in isolation and all aspects o f meaning, including semantics, pragmatics and 
discourse-function are required to give a full account o f grammatical knowledge. This 
model o f language structure therefore anticipates, rather than ignores, construction- 
specific information, which is not predictable from more general patterns o f 
correspondence. For construction grammarians then, the aim is to provide full and 
explanatory accounts o f these specialized linguistic patterns. Croft and Cruse (2004:
28
256) represent the model o f grammatical knowledge in construction grammar with the 










Figure 2.2 The organization of grammatical knowledge in construction grammar (Croft and 
Cruse 2004: 256)
Most variants o f construction grammar are usage-based frameworks. The usage- 
based model claims that all grammatical knowledge, not just the periphery o f language, 
is learned inductively from the input. In this model, it is not assumed that language users 
are innately programmed with linguistic knowledge; instead the assumption is that 
language learning involves general cognitive processes. From this it follows that all of 
the grammar, including both specialized linguistic patterns and broad generalizations, 
should be given a uniform representation. As a result, in usage-based constructional 
theories, all o f the grammar is represented as constructions (form-meaning pairs). 
Linguistic patterns are represented as constructions in the language system if either some 
aspect of their structure or use is unpredictable or their instances are sufficiently frequent 
that the speaker is likely to induce an abstract mental schema. Goldberg (2006: 18) says 
that “the network o f constructions captures our grammatical knowledge o f language in 
toto, i.e. it’s constructions all the way down” (italics and emphasis original).
An important advantage to a usage-based theory o f construction grammar is that 
it is able to intersect with and work alongside theories o f language change. In this thesis, 
I examine the extent to which a construction grammar model o f grammatical knowledge
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can be usefully integrated into grammaticalization theory. Here, I briefly outline some of 
the principles behind a usage-based model o f change.
In theories o f grammar which assume that core language is hardwired in the 
brain, language change is something that happens across generations, during acquisition. 
After the speaker has acquired their language, their core grammar is fixed and is not 
susceptible to change. However, what may change is their linguistic output. 
Consequently, on the basis o f the input they receive, subsequent generations o f speakers 
may acquire different grammars, resulting in language change. In such a model, 
language change is therefore abrupt (see Lightfoot 1979). A usage-based model, on the 
other hand, assumes that a speaker’s grammar can change throughout their lifetime. In 
this model, language learning and language change involves inductively generalizing 
over instances to form schemas which are represented in the language system. Since this 
involves general cognitive processes, such as categorization, there is no need to assume 
that change only occurs in the stages o f acquisition. In such a model, changes to the 
grammar are not catastrophic, but occur in incremental stages, giving the impression of 
gradualness. In this thesis, I assume a usage-based model o f language change.
However, not all versions o f construction grammar are usage-based. Goldberg 
(2006) identifies four main theories o f construction grammar: Unification Construction 
Grammar (Fillmore, Kay and O ’Connor 1988; Fillmore et al. forthcoming, Kay and 
Fillmore 1999), Radical Construction Grammar (Croft 2001), Cognitive Construction 
Grammar (Lakoff 1987; Goldberg 1995, 2006) and Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 
1987, 1991). O f these theories, Unification Construction Grammar has developed 
somewhat separately; unlike the others, it is not a usage-based theory. Throughout this 
chapter, I indicate where Unification Construction Grammar differs from the other 
constructional theories. I do not follow the theoretical assumptions o f Unification 
Construction Grammar in this thesis. Instead, my approach is most consistent with the 
theories presented by Goldberg (2006) and Croft (2001). Although Croft’s focus is on 
creating a theory suitable for cross-linguistic typological study, both authors agree on the 
same set o f fundamental principles (Goldberg 2006: 220-226).
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In the following sections, I introduce the relevant concepts and machinery of 
construction grammar that I make reference to throughout the thesis. These include: the 
inheritance hierarchy as the organization o f grammar, the construction as a symbolic 
form-meaning pair, mismatch and coercion, noncompositionality and construction- 
specificity. For each concept, I explain how they are relevant to a usage-based theory o f 
language change and show how they interface with the basic claims of 
grammaticalization theory.
2.2 Classification and inheritance as a formal system and as a model of 
change
In construction grammar, it is assumed that constructions form a structured inventory 
which makes up the speaker’s knowledge o f the language. This inventory is represented 
as a taxonomic network o f constructions with each construction constituting a separate 
node (Croft and Cruise 2004: 262). The network is hierarchical, showing that some 
constructions are more basic or general than others. Lower-level constructions inherit 
attributes from higher-level constructions.
Individual construction grammars differ as to which model o f inheritance they 
assume. The complete mode o f inheritance is typically adopted in unification-based 
grammars, such as Kay and Fillmore (1999). In this model, a construction inherits all o f 
the information that is specific to a dominating construction. This relation allows 
information to be represented only once in an inheritance hierarchy. Inherited 
information is stored only in the dominating construction, at the highest level possible. 
Complete inheritance therefore licenses a non-redundant system of linguistic knowledge. 
This means that for a speaker to classify an utterance as an instance o f a lower-level 
construction, they must search all the way up the inheritance tree in order to determine 
what the specifications o f this construction are and whether the utterance matches them.
From the complete inheritance model, it follows that although lower-level 
constructions may contain information that is not present in the more general, dominant 
construction, they may not contain information that conflicts with information presented 
at a higher level. To do so would result in ill-formedness. As a result, categories formed
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on the basis o f these inheritance hierarchies are classical. That is, a construction is 
defined as a member o f a larger constructional category if and only if it inherits all o f  the 
grammatical structure o f the superordinate construction.
Other constructional theories adopt default inheritance; these include Cognitive 
Construction Grammar (Goldberg 1995, 2006; Lakoff 1987), Radical Construction 
Grammar (Croft 2001), Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987, 1991) and also Word 
Grammar (Hudson 1990, 2007).' A crucial property of the default inheritance model is 
that conflict between the information specified in inheriting constructions and 
information specified in dominating constructions is permitted. This means that all o f  the 
attributes o f a dominating higher-level construction will be inherited by the lower-level 
construction unless there is conflict. In this case, the more specific construction “wins 
out” and inheritance is limited to only non-conflicting information.
In default inheritance models, information is often stored redundantly. A 
redundant system represents information not only on the highest possible node, but at all 
levels in the hierarchy. Goldberg (1995: 73-74) argues in favour o f a redundant, or “full 
entry”, model since without it there is no way of resolving conflict that may arise in 
cases o f multiple inheritance. For example, if  a construction inherits information from 
two different dominating constructions, but the information specified for these 
constructions conflicts, how do we know which o f these parent constructions “wins”? In 
a case such as this, we can only know which information is inherited from which parent 
construction if  this is specified redundantly in the daughter construction. A redundant 
system can also be argued for on psychological grounds; although a non-redundant 
system is more economical, it requires maximum on-line processing. Goldberg (1995: 
74) says that “the inheritance mechanism o f our system is not an on-line process, but 
rather a static relation defined by shared inform ation...”
1 Word Grammar shares a great deal with constructional theories o f grammar. For instance, in this theory, 
grammatical knowledge is represented as a network, with inheritance relations connecting the individual 
nodes. Hudson (2007: 153) also recognizes that the syntax o f language is comprised “of a very large 
number o f constructions, each with its own peculiar interactions with other constructions and with lexical 
items”. The main difference between Word Grammar and other constructional theories is that the former 
focuses on the (more or less specific types of) dependency relations between the words which make up 
these constructions (Hudson 2007: 156).
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This thesis makes use o f default inheritance and assumes that information is 
stored redundantly. Unlike alternative constructional accounts o f cleft sentences, I place 
fr-clefts in a constructional hierarchy o f copular sentences. I argue that my analysis o f it- 
clefts is superior, since a large number o f the ft-cleft’s properties can be attributed to 
inheritance from the more basic specificational copular construction. As Goldberg 
(2003: 120) comments, “What imbues a constructional approach with explanatory 
adequacy is a further desideratum that each construction must be motivated’’ (italics 
original). The more properties that are inherited from other constructions in the 
language, the more we can say that the construction is motivated. The explanatory power 
o f motivation is in some way reliant on a redundant system. As Lakoff (1987) notes, the 
more redundancy a construction exhibits, the better it fits into the linguistic system. An 
analysis that maximizes motivation can therefore explain why this construction with 
these particular form-meaning correspondences should be likely to occur in the 
language.
Default inheritance is designed to allow for partial generalizations to be 
recognized. Some constructions or instances o f constructions are “better” (or more 
motivated) members o f the constructional category than .others. As a consequence of 
this, categories defined by the inheritance hierarchies o f this model are non-classical, 
with each category containing a prototypical member (or members) and non-prototypical 
members.
In a usage-based model, the storage and organization o f grammatical knowledge 
is dependent upon, and can change according to, patterns o f activation. Together, non- 
classical categories and usage-based assumptions make a number o f testable hypotheses 
regarding the diachronic development o f constructions. Non-prototypical instances o f a 
constructional category are formed by extension from the prototype, overriding 
inheritance from the overarching construction. As prototypical and non-prototypical 
instances coexist, the speaker forms an inductive generalization (or abstraction) which 
stipulates only those characteristics which are shared by all o f  its members. This is 
consistent with the usage-based generalization that the entrenchment o f a more abstract 
(or more general) schema in the speaker’s inventory is a function o f type frequency; that
33
is the frequency o f different “types” o f instance. Changes to the conceptualization of the 
overarching category may, in turn, have consequences for yet higher-order constructions 
(or categories) in the taxonomy. This type o f constructional change therefore proceeds 
upwards throughout the hierarchy, leading to the creation o f new constructions and the 
reconfiguration o f existing ones. As Goldberg (2006: 62) comments, “ ...w e constantly 
parcel out meaning, form abstractions, and generalize over the instances we hear”.
However, the usage-based model predicts that not all constructional change will 
follow this same pattern. While type frequency results in the entrenchment o f a more 
abstract schema, token frequency (that is, the number o f times a given instance is 
activated) results in the entrenchment o f the instance. Bybee (1985: 132-134) argues that 
the repeated use o f an instance which is stored as a conventional unit in the speaker’s 
grammar will only activate (and strengthen) the entrenched instance; it will not serve to 
reinforce the superordinate schema. Consequently, the entrenchment (or fossilization) of 
individual instances is often found occurring alongside a concomitant loss (or 
weakening) o f the overarching schema, which is no longer type productive.
A usage-based, constructional approach therefore predicts that there are two 
different types o f constructional change: one which is brought about by type frequency 
and one which is dependent upon token frequency. Although these changes have 
consequences for constructions at different levels in the hierarchical network, they 
nevertheless involve the same process o f conventionalization (or the entrenchment of 
schemas). For historical linguists who accept a constructional model o f language 
structure, these two different types o f constructional change constitute a reimagining of 
the well-attested item-based changes o f grammaticalization and lexicalization, 
respectively (see especially Himmelmann 2004 and Trousdale 2008a). As I explain in 
chapters 7 and 8 o f this thesis, the diachronic development o f the /7-cleft construction 
(including changes to its dominating constructions) involves both ‘schematization’ and 
‘fossilization’; that is, both grammatical and lexical ‘constructionalization’.
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2.3 Signs as the basis of grammar
In componential syntactic theories, in which separate components o f the grammar 
interrelate via linking rules, constructions are epiphenomenal. However, in construction 
grammar, the syntactic elements and semantic components that are particular to each 
construction are related by symbolic links that are internal to the construction. In this 
way, each complex construction contains units o f form-meaning pairs. However, as well 
as linking individual elements to their conventional meaning, there is an additional 
symbolic link that relates the entirety o f the construction’s form to the construction’s 
conventional meaning. As a result, this model can represent aspects o f conventional 
meaning that are associated with the construction, but cannot be attributed to any o f its 
individual formal elements. Consequently, even a complex construction is itself a 
symbolic whole, or to use Saussure’s term, a linguistic sign. Croft and Cruse (2004: 258) 
represent the symbolic structure o f a construction using the illustration given here as 
Figure 2.3. As shown in this diagram, the construction’s formal characteristics are made 
up o f syntactic, morphological and phonological properties, while its conventional 












Figure 2.3 The symbolic structure of a construction (Croft and Cruse 2004: 258)
In unification-based construction grammars, a linguistic pattern is only 
considered a construction if  some aspect o f its form or function is not predictable either
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from its component parts or from other constructions that exist in the language. Such 
patterns must be listed as constructions in order to provide a comprehensive account o f 
their properties. However, in usage-based construction grammars, predictable or regular 
patterns o f the language can also be recognized as constructions; as long as they occur 
with enough frequency, they may be stored as symbolic units (Goldberg 2006: 05). In a 
usage-based model then, constructions are simply conventionalized chunks o f linguistic 
knowledge.
As symbolic units, constructions are very much like lexical items. The only 
difference is that while constructions are complex, words are simple and may even be 
atomic (that is, morphologically simple). In construction grammar then, the lexicon and 
the inventory o f grammatical constructions are not separate components and instead 
exist along a ‘syntax-lexicon’ continuum ranging from the most schematic (or general) 
and complex constructions to fully substantive and simple items. Construction grammar 
therefore allows a uniform representation o f all grammatical knowledge, including 
words and morphemes, as comprising an inventory of signs.
According to some authors, the central role o f the sign in construction grammar 
makes it ideally suited for providing a theory from which to study grammaticalization 
changes. For example, Diewald (2006) argues that the notion o f a gradient continuum 
between the lexicon and the syntax accords with the gradual nature of 
grammaticalization, in which lexical items develop more grammatical functions through 
a series o f small intermediate stages. Langacker (1990: 16) observes that a 
grammaticalizing element “moves along this continuum rather than jumping from one 
discrete component to another”.
However, if  we accept a constructional model o f language structure, then our 
definition of grammaticalization must change. While grammaticalization theory 
traditionally focuses on changes to atomic lexical items, the uniform representation of 
both lexical elements and complex constructions as signs suggests that changes which 
apply to substantive, simple constructions should also affect more schematic and 
complex constructions. In other words, if  lexical items can grammaticalize, then larger,
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less substantive constructions should also be subject to grammaticalization (Trousdale 
2008b: 33-34).
2.4 Mismatch and coercion
The construction grammar model of grammatical knowledge as comprising a structured 
inventory o f symbolic units encourages the linguist to think about form and meaning at 
the same time. This, in turn, allows the construction grammarian to identify and examine 
mismatch phenomena. Francis and Michaelis (2003: 2) use the term ‘mismatch’ to 
describe mappings between form and meaning which do not conform “to more general 
patterns o f correspondence in the language” . They identify two different kinds of 
mismatch phenomena. ‘Complexity mismatch’ occurs when there is not a one-to-one 
relationship between formal elements and semantic components. For example, 
extraposition constructions, such as (1) below, involve an expletive it which is “present 
in syntax but semantically unspecified” (Francis and Michaelis 2003: 4).
(1) It is a miracle that he survived
‘Content mismatch’, on the other hand, involves an incongruous mapping between form 
and function. For example, Francis and Michaelis provide the example o f predicate 
nominals. Although noun phrases prototypically function as referential argument 
expressions, in sentences like (2) they function as predicates. This construction therefore 
involves category mismatch, whereby “the typical formal properties o f one lexical 
category.. .are associated with the typical semantic properties o f another category” 
(Francis and Michaelis 2003: 5).
(2) John is a doctor
In derivational theories, mismatch is accounted for by assuming that there is an 
underlying level in which the structure behaves in the expected ways. The mismatch 
configuration is derived from default patterns o f correspondence using transformations
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or movement operations. Such an approach can account for the complexity mismatch in 
extraposed sentences, for example. On this analysis, the sentence in (1) derives from the 
underlying non-extraposed sentence in (3).
(3) That he survived is a miracle
However, cases o f category mismatch (such as predicate nominals) are problematic for 
these syntax-based theories, which assume that semantic distinctions are represented by 
syntactic categories and constituent structure. As a result, some authors, including 
Radford (1997), have suggested that predicate nominals represent a separate phrase 
structure category from noun phrases serving as arguments, making use o f the 
terminological distinction between noun phrase (NP) and determiner phrase (DP).
In contrast, for construction grammars which allow default inheritance, mismatch 
can be accommodated neatly, without needing to invoke any additional mechanisms. 
Since mapping between form and meaning is internal to the construction in this model, 
mismatch constructions are simply presented as containing information that overrides 
inheritance from more general patterns. As Francis and Michaelis (2003: 24) comment, 
mismatch effects therefore “provide evidence for symbolic constructions and for 
inheritance hierarchies”. While derivational theories have limits on length o f movement 
and possible landing sites, construction grammar constrains degrees o f mismatch with 
the condition that every construction must be motivated, inheriting a maximum number 
o f properties from the language system (see §2.2).
Mismatch often occurs as the result o f language change, particularly 
grammaticalization. For example, Traugott (2007) discusses a range of examples, such 
as a lot o f  and a bit of, which underwent a development from partitive to degree 
modifier. As partitives, these constructions had meanings similar to a part o f  or a share 
o f  Since a part o f something suggests a quantity, these partitives were associated with 
quantifiers via pragmatic implicature. For example, a bit o f  derives from a bite out o f  
and consequently implies a small piece or quantity. This enabled a semantic reanalysis 
from partitive to degree modifier in which the head develops a scalar meaning, resulting
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in constructional polysemy and extension to nominal contexts in which a partitive 
meaning is unavailable, such as a lot o f  folks.
Semantic reanalysis created a partial mismatch between form and meaning; at 
this point, these constructions have the syntactic attributes o f partitives, but the 
semantics o f quantifiers. Over time, these constructions co-occurred with fewer types o f 
determiner (*the lot of) and acquired a less compositional structure, as shown by the loss 
o f integrity in sorta and alotta. As a result, these binominal strings were realigned with 
the degree-modifier category, resulting in syntactic reanalysis (or ‘head shift’) from 
[NP1 [of NP2]] to [[NP1 of] NP2], The constructions then developed adverbial functions 
and extended distributions, modifying adjectives as in a lot wiser and sort o f  cold. Such 
developments brought about subsequent changes for the overarching degree modifier 
construction, which became a more schematic and productive category.
In this example o f grammaticalization (from partitives to degree modifiers), 
mismatch is the byproduct o f a development in which certain constructions become 
integrated into a different category or family o f constructions. Only once they have 
become full members o f this category, is mismatch, to a large degree, resolved (see 
Francis and Yuasa 2008). However, other times, mismatch is not associated with 
wholesale category change; in such cases, mismatch may become a conventionalized 
feature o f the language system.
For example, complex constructions may be extended to accommodate items 
with which they are not prototypically associated. Michaelis (2003: 263) uses the terms 
‘coercion’ and ‘coercion effect’ “for the enriched interpretations which result from this 
procedure”. In construction grammar, coercion is accounted for by a combination o f 
default inheritance and the symbolic nature o f the construction. If the construction’s 
conventional meaning conflicts with the meaning typically associated with a 
superimposed lexical item, then the constructional requirements “win out” and the 
lexical item conforms to them. Michaelis (2003: 268) refers to this as the ‘Override 
Principle’.
Alternatively, in modular theories o f grammar, which separate syntactic and 
semantic levels o f representation, coercion effects are brought about by placing specific
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coercion operators in semantic structure (see Jackendoff 1997 and De Swart 1998).
These operators are triggered by the need for functors to receive suitable arguments. 
However, as Michaelis (2003: 263-264) comments, while this method can account for 
mismatches such as a beer, in which the indefinite article requires an operator to derive 
a count noun from a mass noun, it cannot account for template-based coercion. In these 
cases, the syntactic head cannot be interpreted as triggering coercion. Instead, the 
construction as a whole alters what the word designates.
An example o f template-based coercion is provided by Goldberg (1995: 158), 
who identifies cases o f mismatch in examples o f the English caused-motion construction 
between the semantics o f the verb and the semantics designated by the construction. She 
notes that in examples like Joe kicked the dog into the bathroom, motion is coded by the 
verb and the preposition into. However, in examples such as Sam squeezed the rubber 
ball inside the ja r  and Sam urged Bill outside o f  the house “neither the verbs squeeze or 
urge nor the prepositions inside or outside independently code motion” (Goldberg 1995: 
158; italics original). In such cases, the construction coerces the “locative term into a 
directional reading” (Goldberg 1995: 159).
According to Michaelis, construction grammar is ideally suited to representing 
these coercion effects, since, unlike in modular models, special operators do not have to 
be employed. She notes that construction grammar “uses a single combinatory 
mechanism, the construction, to account for both coerced and syntactically transparent 
interpretations” (Michaelis 2003: 266). Furthermore, head-driven and template-based 
coercion are given a unified interpretation in the constructional model. In both cases, the 
construction’s conventional meaning overrides the meanings associated with its 
components when they occur outside of the construction.
This begs the question then, how do we know which items can be successfully 
coerced into the constmction and which will result in ungrammaticality? If the use o f a 
particular item has not yet become conventionalized, then to a large extent its 
acceptability will vary from speaker to speaker. Nevertheless, as Goldberg (1995: 159) 
comments, “In order for coercion to be possible, there needs to be a relationship between 
the inherent meaning o f the lexical items and the coerced interpretation” . For example,
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in the case o f the caused motion construction, above, the relationship between the 
prepositional meaning and the constructional meaning is straightforward; the location 
given by the preposition is interpreted as the “endpoint o f a path to that location” 
(Goldberg 1995: 159).
In this thesis, mismatch and coercion effects are shown to play an important role 
in the it-cleft’s historical development. Over time, new subtypes o f //-cleft have emerged 
(by extension from the prototype) in which more general patterns o f correspondence are 
overridden. The coerced interpretations found in these mismatch sentences results in 
several new discourse functions for the //-cleft. As these new uses are conventionalized, 
the overarching //-cleft construction becomes more schematic and productive.
2.5 Noncompositionality, conventionality and construction-specificity
Noncompositionality is often viewed as the primary argument in favour o f recognizing 
constructions as independent syntactic objects. If  aspects o f a construction’s meaning 
cannot be broken down and attributed to its individual components, it cannot be said that 
constructions are epiphenomenal and they must instead gain theoretical significance. In 
construction grammar, symbolic relations are internal to the construction, linking form 
and meaning units not only at a componential level but also at a constructional level; that 
is, the complete structure is linked with all aspects o f the construction’s conventional 
meaning. The symbolic nature o f the construction therefore allows it to have meaning 
which is not provided by or attributed to its individual components.
However, noncompositionality is often overestimated as a fundamental 
requirement for identifying a linguistic pattern as an independent construction. As Croft 
and Cruse (2004: 253) comment, “the common perception that a particular construction 
must be represented as an independent syntactic unit because it is ‘noncompositional’ is 
technically incorrect”. In their work on idioms, Nunberg et al. (1994) suggest that many 
idiomatic constructions are in fact compositional. Using the example of spill the beans, 
the authors notes that this expression carries the meaning divulge the information. The 
construction’s meaning is compositional in the sense that it can be separated and 
attributed to different constructional units. The syntactic element spill and the semantic
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component divulge form a separate unit, while the noun phrase the beans is symbolically 
linked to the meaning the information. Despite this, Nunberg et al. (1994) argue that 
idiomatically combining expressions must still be identified as constructions, since these 
albeit compositional correspondences between form and meaning are nevertheless 
unique to this construction. As a result, the meaning o f this expression cannot be 
determined from the general rules o f semantic interpretation for these elements as they 
exist in other constructions.
Nunberg et al. (1994) therefore separate the concept o f ‘conventionality’ from 
noncompositionality. For constmctions to be identified as such, it is not necessary that 
their meaning cannot be broken down into components which can be attributed to 
individual formal elements, only that “their meaning or use can’t be predicated, or at 
least entirely predicted, on the basis o f a knowledge o f the independent conventions that 
determine the use o f their constituents when they appear in isolation from one another” 
(Nunberg et al. 1994:492).
Conventionality is therefore just as problematic as noncompositionality for 
componential theories o f grammar. Regular syntactic expressions are both compositional 
and made up o f form-meaning pairs that are general to other constructions. In a 
componential model, once we know the meanings that are typically associated with each 
element, we can correctly identify the meaning o f these expressions. However, for less 
regular patterns, meaning may or may not be compositional, but crucially, the form- 
meaning pairings internal to the construction are specific to it. In a componential model, 
the constructional meaning o f these patterns cannot be predicted from more general rules 
o f the grammar. In a usage-based constructional approach, on the other hand, general as 
well as less regular patterns are captured by the constructional taxonomy, with the 
former existing at higher levels and the latter at lower levels in the inheritance hierarchy.
In this thesis, I claim that the //-cleft is a largely compositional construction. 
However, it is unpredictable to the extent that it contains construction-specific mappings 
between form and meaning. In this way, my analysis differs from the constructional 
account provided by Lambrecht (2001). He argues that the //-cleft requires a 
constructional analysis because o f its noncompositional structure (see §6.2.1). In his
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analysis, the //-cleft involves a complexity mismatch whereby the majority o f syntactic 
elements are semantically empty and pragmatic meaning is constructional rather than 
compositional. Little attention is given as to how the //-cleft relates to other 
superordinate constructions in this account.
The approach taken in this thesis is therefore more in keeping with current 
models o f how constructions work. Although construction-specificity and 
noncompositional structures are permitted, inheritance must also be prioritized. I suggest 
that the //-cleft is a motivated construction, inheriting from a larger specificational 
copular construction, which is in itself a mismatch structure. Furthermore, as I go on to 
explain in chapter 7, many of the //-cleft’s construction-specific properties can be shown 
to have been originally inherited from constructions existing at earlier periods o f the 
language. I liken this to the development o f idioms such as kith and kin. The 
componential meanings for this idiom {friends and family) are now peculiar to this 
construction, but were once productive in the language. Likewise, in the the X-er the Y- 
er construction (such as the more you practice, the easier it will get), the is not a definite 
article, but comes from the Old English instrumental demonstrative f y  (Fillmore, Kay 
and.O’Connor 1988). According to Goldberg (1995: 119), in construction grammar, 
“Exceptions are allowed to exist, but only at a cost to the overall system”. The account 
given in this thesis acknowledges this principle, and, as I argue, is all the better for it.
2.6 A note for the reader
As I explained in §2.1, the construction grammar framework I adopt in this thesis is 
consistent with the theories put forward by Croft (2001), Goldberg (1995, 2006) and 
Lakoff (1987). Like these authors, I use pictorial representations to elucidate my 
analyses. These diagrams have no formal status, serving only an illustrative purpose. 
Although some theories of construction grammar (in particular, Fillmore and Kay’s 
Unification Construction Grammar) employ formal representations in the form of 
attribute-value matrixes (AVMs), I do not make use o f this formalism. My pictorial 
representations hopefully make the analysis clearer, but there is no part o f the analysis 
that cannot be stated in English prose and so there is no need for any given formalism.
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3. TOWARDS A UNIFIED ACCOUNT OF SPECIFICATIONAL SENTENCES
This chapter lays the foundations for the analysis o f //-clefts presented in chapter 4. 
Chapter 4 cannot be read in isolation from this precursory chapter, since together they 
amount to a unified analysis o f specificational copular sentences. Throughout chapters 3 
and 4 , 1 build up an interwoven storyline culminating in three mutually supportive 
claims:
□ First, I argue that //-clefts are a subtype o f specificational sentence and that a 
unified account o f specificational copular constructions can provide a maximally 
explanatory analysis o f the //-cleft.
□ Chapter 3 lays the groundwork for a unified analysis, focusing on the NP be NP 
specificational construction. I argue that specificational meaning results from a 
nominal predication relation which relies on the semantics o f definite noun 
phrases.
□ In chapter 4 , 1 incorporate cleft sentences into this analysis. Applying my 
semantic account o f specificational meaning to the //-cleft construction, it 
follows that //-clefts should also involve nominal predication. This leads me to 
argue for a (non-derivational) extraposition analysis o f //-clefts in which the 
sentence-final clause is understood to be a restrictive relative, modifying the 
constituent it. Together, these items form a ‘discontinuous constituent’ which 
provides the definite-like description that is crucial to the interpretation o f this 
structure as a specificational copular construction. I conclude that this analysis o f 
//-clefts maximizes motivation from the language system (via inheritance from 
the more basic specificational schema) and has a number o f advantages over 
alternative accounts.
Chapter 3 is structured as follows. In §3 .1 ,1 review a selection o f //-cleft 
analyses that are labelled here, and elsewhere in the literature, as ‘expletive’ accounts.
As I noted in §1.2.1, expletive analyses tend to maximize correspondence between 17- 
clefts and noncopular subject-predicate sentences. In this section, I argue that such an 
approach is counterintuitive and leaves a number o f questions regarding the structure
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and function o f this construction unresolved. I conclude that //-clefts should instead be 
examined in relation to other specificational copular constructions. Expletive analyses 
are characterized by their shared assumption that the postcopular element in //-clefts 
functions as the preposed argument o f the proposition expressed in the sentence-final 
clause. As I go on to explain, a unified account o f specificational copular sentences is 
not possible if  we adopt an expletive analysis of //-clefts.
In § 3 .2 ,1 claim that a satisfactory analysis o f specificational sentences has not 
yet been provided. After reviewing both ‘equative’ and ‘inverse’ approaches and 
showing that neither can account for the full range o f data, I argue that a better 
understanding o f specificational meaning can help us to explain the behaviour o f 
specificational copular constructions. However, as I go on to show, previous attempts at 
characterizing the semantic or pragmatic concept o f ‘specification’ are not particularly 
useful for explaining both what is unique to these kinds o f copular sentence and how 
they relate to other types o f copular construction.
I provide my own original analysis of specificational copular constructions in 
§3.3. Working from the observation that definite noun phrases are frequently found in 
specificational sentences o f the type NP be NP, I ask whether there is anything special 
about the semantics o f definite descriptions. This leads me to argue that specificational 
sentences involve a special type o f nominal predication relation. Unlike ‘inverse’ 
accounts, which also argue that specificational copular sentences involve predication, 
my constructional account does not invoke movement. As I explain, the analysis 
proposed in this thesis is able to both accommodate and explain a wider range o f data 
than movement-based analyses.
3.1 Why examine it-clefts in relation to specificational structures?
As I noted in § 1.1, there are four main elements in the syntactic structure o f an //-cleft: 
the initial it, a form of the copular verb, a postcopular XP and a sentence-final clause. 
However, our understanding of how these components function and how they relate to 
one another differs from one analysis to another. As a result, it is common in the cleft 
literature for these structural subparts to be labelled using construction-specific, theory
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neutral terminology. Following Hedberg (1990), I make use o f the terms shown in (1) 
throughout this thesis.
(1) Cleft pronoun + copula + clefted constituent + cleft clause 
It was Howard that left
In § 1 .2 ,1 outlined the two main types o f analysis that have been proposed to account for 
the //-cleft’s structure: the expletive approach and the extraposition approach. In this 
section, I review some o f the most influential expletive accounts in more detail, 
explaining why I choose to reject this type o f analysis.
Expletive accounts maximize correspondence between //-clefts and their 
noncopular paraphrases. Common to all expletive accounts is the assumption that the 
cleft clause is directly predicated o f (or is in some other way related to) the clefted 
constituent. This accounts for the truth-conditional equivalence between //-clefts and 
simple subject-predicate sentences. From this, it follows that the cleft pronoun and (in 
most accounts) the copular verb do not play an important role in the interpretation o f the 
sentence.
(2) It was Howard that left [//-cleft]
(3) Howard left [canonical counterpart]
However, while all expletive accounts adopt the same set o f basic assumptions, the 
details o f these analyses differ. In particular, proponents o f the expletive approach differ 
as to how they perceive the exact nature o f the relationship between the postcopular 
element and the cleft clause and how they think this relationship comes about.
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For Jespersen (1937: 86), //-clefts are syntactically identical to their canonical 
counterparts except for the addition o f a “lesser subject and verb” and a “connective 
word”, as shown in example (4), repeated from §1.2.1.1
(4) [It was] Howard [that] left 
[sv] S [3e] V
This “cleaving” or splitting up of the sentence by the semantically empty elements it, be 
and that serves only to highlight the clefted constituent and bring it into focus; it does 
not otherwise affect the interpretation or structure o f the sentence proper. Consequently, 
the only real difference between the examples given in (2) and (3) above lies in their 
information structure: the elements Howard  and left enter into the same type of 
predication relationship in both sentences.
Within the generative tradition, it is possible to express this predication 
relationship at different levels o f representation. For example, Rochemont (1986) 
suggests that the clefted constituent is situated within the cleft clause at deep structure. 
At surface structure, this element is moved through the complementizer position within 
the cleft clause and out into the syntactic focus position adjoined to the verb be.
(5) [s It [Vp [v- [v was] [Np Howard]i] [s-t; that [s tj left]]]]
In other expletive accounts, the clefted constituent does not undergo movement, 
and is instead base-generated in the postcopular position. For example, Chomsky (1977) 
proposes that the clefted XP is base-generated in a topic position adjoined to the clause 
formed on S'. This constituent is coindexed with the gap, generated by w/z-movement, in 
the sentence-final clause, shown in (6).
(6) [s It [Vp was [S" [t o p  [n p  Howard]]; [S' wh{ that [t; left]]]]]
1 The use o f square brackets in Jespersen’s (1937: 86) formalism indicates that this information is 
“extraposed” relative to the sentence proper. Lower case s and v indicate the “lesser” (i.e. expletive) 
subject and verb and 3° represents a “tertiary connective”.
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For Chomsky then, the //-cleft is a type o f  topicalization construction, involving wh- 
movement. The relationship between the clefted constituent and the cleft clause is 
therefore akin that between topic and comment.
Williams (1980) argues that the clefted constituent and the cleft clause enter into 
a subject-predicate relation which is indicated by indexing. He claims that the clefted 
constituent and the cleft clause are coindexed at surface structure as a result o f  the 
“grammatically governed environment o f predication” in which X (any maximal 
projection) precedes an S' configuration. For Williams (1980: 229), //-clefts are “the 
mirror image o f extraposed sentences”. While in the //-cleft in (7), the clefted element is 
the subject and the clausal constituent is the predicate, in the extraposed sentence in (8), 
the postcopular element is the predicate and the sentence-final clause is the subject. In 
both structures, the constituent it is analysed as an “inert element which does not count 
as subject” (Williams 1980: 221).
(7) It was Howard that left
According to Delahunty (1982, 1984), on the other hand, the predication relation 
between the postcopular element and the cleft clause takes place solely at the level o f 
logical form. He assumes that because //-clefts and their noncopular subject-predicate 
counterparts are truth-conditionally synonymous, they must have equivalent Logical 
Structures. He achieves this by converting the cleft clause into a function. The free 
variable contained within this clause is bound by the lambda operator, creating an 
abstract: the function in (10). The Logical Structure given in (10) states that the value for 
the variable (x) (in x left) is denoted by substituting (h) (Howard) for x. By reducing this
Subject Predicate
(8) It is clear that he left
Predicate Subject
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lambda expression to its “normal form”, we obtain the predication relation o f the simple 
sentence Howard left, given in (11).
(9) It was Howard that left
(10) (h) |M L (x )]]
(11) L(h)
However it achieved, whether underlyingly at deep structure (Rochemont 1986), 
via indexing at surface structure (Chomsky 1977; Williams 1980) or as a result of 
lambda conversion at the level o f logical form (Delahunty 1982, 1984), all o f the above 
analyses have in common the notion that the cleft clause is directly predicated o f or is in 
some way related to the postcopular XP2. In this way, expletive accounts highlight the 
similarities and maximize the correspondences between //'-clefts and their noncopular 
subject-predicate counterparts3. In other words, although these authors may recognize 
that //-clefts are subspecies o f copular sentence, this fact does not form the basis o f their 
analysis.
An exception to this generalization is Heggie (1988) who integrates her expletive 
account o f //-clefts into a general theory of copular sentences. As I explained in §1.1, //- 
clefts have a specificational, or identifying, meaning and can therefore be regarded as a 
subtype o f specificational copular sentence. Adopting an ‘inverse’ analysis of 
specificational structures, Heggie assumes that specificational copular sentences, such as 
(13), are the opposite o f predicational copular sentences, such as (12); while in 
predicational sentences, the predicate occurs to the right o f be, in specificational 
sentences, the precopular phrase is the predicate (see §3.2.2 for further details on the 
inverse account).
2 In É. Kiss’ (1998) expletive analysis, the clefted constituent can be either moved into the postcopular 
position from within the cleft clause or base-generated and linked to the corresponding w/j-pronoun in the 
cleft clause at LF. The purpose o f this dual derivation is that it enables E. Kiss to accommodate the it- 
cleft’s unusual agreement patterns. I discuss this aspect ofÉ. K iss’ (1998) analysis in §4.3.
3 However, as I explained above, for Chomsky (1977), the clefted constituent and the cleft clause enter 
into a topic-comment, rather than subject-predicate, relationship.
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(12) John is evil/a murderer
(13) The murderer is John
[predicational copular sentence] 
[specificational copular sentence]
From this, it follows that specificational copular sentences always involve a predication 
relationship. Since most expletive accounts assume that the cleft clause is directly 
predicated o f the clefted constituent, Heggie argues that //-clefts can therefore be 
integrated into a unified analysis o f copular sentences.
Heggie claims that the copular verb (in all copular sentences) is a raising verb 
which takes a small clause complement. The copula functions as a “verbal operator” 
which creates a predicate out o f any phrasal category via coindexing. This index then 
“spreads” to the subject o f the small clause via predication (following Williams 1980).
In the case o f the //-cleft, the sentence-final clause becomes the predicate and the 
postcopular focal element functions as the subject o f the small clause. As Heggie (1988: 
183) comments, this verbal operator function o f be is so unrestricted that it “allows be to 
create small clause structures which do not exist in any other context”, such as the CP- 
small clause found in clefts.
Despite their differences, these expletive accounts all share the same 
fundamental problems. As I explained above, expletive analyses are so-called because 
they assume that the cleft pronoun is a semantically empty dummy element. However, 
this conclusion is not supported by the cleft data. Aside from the initial it, the cleft 
structure can be introduced by other elements. Crucially, this exchange results in a 
difference in meaning. For example, the initial it in //-clefts can alternate with the 
demonstrative pronouns this and that (Hedberg 2000). These demonstrative clefts are 
used to indicate temporal or spatial deixis within the immediate discourse context, 
shown in (14) and (15).4
(14) This is Sarah w e’re talking about, isn’t it?
4 1 use the term ‘demonstrative cleft’ here, and throughout this thesis, to refer to examples which exhibit 
the same configuration as the //-cleft, but which are introduced by demonstrative pronouns. This term is 
used in a difference sense in Calude (2007, 2008) to refer to a subset o f reverse pseudoclefts with 
demonstrative subjects, such as tha t’s what I  thought.
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(15) That was Tom who just phoned
In addition to //-clefts and demonstrative clefts, we also have there-c\efts. Unlike it- 
clefts, there-defts do not carry an exhaustiveness implicature. For instance, we assume 
from the //-cleft in (16) that Sally is the only person working Saturday. However, the 
there-cleft in (17) is used for the purpose o f listing a potentially incomplete list of 
possible candidates.
(16) It’s Sally that’s working Saturday
(17) Well, there’s Tom and Sally that are available to work Saturday
Cleft constructions containing elements other than it as the cleft pronoun 
therefore result in a difference in meaning and/or discourse function. This data therefore 
suggests that the initial it o f  the //-cleft is not a meaningless dummy element and in fact 
plays an important role in the interpretation of the sentence. For example, the lack o f an 
exhaustiveness implicature in there-defts suggests that the property o f exhaustiveness in 
//-clefts may be attributed to the constituent it. Consequently, by completely ignoring the 
contribution o f it and focusing only on the relationship between the clefted constituent 
and the cleft clause, an expletive analysis o f //-clefts is really an incomplete analysis.
In addition, it troubles me that although the cleft clause looks and behaves like a 
restrictive relative clause, expletive accounts assume that this is really a non-modifying 
sentential predicate. For Delahunty (1982), Rochemont (1986) and Heggie (1988), 
relative pronouns, like who, should only occur in the cleft clause as a result o f analogy 
with relative clauses. Chomsky (1977) and Williams (1980), on the other hand, claim 
that the cleft clause has the same internal structure as restrictive relatives. This is 
supported by the fact that they are subject to the same general constraints on wh- 
movement (see Chomsky 1977).5 Nevertheless, since the cleft clause does not
5 For example, as shown in (i) and (ii), both structures obey the complex-NP constraint (Chomsky 1977).
(i) *It’s this document that I accept the recommendation that I should sign
(ii) *The document that I accept the recommendation that I should sign is over here
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restrictively modify its antecedent, it is said to provide a different function from other 
restrictive relatives.
However, the expletive approach seems to be missing an important 
generalization here. Rather than trying to explain away or limit the similarities between 
the cleft clause and restrictive relatives, we should instead be trying to apply what we 
know about restrictive relative clauses to //-clefts. I f  the cleft clause is structured 
internally like a restrictive relative, then the chances are that it also has a modifying 
function. If  this clause does not modify the postcopular constituent then we have to ask, 
what does it modify?
Furthermore, as syntax-centred approaches, the expletive analyses outlined 
above do not focus on explaining how the //-cleft’s pragmatic properties, such as 
exhaustiveness and existentiality, come about. An exception to this generalization is the 
expletive account provided by E. Kiss (1998). She claims that “exhaustive identification 
is a function o f structural focus” (E. Kiss 1998: 251). Identificational focus (which 
expresses exhaustive identification) has a designated syntactic position, occupying the 
specifier slot o f the focus phrase. In E. Kiss’ analysis, the defied constituent occupies 
this scope position, thereby performing two important roles.
(18) [ip It [p w a s k  [ f p  H o w A R D j [F'tk [c p  [k [c that [iP tj left]]]]]]]]
Syntactically, the clefted constituent functions as an operator which “marks the sentence 
part following it and c-commanded by it as the scope of exhaustive identification” (E. 
Kiss 1998: 253). Semantically, the clefted XP expresses the complete set o f elements of 
which the predicate in the cleft clause holds. In this way, E. Kiss provides a syntactic 
explanation for the fact that //-clefts carry exhaustiveness implicatures.
I review E. Kiss’ (1998) analysis in §4.1 amid a larger discussion which 
compares alternative accounts o f the exhaustiveness in //-clefts. After identifying a 
number o f fundamental problems with E. Kiss’ syntax-based analysis, I argue that 
exhaustiveness in //-clefts is in fact a semantic phenomenon and is the outcome of 
universal quantification. Since in all expletive accounts, the initial it is semantically
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empty, no remaining constituents exist which could be said to perform this quantifying 
function. As a result, the expletive approach does not provide us with a satisfactory 
explanation for how the /7-cleft’s meaning differs from that o f a simple, noncopular, 
subject-predicate sentence.
However, as I see it, the most important problem with the expletive approach is 
that it does not prioritize the relationship between //-clefts and other specificational 
copular sentences. I explained above that Heggie (1988: 184) considers her account to 
be the exception. She suggests that her expletive account can be integrated into a unified 
analysis o f copular sentences. Assuming an ‘inverse’ analysis o f specificational 
sentences, Heggie claims that all copular constructions involve predication. However, 
there is an important problem with Heggie’s story. In the inverse account, specificational 
copular sentences always involve nominal predication. For example, in (13), repeated 
here as (19), the precopular NP the murderer is the predicate and the postcopular 
element John is the argument.
(19) The murderer is John
Since /7-clefts are a subtype o f specificational copular sentence, we would assume that 
these too involve nominal predication. In Heggie’s expletive analysis, on the other hand, 
cleft sentences contain a CP-small clause. Predication o f this sort is not shared by other 
specificational copular constructions and this property o f the /7-cleft is therefore an 
unexplained exception to a generalization.
Despite Heggie’s (1988) attempt, expletive analyses do not allow for a truly 
unified account o f specificational copular sentences. Simply stating that all kinds of 
specificational copular sentence involve one type of predication or another is not 
sufficient, since this property is shared by numerous other non-specificational and 
noncopular sentence types. In order to provide a unified analysis o f specificational 
sentences we need much more than this. Throughout the rest o f this chapter, and in the 
next, I build up my own unified analysis o f specificational copular sentences (including 
/7-clefts). M y starting point is to create a more accurate understanding o f what
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specificational meaning in copular constructions actually is. This allows me to be more 
precise about the basic components that every specificational copular construction must 
contain and how this family o f constructions differs from noncopular as well as non- 
specificational sentence types. In chapter 4 , 1 show that //-clefts are best treated as a 
subtype o f specificational sentence and that this approach explains a number of 
otherwise obscure facts about the construction. The upshot is a (non-derivational) 
extraposition account o f //-clefts. As I go on to explain, this analysis does not suffer 
from the same shortcomings as the expletive accounts outlined above.
3.2 What is specificational meaning?
In §3 .3 ,1 present my own, largely semantic, account o f NP be NP  specificational 
copular sentences. As a precursor to this, in this section, I outline some o f the different 
kinds o f analysis that have been proposed in the literature. I begin by presenting two 
opposing analyses o f specificational structures: the ‘equative’ analysis and the ‘inverse’ 
analysis. While an equative analysis assumes that two referring expressions are equated 
in a specificational sentence, proponents o f the inverse analysis instead suggest that 
these sentences involve a predication relationship. I then go on to discuss two less 
formal accounts o f specificational meaning proposed by Higgins (1979) and Declerck 
(1988). From this, I conclude that the concept o f specificational meaning is not well 
understood and that the semantic contribution o f the components o f specificational 
sentences has yet to be given an adequate description.
As I noted in chapter 1, specificational copular sentences include noncleft 
examples as well as pseudoclefts (including w/i-clefts and //z-clefts) and //-clefts. These 
constructions all have a similar ‘identifying’ function. For instance, all o f the examples 
below identify John as the murderer.
(20) The murderer is John
(21) The one that murdered Sally was John
(22) It was John that murdered Sally
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Throughout the literature, it is agreed that specificational copular sentences have a 
different meaning from predicational copular sentences. For example, in (23), the 
predicative noun phrase a murderer ‘describes’ the referent John, or ‘ascribes’ a 
property to John.
(23) John is a murderer
However, what is not agreed upon is how specificational (or identifying) meaning comes 
about. To answer this question, we need to know what the semantic contribution is o f the 
individual components of a specificational sentence.
3.2.1 The equative analysis
For some authors, specificational copular sentences are treated in the same way as 
equatives. Equative sentences (or identity statements) contain two phrasal constituents o f 
the same semantic type which are involved in a relationship o f identity. For example, in
(24), both Cicero and Tully are referring expressions; the proposition states that the 
person we know as Cicero and the person we know as Tully are actually one and the 
same individual. Authors differ as to how this relationship o f identity comes about. For 
example, while some suggest that equative sentences involve a special “equative” or 
“identifying be”, others argue that the copular verb is always semantically inert and that 
the identity relationship instead originates from a special “equative small clause” 
structure (see Heycock and Kroch 1999). Either way, by extending the equative analysis 
to specificational sentences, both the murderer and John in (25) are treated as referring 
expressions.
(24) Cicero is Tully
(25) The murderer is John
The equative analysis o f specificational copular sentences has intuitive appeal 
since an identity relationship would explain why specificational sentences have an
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identifying meaning. In addition, both equatives and specificational sentences are 
reversible. For example, (24) and (25) above have the same meaning as (26) and (27), 
respectively. In (26), the individuals Tully and Cicero are identified as one and the same 
person and in (27), the focal element John is identified as the murderer. For proponents 
o f the equative analysis o f specificational sentences, predicational copular sentences do 
not share this property. For example, the subject and predicate o f (23) above cannot be 
reversed without leading to ungrammaticality, shown in (28).
(26) Tully is Cicero
(27) John is the murderer
(28) *A murderer is John
Based upon this evidence, Heycock and Kroch (1999: 380) argue “that it is not possible 
to treat any constituent appearing in [the subject position of a copular sentence] as 
predicated o f  a postcopular argument”. This claim represents a challenge to ‘inverse’ 
accounts (outlined below) which analyse the subject of a specificational sentence as an 
underlying predicate. In an equative analysis, the noun phrases of both equative and 
specificational sentences are reversible because they are o f the same semantic type. As a 
result, it should not matter in which order they appear.
Heycock and Kroch (1999, 2002) are proponents o f the equative analysis. They 
suggest that this approach has an “economy advantage”, since it reduces the taxonomy 
o f copular sentences to just two types: predicational and equative. However, a potential 
problem for the equative analysis is that the phrasal components of specificational 
sentences do not seem to be as “equal” as those o f “true” equatives. Heycock and Kroch 
concede that one o f the noun phrases in a specificational sentence is usually “less 
referential” than the other. For example, in (25) above, while the postcopular proper 
name John is clearly a referring expression, the definite noun phrase subject the 
murderer does not seem to exhibit this property, or at least not to the same extent. These 
authors note that the “assimilation o f specificational sentences to equatives runs afoul of
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the intuition that the former are asymmetric in interpretation in a way that “true 
equatives” are not” (Heycock and Kroch 1999: 381).
As a way o f getting around this problem, Heycock and Kroch (1999, 2002) claim 
that the asymmetry in specificational sentences is not in fact semantic, but is the result of 
the focus-ground opposition, which causes each noun phrase to differ in 
informativeness. Consequently, these authors maintain that specificational sentences 
contain two constituents o f the same semantic type. I discuss the equative approach in 
more detail in §5.2, where I compare it to my own analysis o f specificational copular 
constructions.
3.2.2 The inverse analysis
An alternative account views specificational copular sentences as inverse predicational 
sentences o f  the type NP be NP. Proponents of this view include Williams (1983), Partee 
(1986), Heggie (1988), Moro (1997), Mikkelsen (2005) and Den Dikken (2006). In these 
analyses, the copular sentence in (29) is predicational, with the postcopular noun phrase 
the best doctor describing the referent John. However, for the corresponding 
specificational sentence in (30), the predicative element is in initial position. In contrast 
to the equative analysis then, the two noun phrases o f a specificational sentence are 
involved in an asymmetric predication relationship and the initial definite noun phrase is 
non-referring.
(29) John is the best doctor
(30) The best doctor is John
In some versions o f this analysis, both specificational and predicational sentences 
are derived from the same small clause structure, in which the referential NP always 
precedes the predicative noun phrase. For example, Moro (1997) and Mikkelsen (2005) 
propose that while predicational sentences are derived via the raising of the referential 
noun phrase into the subject position, the predicative noun phrase is raised to derive a
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specificational sentence. In this syntactic derivational account, the distinction between 
predicational (descriptive) sentences and specificational (identifying) examples is 
therefore dependent upon the alignment of the referential and predicative noun phrases.
One advantage to the inverse analysis is that it acknowledges, and provides an 
explanation for, the asymmetry between the two noun phrases of a specificational 
sentence. In addition, there is good evidence for the claim that specificational sentences 
contain non-referring subjects. By placing these sentence types in environments 
involving left-dislocation structures, question-answer pairs and tag questions, Mikkelsen 
(2002, 2005) shows that while in predicational and equative constructions, anaphoric 
pronouns show agreement with the subject in terms o f gender, number and animacy, 
specificational sentences allow the pronoun it to be anaphoric to gender-specific 
subjects.
(31) The tallest girl in the class is Swedish, isn’t she? [predicational]
(32) The tallest girl in the class is Molly, isn’t it? [specificational]
(33) [Pointing to a player on the field]
SHE is Molly Jacobson, isn’t she? [equative]
(examples from Mikkelsen 2005: 72)
These results indicate that there is a definite semantic difference between the 
subjects o f specificational and equative sentences. As Heycock and Kroch (2002: 106) 
acknowledge, “This behaviour is quite unexpected under an equative analysis” . On the 
basis o f her pronominalization evidence, Mikkelsen claims that there are three distinct 
types o f copular sentence: predicational (involving a referential subject and a predicate), 
specificational (in which the predicative element is raised into the subject position and 
the referring expression is located in the postcopular position), and equative (containing 
two referring expressions).
6 Adger and Ramchand (2003) make use of a similar analysis in order to account for an inverted 
predication construction found in Scottish Gaelic. In support o f the inverse analysis, they conclude that all 
predication constructions reduce to a single underlying syntactic structure.
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For M ikkelsen (2002, 2005) then, specificational and equative copular sentences 
cannot be given a unified analysis; while specificational sentences are inverse 
predicational structures, the semantically equivalent phrases in equative sentences are 
not involved in a predication relationship. However, this tripartite taxonomy o f copular 
sentences is not advocated in all versions o f the inverse approach. For proponents o f the 
inverse analysis who are interested in creating a maximally economical account of 
copular sentences, equatives are also analysed as predicational structures (see for 
example, Partee 1986, Heggie 1988 and Den Dikken 2006). I discuss these so-called 
“economical” accounts in more detail in §5.2.
Despite its intuitive appeal and the support of pronominalization evidence, there 
are a number o f problems with the inverse analysis of specificational sentences. A 
common objection is that not all NP predicates can occur in subject position. For 
example, as I noted above, predicational copular sentences with indefinite noun phrase 
predicates, such as (34), typically resist “inversion”. As I go on to show in §3.3.4, 
proponents o f the inverse analysis have failed to provide an adequate description of, let 
alone an explanation for, these restrictions.
(34) John is a murderer
(35) *A murderer is John
More importantly for my concerns, the inverse analysis does not solve, or even 
broach, the question o f how specificational meaning comes about. The inverse analysis 
assumes that specificational sentences are derived from the same structure as 
predicational copular sentences. From this, we must conclude that specificational 
meaning is the result o f  a syntactic movement operation. The raising o f the referential 
element into subject position leads to a predicational copular sentence, which tells us 
“something about the referent o f the subject”, while the raising of the predicative 
element results in a specificational sentence, telling us “who or what the referent is 
(Mikkelsen 2005: 1; emphasis original). However, it is not clear exactly how or why this 
syntactic operation would result in this well noted difference in meaning. If
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specificational copular sentences are inverse predicational structures, why don’t they 
also describe, rather than identify, the referent?
Furthermore, if  we assume that specificational meaning is dependent upon a 
particular inverse word order, it follows that once we reverse the noun phrases of a 
specificational sentence the result should automatically be predicational. For instance, as 
shown in the examples below, Mikkelsen (2005: 177) categorizes all asymmetric 
copular sentences introduced by referential subjects as predicational.
(36) A. Who is the winner? B. John is the winner, isn’t he? [predicational]
(37) A. Who is the winner? B. The winner is John, isn’t it? [specificational]
(examples from Mikkelsen 2005: 177)
However, as noted by Declerck (1988: 93), examples such as (36), which contain a focal 
referring subject, have the same specificational function o f identifying rather than 
describing the referent as the “inverse” structure in (37). Likewise, Partee (1986: 363) 
acknowledges that her inverse analysis leaves open the question o f how to deal with 
examples such as (38), which have an “unambiguously” specificational rather than 
predicational meaning.
(38) Unusual is what John is (Partee 1986: 363)
This begs the question then, how can we explain these “reverse specificational” 
sentences in a syntactic movement account such as the inverse analysis?
3.2.3 Two less formal accounts of specificational meaning
Both the equative and the inverse analyses o f specificational copular sentences therefore 
overlook important semantic differences between, on the one hand, equative and 
specificational sentences, and on the other, specificational and predicational sentences.
In order to create a unified analysis, equative accounts “work around” the obvious 
asymmetry in specificational examples and fail to account for the pronominalization
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evidence which suggests that the subjects of specificational sentences are non-referring. 
In the syntax-based inverse account, the identifying function of specificational sentences 
is not predicted and consequently, no explanation is provided as to how this meaning 
arises.
However, two less formal accounts of specificational sentences have been 
proposed which focus on characterizing the nature of specificational meaning. In 
contrast to the equative and inverse analyses, Higgins (1979) and Declerck (1988) argue 
that specificational copular sentences involve neither identity nor predication 
relationships. Since these authors are concerned with providing a detailed description o f 
copular sentences rather than a unified and economical analysis, both Higgins (1978) 
and Declerck (1988) propose taxonomies of copular sentences that go beyond the 
predicational, specificational and equative types that we have considered so far. For 
example, Higgins (1979) recognizes an additional ‘identificational’ type o f copular 
sentence and Declerck (1988) suggests that we need to distinguish ‘descriptionally- 
identifying’ and ‘definition’ types as well. However, these are not well-defined, uniform 
categories and many o f the examples they include can be accommodated into the 
tripartite taxonomy o f predicational, equative and specificational sentences. 
Consequently, I do not discuss these alternative types of copular sentence in any more 
detail here.
3.2.3.1 Higgins (1979)
Higgins (1979) argues that specificational sentences function like lists; that is, the 
subject o f a specificational sentence acts as the heading of the list and the postcopular 
elements serve as items on that list. For instance, the noncleft in (39) and the wh-cleft in
(41) can, according to Higgins, be paraphrased as the lists given in (40) and (42), 
respectively.
7 For example, many o f Declerck’s (1988) ‘descriptionally-identifying’ tokens can be classified as 
predicational copular sentences. Example (i), for instance, describes (or classifies) the referent (that man) 
as John ’s brother.
(i) That man is John’s Brother (Declerck 1988. 95)
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(39) John’s opponents were Sally Simons and Reese Winters
(40) John’s opponents: Sally Simons, Reese Winters
(41) W hat I don’t like about John is his tie (Higgins 1979: 214)
(42) Things I don’t like about John: his tie
Higgins suggests that specificational sentences involve a ‘value-variable’ relation. He 
notes, “the heading o f a list provides a “variable”, thereby delimiting a certain domain, 
to which the items on the list conform as “values” of that variable” (Higgins 1979: 155). 
Higgins labels the precopular noun phrase using his own term ‘superscriptional’ and 
refers to the postcopular element as ‘specificational’. Superscriptional elements can be 
definite or indefinite noun phrases, while all types of constituent may be specificational.
Aside from arguing that specificational sentences function as lists, Higgins is not 
forthcoming when it comes to defining what characterizes the ‘superscriptionak and 
‘specificational’ components. However, by using his own terminology, Higgins makes it 
clear that neither the precopular nor the postcopular element o f a specificational 
sentence can be characterized as ‘referential’ or ‘predicational’. For example, Higgins 
separates specificational sentences from identity statements involving two referring 
expressions. He notes that specificational meaning “is not the expression of some kind 
o f identity” (Higgins 1979: 214). Likewise, Higgins (1979: 214) argues that 
specificational sentences do not involve a predication relationship, since “The whole 
notion o f being “about” something is alien to a list”.
However, this does not get us any closer to finding out what ‘ superscriptional ’ 
noun phrases actually are and how they relate to more well-defined concepts such as 
‘referential’ and ‘predicational’. This must be achieved if  we are to find an explanation 
for the connection between specificational and predicational copular sentences that 
Higgins draws our attention to. For example, he assumes that although the pair of 
sentences in (43) and (44) are not directly related, “the existence of the parallelism 
clearly means something. A correct characterization of Superscriptional noun phrases 
should account for this” (Higgins 1979: 274-275). However, because Higgins does not
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have an accurate definition o f the term superscriptional’, he cannot provide an 
explanation for this phenomenon.
As a result o f  using ill-defined, construction-specific terminology, Higgins’ account of 
specificational copular sentences is therefore o f little practical value when it comes to 
drawing generalizations or asking how the different kinds of copular sentence relate to 
one another.
3.2.3.2 Declerck (1988)
An alternative account o f specificational meaning is offered by Declerck (1988). 
Declerck agrees with Higgins (1979) that specificational sentences involve a ‘value- 
variable’ relationship. However, by extending this concept, Declerck provides an 
extremely broad definition o f specificational meaning as pertaining to any sentence, 
copular or noncopular, that gives the answer to a w/z-question. So, for example, both 
sentences in (45) are specificational for Declerck, providing the ‘value’ John for a 
‘variable’. The noncopular sentence in (45a) is an example o f Declerck’s ‘type 1 ’ 
specificational sentence. Here the variable is not present in the formulation o f the 
sentence, but is described by the verb phrase committed the murder. The th-cleft given in 
(45b), on the other hand, is an example o f a ‘type 2 ’ specificational sentence, with the 
subject noun phrase containing the variable that the value specifies, in this case the x  
who committed the murder. Unlike type 1 specificational sentences, type 2 examples are 
reversible, shown in (46).
(45) Who committed the murder?
a) John committed the murder (Declerck 1988: 8)
b) The one who committed the murder is John
(43) That he hasn’t come is a problem
(44) The problem is that he hasn’t come
[predicational]
[specificational]
(examples from Higgins 1979: 274)
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(46) John is the one who committed the murder
For Declerck then, specificational meaning is not peculiar to copular sentences. 
More importantly however, even within the taxonomy of copular sentences, 
specificational meaning is not limited to the specificational copular construction. 
Declerck argues that predicational copular sentences can also have a specificational 
meaning as long as they answer a w/i-question. For example, although (47) is a 
predicational copular sentence, it is also a type 1 specificational sentence having 
predicational focus. Predicational copular sentences therefore make up a distinct 
construction from specificational copular sentences, not as a result o f their distinct 
semantics, but because only the latter, as type 2 specificational sentences, are reversible.
(47) W hat is John like?
John is SILLY (Declerck 1988: 39)
Declerck therefore reduces the concept of specificational meaning to contrastive 
focus. Consequently, in this account, the identifying function of specificational copular 
sentences is purely information-structural and is not the product of the semantic 
contribution o f its components. As a result, the definition of specificational meaning as a 
‘value-variable’ relationship cannot help us to identify what distinguishes specificational 
(identifying) copular sentences from predicational (descriptive) copular sentences. For 
example, although (47) above has contrastive focus, the predicative element silly 
nevertheless ‘describes’ John. If  we want to use specificational meaning as means of 
characterizing the components of a specificational copular sentence and to help us to 
understand the structural properties o f these sentences, we need a semantic account of 
specificational meaning that is specific to this construction and yet, contra Higgins 
(1979), is described in terms o f general, well-understood concepts.
Declerck’s (1988) characterization of the components of a specificational copular 
sentence is also problematic. He suggests that specificational copular sentences contain 
one “weakly referring” noun phrase and one “strongly referring element. As a result,
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although Declerck (1998: 3) argues that such sentences do not “state a relation of 
identity between two entities” and cannot therefore be conflated with identity 
statements, his analysis is nevertheless very similar to an equative account, which 
analyses specificational sentences as containing two referring expressions.
Declerck relies on Donnellan’s (1966) referential/attributive distinction to 
capture the asymmetry between the two referring expressions of a specificational 
sentence. Donnellan notes that in an example such as (48), the initial definite description 
has two possible interpretations. If the speaker knows that for example John is Sm ith’s 
murderer, then this definite description is treated as ‘referential’ by Donnellan. If, 
however, the speaker does not know Smith's murderer, they may still utter (48) to 
indicate that whoever the murderer is, they are insane. In such cases, Donnellan labels 
the use o f the definite description in subject position as ‘attributive’. As Donnellan 
(1966: 285) puts it, “A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an 
assertion states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so”.
(48) Smith’s murderer is insane (Donnellan 1966: 285)
Declerck (1988) claims that the ‘variable’ in specificational copular sentences is 
a weakly referring ‘attributive’ noun phrase, while the ‘value’ is a strongly referring 
expression. He suggests that “The purpose of a specificational sentence with a definite 
NP as a variable is precisely to identify the referent of an NP whose use has remained 
attributive for the hearer” (Declerck 1988: 47). However, Declerck recognizes that an 
attributive noun phrase cannot distinguish specificational copular sentences from other 
copular constructions. For example, he argues against Elffers (1979), who claims that an 
attributive subject noun phrase is “a sufficient condition for the sentence to be 
specificational”, since predicational copular sentences, such as (48) above, can also 
contain attributive subjects (Declerck 1988: 48f).
However, this fact presents a problem for Declerck (1988), since it means that 
his analysis cannot explain Mikkelsen’s (2005) pronominalization evidence. As I 
explained in §3.2.2, these results suggest that the subjects of specificational sentences
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are semantically distinct from the subjects of predicational and equative sentences. 
Mikkelsen (2005. 89) shows that in predicational copular sentences even subjects with 
“unknown reference” (our ‘attributive’ noun phrases) “do not pronominalize as it, but 
with the gendered pronouns she/he”. For example, gendered pronouns are used to refer 
back to Smith s murderer in (49) regardless of whether the speech participants know the 
identity o f this person or not. In contrast, the subjects of specificational sentences 
invariably pronominalize with it, as in (50).
(49) Smith’s murderer (whoever he is) is insane, isn’t he?
(50) Smith’s murderer is John, isn’t it?
This evidence suggests that the subject of a specificational sentence is neither strongly 
nor weakly referring and consequently cannot be satisfactory categorized as an 
attributive noun phrase. Declerck’s account therefore suffers from the same problems as 
other equative analyses.
3.2.4 Interim summary
In conclusion then, this short review of some of the different kinds o f approaches to 
specificational copular sentences has shown that none of the existing analyses have 
managed to provide an account that tells us both how specificational subjects differ 
from the subjects o f other copular constructions and how specificational meaning results 
from the semantic contribution o f the construction’s components. In the following 
section, § 3 .3 ,1 present my own, largely semantic account o f specificational copular 
sentences. In contrast to Declerck’s (1988) all-encompassing ‘value-variable’ 
relationship, I argue for a construction-specific definition of specificational meaning as 
resulting from a special type o f nominal predication relationship.
By assuming that specificational sentences involve nominal predication, my 
analysis has much in common with the inverse analyses outlined in §3.2.2. However, 
unlike inverse accounts, my analysis does not rely on syntactic movement. As I go on to 
explain, the semantic account offered in this thesis therefore profits from the insights of
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the inverse analysis without encountering the same problems. I frame my discussion in 
response to Mikkelsen (2005). This choice is based on a number of reasons. Mikkelsen 
(2005) is a recent example o f the inverse approach which builds upon earlier accounts, 
such as Moro (1997). Unlike Den Dikken (2006), who develops his own ‘relators and 
linkers’ approach to predication, Mikkelsen (2005) is therefore representative of the 
“standard” inverse analysis. In addition, I agree with Mikkelsen that there are three 
distinct types o f  copular sentence: predicational, specificational and equative. I argue in 
§5.2 that attempts to subsume equative and specificational sentences within the same 
inverse predicational structure involve a false economy. By responding to Mikkelsen 
(2005), I can therefore focus on the key issue of comparing a semantic predicational 
account to one involving syntactic movement.
3.3 My own analysis of specificational sentences
In this section, I develop a largely semantic, constructional account of specificational 
copular sentences o f the type NP be N P S My argument is structured as follows. In 
§3.3 .1 ,1 outline some o f the difficult data that, to my mind, a satisfactory account must 
be able to accommodate and/or explain. With this goal in place, I suggest that a 
profitable starting point is to examine the semantic role of definite descriptions in 
specificational sentences. In §3.3 .2 ,1 provide a Russellian analysis of definite noun 
phrases, before going on, in §3.3.3, to incorporate this into a semantic account of 
specificational constructions. I conclude that specificational meaning results from a 
nominal predication relation involving definite noun phrases. However, while this 
analysis therefore retains the intuition o f inverse accounts that specificational sentences 
are semantically asymmetrical, it does not rely on syntactic movement. As I explain, the 
account provided in this thesis is therefore able to accommodate more data than 
movement-based analyses, since it predicts that specificational meaning is independent
8 Noncleft specificational sentences do not all have the form NP be NP. Nevertheless, these sentences 
form the prototypical case and make for a convenient starting point for our analysis. In what follows, I 
argue that specificational sentences always contain a predicative NP. However, the other phrasal element 
does not always have to be nominal. Specificational sentences containing non-NP phrasal elements are not 
fully integrated into my account until chapter 8.
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from word order. Finally, in §3.3.4,1 provide an explanation for the limited distribution 
o f indefinite noun phrase subjects based upon the differing semantics o f definite and 
indefinite noun phrases. I argue that this semantic account explains the data better than 
the information-structural distinction that Mikkelsen (2005) invokes.9
3.3.1 The data
As I see it, there are three sets o f data that a satisfactory analysis o f specificational NP  
be NP  sentences must be able to accommodate and/or explain. The first set o f data is 
M ikkelsen’s (2005: 72) pronominalization evidence, introduced in §3.2.2. This data 
suggests that specificational sentences differ from predicational copular sentences with 
respect to the semantic content o f their initial noun phrase. For example, in the 
predicational sentence given here as (51), the pronoun she agrees with the referential 
subject. However, in (52), this same gender-specific definite noun phrase 
pronominalizes with it.
(51) The tallest girl in the class is Swedish, isn’t she? [predicational]
(52) The tallest girl in the class is Molly, isn’t it? [specificational]
(examples from Mikkelsen 2005: 72)
Since it appears to be the default pronoun for non-referring, predicative expressions (as 
shown in (53)) this evidence leads me to conclude that while the subject o f the 
predicational sentence in (51) is semantically referential, the initial NP in (52) is a non­
referring expression. On this basis, I reject the equative account, which analyses (52) as 
containing two referential noun phrases, and will assume that specificational sentences 
are semantically asymmetrical. The question therefore arises as to how the initial 
definite noun phrase in (52) obtains a non-referring semantics?
(53) M olly is very tall. It is a difficult thing to be at her age.
9 The analysis outlined in §3.3 builds upon ideas originally presented as a conference paper entitled ‘How 
specificational are cleft sentences?’ (see Patten 2007).
68
As I noted in §3.2.2, Mikkelsen s (2005) inverse account treats specificational 
copular sentences as “reverse” predicational sentences. For Mikkelsen (2005), both 
specificational sentences and predicational copular sentences o f the type NP be NP  are 
derived from the same small clause structure (shown in Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1 The predicational core (Mikkelsen 2005: 166)
The argument goes that if  the referential noun phrase is raised into the subject position, a 
predicational copular sentence is obtained, while a specificational copular sentence 
results from a movement operation which raises the predicative noun phrase. So, in this 
analysis, the initial NP o f the specificational copular sentence in (55) corresponds to the 
predicative noun phrase o f the predicational sentence in (54).
(54) John is the best doctor, isn’t he?
(55) The best doctor is John, isn’t it?
This inverse analysis neatly explains Mikkelsen’s pronominalization results. 
However, I have chosen to reject a movement-based account. As I explained in §3.2.2, 
the inverse account equates specificational meaning with an “inverse” word order, in 
which a predicate precedes its argument. But, this cannot explain reverse specificational 
sentences, such as (56), which contain referential subjects but still have a specificational 
(or identifying) meaning.
(56) Who is the best doctor? John is the best doctor, isn’t he?
PredP
DP r e f  Pred'
Pred DPpred
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In order to accommodate this data, we need to find an analysis of specificational NP be 
NP  sentences that can explain how specificational meaning comes about without relying 
on syntactic movement or word order to do so. To my mind, the final set of data that is 
in need o f an explanation can actually help us to achieve this goal.
In § 3 .2 ,1 noted that specificational sentences with initial indefinite noun phrases 
are often deemed ungrammatical, as shown in (57). For inverse accounts, which assume 
that predicates can precede their subjects, this data is problematic.
(57) *A doctor is John
Mikkelsen (2005) attempts to explain this data by arguing that predicates can only move 
to subject position if  they contain discourse-old information; since indefinite noun 
phrases are typically associated with discourse-new information, they rarely meet this 
criterion. However, in §3.3.4,1 argue that Mikkelsen’s (2005) information-structural 
distinction cannot satisfactorily predict the range of indefinite noun phrases that can 
occur in initial position. What we need then, is an account that provides a full and 
accurate explanation as to which types o f indefinite noun phrases can occur as the initial 
NP o f a specificational sentence and which cannot.
It is clear from examples such as (57) above, that indefinite noun phrases are not 
preferred as the initial NP of a specificational sentence. The flipside of this is that 
definite noun phrases are commonly found in NP be NP  specificational sentences. I 
argue that this simple observation can provide us with the best starting point for finding 
out about the nature o f specificational meaning and the structure of specificational 
sentences. Throughout the remainder o f §3.3 ,1 ask whether there is anything special 
about the semantics o f definite noun phrases that makes them particularly suited to the 
specifying function and if, in fact, their unique semantics actually contributes to the 
creation o f specificational meaning.
This leads me to argue for a semantic account of specificational sentences in 
which specificational meaning results from a nominal predication relation involving 
definite noun phrases; predicational (descriptive) and specificational (identifying)
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meanings are understood as two possible interpretations of the same predication relation. 
In this analysis, specificational meaning is therefore not equated with syntactic 
movement and/or word order. Consequently, “reverse” specificational sentences can be 
accommodated into this analysis. Like Mikkelsen’s (2005) inverse account, in my 
analysis the initial definite noun phrase o f the “canonical” specificational sentence is 
non-referring. As a result, the account provided in this thesis can also accommodate the 
pronominalization data. However, rather than assuming that this NP moves from a 
predicative, postcopular position, I show that semantically, definite descriptions are 
inherently non-referring. Finally, by examining the differing semantics of definite and 
indefinite noun phrases, my analysis correctly predicts when an indefinite noun phrase 
will be permitted as the initial NP of a specificational sentence.
The analysis o f specificational copular sentences provided in this thesis therefore 
has the advantage over alternative accounts in being able to accommodate and explain 
the full range o f data outlined above. As my starting point, in the next section, I outline 
the Russellian analysis o f definite descriptions upon which my semantic account of 
specificational N P be NP  sentences depends.
3.3.2 The semantics of definite noun phrases
We can begin by looking at the differences between definite noun phrases and proper 
names outlined in Neale’s (1990) Russellian analysis. The Russellian perspective 
assumes that definite noun phrases are ‘object-independent’ descriptions. As Neale 
(1990: 17) comments, “to know something by description it is not necessary to have had 
any sort o f epistemic contact with the object that, in fact, satisfies the description one 
knows it under” . Unlike ‘object-dependent’ expressions, such as proper names, definite 
descriptions are therefore not directly referring.
This analysis is supported by the behavior o f definite descriptions in modal 
contexts. Let us assume for a moment that definite noun phrases are referring 
expressions and that (58a) is an identity statement. According to the Principle of 
Substitutivity, it follows that if  two expressions refer to the same entity, then they can be 
substituted for one another without altering the truth value of the sentence. However,
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since (58b) and (58c) below do not share the same truth value, this suggests that (58a) is 
not a genuine identity statement.
(58) (a) Yuri Gagarin = the first man in space (true)
(b) Yuri Gagarin might not have been Yuri Gagarin (false)
(c) Yuri Gagarin might not have been the first man in space (true)
(examples from Kearns 2000: 108)
We can explain these differing truth values as a consequence o f the fact that modality 
deals with possible worlds. The reference o f the proper name Yuri Gagarin is fixed; that 
is, it refers to the same individual in this or any other possible world. In contrast, the 
definite noun phrase the firs t man in space could describe different individuals in 
different possible worlds, in which another astronaut completed the mission before Yuri 
Gagarin. For this reason, the proposition in (58c) is true, leading us to conclude that 
definite noun phrases are descriptions rather than referring expressions.
Russell (1905) categorizes definite descriptions not with the object-dependent 
referring expressions, but as belonging to the category o f quantified phrases. In 
particular, definite descriptions involve proportional quantification, which means that, 
like the quantifiers all and most, the definite article (the) quantifies over and in relation 
to a set. Additionally, definite descriptions have their own peculiar characteristics, such 
that they always expresses a proportion of a restricted rather than a general set; they 
involve universal quantification, meaning that the proportion o f the set they express is 
the whole or all o f it; and they have existential import (Neale 1990: 180).
To illustrate these properties, we can compare the behavior of quantifying 
expressions with all, which, like definite descriptions, involve universal quantification, 
but have neither o f  the other two characteristics. In (59), the proportion expressed is one 
o f universal quantification over a very general set, ‘all the children that exist’. However, 
sentence (60) must be understood as expressing universal quantification over a restricted 
set, such as ‘all the children that live here’. Sentence (60) also assumes that the set
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children that live here exists. This is not the case for sentence (59), which would be an 
acceptable proposition even in a world in which children ceased to exist.
(59) All children are naughty
(60) The children are naughty
Like other quantifying expressions, definite noun phrases are semantically 
descriptive rather than referring. This is not to deny that definite noun phrases can be 
used to pick out a particular individual, but, according to Grice (1969), such usage is a 
pragmatic, rather than a semantic, phenomenon. Grice makes a distinction between what 
a speaker says in the proposition they express and what a speaker means to 
communicate to their audience. For instance, by uttering sentence (61), a speaker may be 
expressing the Russellian proposition that ‘all cats that live here are very timid’. 
However, they may intend to convey that ‘a particular individual or referent is timid’. 
According to Grice, the speaker can communicate this secondary information by 
exploiting the assumption that both speaker and hearer are aware that a particular 
individual matches the description proposed in the definite noun phrase.
(61) The cat is very timid
As Neale (1990: 88) comments, “definite descriptions are particularly susceptible 
to referential usage because of their own particular semantics”. Given that definite noun 
phrases involve an existential meaning, the members of the set expressed must exist. 
Furthermore, since the definite article expresses universal quantification over a 
restricted, rather than a general set, the number o f individuals that exist which match this 
description is severely restricted. This is particularly true o f definite descriptions 
involving singular nouns, where the set is so restricted that it has only one member. As 
Kearns (2000: 97) comments, “a singular definite description provides not only a 
familiar SET, but, more saliently, a familiar INDIVIDUAL ’ (emphasis original). 
However, from the Russellian-Gricean perspective, this usage is the result o f shared
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knowledge and is not part of the semantics of the proposition. While definite 
descriptions can therefore be “used” referentially, they are not directly referring. Instead, 
the referential usage o f definite descriptions is derived via general pragmatic principles.
3.3.3 A semantic account of specificational meaning
In this section, I incorporate a Russellian analysis of definite noun phrases into a 
semantic account o f specification. In §3.3.2,1 showed that definite descriptions denote a 
universally quantified and existentially presupposed set. Here, I argue that this property 
o f definite noun phrases makes them ideally suited to occurring in specificational 
sentences and is in fact what provides the sentence with its specificational meaning. I 
begin, in §3.3.3.1, by examining how nominal predication works before showing how 
specificational meaning results from the reinterpretation of a nominal predication 
relation involving definite noun phrases. At the outset then, “reverse” specificational 
sentences are accounted for in my analysis. In §3.3.3.2,1 extend this account to 
“canonical” specificational sentences. I claim that this construction involves mismatch, 
whereby the semantic predicate is also the syntactic subject. This explains Mikkelsen’s 
(2005) pronominalization data, outlined in §3.3.1. Finally, in §3.3.3.3,1 show how my 
account o f specificational meaning differs from and improves on alternative analyses. I 
explain that my account does not rely on the referential/attributive distinction, syntactic 
movement or a fixed word order, or hyponymy relationships and, as a result, does not 
suffer from the same problems as other, similar, accounts.
3.3.3.1 Predicate nominals and reverse specificational sentences
In construction grammar, predication involves a complex interaction o f semantic and 
morphosyntactic information; if  we take standard predication involving an active finite 
verb, the relevant semantic participant is linked to the referent of the verb’s 
morphosyntactic subject. Predication, then, requires us to understand the semantics of 
different kinds o f predicates, and not to view it solely as subject assignment. Verbs are 
understood to be inherently relational; that is, they presuppose the existence of another 
entity (see Langacker 1987: 304; Croft 1991: 62-63; Croft and Cruse 2004: 280-281).
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For example, the verb dances requires a dancer. Proper names, on the other hand, are 
non-relational since they do not presuppose any other concept. Therefore, the sentence 
Sarah dances includes a relational predicate containing a ‘substructure’ which is 
elaborated by the non-relational argument Sarah.
However, nominal predication behaves differently from verbal predication. As 
Croft (1991: 63) notes, prototypical nouns, such as man are not relational, since “the 
existence o f a man does not imply the existence of another entity”. Furthermore, Francis 
(1999a, b) argues convincingly that even nouns which are inherently relational 
(including deverbal nouns) cannot assign thematic roles outside of their own noun 
phrases, contra Moro (1997). This begs the question then, what is the relationship 
between a predicative NP and its precopular subject?
Most authors agree that nominal predication involves a classifying relationship, 
whereby the subject referent is categorized as a member of a class or kind. For instance, 
(62) states that Sally is a member o f the set student. This has the effect o f ascribing a 
property to, or describing, Sally.
(62) Sally is a student [class-membership: predicational]
But how does this classifying predication relation come about? Indefinite noun phrases, 
such as a student, typically denote individuals; that is, they refer to a single member of 
a set (see §3.3.4). Therefore, it must be the construction which provides the postcopular 
NP with a predicative semantics via coercion (see the discussion on mismatch and 
predicate nominals in §2.4). In addition, it is the construction that imposes the syntactic 
relation such that the postcopular NP requires a syntactic subject. In (62) then, the 
predicate nominal construction imposes a class-membership predication relation onto the 
two noun phrases.10 This allows the indefinite NP a student to be construed predicatively 
as denoting a set or kind.
10 Francis (1999b) agrees; she claims that it is the construction which assigns the subject the “non- 
traditional” thematic role o f ‘classified’ or ‘that which is classified .
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I argue that sentences with definite NP predicates involve the same classifying 
predication relation as those with indefinite NP predicates, contra Croft (1991) and 
Francis (1999a, b). From the Russellian analysis of definite descriptions, outlined in 
§3.3.2, definite noun phrases are understood to denote restricted sets. Consequently, 
example (63) can also be analysed as involving a classifying relationship; that is, the 
referent Sally is classified as a member (albeit the only member) of the set best student 
we have.
(63) Sally is the best student we have [class-membership: predicational]
Again, this classifying relationship allows for a “predicational” interpretation, in which 
an individual is ascribed a property. For example, in a context where the speaker is 
introducing Sally, example (63) describes her as the best student we have.
However, definite noun phrase predicates create a special type of class- 
membership predication relation. For example, in (63), the set the best student we have 
is so restricted that the referent Sally makes up the complete membership o f this set. 
Consequently, this class-membership relation can be used not only to describe the 
referent, but also to identify or specify the list o f members in the set, shown in (64).
(64) Sally is the best student we have [class-membership: reverse specificational]
On this account, specificational meaning is therefore tied to the inherent semantics of 
definite descriptions, which denote restricted sets. The specificational interpretation of 
this class-membership relation is dependent upon a particular information-structure. For
11 Croft (1991: 69) claims that sentences containing postcopular definite NPs involve token-to-token 
identity” linked by an “equational be” or a “be of identity”. Similarly, Francis (1999b) argues that such 
sentences are instances o f a separate type of predicate nominal construction: the identifying 
construction”. She claims that this construction imposes an identifying relationship onto the subject and 
the postcopular NP, assigning the theta-role ‘identified’ to the subject. An important advantage to my 
account is that sentences with indefinite and definite noun phrase predicates are given a unified analysis as 
involving the same class-membership predication relation. From this, it follows that reverse specificational 
sentences do not require the stipulation of a separate type of predication relation or an equative semantics.
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instance, in (64), the referent Sally is marked as focal; the result is a reverse 
specificational sentence.
Reverse specificational sentences therefore form a sub-construction o f the larger 
predicate nominal construction (see Figure 3.2). I analyse the predicate nominal 
construction as involving a subject, a (semantically empty) copular verb and a 
predicative NP complement slot.12 While reverse specificational sentences inherit this 
structure, they require a definite NP predicate. They also exhibit the same type o f 
classifying predication relation as other instances of the predicate nominal construction, 
although the semantics o f definite descriptions ensures that the set (or classifier) is 
restricted. However unlike the predicate nominal construction, reverse specificational 
sentences also have an additional information-structural requirement. In order for this 
predication relation to be interpreted specificationally, the referring expression must be 
marked as focal.
Evidence for analysing the reverse specificational construction as a subtype of 
the predicate nominal construction is provided by the diagnostics for predicative 
complement status. For example, whether the initial subject is in focus (creating a 
specificational interpretation) or not (creating a predicational interpretation), the subject- 
predicate string Lucy the leader is perfectly grammatical both in the absolutive with X Y  
construction (see (65) and (66)) and embedded under consider (see (67) and (68)). This 
is not expected on an equative account, which analyses reverse specificational sentences 
as involving two referring expressions.
(65) A: Should we make Lucy the leader or Sarah?
B: Well, with Lucy the leader, the mission would surely fail
(66) A: Should we make Lucy the leader or the scout?
B: Well, with Lucy t h e  l e a d e r , I think we’d be in trouble
12 I label the verb be as “semantically empty” because specificational meaning is produced by the 
relationship between the two NPs rather than being a lexical property o f be. However, this is not to say 
that the copula is unimportant to the specificational construction. It is one of limited number of verbs that 
permit a specificational meaning relation to occur (see Higgins 1979: 161). However, since my focus is on 
it-clefts and related copular constructions, I do not discuss this issue in any more detail here.
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(67) A: Who is the leader?
B: I consider L u c y  the leader
(68) A: What is Lucy’s role?
B: I consider Lucy t h e  l e a d e r
The predicate nominal construction
Figure 3.2 Predicate nominal constructions
Therefore, on my semantic account, specificational meaning involves a 
reinterpretation o f the same class-membership predication relation which characterizes 
nominal predication more generally. Consequently, my analysis is able to accommodate 
reverse specificational sentences neatly: it explains how these sentences acquire a 
specificational inteipretation while at the same time recognizing that they are essentially 
predicate nominal sentences. This represents an important improvement over the syntax-
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based inverse analyses o f specification^ sentences. I come back to this issue in §3.3.3.3. 
In the next section, §3.3.3.2,1 extend my analysis to canonical specificational sentences.
3.3.3.2 Canonical specificational sentences land eauativesl 
In §3 .3 .1 ,1 claimed that the subjects o f “canonical” specificational sentences are 
semantically non-referring, based upon Mikkelsen’s (2005) finding that such sentences 
pronominalize with it (shown in (69)). In what follows, I show how, once we apply a 
Russellian analysis o f definite descriptions to this data, the non-referring semantics of 
specificational subjects can be given a simple explanation.
(69) The best student we have is Sally, isn’t it? [class-membership: specificational]
Following a Russellian analysis, in (69) above, the definite NP subject the best student 
we have denotes a universally quantified and restricted set. Gricean reasoning has not 
been employed to convert this description into a referring expression (see §3.3.2). 
M ikkelsen’s (2005) pronominalization data therefore falls out from my analysis, which 
views definite noun phrases as inherently non-referring. On this semantic account, there 
is no need to suggest that the initial NP moves from an underlying predicative position 
in order to obtain a non-referring semantics (see §3.3.3.3).
I argue that canonical specificational sentences, such as (69) above, involve the 
same class-membership relation as predicate nominal sentences with postcopular 
definite NPs (see §3.3.3.1). The only difference is that the restricted set (the predicate) is 
given prior to the identification o f its members (the referent(s)). However, this word 
order only permits a specificational interpretation; it cannot be given a “predicational 
(or descriptive) reading. For instance, in answer to the question posed in (70), the 
sentence in (70a), which contains an initial focused predicate, is unacceptable. Instead, 
the predicate nominal construct in (70b) is strongly preferred.
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(70) Who is Sally? Tell me about her.
a) *The best student we h ave  is Sally.
b) Sally is the best student w e h a v e .
In (69) above then, the class-membership predication relation is interpreted 
specificationally, as identifying the complete membership of the set the best student we 
have. Therefore, in sentences with this word order, the postcopular expression is always 
in focus (which may or may not be marked by intonation). This configuration conforms 
to (and is therefore motivated by) highly general information-structure tendencies. For 
example, there is a well-known preference for linguistic patterns in which given 
information is presented prior to new information and focal elements occur clause- 
finally (Ward, Bim er and Huddleston 2002: 1372).
However, what is less clear is how the class-membership predication relation in 
canonical specificational sentences actually works. In §3.3.3.1,1 claimed that indefinite 
noun phrases need to be in the predicate nominal construction (which imposes a 
classifying relationship on the subject and postverbal NP) in order to be construed as the 
semantic predicate. However, this is not required for definite noun phrases, which 
(according to a Russellian analysis) are semantically set-denoting. Indeed, there is an 
argument for suggesting that definite noun phrases are, in some sense, relational. As 
quantified phrases, definite descriptions have their own unique set of properties such that 
they denote complete (universally quantified) and restricted sets and have existential 
presuppositions (see §3.3.2). This means that definite noun phrases imply the existence
13of another entity -  the membership of the existentially presupposed set.
If  we analyse the canonical specificational structure as consisting of a subject, a 
copular verb and a complement (which is not predicative), then a semantic predication 
can be derived compositionally from the semantics. From a constructional perspective, 
predication (or valence) is relative. As Croft and Cruse (2004: 281) comment, predicate
13 This is also what allows a definite description to be so easily converted into an act of reference (see 
§3.3.2). On this usage, the same NP that denotes a restricted set is used to refer to its members. In 
specificational sentences, on the other hand, the restricted set and its members are represented in two 
different NPs.
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and argument status depend on what two semantic structures are being compared” . In 
the case o f the canonical specificational structure, a definite description is compared 
with a referring expression. This allows a predicational class-membership relation to
14ensue.
On this analysis, canonical specificational and equative structures can be given a 
unified account. Both o f these constructions have the same syntactic structure (subject- 
verb-complement). Unlike in the predicate nominal construction, this complement is not 
marked as predicative and so does not require a syntactic subject. This explains why 
canonical specificational and equative structures cannot occur in the with X Y  
construction (see (71) and (72)) or embedded under consider (see (73) and (74)).
(71) A: Should we make Lucy the leader or Sarah?
B: *Well, with the leader Lucy, the mission would surely fail
(72) A: Is Cicero Tully?
B: *Well, with Cicero Tully...
(73) A: Who is the leader?
B: *1 consider the leader Lucy
(74) A: Who is Cicero?
B: *1 consider Cicero Tully
Since this structure is underspecified for predication, the semantics is not read off 
from the syntax. In equative sentences (where the subject and the complement are both 
semantically referring), a class-membership predication relation is not possible since 
referring expressions are not relational (see §3.3.3.1). However, in canonical 
specificational sentences, the subject denotes a restricted set, which, when paired with a 
referential complement, is understood to be the semantic predicate. In the canonical
14 Therefore, while in predicate nominal sentences, the predication relation is constructional, in canonical 
specificational sentences it is compositional, deriving from the inherent semantics of definite noun 
phrases. From this, it follows that the predication relation in reverse specificational sentences is both 
constructional (inherited from the predicate nominal constmction) and compositional (due to the semantics 
o f definite NPs).
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specificational construction then, we have a mismatch between the semantics and the 
syntax; that is, the initial NP is both the syntactic subject and the semantic predicate (see 
Figure 3 .3).15
The equative construction
The canonical specificational construction
Figure 3.3 Equative and canonical specificational constructions
15 Evidence for analysing the initial semantically predicating NP (rather than the postcopular referring 
expression) as the syntactic subject is provided by diagnostics for subject status. For instance, it is the 
initial NP that undergoes subject raising (see (i)) and is affected by the constraints on subject extraction
when adjacent to complementizers such as that (shown in (ii)). This is also true of the initial NP of
equative sentences.
(i) The murderer is John
a) The murderer is likely to be John
b) *John is likely the murderer to be____
(ii) We all believe that the murderer is John
a) »It’s the murderer that we all believe that is John
b) It’s John that we all believe that the murderer i s ------
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Although economy is not a priority for a constructional analysis, a motivated 
account, in which constructions are related within a hierarchical network, is strongly 
preferred. In the analysis developed in §3.3.3.1, reverse specificational sentences were 
shown to inherit the syntactic and semantic structure of the “classifying” predicate 
nominal construction. The construction’s more idiosyncratic properties fall out from the 
inherent semantics o f definite descriptions and additional information-structural 
requirements. Likewise, in this section, I have argued that the canonical specificational 
construction shares its syntactic structure with equatives, but exhibits the same semantic 
relation as the reverse specificational construction.
3.3.3.3 What my analysis isn’t
In this section, I clarify how my analysis of specificational sentences differs from and 
improves on some o f the alternative accounts proposed in the literature. 1 explain that 
because my analysis o f specificational meaning does not rely on Donnellan’s (1966) 
referential/attributive distinction, on syntactic movement or a fixed word order, or on a 
particular type o f hyponymy relationship, it sidesteps many of the problems which affect 
otherwise similar accounts.
3.3.3.3.1 On the referential/attributive distinction
In §3.3 .3 .2 ,1 argued that canonical specificational sentences and equatives share the 
same “underspecified” syntactic structure; that is, one which doesn’t coerce a particular 
semantics. This analysis reflects the strong superficial similarity between these two 
sentence-types, as shown in (75) and (76).
(75) The guy at the bar is JOHN PRICE, isn’t it? [specificational]
(76) The guy at the bar is John Price, isn’t he? [equative]
The difference in meaning between these two examples is entirely dependent upon 
whether Gricean reasoning, outlined in §3.3.2, has gone through. For example (76), we 
can imagine a context in which the speaker knows of two individuals {the guy at the bar
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and John Price) but does not know that they are in fact the same person. In such a 
context, Gricean reasoning converts the initial definite description into an act of 
reference, as shown by the gender-specific pronoun he.
Nevertheless, the distinction between describing a set and referring to an 
individual cannot be reduced to the distinction between “unknown” and “known”. As I 
explained in §3.2.3.2, Donnellan (1966) classifies definite noun phrases as either 
‘referential’ (referring to a known individual) or ‘attributive’ (referring to an unknown 
individual). However, since even attributive definite noun phrases pronominalize with 
gendered pronouns, shown in (77), both types are treated here as an act o f reference.
(77) The murderer, whoever he is, is insane, isn’t he?
Regardless o f whether the speaker is referring to an individual in the “real world” or 
whether the are referring to an assumed individual that exists only as a “mental” or 
“imagined” referent, they are taking the same step from describing a set to referring to 
an individual, known or unknown.
Therefore, the pronominalization data suggests that the referential/attributive 
distinction does not bring about a constructional difference (see also Donnellan 1966: 
297). This represents an important problem for accounts of specificational meaning 
which rely on the referential/attributive distinction in order to distinguish between 
specificational and equative constructions, such as Declerck (1988) (see §3.2.3.2). 
Instead, I argue that the relevant constructional distinction between the canonical 
specificational and equative sentences in (75) and (76) above is that while the latter 
involves a ‘referential reading’ o f the subject noun phrase, the former involves a 
‘description reading’, in which the definite NP denotes a set, but is not used to refer to 
an individual. While definite NP subjects of equative (and also predicational) sentences 
may be referring to different degrees o f precision (shown in (77)), in such cases Gricean 
reasoning has been employed, which effectively converts a description into an act of 
reference.
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3.3.3.3.2 On syntactic movement and a fixed word order 
The constructional account sketched over §3.3.3.1 and §3.3.3.2 shares a number of 
properties with M ikkelsen’s (2005) inverse analysis of specificational sentences 
(outlined in §3.2.2). For one thing, it retains the important intuition that specificational 
sentences are not semantically equative and that the asymmetric relation between the 
two NPs is a case o f apparent predication. Like Mikkelsen, I treat the initial NP of the 
canonical specificational structure as a non-referring, predicative element. Therefore, as 
I explained in §3.3.3.2, my semantic account is just as successful at accommodating and 
explaining the pronominalization data as Mikkelsen’s (2005) inverse analysis. Finally, 
both Mikkelsen and I assume that the canonical specificational sentence type involves 
mismatch; that is, the initial NP is both the syntactic subject and the semantic predicate.
However, on the inverse account, this mismatch phenomenon is explained as a 
consequence o f syntactic movement; the assumption being that mismatch configurations 
are derived from underlying structures which behave in expected ways. In contrast, in 
construction grammar, mapping between form and meaning is internal to the 
construction. Consequently, in this model, mismatch constructions are not derived and 
are simply presented as containing information which overrides inheritance from more 
general patterns (see §2.4). However, while mismatch configurations are tolerated in 
construction grammar, they must be explained; that is, there must be some motivation as 
to why this particular construction should appear in the language. In the account given in 
§3.3.3.2,1 claimed that canonical specificational sentences inherit the same 
(underspecified) syntactic structure as the equative construction. Furthermore, I argued 
that the class-membership predication relation of the canonical specificational 
construction follows from the inherent semantics of definite descriptions, which (on a 
Russellian analysis) denote a complete and restricted set and presuppose the existence of 
its membership. Finally, I claimed that this mismatch construction is motivated by 
highly general information-structure principles.
An important advantage to my, largely semantic, analysis is that it is able to 
explain the relationship between predicational (descriptive) and specificational 
(identifying) meaning. In §3.3.3.1,1 showed that specificational meaning involves a
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reinterpretation o f the class-membership relation involving definite NP predicates. In 
contrast, Mikkelsen s (2005) inverse analysis is a syntax-based approach which does not 
examine the origins o f specificational meaning. Nevertheless, since specificational 
sentences are defined as inverse predicational sentences, we must conclude that, on 
this approach, specificational meaning is the result of syntactic movement.
As I explained in §3.2.2, there are two important problems with this syntax-based 
account. First, no explanation is provided as to why a syntactic movement operation 
should lead to this change in meaning from description to specification. Secondly, this 
account assumes that specificational sentences must always have an “inverse” word 
order. This means o f course that the inverse analysis cannot accommodate reverse 
specificational sentences. Despite their specificational (or identifying) meaning, 
Mikkelsen (2005: 72) categorizes reverse specificational examples as “predicational”.
On my own semantic account, on the other hand, specificational meaning is not equated 
with syntactic movement. While my analysis retains the intuition that reverse 
specificational sentences share the same predication relation and syntactic structure as 
other instances o f the predicate nominal construction, it also explains how 
specificational meaning comes about (as the result o f the inherent semantics o f definite 
descriptions and properties o f information-structure). Consequently, on my account, the 
reverse specificational data is both accommodated and explained.
3.3.3.3.3 On hyponymy relationships
The analysis o f specificational sentences developed over §3.3.3 has a number of points 
in common with the account o f Blom and Daalder (1977). These authors suggest that 
predicational copular sentences involve a class-membership relation in which the subject 
referent is a hyponym of the superordinate category indicated by the predicate nominal. 
They claim that specificational sentences have the reverse alignment, with the subject 
denoting a more general concept than the postcopular NP. However, Declerck (1988:
92) criticizes this account. He notes that although predicational copular sentences 
typically express a class-membership relation, “there are subtypes of predicational
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sentences where no idea o f class-inclusion (or class-membership) appears to be present” 
citing examples with definite noun phrase predicates such as (78).
(78) John is the best musician in town (Declerck 1988: 92)
He also argues that specificational sentences do not involve a hyponymy relationship, 
since “There is no difference in generality between the variable NP and the value NP” 
(Declerck 1988: 93). Declerck suggests that this is the reason why specificational 
sentences are reversible, because they exhibit no difference in specificity. Furthermore, 
he notes that specificational sentences cannot be “reverse” predicational sentences 
because o f the existence o f reverse specificational sentences.
The analysis presented in this thesis provides a solution to the discrepancy 
between these two arguments. On the one hand, like Blom and Daalder (1977), I assume 
that canonical specificational sentences involve a class-membership predication 
relationship and are therefore, in some sense, “reverse” predicational sentences. 
However, I also agree with Declerck (1988) that specificational sentences do not involve 
a hyponymy relation and that specificational meaning is not tied to a particular word 
order. Where my account advances on this literature is by showing that the lack o f a 
hyponymy relation does not prevent a class-membership relation. For sentences with 
definite NP predicates, such as (78) above, there is, as Declerck comments, no difference 
in generality. However, what Declerck does not recognize is that the predicate still 
denotes a set. This property o f definite descriptions allows the copular sentence to 
acquire both predicational (x is a member of the set Y) and specificational (x makes up 
the complete membership o f the set Y) interpretations. Unlike Blom and Daalder’s 
(1977) analysis, this account is not dependent upon word order.
3.3.3.4 Interim summary
Throughout §3 .3 .3 ,1 have shown that in both (canonical and reverse) forms of 
specificational copular sentence, one o f the two NPs denotes a universally quantified, 
restricted and existentially presupposed set. This characteristic, which is inherent to the
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semantics o f definite noun phrases, is crucial for creating specificational meaning. As I 
go on to reveal in the following section, this analysis provides a comprehensive means 
of describing, and providing an explanation for, the limited distribution of indefinite NP 
subjects in the canonical specificational construction.
3.3.4 Explaining the distribution of indefinite noun phrases
In §3 .3 .3 ,1 presented a largely semantic, constructional account of specificational 
sentences. I showed that this analysis can account for Mikkelsen’s (2005) 
pronominalization data as well as accommodating reverse specificational sentences. In 
this section, I focus on the third and final set of data outlined in §3.3.1: the behaviour of 
indefinite noun phrases. So far, I have only examined specificational copular sentences 
containing definite noun phrases and have presented an analysis of specificational 
meaning which relies on the inherent semantics of definite descriptions. Here, I show 
that this account not only provides a reason as to why indefinite noun phrases rarely 
occur as the initial NP of a canonical specificational sentence but also explains why 
some indefinite noun phrase subjects are more acceptable than others.
From the Russellian analysis outlined in §3.3.2, definite descriptions are shown 
to involve proportional quantification, quantifying over and in relation to a set. 
Specifically, they express a universally quantified, restricted set. This means that the 
proportion o f the set they express is the complete set. While definite descriptions involve 
proportional quantification, indefinite noun phrases involve cardinal quantification. Like 
noun phrases introduced by some, many and numbers, such as four, indefinite 
descriptions express a quantity rather than a proportion. For instance, the noun phrase a 
man highlights one o f the members o f the set man. However, to understand this 
description, we do not need to know what the set man constitutes. The total number o f 
members in the set is irrelevant for the description and there are no restrictions in place 
for how general this set can be.
Because indefinite noun phrases involve cardinal, rather than proportional 
quantification, they are unlikely to occur as the subject of a canonical specificational 
sentence. When occurring in subject position, indefinite noun phrases denote individuals
rather than sets and so are unlikely to be interpreted as a semantic predicate, inducing a 
class-membership relation over a postcopular referent. Indefinite noun phrases are 
normally construed as sets or kinds only when occurring in the predicate nominal 
construction. However, while definite noun phrases denote very restricted sets, indefinite 
noun phrase predicates typically express general sets. For example in (79), John is 
identified as a member o f the set doctor. Here, a specificational interpretation o f this 
class-membership relation is not possible, since John does not come close to identifying 
the complete membership o f the set doctor. The analysis presented in §3.3.3, therefore 
provides an explanation as to why canonical specificational sentences with indefinite 
noun phrase subjects, such as (80), are usually ungrammatical.
(79) John is a doctor
(80) *A doctor is John
However, occasionally, specificational copular sentences are found with 
indefinite noun phrase subjects. Examples (81) and (82) are provided by Mikkelsen 
(2005: 155) and Declerck (1988: 21), respectively. The grammaticality o f these 
examples suggests that there is something special about these particular indefinite noun 
phrases that allows them to be accommodated (or coerced) into the subject position of 
the canonical specificational construction. From the analysis of specificational sentences 
outlined in §3.3.3, we would expect them to share some properties with definite noun 
phrases. A useful way into the discussion then, is to see how these examples compare to 
similar sentences containing definite noun phrase subjects and to ask what alternative 
function specificational sentences introduced by indefinite noun phrases provide.
(81) A philosopher who seems to share Kiparsky’s intuitions on some factive 
predicates is Unger (1972), who argues... (Mikkelsen 2005: 155)
(82) An example o f a superpower is the Soviet Union (Declerck 1988: 21)
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When we examine the function o f these two examples, it appears that they are in fact 
instances o f two separate specificational constmctions. I suggest that while the example 
shown in (82) serves to express a quantity (one) of a restricted and existentially 
presupposed set, the primary function o f examples such as (81) is to bypass the 
existentiality condition o f definite noun phrases. I discuss instances o f each type in turn, 
beginning with those that behave similarly to example (81).
Mikkelsen (2005: 155) observes that example (81) occurs in a discourse about 
Kiparsky. However, the existence o f a set of philosophers who share Kiparsky ’s 
intuitions is not asserted in the prior discourse and cannot be assumed to be shared 
knowledge. Such examples therefore differ from specificational sentences containing 
definite noun phrase subjects. To illustrate this point, consider the examples in (83) and 
(84).16
(83) Presupposed: A psychologist works at Scarsdale Hospital
a) The psychologist that works at the hospital is Dr. Amy Schrute
b) The psychologist is Dr. Amy Schrute
(84) Presupposed: There are several psychologists working at Scarsdale Hospital
a) #A psychologist who works at the hospital is Dr. Amy Schrute
b) *A psychologist is Dr. Amy Schrute
From (83), we can see that specificational sentences with definite noun phrase subjects 
presuppose the existence o f the restricted set. However, the indefinite specificational
16 In these examples, I have chosen to use that to introduce the relative clause in the definite NP in (83) 
and who in the indefinite NP in (84). I do this simply as a response to Bolinger’s (1977: 12) claim that 
while the use o f that is associated with given information, who indicates that the relative clause expresses 
new information. For example, Bolinger argues that in (i), the hearer is informed of the person s 
availability, while in (ii) their availability is not at issue. Although the information-structural distinction 
between that and who is only a tendency, and cannot alone be used as a diagnostic of given/new 
information, it is likely that specificational sentences introduced by the indefinite article will prefer use of 
who rather than that, as in (81).
(i) ...som eone else who I knew was available (Bolinger 1977. 12)
(ii) ...som eone else that I knew was available (Bolinger 1977. 12)
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sentence shown in (84) does not require that the existence of the restricted set of 
philosophers working at the hospital is established in the previous discourse context or 
by shared knowledge. In fact, as shown in (84a), this specificational sentence becomes 
unacceptable when occurring in this context. This suggests that, in contrast to (82) 
above, the function o f the indefinite article in (84) is not to describe a single member of 
an existentially presupposed set.
Instead, I argue that the primary function of examples such as (81) and (84) is to 
allow a specificational class-membership relation even when the restrictive set is not 
existentially presupposed. By introducing a specificational sentence with an indefinite 
article, the speaker is able to assert the existentiality of the set without it having to be 
shared knowledge. That is, the sentence in (84) effectively tells us both that there is a 
psychologist who works at the hospital and that Dr. Amy Schrute matches this 
description. Likewise, example (81) asserts that there is a philosopher who shares 
Kiparsky’s intuitions and that the referent Unger matches this description. When 
accommodated into the subject position of a canonical specificational sentence, 
indefinite noun phrases are therefore understood to denote an existentially asserted, 
restricted set and will be interpreted as the semantic predicate.17
Aside from these presuppositional differences, the definite and indefinite 
examples in (83) and (84) above differ as to whether the restrictive relative clause 
who/that works at the hospital can be omitted. While specificational sentences with
17 However, since the indefinite article does not provide universal quantification over this set, there is no 
exhaustivity presupposition such that the referent is necessarily the only individual that can match the 
description in the initial NP. This becomes even clearer when we examine specificational sentences with 
plural noun phrases in initial position. The definite NP subject in (i) involves proportional quantification, 
denoting a complete set. From this, it follows that the three individuals listed in the postcopular position 
make up a complete list o f the members in this set. However, in (ii), the plural set is not universally 
quantified and so the three individuals listed in the postcopular position are understood as making up 
either the full set or a subset o f members. For this reason, the verb include is required rather than be. 
Despite this, sentence (ii) still expresses a specificational meaning; as Higgins (1979: 161) observes, other 
verbs than the copular permit “a similar meaning relation” (see also footnote 12). This begs the question as 
to why indefinite NP subjects are ever permitted in the copular construction. I suggest that the reason is 
because the initial set is marked as singular and so can only be matched to a single referent in any one act 
o f specification.
(i) The psychologists working at the hospital are Amy Schrute, Carl Scott and Andrea Smith
(ii) Psychologists working at the hospital include (*are) Amy Schrute, Carl Scott and Andrea Smith
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definite NP subjects frequently occur with unmodified head nouns, specification^ 
sentences with indefinite NP subjects do not, shown in (80) and (84b) above. In what 
follows, I explain why the indefinite NP subjects o f specificational sentences are 
restricted in this way.
As I noted in §3.3.2, definite noun phrases always quantify over and in relation 
to a restricted set. However, part o f this restrictive set information is often left 
unexpressed. For instance, the incomplete description provided in example (60), 
repeated here for convenience as (85), may express the same proposition as that in (86), 
where the background set is recovered in the form of a relative clause.18
(85) The children are naughty
(86) The children that live here are naughty
Kearns (2000: 80) suggests that the reason why this information is frequently omitted is 
because, “the speaker or writer assumes, or presupposes, that the audience can identify 
the background set, either from general shared knowledge, or because the information 
has been given earlier in the discourse”.
For definite descriptions then, a restrictive context is expected and is assumed 
when left unexpressed. However, from the analysis presented above, the specificational 
examples with indefinite NP subjects, shown in (81) and (84), are not expected to 
behave in this way. Since the restricted set is not presupposed to exist and the indefinite 
NP serves to assert the existence this set, the information in the relative clause cannot be 
left unexpressed. If  the initial NP is not understood to denote a restricted set, it cannot 
fulfill the requirements o f the specificational copular construction, shown in §3.3.3.2.
Moving on now to the specificational example given in (82) above, and repeated 
here as (87), I suggest that this indefinite NP serves not to assert the existence of a
18 In this semantic approach to quantifier domain restriction, sentences (85) and (86) are syntactically 
distinct, but they express the same semantic proposition. It is not assumed that incomplete descriptions 
contain unexpressed restrictive material at some underlying level of syntactic representation (e.g. a 
relative clause). Such an analysis is dubbed the ‘syntactic ellipsis’ approach by Stanley and Szabô (2000), 
and is strongly criticized therein.
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restricted set, but to express a quantity (one) of a restricted and existentially presupposed 
set. Although example (87) is introduced by the indefinite article, this type of indefinite 
specificational sentence is usually introduced by the number one. For instance, while 
(84a) above was shown to be unacceptable in contexts where the restricted set is 
presupposed, the parallel sentence in (88a), introduced by one, is acceptable as long as it 
is understood as corresponding in meaning to (88b), selecting a single member out o f the 
existentially presupposed and restricted set of psychologists working at the hospital.
(87) An example o f a superpower is the Soviet Union
(88) Presupposed: There are several psychologists working at Scarsdale Hospital
a) One psychologist that works at the hospital is Dr. Amy Schrute
b) One o f  the psychologists working at the hospital is Dr. Amy Schmte
c) ??One psychologist is Dr. Amy Schmte
d) One such psychologist is Dr. Amy Schmte
Again, as shown in (88c), this type o f indefinite specificational sentence also 
becomes less acceptable when part o f the restrictive set information is left unexpressed. 
The reason for this lies in the differing semantics of indefinite and definite noun phrases. 
While definite noun phrases express proportional quantification over and in relation to a 
restrictive set, indefinite noun phrases involve cardinal quantification; they express a 
quantity o f a set without placing any restrictions on how general this set can be. 
Consequently, when occurring with an unmodified head noun, as in (88c), the number 
one is understood to select a single member out of the very general set of all 
psychologists that exist. Only when the indefinite noun phrase contains either restrictive 
information (as in (88a)) or overtly refers back to an earlier mention of the restricted set 
(as in (88d)), will the indefinite noun phrase be permitted as occurring in the 
specificational constmction.
However, a few exceptions to this pattern are presented in (89) and (90) below.
In these examples, the head noun is not modified by a restrictive relative clause, that is,
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part o f the restrictive set information (examples o f  superpowers and approaches to the 
problem at hand) is left unexpressed. I suggest that the reason for this is that the 
restrictive information is presupposed lexically by the head noun. For example, an 
example must be an example o f  something. Likewise, an approach must be an approach 
to something. If  this is the case, then these indefinite noun phrase subjects are permitted 
because the head noun requires a complement that can only be fulfilled by incorporating 
restrictive information from the discourse context.19
(89) Presupposed: The are several superpowers in the world
a) A good example is the Soviet Union
b) One example is the Soviet Union
(90) Presupposed: There are several possible approaches to the problem at hand
a) A good approach is to enlist the help o f local businessmen
b) One approach is to enlist the help o f local businessmen
From this analysis, we have seen that specificational sentences with indefinite 
NP subjects perform two possible roles: they are used to either assert the existence of a 
restricted set or to express a quantity o f a restricted and existentially presupposed set. 
From the data, it seems that indefinite noun phrases are normally permitted into the 
subject position only if they quantify in relation to an overt and restricted set, which is 
often presented in the form o f a relative clause. I explained this data by appealing to the 
inherent semantics o f indefinite noun phrases. Unlike definite noun phrases, indefinite 
NPs do not provide restrictions as to the generality of the set they quantify. 
Consequently, when this restrictive set information is not overtly provided in an 
indefinite NP, it will not normally be assumed unless specified by the lexical head or by
19 It is interesting that unmodified indefinite NP subjects become more acceptable if the head noun depicts 
a set that is already limited in number. For example, (i), involving the more restricted set superpower, 
seems to be more acceptable that the very general noun woman in (ii).
(i) ??One superpower is the Soviet Union
(ii) *One woman is Susan
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anaphoric reference (see above). Since specificational sentences involve a class- 
membership relation between a referring expression and the description of a restricted 
set, only indefinite noun phrases that overtly provide restrictive set information can be 
coerced into the subject position o f the canonical specificational construction.
This analysis o f specificational sentences with indefinite noun phrase subjects 
has a number o f advantages over alternative accounts. For example, in defense o f the 
inverse analysis o f specificational sentences, Mikkelsen (2005) attempts to explain the 
behaviour o f indefinite noun phrase subjects as a consequence of information-structure. 
In what follows, I show that this account cannot accommodate the full range o f data. The 
upshot is that by assuming an inverse analysis of specificational sentences, we cannot 
explain the distribution o f indefinite noun phrases.
In §3 .3 .1 ,1 explained that the behaviour o f indefinite noun phrases poses a 
problem for the inverse analysis o f specificational sentences. On this account, 
specificational sentences are derived via a movement operation which places the 
underlying predicate in the precopular position. Moro (1997) assumes that movement of 
the predicative noun phrase into the subject position can occur freely. Consequently, 
since indefinite noun phrases often occur as the predicate of a predicational copular 
sentence, they should, in theory, be able to occur in the subject position of a 
specificational sentence. Ungrammatical examples such as (92) are therefore unexpected 
on this account.
(91) John is a doctor
(92) *A doctor is John
In order to account for the behavior of indefinite noun phrases, Mikkelsen (2005) 
goes beyond Moro (1997), providing limits as to when “inversion” i.e. the raising o f the 
predicative noun phrase, can occur. She notes that the raising of the referential noun 
phrase to the subject position is the unmarked or most likely occurrence; Other things 
being equal, the most referential DP occupies the subject position (Mikkelsen 2005. 
163). However, Mikkelsen argues that if  the predicative NP contains discourse-old
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information it may be understood as the topic of the sentence. Consequently, “the 
preference for the topic to be in subject position may override this default alignment”, 
resulting in a specificational sentence (Mikkelsen 2005: 163).20
Although a discourse-old predicate does not force a specificational argument 
structure, Mikkelsen argues that the raising of the predicative noun phrase will only be 
permitted if this information-structure criterion is fulfilled.21 By introducing this caveat, 
Mikkelsen (2005. 153) explains the restrictions on indefinite specificational subjects as a 
consequence o f the association o f indefinite noun phrases with discourse-new 
information. As a result, indefinite noun phrase predicates rarely meet the criterion for a 
verified topic, and do not qualify for the role of subject.
Mikkelsen (2005) suggests that indefinite noun phrases can only move into 
subject position if  they contain discourse-old information.22 This analysis can therefore 
accommodate examples such as (81), repeated here as (93). Mikkelsen notes that in this 
example, the indefinite noun phrase subject involves discourse-old information, since 
Kiparsky has been mentioned earlier in the text.
(93) A philosopher who seems to share Kiparsky’s intuitions on some factive
predicates is Unger (1972), who argues... (Mikkelsen 2005: 155)
20 A potential problem with Mikkelsen’s (2005) analysis is that she assumes that ‘topic’ and ‘discourse- 
old’ are equivalent notions. However, topics may be discourse new. For example, in (i), that guy that 
keeps calling is new to the discourse even though the individual described is known to the hearer.
(i) That guy that keeps calling, he turned up at my work today.
21 Mikkelsen (2005) argues that a discourse-old predicate cannot force a specificational alignment, in 
which the predicate precedes the subject, because such an analysis would predict that sentences such as (i) 
could not occur. While Mikkelsen (2005: 177) labels this example ‘predicational’ in response to its 
alignment, such sentences are referred to as ‘reverse specificational’ sentences elsewhere in this thesis.
(i) A: Who is the winner? B. John is the winner.
22 A similar explanation for the fact that specificational subjects are typically definite noun phrases is 
provided by Declerck (1988). Like Mikkelsen (2005), he suggests that indefinite noun phrases are used to 
introduce new information and only occur as the subject o f a specificational sentence if they contain 
“modifiers expressing old information” (Declerck 1988: 19).
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However, as M ikkelsen (2005: 159) herself acknowledges, even when indefinite noun 
phrase predicates do express discourse-old information they may still not be permitted as 
the subject o f a specificational sentence, shown in (94b). Consequently, Mikkelsen’s 
information-structure account does not sufficiently counteract the serious claims made 
against the inverse analysis for its inability to explain the behavior of indefinite noun 
phrases.
(94) (a) A. I ’d love to marry a doctor.
B. John’s a doctor! [predicational]
(b) A. I ’d love to marry a doctor.
B. *A doctor is John! [specificational]
In contrast, the analysis proposed in this thesis can explain why some indefinite 
specificational sentences, such as (93), are grammatical, while others, such as (94b) are 
not. Mikkelsen (2005) is o f course correct that definite noun phrases are associated with 
discourse familiar information. This follows straightforwardly from an analysis which 
views definite noun phrases as involving the universal quantification of an existentially
presupposed set. However, while Mikkelsen claims that the example in (93) also
contains discourse-old information, the set philosopher who shares Kiparsky’s intuitions 
is not presupposed. As I explained above, specificational sentences with indefinite NP 
subjects therefore have a unique function: to assert (rather than presuppose) the 
existence o f a restricted set at the same time as involving it in a class-membership 
relation.
Rather than requiring discourse-old or presupposed information, it seems then 
that the fundamental criterion for a (canonical) specificational sentence is that the initial 
NP must express a restricted set. Since indefinite noun phrases can express a quantity of 
a very general set, this restrictive set information must be overtly provided. This 
criterion seems to be much more consistent than the information-structure distinction 
proposed by Mikkelsen. Regardless o f whether the subject, a scientist, is discourse-new 
or discourse old, (95) is an unacceptable specificational sentence. While Mikkelsen s
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account cannot predict this, the semantic analysis presented here states that indefinite 
noun phrases require restrictive set information in order to occur as the subject o f a 
grammatical specificational sentence, as in (96).
(95) *A scientist is Dr John Matthews
(96) A scientist who is currently working on the new drug is Dr John Matthews
An alternative explanation for the fact that indefinite specificational subjects 
require restrictive or modifying information has been proposed by Heycock and Kroch 
(2002). They comment that indefinite specificational subjects “are good only to the 
extent that they have a “specific” reading” (Heycock and Kroch 2002: 112). Since 
additional material is often said to facilitate a specific reading for indefinite noun 
phrases (see Fodor and Sag 1982), one could argue that the grammaticality o f relativized 
indefinite specificational subjects is due to a specificity condition. In this analysis, a 
scientist, in (95) above, is considered to be a non-specific indefinite noun phrase; that is, 
the speaker has no particular scientist in mind. However, in the specificational sentence 
in (96), a scientist that is currently working on the new drug is a specific indefinite NP, 
since it can be argued that the speaker (although perhaps not the hearer) has a particular 
individual in mind.
However, there is an important problem with this explanation: specificity is 
linked to referential use. From the following pair o f examples, we can see that the 
specific indefinite noun phrase subject of the predicational copular sentence in (97) 
agrees with the gender-specific tag question. However, this is not possible for the 
specificational sentence in (98).23
(97) A doctor who finds cures for rare diseases lives there, doesn’t he?
(98) *A doctor who finds cures for rare diseases is John Almond, isn’t he?
23 However, anaphoric it is also not possible for example (98), as shown in the example below. The reason 
for this is that it is inherently definite and cannot refer to indefinite noun phrases.
(i) *A doctor who finds cures for rare diseases is John Almond, isn t it?
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This suggests that when occurring in the specificational construction, indefinite noun 
phrases are treated as semantic predicates, describing a restricted set doctor who finds  
cures fo r  rare diseases, rather than referring to an individual. Furthermore, since 
unmodified noun phrases can have both generic and specific readings, this account does 
not satisfactorily explain why sentences such as (95) above, are ungrammatical.
In this section, I have shown that as well as accounting for Mikkelsen’s (2005) 
pronominalization data and reverse specificational sentences, my constructional analysis 
of specificational meaning can also explain why some indefinite noun phrases can be 
accommodated into the subject position of a canonical specificational sentence and 
provides restrictions as to when they are allowed to perform this role. In addition, this 
data, which shows that restrictively modified noun phrases are preferred over 
unmodified indefinite noun phrases, provides support for my analysis o f specificational 
sentences, in which a restricted set (existentially presupposed or asserted) enters into a 
class-membership predication relation with a referring expression.
3.4 Chapter summary
I began this chapter by claiming that //-clefts should be examined in relation to other 
specificational copular constructions (see §3.1). However, as I explained in §3.2, there is 
currently no agreed definition o f what a specificational sentence is or how it works. As a 
result, in § 3 .3 ,1 built up my own analysis o f specificational copular constructions. I 
began by examining the role o f definite noun phrases in these sentences and adopted a 
Russellian analysis o f definite descriptions. I claimed that specificational meaning 
results from a class-membership predication relation involving definite NP predicates. I 
showed that my analysis o f specificational copular sentences is able to both 
accommodate and explain more data than the alternative accounts. In chapter 4 , 1 apply 
this analysis o f NP be NP  specificational sentences to clefts. I suggest that from this 
perspective, our understanding o f the behaviour and structure of //-clefts can be much 
improved.
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4. A CONSTRUCTIONAL ACCOUNT OF CLEFT SENTENCES AS 
SPECIFICATIONAL STRUCTURES
In this chapter, I apply the constructional account of specificational NP be NP  sentences 
from chapter 3 to //-clefts. This leads me to argue for a (non-derivational) extraposition 
account o f //-clefts, in which the cleft clause is analysed as a restrictive relative, 
modifying the element it. I claim that this ‘discontinuous constituent’ functions like a 
definite noun phrase, allowing //-clefts to be analysed as involving a nominal predication 
relation, just like the N P be NP  sentences in §3 .3 .1 show how once we take this step, 
many o f the //-cleft’s seemingly idiosyncratic properties are inherited from the wider 
specificational construction and can be explained either as the result of the semantics of 
definite noun phrases or as a product o f specificational meaning.
The chapter is structured as follows. In §4 .1 ,1 outline my analysis of //-clefts and 
go on to show what it buys us. In this section, I frame my discussion in response to the 
expletive analyses discussed in §3.1. Focusing in particular on the //-cleft’s pragmatic 
properties and on the status o f the cleft clause, I show that my analysis, which views 
clefts primarily as specificational copular sentences, both fits and explains the data far 
better. In § 4 .2 ,1 explain how the particular analysis o f //-clefts argued for in this thesis is 
superior to other extraposition accounts that have been proposed in the cleft literature. 
Here, I outline some fundamental problems with the earlier transformational accounts 
and show how my analysis advances on the recent ‘discontinuous constituent’ accounts 
of Percus (1997) Hedberg (1990, 2000) and Han and Hedberg (2008).
W hat is unique about the analysis argued for here is that it assumes that //-clefts 
and specificational copular sentences in general involve a nominal predication relation 
that is tied up with the semantics o f definite noun phrases. This provides support for a 
discontinuous constituent analysis by explaining why //-clefts should contain a definite- 
like description in subject position. Furthermore, although other authors have identified 
a number o f  properties that //-clefts share with definite noun phrases, I explain how these 
properties come about by applying classic philosophical work on definite descriptions to 
the //-cleft data. Finally, in §4 .3 ,1 respond to some of the arguments that have been
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raised against extraposition analyses o f /7-clefts. Here, I claim that these objections do 
not represent an insurmountable problem for the analysis proposed in this thesis and I 
show that much o f  the “difficult” data can be accommodated.
4.1 A motivated analysis of /f-clefts
In this section, I describe an analysis o f /7-clefts which treats them as a subtype of 
specificational copular sentence. I argue that the initial it and the cleft clause together 
form a discontinuous definite description, with it functioning both like the definite 
article and as a semantically general head noun. The cleft clause is classified as an 
extraposed restrictive relative clause which modifies it. With this analysis in place, my 
account o f  specificational meaning from chapter 3 can be extended to /7-clefts.' My 
claim is that /7-clefts inherit from the wider (canonical) specificational copular 
construction. This is shown in the diagrammatic representation given in Figure 4.1. Like 
other specificational copular sentences, the /7-cleft is a nominal predication structure 
containing a (discontinuous) definite NP predicate. The focused postcopular NP (the 
clefited constituent) refers to the complete membership o f the set described by the 
definite noun phrase. In what follows, I go through the reasoning that brings me to this 
analysis o f /7-clefts and show that many of the /7-cleft’s functional and structural 
properties fall out from my analysis.
1 My discussion centres on /7-clefts with NP foci (as shown in Figure 4.1). As I explained in §1.1, /7-clefts 
also allow a variety o f  non-nominal elements into the postcopular position. However, in §5.3,1 show that 
the range o f possible /7-cleft foci is not inherited from other constructions. Since the purpose of this 
chapter is to highlight patterns o f correspondence between /7-clefts and other specificational constructions,
1 do not discuss /7-clefts with non-NP foci in detail here. These instances are given a diachronic 
explanation and are properly integrated into my analysis in chapters 7 and 8.
2 As shown in Figure 4.1, my analysis effectively reduces idiosyncrasy in the /7-cleft construction to two 
main properties: the restrictive modification of the pronoun it and the extraposition of the relative clause. 
These construction-specific properties are o f course problematic for this analysis if they are not motivated 
(see §4.3) and I go on to provide a diachronic explanation for them in chapters 7 and 8.
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The canonical specificational construction
Figure 4.1 The it-cleft construction and the overarching specificational schema
4.1.1 A family o f specificational copuiar constructions
In this section, I explain the reasoning behind ray analysis o f /7-clefts. I start from the 
premise that /7-clefts have a specificational meaning. For example, the /7-cleft in ( l)  
identifies orange soda  as my favourite drink. As I noted in §3.2, /7-clefts share this 
property with noncleft specificational NP be NP  sentences and with the so-called 
‘pseudoclefts’ (including ///-clefts and vv/z-clefts).
(1) It’s orange soda that I like best
(2) W hat I like best is orange soda
(3) The thing that I like best is orange soda






Since all o f  these examples share the same specifying function and (as copular 
constructions) they are formally related, I suggest that these sentence types form a 
“family” o f constructions. In construction grammar, the language system is represented 
as a hierarchical network o f constructions. Constructions are related to one another via 
inheritance links. I suggest that what links all o f these types of specificational copular 
sentence is that they all inherit from the same basic schema.
In § 3 .3 ,1 suggested that specificational meaning is the product o f a special type 
o f nominal predication relation. In such sentences, the description of a restricted set 
enters into a class-membership predication relation with a referring expression. Since 
definite noun phrases inherently describe a universally quantified restricted set, this 
analysis explains why definite descriptions are so common in specificational N P be NP  
sentences. I f  cleft sentences are indeed specificational, it follows that they should also 
involve the description o f a set and that they may well exhibit properties in common 
with definite noun phrases. As we saw in §3.3.4, the restrictive set information found in 
definite noun phrases can be given, or recovered, in the form of a relative clause. 
Consequently, the clausal constituent in cleft sentences may well provide this restrictive 
set information.
W ith rA-clefts, the comparison with specificational sentences introduced by 
definite noun phrases is easily made. 77r-clefts are defined by Collins (1991b: 483)) as 
pseudoclefts “introduced by the in conjunction with the proform equivalents of the 
English interrogatives {thing, one, place, time, reason, way)”. In other words, //i-clefts, 
such as (5), are introduced by a precopular definite description containing a restrictive 
relative clause.
(5) [The [one [that left]]] was Howard [//i-cleft]
Following a Russellian analysis o f definite descriptions, we can therefore assume that 
the definite article quantifies proportionally over the restrictive set one that left, with the 
lexical item one performing the role o f head noun, which the relative clause modifies.
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As with canonical (i.e. non-reversed) NP beN P  specificational sentences, the unique 
member o f this restricted set (the referent Howard) is located in the postcopular position.
This analysis can be extended to w/z-clefts, with the only difference being that 
the precopular constituent is a ‘fused relative’ construction. Ward, Bimer and 
Huddleston (2002: 1420) show that fused relatives, such as that found in (6) below, 
correspond to definite noun phrases with integrated relative clauses: in this case ‘thex  [I 
like x  best] ’.
(6) [What [I like best]] is orange soda
From this, it follows that the introductory element what performs the two roles of 
providing definite-like quantification as well as acting as the head noun of the 
description. As a result, the analysis o f specificational meaning as involving a nominal 
predication relation can be applied to w/z-clefts.
//-clefts do not show the same superficial correspondence to noncleft 
specificational sentences as //z-clefts and w/z-clefts. The reason for this is that the cleft 
clause is located in an extraposed sentence-final position. However, once we assume that 
the cleft clause is a restrictive relative (an assumption backed by considerable evidence 
presented in §4.3), the formal resemblance between //-clefts and specificational NP be 
NP  sentences becomes apparent. The function o f a restrictive relative clause is to modify 
a nominal antecedent. However, it is generally agreed throughout the cleft literature that 
the cleft clause does not restrictively modify the postcopular constituent.3 So what then 
does it modify? The answer is that the cleft clause restrictively modifies, and forms a 
semantic unit, with the initial it.
(7) [It t;] was Howard [that left];
3 For example, when talking about his earlier extraposition (or “transposition ) theory, Jespersen (1937. 
83) notes that “the clause is felt to be, and is treated like, a relative clause, though it does not logically 
restrict the word with which it is connected”.
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Although it normally functions as a complete pronominal NP, I suggest that in /7-clefts, 
this element performs a role equivalent to the one or the thing in ///-clefts. The initial it 
and the cleft clause operate together like a discontinuous definite description^ that is, the 
constituent it provides definite-like quantification as well as acting as the head noun 
which is restrictively modified by the cleft clause.4
I conclude then that all types o f cleft sentence, including /7-clefts, can be 
analysed as subtypes o f specificational copular sentence.5 In these examples, 
specificational meaning comes about as a result of a nominal predication relation 
involving definite NP predicates. While the definite description denotes a restricted set, 
the postcopular element provides the membership of this set, thereby accounting for the 
identifying meaning associated with these constructions. However, by effectively 
reducing cleft constructions to specificational NP be NP  sentences, we are left to ask, 
what is the theoretical significance o f the concept “cleft”? Should cleft sentences be 
grouped together as forming a construction distinct from so-called “noncleff ’ 
specificational sentences?
Where cleft sentences differ from other specificational sentences is that the 
definite description is headed by a semantically general or underspecified noun. For 
example, while noncleft specificational sentences, such as (8), involve meaningful
4 Support for a unified analysis o f cleft sentences comes from Lambrecht (2001: 469), who notes that the 
constituent what in w/i-clefts is a “composite element combining in a single word the functions of the 
morphemes it and that which in IT clefts appear in discontinuous form”. He draws evidence for this 
suggestion from French “where what is expressed by the sequence ce que or ce qui ‘it that’”. On this basis, 
Lambrecht argues in favour o f an expletive analysis of cleft sentences in which the introductory items 
what, it...that and the one that are all semantically inert dummy elements (see also §6.2.1). However, the 
suggestion that it and that form a unit, corresponding to the composite element what provides equal 
support for the analysis presented here, in which the cleft pronoun and the cleft clause function together as 
a discontinuous definite description.
5 In addition to ///-clefts, w/z-clefts and /7-clefts, other types of cleft sentence have been noted in the 
literature. While these are also subtypes of specificational copular construction, they express meanings 
that go beyond or differ from definite-like quantification. As a result, I do not discuss these instances here. 
For example, a//-clefts, which are classified by Collins (1991b: 483) as a distinct type of pseudocleft, have 
a “below expectation” scalar reading (see Traugott 2008). For example, the meaning of all in (i) 
corresponds to the only thing.
(i) All he cares about is himself
Furthermore, as I explained in §3.1, the /7-cleft’s structural configuration is shared by demonstrative clefts 
and there-clefts. While demonstrative clefts have an additional deictic meaning, there-clefts do not 
involve definite-like quantification, as shown in §4.1.2.3.
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nouns, the corresponding cleft sentences are introduced by semantically general nouns 
such as one or thing, as shown in the th-cleft given in (9).
These nouns require modification in order to give a sufficiently informative description; 
without it they cannot identify a restricted set. For this reason, in cleft sentences, the 
relative clause, which provides restrictive set information, is obligatory, as shown in (10) 
and ( l l ) .6
(10) *'The one was Howard
(11) *What is champagne
So-called “truncated clefts”, such as (12), provide an apparent exception to the claim 
that cleft sentences always require restrictive modification. However, I suggest that these 
examples do not involve the “truncation” o f an /7-cleft, but instead are instances o f a 
separate specificational construction, involving it as a full pronoun, which is anaphoric 
to a complete set description. Similar analyses are proposed by Hedberg (2000) and 
Mikkelsen (2007).
(12) A. Is John the murderer? B. No, it’s Gary.
Therefore, once we incorporate the different types of cleft sentence into a unified 
analysis o f  specificational copular constructions, the only property that distinguishes 
“clefts” from “nonclefits” is that, in the former, the precopular description is introduced 
by an underspecified or semantically general head noun which requires restrictive
6 Lambrecht (2001: 469) uses the ungrammaticality o f sentences such as (10) and (11) as evidence that the 
one and what are “dummy elements” rather than argument expressions. However, the analysis provided in 
this thesis explains why these examples are ungrammatical, without requiring that the introductory items 
are semantically redundant.
(8) The bassoon player is Howard




modification. It is not at all clear to me whether this feature is sufficient to collect or 
group these different cleft constructions together as forming an overarching cleft 
schema. For many authors, the concept “cleft” is inextricably tied to the correspondence 
of these sentences to their noncopular counterparts7. However, since I view these 
examples primarily as specificational copular sentences, the term “cleft” has no 
theoretical significance here8. As a result, it may be the case that the concept o f “cleft 
sentence” has no psychological reality either. What is more, my unified analysis of 
specificational copular sentences raises the question of whether the //¿-cleft should be 
recognized as a distinct construction. Unlike //-clefts and w/i-clefts, //¿-clefts are not 
formally distinct from noncleft NP be NP  sentences. Since the semantic content o f the 
head noun is a matter o f  degree, rather than an absolute distinction, it is not clear where 
the dividing line between them is and whether they truly represent two separate 
constructions.
In this analysis then, cleft sentences are treated as fully fledged copular 
constructions rather than as focusing devices which “cleave” the informational content 
o f simple noncopular sentences. The //-cleft analysis formulated here therefore differs 
considerably from the expletive analyses outlined in §3.1 (including Jespersen 1937, 
Chomsky 1977, W illiams 1980, Delahunty 1982, Rochemont 1986, Heggie 1988 and E. 
Kiss 1998). The expletive approach maximizes correspondence between //-clefts and 
their noncopular counterparts. As Hedberg (1990: 35) comments, this approach results in 
a counterintuitive analysis in which “nothing is what it seems”: the constituent it is 
analysed as a meaningless expletive element, the postcopular constituent is really a 
preposed argument and although the cleft clause looks and behaves like a restrictive 
relative, it is treated as a non-modifying predicate.
7 For example, Collins (1991b: 484) limits his examples of ¿/¡-clefts to only those sentences that can be 
analysed “as in any sense a cleaving of a simple sentence”. Likewise, Lambrecht (2001. 503) argues that 
the nonequivalence between proverbial ¡¿-clefts and noncopular subject-predicate sentences strongly 
suggests noncleft status o f this construction” (see §5.2).
8 Ward, Bimer and Huddleston (2002: 1423) note that the terms ‘cleft’ and ‘pseudocleft’ “serve as 
convenient metaphors” for the fact that while ¿/-clefts almost always have noncopular paraphrases, wh- 
clefts and ¿/¡-clefts do not always have simple sentence counterparts.
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In contrast, I have argued that the initial it is not an inert element and in fact 
plays an important semantic function, providing definite-like quantification as well as 
acting as the head noun o f the description o f a set. As I go on to show in §4.1.2, once we 
recognize the quantifying function o f initial it, we can provide an explanation for many 
of the ¿/-cleft’s pragmatic properties; without acknowledging the semantic contribution 
of this word, we cannot successfully account for the exhaustiveness and existentiality 
presuppositions in //-clefts.
In m y account, the cleft clause is analysed a restrictive relative which modifies 
the initial constituent it but is in an extraposed sentence-final position. I assume that this 
property o f the //-cleft is motivated by information structure principles, such as the 
tendency for heavy constituents to occur near the end of the clause (see Ward, Bimer 
and Huddleston 2002: 1372). Although this analysis of the cleft clause is not 
uncontroversial, I provide further evidence for it in §4.1.3.1 show that with this analysis 
in place, we can account for many of the //-cleft’s (seemingly contradictory) properties 
without stipulating a special type o f clause that is unique to the //-cleft construction.
W hile other authors in the cleft literature have advocated similar analyses to the 
one proposed here (see §4.2), what is truly unique about this analysis is that it is 
integrated into an original account of specificational sentences. I have argued that 
specificational meaning results from a nominal predication relation involving definite 
noun phrase predicates. This not only provides support for a discontinuous constituent 
analysis o f //-clefts but it also explains why the definite-like description in //-clefts is so 
important to its specifying function. The upshot is a truly unified analysis of 
specificational copular sentences as involving the same type o f nominal predication 
relation. This compares favourably to Heggie’s (1988) attempts at integrating an 
expletive analysis o f  //-clefts into a unified account of copular constructions. As I 
explained in §3.1, Heggie assumes that the cleft clause in //-clefts is directly predicated 
of the clefted constituent and concludes that all copular constructions involve a 
predication relation o f some sort. However, Heggie’s expletive analysis does not provide 
the //-cleft with the same type o f predication relation that exists in other specificational
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sentences. As a result, she fails to recognize the role of nominal predication in creating 
specificational meaning for all such constructions.
4.1.2 Explaining the it-c/eff’s pragmatic properties
In this section, I provide support for the ‘discontinuous constituent’ analysis of//-clefts 
presented in §4 .1 .1 .1 show that many of the //-cleft’s pragmatic properties, including 
focus, existentiality, exhaustiveness, contrast and givenness, are inherited from the wider 
specificational construction and from definite noun phrases in general. While others 
have recognized such similarities between the behaviour of definite noun phrases and //- 
clefts (see §4.2), here I provide an explanation for them in relation to my own account of 
specificational sentences, which involves a Russellian analysis o f definite descriptions.
I conclude that the extraposition-ffom-NP analysis argued for in this thesis 
therefore has more explanatory power than the expletive analyses outlined in §3.1. In 
these syntax-centred approaches, the pragmatic properties o f //-clefts are often regarded 
as peculiar to clefts. For instance, Delahunty (1984: 73) suggests that they lie “in the 
nature o f cleft focusing itse lf’. An important advantage to the analysis proposed here is 
that it is able to explain the //-cleft’s semantic and pragmatic properties by appealing to 
more general linguistic patterns.
4.1.2.1 Focus
The //-cleft is widely regarded as a focusing construction; that is, the primary 
informational content is placed in the syntactically marked postcopular position and is 
typically coupled with prosodic prominence, as shown in (13).
(13) It was H o w a r d  that left
For proponents o f the expletive analysis, the //-cleft’s main function is to mark focus 
syntactically, providing an information-structure variant of corresponding simple 
noncopular sentences. However, in the analysis proposed here, focus in //-clefts is shown 
to be due to inheritance from the wider specificational copular construction.
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I explained in §3.3.3 that specificational meaning in copular sentences results 
from a special type o f predication relationship involving definite noun phrases. This 
same predication relationship allows for two possible interpretations: a predicational 
reading in which the referent is described as having a particular property and a 
specificational reading in which the referent provides the complete membership o f a 
restricted set. The specificational reading is selected if either the referent is marked as 
focal by intonation, as in (14), or the referent is placed after the verb in a position that, in 
English, tends to contain the focal element, as shown in (15).
(14) J o h n  is the murderer
(15) The m urderer is John
From the premise that /7-clefts are specificational copular sentences, it follows 
that they should inherit this property (see Figure 4.1 above). As a result, I claim that it- 
clefts do not function primarily as a focusing device, operating as an alternative to 
noncopular sentences. Instead, their main function is to provide specificational meaning. 
Since specificational meaning involves the listing of the members of an established set, 
focus will inevitably fall on the referent or referents that make up the membership of this 
set.
4.1.2.2 Existential presuppositions
A further property o f the zY-cleft is that it is presuppositional; that is, the information 
given in the cleft clause is not part o f the assertion. For example, in sentence (16), the 
proposition that someone left is taken for granted as a precondition to the assertion that 
Howard  was the one who left. Presuppositions are preserved under negation. For 
instance, in (17), we are told that Howard didn ’t leave but the presupposition that 
somebody (else) did leave remains in force (see Halvorsen 1978). Tellingly, this same 
property is also found in sentences containing definite descriptions. For example, the 
sentences in (18) and (19) both presuppose that the murderer exists.
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(16) It was Howard that left
(17) It wasn ’ t Howard that left
(18) The m urderer is John
(19) The murderer isn’t John
I argue that for all types o f specificational copular sentence, existential presupposition 
can be explained as a consequence o f the definite-like elements contained within them. 
As I showed in §3.3.2, definite descriptions involve existential commitment. That is, by 
using a definite noun phrase the speaker assumes that the described set exists. 
Consequently, any analysis o f the presuppositional nature of cleft sentences must apply 
equally to definite descriptions.9
4.1.2.3 Exhaustiveness
In addition, it is often acknowledged that fr-clefits are exhaustive. For instance, the 
noncopular subject-predicate sentence given in (20) does not preclude the possibility that 
additional people besides H oward  also left on that occasion. However, from the 
corresponding fr-cleft presented as (21), we assume that Howard is the only person that 
left. This property o f  exhaustiveness is also found in specificational NP be NP  sentences 
containing definite descriptions. For example, (22) suggests that there is only one 
bassoon player in the band and that this description uniquely applies to Howard.
(20) Howard left [noncopular sentence]
(21) It was Howard that left [zY-cleft]
(22) The bassoon player was Howard [specificational NP be NP]
9 The concept o f presupposition plays an important role in arguments about where the boundary lies 
between semantics and pragmatics (Huang 2007). As a result, exactly how the existential presupposition 
of definite noun phrases should be analysed is a matter o f current debate. Some authors attempt to reduce 
the concept o f presupposition to ‘semantic entailment’ for positive sentences and conversational 
implicature’ for negative sentences (see Atlas and Levinson 1981 for this type of analysis o f zf-clefts). It is 
beyond the scope o f this thesis to review these arguments here. Consequently, I continue to use the cover 
term ‘presupposition’ for meanings that remain even when the sentence is negated.
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I suggest that the exhaustiveness in //-clefts and other specificational copular 
sentences originates from the semantics of definite descriptions. In §3.3.2,1 noted that 
definite noun phrases involve universal quantification. This means that they express a 
complete set, encompassing all o f its members.10 Specificational sentences have an 
identifying function: when we identify the referents that a universally quantified 
expression describes, we necessarily get a complete list o f all of the members of that set. 
This analysis is supported by Higgins (1979: 150), who claims that in specificational 
sentences, the postcopular noun phrase “says what constitutes or makes up the object 
[which for us is the set] referred to by the subject noun phrase”. As a result, once we 
treat the initial it and the cleft clause o f //-clefts as a definite-like description, the 
property o f  exhaustiveness falls out neatly.
This analysis contrasts with the assumptions o f Atlas and Levinson (1981: 29), 
who argue that “there is no exhaustiveness presupposition for clefts”. These authors 
suggest that positive clefts, such as (23), entail but do not presuppose that Mary kissed 
exactly one person. They claim that this proposition follows as a consequence o f the fact 
that the example in (23) lists only one person {John). This fact, accompanied by the 
presupposition that Mary kissed someone entails that Mary kissed exactly one person. 
However, for negative clefts, Atlas and Levinson claim that exhaustivity is neither 
entailed nor presupposed. For example, they argue that because the singular John can be 
replaced by the plural Mart and Rick in (24), there is no conventional implication that 
Mary kissed only one person. They note, “What is being contradicted here is not a 
“presupposition” but an assertion, and there is no problem of felicitousness” (Atlas and 
Levinson 1981: 54). For Atlas and Levinson then, the positive cleft in (23) entails that 
Mary kissed only one person, but this is not retained for the negative sentence in (24). 
Consequently, they argue that there is no exhaustiveness implicature in either sentence.
(23) It was John that Mary kissed (Atlas and Levinson 1981: 21)
10 As Hawkins (1978: 159) comments, definite noun phrases have “inclusive reference , that is, they 
“refer to the totality o f the objects or mass in the relevant shared set .
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(24) It w asn’t John that Mary kissed -  it was Mart and Rick
(Atlas and Levinson 1981: 25)
An alternative analysis is provided by Declerck (1988: 30). He argues that the 
positive cleft in (23) has an exhaustiveness implicature stemming from the Maxim of 
Quantity (‘Make your contribution as informative as required’). If the speaker adheres to 
this principle, they will provide an exhaustive list o f the values that satisfy the variable 
in Mary kissedx. He notes, “It is clear, then, that exhaustiveness follows directly from 
the act o f specification itself. Exhaustiveness is nothing else than ‘exhaustive listing’” 
(Declerck 1988: 30). Like Atlas and Levinson (1981), Declerck (1988: 31) assumes that 
negative clefts do not have an exhaustiveness implicature. He argues that examples such 
as (24) are not really specificational, since a value is not specified for a variable; without 
the act o f  specification, exhaustiveness is not implied. For Declerck (1988) as well as 
Atlas and Levinson (1981) then, exhaustiveness may be associated with positive clefts 
(either by entailment or implicature) but is not present in negative clefts.
However, in my analysis, exhaustiveness is a consequence of the universal 
quantification involved in definite descriptions; it is not necessary to stipulate that it is 
implicated or entailed by the act o f specification itself. Therefore, the implication o f (23) 
is not that M ary kissed only one person  but that John makes up the complete 
membership o f the set o f individuals that Mary kissed. Consequently, (24) is not 
problematic, since all that is asserted is that the entire set of people that Mary kissed is 
not made up o f  John but o f Mart and Rick. Atlas and Levinson are therefore correct that
(24) involves the contradiction o f an assertion rather than a presupposition. However, 
the universal quantification o f the defmite-like description is not part of this assertion 
and is consequently retained in the negative statement. Therefore, ‘exhaustiveness , or 
the fact that we are talking about the complete set o f people that Mary kissed, is an 
equally prominent feature o f both positive and negative clefts.
The situation is only slightly different for NP be NP specificational sentences. 
Unlike in /7-clefts, the precopular definite NP o f these sentences contains a head noun 
which is marked for number. Consequently, they specify whether the number of
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individuals that match the description is singular or plural. Nevertheless, the 
exhaustiveness condition behaves in the exact same way. For example, in (25), Howard 
and Paul are understood to be the only people that left. This is a consequence o f the fact 
that the ones that left is a universally quantified set, encompassing all o f its members.
(25) The on es that left were Howard and Paul [specificational NP be NP]
From this Russellian analysis, the exhaustiveness of //-clefts can therefore be 
traced to the semantic contribution o f the discontinuous constituent (involving it and the 
extraposed relative clause), which is a definite description. However, there are other 
cleft constructions, such as there-clefts, which are not exhaustive. The function of 
sentences such as (26) seems to be to acknowledge that the speaker is unsure o f all o f the 
members o f the described set; that is, they don’t really know what the set constitutes.
(26) Well, there’s John and M ary that are available to work Saturday [.. .and I think 
maybe Bob to o .. .I’ll ask around]
Nevertheless, these too correspond to a subset o f noncleft specificational 
sentences. W hile exhaustiveness is the necessary outcome of the standard use of definite 
or definite-like descriptions in specificational sentences, indefinite noun phrases do not 
involve universal quantification. Consequently, specificational sentences with indefinite 
subjects are not usually exhaustive, since the focal element only ever identifies a single 
member o f the (potentially plural) set (see §3.3.4). Take the examples in (27).
(27) A scientist that is currently working on the new drug is Dr. John M atthews... 
Another scientist working on the dmg is Dr Andrew Perry
In this example, two indefinite specificational sentences follow on from one another, 
citing different individuals as corresponding to the same set. Contra Declerck (1988), 
exhaustiveness is therefore not inherent to the act of specification, but is a consequence
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of the semantic contribution o f the definite article and the (functionally similar) 
constituents what and it in clefts.
In what follows, I compare my semantic explanation for the exhaustiveness o f //- 
clefts to the syntax-based account proposed by E. Kiss (1998). As I explained in §3.1, E. 
Kiss (1998) argues in favour o f an expletive analysis of //-clefts; that is, she assumes that 
the cleft clause is directly predicated o f the clefted constituent and that the cleft pronoun 
is a dummy element. Here, I show that without recognizing the important semantic 
contribution o f  the initial it, E. Kiss cannot satisfactorily account for the property of 
exhaustiveness.
E. Kiss (1998: 251) claims that “exhaustive identification is a function o f 
structural focus” . She suggests that, cross-linguistically, this “identificational focus” 
occupies a designated syntactic position as the specifier o f a functional projection (the 
focus phrase) and goes on to claim that the clefted constituent in //-clefts “is the 
realization o f identificational focus in English” (E. Kiss 1998: 258). As a result, E. Kiss 
provides a syntactic analysis o f //-clefts in which the clefted constituent is moved from 
within the cleft clause, through spec-CP and into the specifier slot of the focus phrase, as 
shown in (28)11.
(2 8 ) [n> I t [r  w a s k [FP H o w a r d s  [P tk [CP [ts [ c  th a t [iP f  left]]]]]]]]
After moving into this scope position, the clefted constituent performs two important 
roles. Syntactically, the clefted constituent functions as an operator, which marks “the 
sentence part following it and c-commanded by it as the scope o f exhaustive 
identification” (E. Kiss 1998: 253). Semantically, the clefted XP expresses the complete 
set o f elements for which the predicate in the cleft clause holds.
There are some important problems with E. Kiss’ (1998) account. For one thing, 
her analysis cannot account for the full range of data. E. Kiss assumes that 
exhaustiveness is dependent upon a syntactic structure which in English is particular to
11 Alternatively, the clefted constituent can be base-generated in spec-FP and then coindexed with the 
corresponding wA-pronoun in the cleft clause (E. Kiss 1998: 259). This allows E. Kiss to account for all of 
the ft-cleft’s agreement patterns (see §4.3).
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the //-cleft configuration. However, we have seen above that this property is also found 
in other specificational copular constructions. It is not at all clear whether E. Kiss’ 
identificational focus structure could be accommodated into the NP be NP  syntactic 
configuration o f examples such as (22) and (25) above. 77iere-clefts also pose a problem 
for E. Kiss’ claim that exhaustive identification is tied to cleft structure. As shown in
(26) above, there-clefts are not exhaustive. Since these sentences presumably have the 
same structure as //-clefts, this is not expected under E. Kiss’ analysis.
In addition, E. Kiss’ (1998) analysis is highly stipulative and suffers from 
circularity. E. Kiss (1998: 245) assumes that the clefted constituent functions both as a 
syntactic operator (expressing exhaustive identification) which binds the variable left 
behind in the cleft clause and as the value for this variable. In other words, she assumes 
that the same constituent that expresses an exhaustive set o f elements is also the 
constituent that causes exhaustiveness in //-clefts. This does not make a great deal of 
sense to me and, since her analysis is specific to the cleft configuration, it cannot be 
supported by more general patterns o f correspondence in the language.
As a result, despite E. Kiss’ (1998) attempts, expletive accounts cannot 
successfully account for the exhaustiveness in //-clefts. This is only possible once we 
recognize the important semantic contribution o f the constituent it. Once we take this 
step, we can explain the full range of data in an analysis that is supported by inheritance 
from definite noun phrases.
4.1.2.4 Contrast
Along with exhaustiveness, it is often noted that the postcopular element of a cleft 
sentence is contrastive. For example, the positive cleft in (29) contrasts Howard with the 
set o f people at the party who didn’t leave early. This sense of contrast is even more 
pronounced in negative clefts. For example, in (30) Howard is contrasted with the 
individual that did leave early.
(29) It was Howard that left the party early
(30) It w asn’t Howard that left the party early
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I suggest that the contrastive nature o f cleft sentences is a consequence o f the exhaustive 
and existential presuppositions o f definite noun phases. Exhaustively listing the 
complete set o f individuals that left early in (29) invites a sharp contrast between those 
people that left early and those people that didn’t. Likewise, in (30) the existential 
presupposition that there is a set o f people that did leave early invites a contrast between 
Howard, who is excluded from this set, and the unknown individual or individuals that 
together make it up. This sense o f contrast is heightened, since Howard is being 
contrasted with other individuals that attended the party rather than all other people that 
exist.12 In these examples, the set o f possible referents that could potentially make up the 
described set is restricted by information given in the relative clause.
A contrastive interpretation is also possible for noncleft specificational 
sentences. For example, depending upon the context, (31) can be used to contrast Dr. 
Amy Schrute with other non-psychologists working at the hospital or with other 
psychologists that d o n ’t work at the hospital. In the former interpretation, the restrictive 
relative clause provides the “background set” o f hospital workers, with the head noun 
providing the characteristic that distinguishes the referent from all other members o f this 
background set. In the latter interpretation, the head noun psychologist provides the 
background set, with the relative clause telling us what separates the referent from all 
other psychologists. However, if  the restrictive relative clause is omitted, the head noun 
must be interpreted as containing the “distinguishing” information. For instance, 
example (32) can only be used to contrast Dr. Amy Schrute with other non-psychologists 
(that work at the hospital) P It cannot be used to contrast the referent with other 
psychologists.
(31) The psychologist that works at the hospital is Dr. Amy Schrute
(32) The psychologist is Dr. Amy Schrute
12 Declerck (1988: 25) also notes that the sense of contrast is stronger when the set from which the referent 
is selected is restricted. He provides the example given here as (i).
(i) We don’t know which o f them is the murderer, but it certainly isn’t Tom (Declerck 1988: 25)
13 In this section, I use parentheses to indicate information which must be recovered from the context.
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This provides a further explanation as to why the restrictive relative clauses of 
cleft sentences cannot be omitted (see examples (10) and (11) above and the surrounding 
discussion). Since the head noun o f the precopular phrase in clefts is underspecified, it is 
the context that tells us what it denotes. For example, in a discourse about psychologists, 
the precopular phrase in (33) is understood to mean the one (out o f  the set o f  
psychologists) that works at the hospital. The referent Dr. Amy Schrute can be 
contrasted with other psychologists that don't work at the hospital but not with non­
psychologists that work at the hospital. In cleft sentences then, the head noun always 
denotes the “background set” from which the referent is selected, with the restrictive 
relative clause providing the information that distinguishes the referent from the other 
members o f this background set. Since, as shown above, only the background set can be 
left unexpressed, it follows that the restrictive relative clause in cleft sentences cannot be 
omitted. For example, in (34) the noun one does not provide any information with which 
to restrict the referent from other members o f the background set o f people working at 
the hospital.
(33) The one that works at the hospital is Dr. Amy Schrute
(34) *The one is Dr Amy Schrute
In order to capture the two possible meanings of (31) above, cleft sentences must alter 
the information in the relative clause. For example, in a discourse about the hospital,
(35) can be used to contrast Dr. Am y Schrute with non-psychologists (that work at the 
hospital).
(35) It’s Dr. Am y Schrute that’s the psychologist
As well as involving existential and exhaustiveness presuppositions, contrast in 
cleft sentences is therefore also a consequence of the fact that definite descriptions 
denote restricted sets. Containing both a head noun and further restrictive information, 
definite noun phrases allow for two possible interpretations depending upon the context.
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either the head noun denotes the background set which is further restricted, or the 
background set is provided by the (potentially unexpressed) modifying information, with 
the head noun telling us what distinguishes the postcopular referent from the other 
members o f this set. In essence then, definite noun phrases denote restricted sets by way 
of restricting a slightly more general set. In specificational sentences (where a referent is 
identified as matching the description o f the restricted set) it follows that this referent is 
contrasted with other members o f  the background set.
4.1.2.5 Givenness
Finally, it is well known that the sentence-final clause in cleft sentences is made up of 
given, or known, information. For instance, in the following exchange, the postcopular 
element expresses the new information, that o f the referent Paul, whereas the relative 
clause stole the money is discourse-old information.
(36) A: W hich o f the students took it? B: It was Paul that stole the money
By interpreting the relative clause as corresponding to the restrictive set 
information o f a definite description, this fact becomes unsurprising. As we have seen, 
definite noun phrases involve existential commitment. If the interlocutors assume that 
the described set exists, it follows that they are likely to be familiar with that set. 
Consequently, the use o f definite descriptions is associated with given or shared 
information (see also §3.3.4). The example above therefore represents a “prototypical” 
//-cleft, in which the unknown member (in this case Paul) of a known set o f students that 
stole the money is identified. However, as I go on to explain in §5.6, not all //-clefts are 
associated with given information. Such examples require an independent explanation.
4.1.2.6 Summary and interim conclusions
Throughout this section, I have provided additional support for the analysis proposed in 
§4.1.1, in which the constituent it and the cleft clause function together as a 
discontinuous definite description. I have shown that many of the //-cleft s pragmatic
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properties fall out straightforwardly from this analysis and can be explained either as a 
product o f specificational meaning (namely focus), or as a resulting from the inherent 
semantics o f  definite noun phrases (including existentiality, exhaustiveness, contrast and 
givenness).
I conclude that the analysis put forward in this thesis has much more explanatory 
power than the expletive accounts outlined in §3.1. For proponents of the expletive 
approach, the constituent it is a semantically inert element. Without recognizing that the 
initial it performs a definite-like quantificational role, expletive accounts cannot 
satisfactorily explain where these pragmatic properties come from. For example, while 
É. Kiss (1998) invokes construction-specific, stipulative mechanisms to account for the 
exhaustiveness in //-clefts, I have shown that these pragmatic properties are motivated 
by inheritance from the wider specificational construction and are supported by more 
general patterns o f  correspondence in the language system.
4.1.3 Explaining the behaviour of the cleft clause
In addition to explaining the //-cleft’s pragmatic properties, the analysis outlined in this 
chapter also helps us to understand the construction’s structural properties. I have argued 
in favour o f  a discontinuous constituent analysis o f //-clefts in which the cleft clause and 
the constituent it form a semantic unit, acting as a discontinuous definite description. In 
my own version o f  this type o f approach, the cleft it is equivalent to the one in //z-clefts. 
Consequently, this element is not classified as a complete and referential NP, but as 
performing definite-like quantification and acting as the underspecified head noun o f the 
description. From this, it follows that the cleft clause is a restrictive relative, modifying 
the constituent it.
In this section, I provide further evidence in support of this analysis. I show how 
once we view the cleft clause as modifying the constituent it, its behaviour is consistent 
with a restrictive relative clause analysis. In this way, my analysis of //-clefts has an 
important advantage over expletive accounts, which view the cleft clause as being in 
some way related to the complement o f be. On this type of analysis, the behaviour of the
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cleft clause is unpredictable and has to be stipulated as idiosyncratic to the cleft 
construction.
As I explained in §3.1, scholars who adopt the expletive analysis recognize that 
the sentence-final clause in //-clefts looks and behaves in some ways like a relative 
clause. For some o f  these authors, there is only a superficial similarity between these 
structures. For example, Delahunty (1982), Rochemont (1986) and Heggie (1988) 
suggest that the occurrence o f relative pronouns in the cleft clause of //-clefts with NP 
foci, such as who, is the result o f  analogy with relative clauses. Others, such as Chomsky
(1977) and W illiams (1980), claim that the cleft clause has the same internal structure as 
a restrictive relative but note that the cleft clause does not restrictively modify its 
immediate antecedent. Instead, as Heggie (1988) notes, the external relationship between 
the cleft clause and the clefted constituent has more in common with the behaviour of 
nonrestrictive relatives.
Still other proponents o f the expletive analysis have overtly classified the cleft 
clause as a type o f relative clause. For example, Delin (1989) suggests that when the 
postcopular element is nominal, as in (37), the cleft clause can be given a restrictive 
relative analysis. However, as I noted in §1.1, //-clefts can occur with a range of 
elements in the postcopular position. Since restrictive relative clauses cannot modify 
non-nominal antecedents, Delin claims that in these examples, such as the prepositional 
phrase focus //-cleft in (38), the sentence-final clause should be analysed as a sentential 
complement. For Lambrecht (2001), on the other hand, the cleft clause is a type of 
nonrestrictive relative clause. This allows him a unified analysis of all kinds o f //-cleft, 
since nonrestrictive relatives can have non-nominal antecedents, shown in (39).
(37) It was the vicar who had him shot
(38) It was with a knife that he cut it
(39) She quickly tucked the key under the mattress, which was her favourite hiding
place, and returned to her book.
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According to Lambrecht (2001: 473), the cleft clause is predicated o f the focal element 
but it does not perform a modifying function; this property is shared with other 
nonrestrictive relatives.
Both Delin (1989) and Lambrecht (2001) therefore attempt to integrate the cleft 
clause (at least for /i-clefts with nominal focal elements) into a unified analysis of 
relative clauses. W hile this is clearly advantageous, there is an important problem with 
analysing the clefted constituent as the antecedent to the relative clause: the relationship 
between the cleft clause and its immediate antecedent appears to be somewhat different 
from that found with relative clauses in other constructions. Consequently, on an 
expletive account, the relative clause in z'f-clefts does not fit neatly into either the 
restrictive or nonrestrictive category. As Lambrecht (2001: 468) acknowledges, “Its 
category membership is sometimes debatable or unclear” .
On the one hand, the cleft clause shares a number of properties with 
nonrestrictive relatives (if we assume that it is relative to the complement o f be). For
instance, the immediate antecedent to the cleft clause can be a pronoun or proper name,
as in (40). Nonrestrictive relative clauses, which provide additional information about 
their antecedents, can also attach to these elements, as in (41). In contrast, restrictive 
relative clauses m odify and restrict the “type specification” of the antecedent noun 
(Langacker 1991: 432), shown in (42). Since pronouns and proper names are full noun 
phrases, they cannot be further modified by restrictive relatives (see example (43))14.
(40) It’s Howard that plays the bassoon
(41) Howard, w ho’s a specialist in snakes, cured him
(42) I gave it to the man that wears a green jacket
(43) *1 gave it to Howard that wears a green jacket
14 As Davidse (2000: 1111) points out, a restrictive relative clause can modify a proper noun only if it is 
preceded be a determiner, as in (i). Here, John is used not to refer to a fully specified entity, but as a 
common noun denoting a general type “person with the name John .
(i) I’ve just met the John you used to go out with (Davidse 2000: 1111)
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As Delin (1989: 60) acknowledges, this poses a problem for her claim that NP-focus it- 
clefts contain restrictive relative clauses.
Cleft clauses also appear to pattern with nonrestrictive relatives in terms o f their 
prosodic structure. Restrictive relative clauses and their antecedent nouns form a 
constituent, and therefore an intonation unit, within the noun phrase, with nuclear stress 
falling on the tone-final element (see example (44)). However, attaching as they do to 
full noun phrases, nonrestrictive relatives occur as a separate constituent. Like these 
nonrestrictive relatives, the cleft clause does not form an intonation unit with its 
antecedent, shown in (45) (see Halliday 1967: 237; Davidse 2000: 1103).
(44) [The doctor who phoned me] lives there
(45) It was [the doctor] [who phoned me]
However, the relative clause in it-clefts has a number of other characteristics that 
are typical o f  restrictive, rather than nonrestrictive relative clauses. For instance, while 
nonrestrictive relatives are separated from the rest of the sentence by commas in writing 
or pauses in speech, this property is not shared by restrictive relatives or the cleft clause. 
The sentence-final clause in ft-clefts also occurs with the same range of introductory 
elements as restrictive relatives. For example, the cleft clause is commonly introduced 
by that and can also occur without an overt relative pronoun. While restrictive relatives 
commonly occur with that or zero, both options are strongly resisted by nonrestrictive 
relative clauses, which typically require an overt wh- relative pronoun.
(46) It was Howard that70 I used to work with [/7-cleft]
(47) The guy th a t/0  I used to work with lives there [restrictive]
(48) * Howard, th a t/0  I used to work with, lives there [nonrestrictive]
This evidence poses a problem for the analysis o f the cleft clause as a 
nonrestrictive relative. However, Lam brechf s (2001) “nonrestrictive analysis o f the 
cleft clause is dependent more on the lack o f similarity to restrictive relatives rather than
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on perceived correspondences with other nonrestrictive relative clauses. For example, 
while restrictive relative clauses only permit zero realization of the relative marker when 
the antecedent acts as an object complement of the proposition in the relative clause, it- 
clefts, such as (50), can occur without that even when the relative element is the subject 
(see also Somicola 1988: 347).
(49) *The man paid for that is over there [restrictive relative clause]
(50) It was your husband paid for that [z'/-cleft]
(Lambrecht 2001: 470; Delahunty 1982: 52)
Rather than analysing the example in (50) as involving “(substandard) complementizer 
drop”, Lambrecht (2001: 470-471) takes this as evidence that, when present, the 
complementizer that in /7-clefts is semantically inert; “we could say with equal if  not 
greater justification, that this sentence represents a canonical sentence {Your husband 
paid  fo r  that)”. From this, it follows that the cleft clause is directly predicated o f the 
clefted constituent. W hile Lambrecht (2001: 473) argues that the cleft clause is not a 
restrictive relative, he notes that “the fundamental property o f all RCs [is] that they are 
p r e d ic a t e s ”  (emphasis original). On this basis, Lambrecht categorizes the cleft clause 
as a “kind o f ’ nonrestrictive relative.
The attempts o f  Delin (1989) and Lambrecht (2001) to categorize the sentence- 
final clause in //-clefts as a type o f relative clause are therefore highly problematic. As 
we have seen, if  we assume that the clefted constituent is the antecedent to the cleft 
clause, then this clause exhibits properties o f both restrictive and nonrestrictive relatives. 
Consequently, with an expletive analysis in place, the cleft clause does not conform to 
the general principles o f  the grammar and requires an idiosyncratic account. As 
Huddleston (1984: 462) comments, this analysis, in which the clefted constituent is 
perceived as the antecedent to the cleft clause, “is very largely ad hoc -  the relative 
clause is o f  a kind that is sui generis, unique to this construction”.
However, we can rescue the relative clause analysis o f the cleft clause by treating 
the /7-cleft as a fully-fledged specificational construction. Now, the antecedent to the
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relative clause is shown to be not the complement of be (the defied constituent), but the 
initial it, which quantifies the description as well as acting as head noun. Invoking this 
analysis, the cleft clause can be given a reasonably consistent analysis as a restrictive 
relative clause. This analysis has two advantages: it helps cash out the treatment o f the 
initial it and the relative clause as a definite description and it maximizes generality and 
consistency within the grammar.
Regardless o f  the syntactic category of the clefted constituent, in this account the 
antecedent to the cleft clause is the nominal it. As a result, there is no need to establish a 
separate function o f “sentential complement” for ft-clefits with non-NP foci, contra Delin
(1989). We can see then that example (51) below corresponds to (52), in which the 
relative clause modifies the abstract, adverbial noun way.
(51) [It] was with a knife [that he cut it]
(52) [The way he cut it] was with a knife
The constituent it normally functions as a complete referential pronoun, and so would 
not normally be the expected antecedent o f a restrictive relative. However, by analysing 
the cleft it as part o f a definite-like description, equivalent to the one or the thing, it is 
possible for the relative clause to modify this element restrictively. Although this 
function for the initial it is therefore specific to the h-cleft construction, I provide 
additional evidence for this analysis o f the cleft it in §7.1.
Like restrictive relatives, the cleft clause forms a constituent and therefore an
intonation unit with the unstressed it, shown in (53). Huddleston (1984: 461) notes that 
an analysis in which the relative clause modifies it rather than the complement o f be 
clearly accounts for the separate readings o f examples such as (53) and (54) below. In
(53), the relative clause restrictively modifies it; in (54), the doctor is the antecedent.
(53) A: Who phoned? B: [It] was the doctor [who phoned me]
(54) A: Who was at the door? B: It was [the doctor who phoned me]
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By treating the constituent it as the antecedent o f the relative clause, it is also 
possible to explain why /7-clefts can accommodate the omission o f the relative pronoun, 
even when the relative element is the subject o f this embedded clause. While (55) 
creates an unintended “garden-path” reading, in which the man 0 pa id  fo r  that can be 
mistakenly understood as a complete subject-predicate sentence, this ambiguity does not 
arise for the /7-cleft in (56), since the antecedent o f the relative clause is not the 
complement o f  be.
(55) *The man paid for that is over there [restrictive relative clause]
(56) It was your husband paid for that [it-clefit]
Consequently, and in comparison to the expletive accounts, by treating the 
constituent it and the cleft clause as forming a definite description, the sentence-final 
clause in /7-clefits can be unequivocally classified as a restrictive relative, and does not 
have to be treated separately as idiosyncratic to this construction. With this analysis in 
place, the “unusual” behaviour o f the cleft clause becomes predictable from what we 
know about how restrictive relative clauses operate in the rest o f the grammar.
4.1.4 Summary and interim conclusions
Throughout § 4 .1 ,1 have shown that an analysis which views the /7-cleft primarily 
as a specificational copular construction has greater explanatory force than an expletive 
account. I began by arguing that /7-clefits, like the specificational NP be NP  sentences 
analysed in §3.3, involve a special type o f nominal predication relation. This led me to 
advocate a discontinuous constituent analysis o f /7-clefts in which the initial it and the 
cleft clause form a definite-like description. I have shown that this unified analysis o f z7- 
clefts and other specificational copular constructions allows the maximum number o f the 
/7-cleft’s formal and functional properties to be inherited from the wider specificational 
construction and from more general patterns o f correspondence in the language. This 
account explains both why these properties occur and what roles they perform in the 
creation o f specificational meaning.
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4.2 A Comparison with other extraposition accounts
In § 4 .1 ,1 explained how a semantic account o f specificational copular sentences calls for 
a (non-derivational) extraposition analysis o f zY-clefts in which the constituent it and the 
relative clause function as a discontinuous definite description. I have shown that this 
analysis has a number o f advantages over the expletive accounts and is able to provide 
motivation and an explanation for many o f the /7-cleft’s seemingly idiosyncratic 
properties. In this section, I review a selection o f alternative extraposition accounts and 
explain how my own particular version o f  this approach draws on, and improves on, the 
existing literature.
4.2.1 Jespersen (1927)
My analysis o f cleft sentences shares much with Jespersen’s (1927) original 
“transposition theory” .15 Prior to rejecting these ideas in favour o f an expletive account, 
Jespersen analysed the sentence-final clause in /7-clefts as a restrictive relative. Since 
this clause occurs immediately after a phrasal constituent that cannot be further 
modified, he suggests that the relative clause restricts the initial pronoun it rather than 
the focal element. In this way, Jespersen captures the close relationship between /7-clefts, 
such as (57), and other types o f specificational sentence, such as the reverse 
specificational example given here as (58).
(57) It was the Colonel I was looking for
(58) The colonel was the man I was looking for (examples from Jespersen 1927: 88)
This early account therefore foreshadows the type o f ‘discontinuous constituent’ 
analysis advocated in this thesis (see also §4.2.7, §4.2.8 and §4.2.9 below).
15 Although often cited, Jespersen (1927) was not the first to propose an extraposition analysis o f //-clefts. 
For instance, Fowler and Fowler (1908) suggest that the cleft pronoun and the cleft clause function 
together as a subject NP: “the ‘that’ clause, supplemented or introduced by ‘it’, gives us the subject o f a 
predication”, while “the predication answers an imaginary question recorded distinctly in the relative . On 
this analysis, the //-cleft It is money that I  want is understood in relation to the exchange “‘What do you 
want?’ ‘It (the thing) that I want is money’” .
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4.2.2 Akmajian (1970)
The transformational accounts o f the 1970s share Jespersen’s insight that //-clefts should 
be examined in relation to other specificational copular constructions. However, not all 
o f these analyses assume, as Jespersen (1927) and I do, that the sentence-final clause 
restrictively modifies the constituent it. For example, Akmajian (1970) suggests that //- 
clefts are syntactically derived from “headless” pseudocleft sentences. Using the 
terminology adopted in this thesis, Akmajian claims that //-clefts are derived from wh- 
clefts, such as (59a) and (60a), but not from //2-clefts, such as (61). Although wh-clefts 
introduced by who are regarded by many as ungrammatical, Akmajian (1970: 164) 
includes these examples, such as (60a), as suitable “sources” for //-clefts, noting that for 
some speakers, these examples “obligatorily become cleft sentences” (italic original).
(59) a) W hat John bought was a car 
b) It was a car that John bought
(60) a) ??Who chose Nixon was Agnew
b) It was Nixon who chose Agnew
(61) • The one who Nixon chose was Agnew
On this account, //-clefts are derived from w/i-clefts by a rule particular to cleft 
sentences: the “Cleft Extraposition Rule”, which may require the replacement o f the wh- 
word by that, as in (59) above. Akmajian (1970: 150) claims that, after the extraposition 
o f the relative clause, “the element IT is left in subject position”. Because Akmajian 
does not include the “head” o f the relative clause in the derivation o f //-clefts, he fails to 
see the link between the one in (61) and it in (60b).16 For Akmajian (1970) then, the 
constituent it is an expletive element and is not restricted by the sentence-final clause.
16 Akmajian claims that //-clefts cannot be derived from //¡-clefts because they often do not have the same 
meaning. For example, Akmajian (1970: 161-162) notes that the headed pseudocleft in (i) tells us “that a 
certain place  is located in the garden” while the headless pseudocleft in (ii) and the //-cleft in (iii) tell us 
“that John  was located in a certain place”. Akmajian seems to be claiming here that //¡-clefts have a 
predicational meaning while //-clefts and w/t-clefts are specificational. However, Bolinger (1972) 
successfully argues against this claim, showing that both //¡-clefts and w/i-clefts allow both predicational 
and specificational (or, using his terminology, “equational”) readings.
(Akmajian 1970: 150) 
(Akmajian 1970: 149)
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To my mind, Akm ajian’s (1970) analysis misses an important generalization. In 
§4 .1 .1 ,1 analysed the wh-clause in w/j-clefts as a fused relative construction rather than 
as a “headless” relative, claiming that the initial what in wh-clefts performs the same 
role as the thing that in //z-clefts. In other words, the wh-clause functions as a complete 
definite noun phrase -  this is what allows the w/i-cleft configuration to acquire a 
specificational meaning. On my analysis, it follows that if  this w/i-clause is extraposed 
then the resulting construction is a ‘right-dislocated pseudocleft’ rather than an //-cleft.
4.2.3 Gundel (1977)
Gundel (1977) agrees, providing an analysis in which //-clefts are derived from right- 
dislocated structures. In right-dislocated pseudoclefts, the initial fused relative o f the wh- 
cleft is extraposed, with it acting as a pronominal reference to the right-dislocated 
constituent, shown in (62b). Gundel claims that //-clefts are reduced forms o f right- 
dislocated pseudocleft, derived by an optional, construction-specific “Variable Head 
Deletion” rule. This rule deletes the head element o f the compound pronoun what, whilst 
simultaneously deleting the intervening sentence boundary between the sentence-final 
clause and the postcopular constituent. The result, she claims, is an //-cleft with a 
sentence-final restrictive relative clause structure and a referential subject (it) which acts 
as a pronominal copy for the dislocated constituent.
(62) a) W hat you heard was an explosion
b) It was an explosion, what you heard
c) It was an explosion that you heard (examples from Gundel 1977: 543)
However, an unfavourable consequence o f Gundel’s account is that right- 
dislocated pseudoclefts, which appear less natural than their //-cleft counterparts, are 
analysed as having a more basic structure. Furthermore, as Gundel (1977: 557) 
acknowledges, the Variable Head Deletion rule “has no independent motivation in
(i) The place where I found John was in the garden
(ii) W here I found John was in the garden
(iii) It was in the garden that I found John (examples from Akmajian 1970: 161-162)
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English, and the fact that it can apply only in ID [specificational] structures is admittedly 
suspicious” . G undel’s analysis is therefore ad hoc : it involves a major constructional 
change from a complete noun phrase into a restrictive relative without explaining why a 
restrictive relative clause structure should be able to occur without its normal modifying 
function. Consequently, G undel’s analysis leaves too many questions unanswered and 
provides a structure for the //-cleft that increases, rather than reduces, the number o f 
idiosyncratic properties that the construction exhibits.
4.2.4 Wirth (1978)
For W irth (1978), both //-clefts and pseudoclefits are derived from the same source: from 
copular sentences whose subjects contain a relative clause with a pronominal head. //- 
clefts are derived via an extraposition rule and a “restricted nominal reduction” rule 
which leads to the realization o f the pronominal head as it. W irth’s account captures the 
idea that it and the definite article share the same function, claiming that it is a “syntactic 
variant” o f the, occurring when a head noun is not stipulated. However, it is not clear 
what semantic value W irth attributes to the constituent it. Furthermore, like Akmajian 
(1970), W irth suggests that wh-clefts involve a “headless” relative structure. 
Consequently, she too fails to provide a unified analysis that recognizes the role of 
definite quantification in all o f  these specificational constructions.
4.2.5 The problem with transformational accounts
Despite their differences, the accounts o f Akmajian (1970), Gundel (1977) and Wirth 
(1978) all share an additional, common problem which stems from their adoption of 
transformational theories o f grammar. These authors all assume that //-clefts are derived 
from alternative copular structures, including w/i-clefits, right-dislocated pseudoclefts 
and copular sentences with subjects containing modified pronominal heads. On a 
transformational account, it is assumed that the source structure and all o f  the derived 
structures will exhibit the same behaviour. However, //-clefts differ in some important 
ways from w/z-clefts (right-dislocated or otherwise).
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For example, as I go on to explain in §5.3, w/z-clefts and //-clefts allow a 
different range o f  focal elements to occur in the postcopular position. In some ways, the 
range o f possible //-cleft foci is more restricted. For instance, adjectival foci are much 
more acceptable in wh-clefts (shown in (63)). In order to account for this, Akmajian 
(1970) and W irth (1978) provide restrictions as to which types o f copular sentence the 
transformational rule o f  extraposition can apply to. Akmajian (1970) suggests that the 
Cleft Extraposition Rule only applies to pseudoclefts with NP or PP foci, while Wirth
(1978) argues that extraposition is only possible over postcopular noun phrases. 
However, in truth, the range o f  possible //-cleft foci is much greater than this and cannot 
be divided into major phrasal categories. For instance, //-clefts can sometimes 
accommodate adjectival foci, but only in certain circumstances, shown in (64).
(63) a) W hat John is is tall 
b) *It is tall that John is
(64) It’s not sick that he was but tired (E. Kiss 1998: 262)
Even more problematic for these transformational accounts is the fact that some 
//-clefts have no possible pseudocleft source. For example, certain prepositional phrases 
will only be permitted as the focal element o f an //-cleft, shown in (65a) and (65b). In 
order to accommodate these examples into her transformational account, Gundel (1977) 
suggests that they are instead derived from other cleft sentences, such as (65c), by an 
optional rule which copies the preposition into the focus and deletes the original.
(65) a) It was with George that M ary eloped (Gundel 1977: 550)
b) *(The one) that Mary eloped was with George
c) It was George that M ary eloped with (Gundel 1977: 550)
However, Preposition Copying cannot account for all //-cleft examples without a 
pseudocleft source. For example, Gundel suggests that (66a) cannot be derived from the 
wh-cleft in (66b). However, the //-cleft in (66c) is at least an equally unacceptable
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source. 17
(66) a) It is with great pride that I accept this nomination (Gundel 1977: 548)
b) *How I accept this nomination is with great pride (Gundel 1977: 548)
c) *It is great pride that I accept this nomination with
So how does this compare with the constructional approach which I propose? 
Throughout this chapter, m y main concern has been to maximize correspondence 
between the //-cleft and other specificational copular constructions. As a result, the 
discussion has so far centred on //-clefts with NP foci, since these examples show the 
greatest similarity to the specificational N P be NP  sentences discussed in chapter 3. 
However, a key property o f the construction grammar framework is that while the 
motivation for each construction should be maximized, idiosyncrasies are both tolerated 
and expected (see §2.5). Therefore, the fact that the //-cleft permits a construction- 
specific range o f  foci, which is neither shared by other specificational constructions nor 
comprised o f major syntactic categories, is not problematic for this analysis. 
Consequently, and in contrast to a transformational account, a constructional analysis 
allows us to observe true generalizations without requiring us to provide a series o f ad  
hoc, unmotivated and complex rules in order to explain away every construction-specific 
property that does not (intuitively) seem to be the product o f a more general pattern. I 
return to this issue, and to non-NP focus //-clefts in chapter 5.
17 Emonds (1976) puts forward an alternative account which proposes to handle examples which have no 
possible pseudocleft source, such as (65a) repeated here as (iii). Emonds’ analysis is really a mixture of 
expletive and extraposition approaches. Ele assumes that ¿/-clefts are derived from a source structure in 
which the defied  constituent is base-generated inside the cleft clause, shown in (i). Emonds claims that the 
defied  constituent (NP or PP) is moved out o f the cleft clause by a transformation called “focus 
placement” before the structure undergoes Akmajian’s (1970) “cleft extraposition”.
(i) [that Mary eloped with George] was
(ii) [that Mary eloped] was with George
(iii) It was with George that Mary eloped
However, Emonds’ analysis is highly suspect. For one thing, his analysis predicts that //-clefts permit only 
NP or PP foci. Furthermore, as E. Kiss (1998: 258) argues, Emonds’ set o f derivations “is highly 
stipulative; the initial structure is unlikely, and the rightward movement rule focus placement is not 
independently motivated”.
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So far then, I have shown that the transformational accounts o f Akmajian (1970), 
Gundel (1977) and W irth (1978) do not compare favourably with the extraposition 
analysis argued for in this thesis. We can now look at some extraposition proposals 
which are more similar to my own. All o f the following analyses claim, as I do, that the 
initial it and the cleft clause form a semantic unit.
4.2.6 Bolinger (1972)
Bolinger (1972) proposes a somewhat different transformational account to Akmajian 
(1970), Gundel (1977) and Wirth (1978). Although he suggests that analytic compound 
relatives, such as (67), “provide an ideal source for cleft sentences, since they spell out 
the two elements that are divided between clauses”, Bolinger (1972: 110) does not 
provide an analysis whereby ¿/-clefts are derived from these structures. Instead, Bolinger 
argues that the same transformational rule creates the “inverted” structure in (68) and the 
¿/-cleft in (69). This rule involves the “inversion” o f the restrictive relative clause while 
the nominal head remains in initial position. Bolinger claims that while “inversion” (or 
extraposition-from-NP) is optional for (67), it applies obligatorily in ¿/-clefts. 
Consequently, the transformational source o f  the example given in (69) is not an 
acceptable sentence, as shown in (70).
(67) That which he stole was money [analytic compound relative]
(68) That was money which (that) he stole [‘inverted’ compound relative]
(69) It was money that he stole [¿/-cleft]
(70) *It that he stole was money [¿/-cleft source]
(examples from Bolinger 1972: 109)
Bolinger’s (1972) account exhibits a number o f similarities with both Jespersen’s 
(1927) proposal and the analysis provided in this thesis, //-clefts are analysed as 
containing an extraposed restrictive relative clause which modifies the initial it. 
Bolinger’s analysis therefore contrasts with the proposals o f Akmajian (1970) and 
Gundel (1977) since it suggests that the constituent it is important to the semantics o f the
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construction and is not simply an expletive element or a pronominal copy which is 
inserted as a consequence o f extraposition.
However, Bolinger’s (1972) “obligatory inversion” for /7-clefts raises an 
important question. If  a transformational rule is obligatory, how can we be sure that 
speakers actually have the underlying source structure? In the case o f the /7-cleft, there 
seems to be no motivation for this kind o f transformational analysis. A constructional 
approach such as the one advocated in this thesis assumes that /7-clefts are not derived 
from any other structure. Since construction grammar is a monostratal theory, 
underlying structures are not posited.
4.2.7 Percus (1997)
Recently, a number o f  extraposition analyses have been put forward which explicitly 
argue, as I do, that the constituent it and the relative clause o f /7-clefts function together 
as a discontinuous definite description. For example, Percus (1997) argues that the 
sentence-final clause in /7-clefts is an extraposed restrictive relative clause modifying the 
initial it. As in my analysis, the constituent it provides the functions o f the definite 
article as well as acting as the head noun o f the description. Percus notes that this type o f 
analysis explains why /7-clefts share a number o f  properties with definite descriptions, 
including existential and exhaustiveness presuppositions.
However, Percus’ (1997) account differs from my own analysis in some 
important respects. W hile I claim that the cleft it and the relative clause function 
together like a discontinuous definite description, inheriting properties from 
specificational sentences with definite NPs, Percus argues that /7-clefts are actually 
derived from an underlying structure containing a definite description. For example, 
Percus (1997: 338) assumes that the /7-cleft in (71a) has the underlying structure given 
here as (71b). This is subject to extraposition-ffom-NP, shown in (71c), before the 
definite determiner and null head are realized as it at morphological spell-out, given in 
(7 Id).
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(71) a) It is  [j o h n ]f that M ary saw.
b) [ip [dp the 0 [Cp OPj that M ary saw tj]]j [Vp tj is John]]
c) [[ip [dp the 0 tk]j [vp tj is John]] [Cp OPj that Mary saw tj]k]
0 0 0 H O D
d) I t is John that Mary saw
Spell-Out: [dp the 0 tk] => It (Percus 1997: 338)
In addition to the theory o f grammar that Percus adopts, his understanding o f it- 
cleft semantics differs crucially from m y own. Percus (1997: 346) argues that 
specificational sentences, including /7-clefts, are semantically equative, relating two 
arguments o f the same type. Percus notes, however, that in specificational sentences, one 
o f these arguments must refer to an “unknown” individual. Consequently, although 
Percus does not mention Donnellan’s (1966) referential/attributive distinction, his 
analysis is similar to that o f Declerck (1988), and is therefore subject to the same 
fundamental problems (see §3.2.3.2). Percus claims that predicational and equative 
structures contain two different types o f copular verb. While the former relates an 
individual and a predicate and does not allow inversion, the latter can be inverted, 
“selecting two arguments o f  the type o f individuals” with the restriction that “one o f its 
syntactic arguments be a Du [‘unknown’ description]” (Percus 1997: 346).
4.2.8 Hedberg (1990, 2000)
Hedberg (1990, 2000) also advocates a discontinuous constituent analysis o f /7-clefts, 
formulating two slightly different versions o f  this approach. I begin by describing 
Hedberg (2000). For Hedberg (2000), the constituent it and the sentence-final clause o f 
the /7-cleft function pragmatically and semantically like a definite description. Hedberg 
(2000: 894) proposes that definite noun phrases are comprised o f two parts: “an 
in d e x ic a l  component, which is expressed by the determiner head and determines the 
relation o f the referent to the context, and a d e s c r ip t iv e  component, which is expressed 
by its nominal complement and describes the referent” (emphasis original). For Hedberg 
(2000: 898), ‘77 is analyzed as an allomorph o f the”, acting as the definite article head
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(the indexical component) o f  the determiner phrase, while the sentence-final clause is 
said to function as the descriptive component. This is shown in (72) and (73), where the 
descriptive component is highlighted in bold.
(72) [Dp [ d  the] [NP [NP dog] [PP next door]]]
(73) [d p  [d  it] ... [cp who won]] (examples from Hedberg 2000: 898)
Consequently, Hedberg’s analysis differs both from that proposed by Percus 
(1997) and from the account put forward in this thesis. Both Percus (1997) and I argue 
that the cleft clause restrictively modifies the constituent //, which functions both as the 
definite article and a semantically underspecified head noun. However, for Hedberg, the 
constituent it functions as the determiner, with the cleft clause corresponding to the 
entire nominal content o f  the determiner phrase. The differences in these analyses seem 
to result from a difference in approach. While Hedberg (2000) examines //-clefts in 
relation to definite descriptions as they occur outside o f the specificational construction, 
Percus (1997) and I compare //-clefts to other specificational copular sentences 
containing definite noun phrases.
As a result o f  our common approach, Percus (1997) and I recognize that //-clefts 
correspond closely to //z-clefts, which are introduced by restrictively modified, 
semantically general head nouns such as one and thing. From this, it follows that the 
cleft it functions as both the definite article and head noun o f a definite description and 
is modified by a restrictive relative clause. Hedberg (2000), on the other hand, does not 
make this connection. She suggests that the definite article is realized as it as a 
consequence o f extraposition; that is, “when no descriptive content (NP or CP) 
immediately follows” (Hedberg 2000: 898). However, as I go on to show in §7.1, this is 
not supported by the historical evidence, since the pronoun it could sometimes occur 
with an immediately following restrictive relative clause at earlier periods o f the 
language.
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In Hedberg’s analysis (2000: 912), the “complement clause” is extraposed from 
the subject DP and is subsequently adjoined to the focal element, within the VP, as 
shown in (75).
(74) It was Clinton who won (Hedberg 2000: 891)
(75) [ip [d p  [ d  it]]i [ r  [i w a s k ]  [v p  [d p  [d p  Clinton] [cpi [whoj] [c  tj won]]]]]]
Hedberg (2000) argues that this analysis represents the “best o f both” the expletive and 
the extraposition accounts. By recognizing that the complement clause and the initial it 
function pragm atically and semantically like a discontinuous definite description, her 
analysis is able to capture the many similarities between //-clefts and definite noun 
phrases. However, on her account, the complement clause is syntactically adjoined to the 
clefted constituent. Consequently, this analysis also accommodates Delahunty’s (1982, 
1984) claim that the postcopular element and the cleft clause form a syntactic constituent 
within VP.
However, Hedberg’s (2000) extraposition account is ad  hoc. As I noted above, 
for Hedberg, the “complement clause” o f  the subject DP is extraposed into a position 
internal to another DP inside the verb phrase. The upshot is that the complement clause 
is adjoined to the postcopular DP “in the position o f a nonrestrictive relative clause” 
(Hedberg 2000: 915). Unlike right-dislocation or extraposition-ffom-NP, this type of 
extraposition is novel to this construction and is therefore unmotivated. Furthermore, 
Hedberg’s account is unnecessarily complex. As I go on to explain in §4.3, the data that 
Delahunty (1982, 1984) uses to argue in favour o f VP-intemal constituency is not 
problematic for a straightforward extraposition-from-NP analysis such as the one argued 
for in this thesis and does not necessarily require that the focal element and the cleft 
clause should be analysed as syntactic sisters.
Hedberg’s (2000) syntactic analysis o f //-clefts is therefore very different from 
that proposed here. However, semantically, there are some similarities. Like me,
Hedberg does not provide an equative analysis for specificational //-clefts. Instead, she 
suggests that the postcopular element is referential (type <e>), while the definite
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description is o f  a higher semantic type which is either a predicate (type <e,t>) or a 
generalized quantifier (type « e , t >  t>) (Hedberg 2000: 917). However, confusingly, 
elsewhere in her paper, Hedberg (2000: 891) claims that the constituent it in ¿/-clefts is 
“referential”, with the cleft it and the cleft clause forming a “discontinuous referring 
expression” (Hedberg 2000: 898). Furthermore, Hedberg’s (2000: 916) semantic 
analysis relies on an “identificational copula”; this element is required to obtain a 
specificational (or identifying) rather than a predicational meaning and also plays an 
important role in assigning exhaustive identification to the clefted constituent. On my 
account, on the other hand, specificational meaning (as well as exhaustiveness) results 
from a nominal predication relation involving definite NP predicates and is not reliant on 
a special type o f  copular verb (see §3.3.3 and §4.1.2.3).
In her 1990 thesis, Hedberg also argues for a discontinuous constituent analysis 
o f //-clefts. Although her argument is largely consistent with Hedberg (2000), Hedberg 
(1990) proposes a different syntactic structure for the //-cleft. For example, Hedberg
(1990) claims that the cleft clause is structured internally like a restrictive relative 
clause. Likewise, rather than adjoining within DP, the cleft clause adjoins to VP, shown 
in (77). Nevertheless, like Hedberg (2000), Hedberg (1990: 99) assumes that the cleft 
clause forms a constituent with the postcopular element within VP, claiming that “the 
relation which holds between the cleft pronoun and the cleft clause is not identical to the
relation which holds between an extraposed relative clause and its NP head”. Again, this
18differs from m y own straightforward, extraposition-from-NP account o f //-clefts.
(76) It is Joe that smokes
(77) [ip [n p  it]j [r [r [i] [v isk]] [v p  [v p  [tk] [n p  Joe]] [cpj [opi] [c  [c that] [ip t, 
smokes]]]]]]
18 Reeve (2008) proposes a syntactic account o f ft-clefts which draws heavily from Hedberg (1990, 2000). 
He claims that the cleft clause is a restrictive relative which is underlyingly adjoined to the clefted 
constituent within DP. The cleft clause is subsequently extraposed and is adjoined to VP, forming a 
constituent within VP. Semantically, however, Reeve argues in favour of Percus’ (1997) analysis, in 
which the restrictive relative clause and the non-expletive it function together like a discontinuous definite 
NP and the copula has an equative semantics.
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4.2.9 Han and Hedberg (2008)
In subsequent, related work, Han and Hedberg (2008) propose a discontinuous 
constituent analysis for //-clefts within Tree Adjoining Grammar. Again, like Hedberg 
(2000), their aim is to “capture the best o f both” extraposition and expletive accounts 
(Han and Hedberg 2008: 345). In order to do this, Han and Hedberg exploit the fact that 
Tree Adjoining Grammar allows for mismatch between the syntax and the semantics. As 
part o f the machinery o f Tree Adjoining Grammar, structures are analysed both with a 
derived tree, which represents surface constituency, and a derivation tree, which 
represents semantic composition and syntactic dependencies (Han and Hedberg 2000: 
355). In the derived tree, the cleft clause (CP) is syntactically adjoined to the focal 
phrase (FP), forming a small clause (FP). However, in the derivation tree, the pronoun it 
and the cleft clause form a syntactic and a semantic unit, which is represented by placing 
elementary trees for them in a single multi-component set.
Han and Hedberg (2008) claim that this analysis explains the fact that //-clefts 
share a number o f properties with definite descriptions, while at the same time 
accounting for the evidence in favour o f an expletive account. However, Han and 
Hedberg’s (2008) derived tree does not straightforwardly explain the connectivity 
effects (discussed in §4.3) which support an expletive analysis, since the postcopular 
element is not situated within the cleft clause at any stage in the derivation. In order to 
accommodate this awkward data, Han and Hedberg make use o f feature unification. For 
example, they postulate an agreement feature attribute (Agr) in order to capture 
agreement between the cleft pronoun and the copular verb and between the focal 
element and the verb in the cleft clause respectively. Essentially, all that Han and 
Hedberg’s (2008) analysis really buys us then, is a way o f accommodating Delahunty’s 
syntactic constituency data into an extraposition account. However, as I explain in §4.3, 
this data is not actually problematic for the straightforward extraposition-ffom-NP 
analysis proposed in this thesis.
As a result, I believe that Han and Hedberg’s (2008) “two-tree” analysis for //- 
clefts is unnecessarily complex. Han and Hedberg claim that the advantage o f a Tree 
Adjoining Grammar model is that is allows for mismatch between the semantics and the
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syntax. Since my own constructional analysis involves mismatch, I have no theoretical 
objection to this. However, while in my analysis, mismatch is motivated and explained 
as a consequence o f the nature o f semantic predication, Han and Hedberg provide no 
real justification as to why, in their analysis, the syntax and semantics o f ¿/-clefts should 
be so completely at odds with one another. To my mind, it seems as though Han and 
Hedberg make opportunistic use o f the “two tree” model in order to propose two 
disparate analyses o f ¿¿-clefts within the same proposal.
Semantically, Han and Hedberg (2008) argue for an equative analysis o f 
specificational ¿¿-clefts, in which an “equative copula” identifies two referential 
arguments: the discontinuous constituent and the postcopular element.
(78) It was Ohno who won
(79) THEz [won(z)] [z = Ohno] (Han and Hedberg 2008: 349)
Consequently, Han and Hedberg’s (2008) analysis suffers from the same problems as 
other equative analyses, such as Heycock and Kroch (1999, 2002) (see §3.2). I discuss 
this equative analysis in more detail in §5.2.3, where I review Han and Hedberg’s (2008) 
account o f predicational ¿¿-clefts.
4.2.10 Summary and interim conclusions
In this section, I have shown that, while the analysis o f ¿¿-clefts proposed in this thesis 
builds upon many o f the insights o f  earlier extraposition accounts, it also improves upon 
the existing literature. None o f the extraposition accounts I have reviewed here 
recognize the crucial role that definite descriptions play in creating specificational 
meaning. It is this that provides the most compelling support for a discontinuous definite 
description analysis o f ¿¿-clefts. M y analysis examines the semantics o f definite NPs in 
more detail than other discontinuous constituent accounts, which do not recognize that 
definite noun phrases in specificational sentences, and the discontinuous constituent in 
¿¿-clefts, denote sets. The set treatment o f  definite descriptions is the basis for an analysis 
in which specificational sentences involve a class-membership predication relation.
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4.3 Remaining questions and problems
In this section, I address some o f  the difficult data which many have claimed is at odds 
with an extraposition analysis o f //-clefts. For example, Delahunty’s (1982, 1984) 
constituency tests and num ber agreement issues at first sight support an expletive 
analysis o f  //-clefts. However, as I explain below, this data does not present an 
insurmountable obstacle to an extraposition analysis and can be accounted for on this 
approach. I also discuss Jespersen’s (1937) criticisms o f his own earlier “transposition” 
analysis, noting that many o f  these do not apply to the extraposition account argued for 
here. Finally, I briefly address the binding (or “connectivity”) effects which have been 
used to support analyses in which specificational copular sentences are derived via 
movement operations. I conclude that although the account proposed in this thesis is not 
without its problems and leaves some questions unanswered, it has many advantages 
over the alternatives.
4.3.1 Constituency tests
As I noted in §4.2.8, Delahunty (1982, 1984) argues that the postcopular focal element 
and the sentence-final clause o f //-clefts form a constituent within VP. This claim is at 
odds with the straightforward extraposition-ffom-NP analysis advocated here. Delahunty 
(1982) presents five constituency tests in support o f his analysis, including VP-deletion, 
right-node-raising, parenthetical formation, VP-conjunction and VP-ffonting. With 
respect to each o f  these environments, shown in (80) to (84), Delahunty claims that the 
focal element and the cleft clause operate as a syntactic unit (underlined).
(80) VP deletion: I said that it should have been Bill who negotiated the new contract, 
and it should have been.
(81) Right-node-raising: It could have been -  and it should have been -  Bill who 
negotiated the new contract.
(82) Parenthetical form ation: It must have been, in my opinion, the cyanide that did 
it.
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(83) VP-conjunction: It must have been Fred that kissed M ary but Bill that left with 
her.
(84) VP-preposing: I said that it was Bill that argued the case, and Bill that argued the 
case it was. (examples adapted from Hedberg 1990: 98)
There are three possible responses to Delahunty’s claims. First, this data is not 
necessarily problematic for my account. Second, Delahunty’s constituency tests are not 
necessarily reliable. And third, there is constituency evidence for a discontinuous 
definite description analysis. I take these in turn, starting o ff by discussing how these 
data do not all constitute arguments against my analysis.
I argued in §4.1 that the element it in /7-clefts is restrictively modified, providing 
the same function as the definite article and head noun o f a definite description. 
However, in so-called “truncated clefts”, the initial it is a full pronoun which is 
anaphoric to a complete set description. From this it follows that example (85) 
represents a separate specificational construction from the z'7-cleft and does not involve 
the deletion o f the restrictive relative clause.
(85) A. Is John the murderer? B. No, i t ’s Gary.
In examples o f VP-deletion then, such as (80) (repeated here as (86)), it is consistent 
with the analysis proposed in this thesis that the second instance o f it is a full pronoun 
(presented in bold) and is anaphoric to the description it (the one) who negotiated the 
new contract (underlined). On this analysis, the example in (86) involves the “deletion” 
only o f Bill and not Bill who negotiated the new contract. Consequently, this data is not 
problematic to an extraposition analysis which recognizes that, in specificational 
sentences, it can operate both as a full pronominal NP and as the head o f a restrictively 
modified definite description. As a result, VP-deletion cannot be used as an argument 
against the analysis proposed in this thesis.
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(86) I said that it should have been Bill who negotiated the new contract, and it 
should have been.
Now we can turn to the issue o f why these constituency tests are not all reliable. 
As Croft (2001: 189) comments, coordination is not a reliable test for constituency. This 
calls into question the “constituency” results o f right-node-raising, shown in (81) and 
VP-conjunction, shown in (83). For example, Croft (2001: 189) provides the following 
examples o f  English coordinate constructions which “support “constituents” that are not 
supported by other criteria”.
(87) Right-node-raising: [Jenny makes]?? and [Randy sells] ?? the prints
(88) Gapping: Jenny gave [the books to Randy]?? and [the magazines to Bill]??
(Croft 2001: 189)
In line with Croft’s (2001: 189) observations about the unreliability o f coordination- 
based constituency tests, Hedberg (1990: 98) notes that right-node-raising, parenthetical 
formation and VP-conjunction constructions “do not entirely exclude extraposed relative 
clauses.. .from appearing in the position filled by the cleft clause in clefts”. She provides 
the following examples. In each o f  these cases, the extraposed relative clause clearly 
restricts, and forms a “discontinuous constituent” with, nobody, but shows the same 
pattern o f behaviour as the /t-clefts given in (81) to (83) above.
(89) Nobody would -  and nobody could -  drink instant coffee who knew anything 
about espresso.
(90) Nobody would ever, in my opinion, drink instant coffee, who knew anything 
about espresso.
(91) Nobody could drink instant coffee and enjoy it, who knew anything about 
espresso. (Hedberg 1990: 99)
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This evidence therefore shows that the data involving right-node-raising, parenthetical 
formation and VP-conjunction is equally consistent with my extraposition-from-NP 
account o f  //-clefts and does not undermine my analysis.
This leaves us with VP-fronting (or VP-preposing). Hedberg (1990: 98-99) 
shows that VP-preposing is not possible for extraposed relative structures, giving the 
example shown here as (92). On this basis, Hedberg claims that //-clefts do not involve 
straightforward extraposition-from-NP, and the cleft clause must instead be a constituent 
o f the VP.
(92) *1 said a candidate would win who had charisma, and win who had charisma, a
candidate did. (Hedberg 1990: 99)
However, even Delahunty (1982, 1984) observes that VP-fronting in //-clefts, shown in
(84), is unacceptable to many speakers. In his (1982) thesis, he builds up his analysis 
that the postcopular element and the cleft clause are syntactic sisters without this 
evidence, treating such examples as ungrammatical. Likewise, Delin (1989) considers 
the ungrammaticality o f preposing in (93) to be evidence against treating the postcopular 
element and the cleft clause as a constituent.
(93) *1 said it is John that’s an interesting guy, and John that’s an interesting guy it is.
(Delin 1989; cited in Hedberg 2000: 916f)
Nevertheless, in his (1984) paper, Delahunty argues that the low acceptability o f //-cleft 
examples involving VP-fronting is dependent upon “stylistic awkwardness” rather than 
ungrammaticality. Similarly, Hedberg (1990: 98) claims that since some o f these 
examples are more acceptable than others, preposing can be used as evidence for 
constituency. She notes that the //-cleft given here as (94) and the noncleft example of 
VP-preposing in (95) are “equally acceptable” .
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(94) I said that it would be a conservative w ho’d win, and a conservative who won it 
certainly was.
(95) I said that I would finish by September, and finish by September I did.
(Hedberg 1990: 98; her judgments)
However, I disagree with Hedberg (1990). The /7-cleft in (94) is clearly less acceptable 
and is certainly less natural than the noncleft example given in (95).
In conclusion then, examples o f VP-preposing are at best unnatural and at worst 
ungrammatical. Consequently, I do not view this data as strong evidence for VP-intemal 
constituency. In sum, Delahunty’s constituency tests are not problematic for an 
extraposition analysis o f  /7-clefts, since this data (where grammatical) can be 
accommodated fairly neatly.
We can follow Delahunty’s discussion by pointing out that there is evidence that 
the cleft clause does not form a constituent with the postcopular element. For example 
although Han and Hedberg (2008:357) conclude that the clefted constituent and the cleft 
clause form a syntactic constituent, they note that they can be separated by an adverbial 
phrase, shown in (96).
(96) It was Kim, in m y opinion, who won the race (Han and Hedberg 2008: 357)
This adverbial phrase records speaker opinion rather than the manner o f the act denoted 
by the verb. As a result, in my opinion must be a sentence adverbial rather than a VP 
adverbial and cannot be located within the VP. The fact that a sentence adverbial can 
come between the clefted constituent {Kim) and the cleft clause {who won the race) 
provides a solid argument against the claim that they are syntactic sisters within VP.
4.3.2 Agreement issues
M oving beyond constituency diagnostics, we can look at agreement facts, which have 
also been used to argue against an extraposition analysis o f /7-clefts (see for example 
Jespersen 1937). I argue here that, for the most part, /7-cleft agreement actually supports
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an approach in which //-clefts are analysed as a subtype o f  the specificational copular 
construction. For example, Akmajian (1970) notes that, for the vast majority o f speakers, 
the verb in the cleft clause is systematically marked as third person and pronouns in 
postcopular position are always in the objective case, shown in (97).
(97) It’s me who does this job  (Akmajian 1970: 151)
This pattern is to be expected on an extraposition account, since the //-cleft in (97) 
corresponds to the pseudocleft in (98). Here, the verb in the relative clause shows 
agreement with the third person head noun one and the focal element is marked as 
objective as a result o f  its postverbal position.
(98) The one who does this job is me
However, this data is problematic for expletive accounts which assume a 
predication relationship between the clefted constituent and the cleft clause. Under an 
expletive analysis, we would expect the postcopular element in (97) to be marked as 
nominative (since it acts as the preposed argument o f the proposition expressed in the 
cleft clause) and for the verb in the cleft clause to show person agreement with the 
clefted constituent, as shown in (99). However, this pattern is not found in the dialect o f 
the majority o f  speakers.
(99) *??It is I who do this job
The person agreement data is particularly awkward for expletive analyses which invoke 
movement to extract the clefted constituent out o f the cleft clause (including Rochemont 
1986), since examples such as (97) do not have corresponding noncopular paraphrases.
In order to accommodate this data, É. Kiss (1998: 259), whose main argument requires 
movement, suggests that the clefted constituent can also be base-generated in the 
postcopular position and coindexed with the w/z-pronoun in the cleft clause.
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Nevertheless, although expletive analyses invoking the base-generation strategy can 
accommodate this person agreement data, they still cannot explain it.
W hile person agreement and case provide evidence in support o f an extraposition 
analysis, num ber agreement is much more problematic. As shown in (100), the verb in 
the cleft clause agrees in number with the clefted constituent. Akmajian (1970) claims 
that the num ber agreement patterns in //-clefts are also found in their corresponding
pseudocleft sentences. For example in (101) the plural verb (are) in the relative clause
agrees in number with the head noun o f the definite description (ones).
(100) It is John and Sally [who are responsible]
(101) The ones [who are responsible] are John and Sally
However, as Huddleston (1984: 461) comments, there are some important differences in 
the number agreement patterns o f //-clefts and pseudoclefts. For instance, from (100) 
above we can see that the copular verb in the matrix clause o f the //-cleft is always 
singular and does not agree in number with the verb o f the relative clause. In contrast, in 
the pseudocleft in (101), both the copular o f  the matrix clause and the verb in the relative 
clause agree in num ber with the head noun ones. This observation is problematic for my 
analysis o f //-clefts. From the example given in (100) it would appear that while the 
copular verb o f the matrix clause agrees in number with the singular pronoun it, the verb 
o f the relative clause shows agreement with the focal element, exactly as would be 
predicted on an expletive account.
Nevertheless, the semantic account o f specificational sentences proposed in this 
thesis can help to explain this data. I argued in §3.3 that specificational copular 
sentences involve a nominal predication relation in which we are told the membership o f 
a restricted set. In § 4 .1 ,1 extended this analysis to //-clefts, arguing that the 
discontinuous definite description, made up o f it and the restrictive relative clause, 
denotes a restricted set. In pseudoclefts such as (102), the restricted set is described by 
its (plural) members, the ones that travel by train. The //-cleft construction can also 
identify more than one member as comprising a restricted set. However, in this case,
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shown in (103), the constituent it and the copular verb are marked as singular. 
Effectively, in this example, a singular set {o f co-workers that travel by train) is 
identified as having plural members.
(102) The ones that travel by train a re  John, Suzie and Tom
(103) It’s John, Suzie and Tom that travel by train
In this way, /7-clefts behave differently from specificational sentences with overt 
nominal heads. It is possible that this small difference could well lead to the interesting 
number agreement patterns we find in z7-clefts. In construction grammar, it is accepted 
that speakers m ay have different conceptualizations underlying a single linguistic 
structure and that this can lead to variation and change. For example, Croft (2001: 127) 
provides the following attested example in which a noun marked as singular is followed 
by a plural verb. Croft explains this phenomenon, which has become a convention o f the 
language, as the result o f  speakers having alternative conceptualizations available 
underlying collective entities, such as a highway authority. He notes that “a collective 
entity is conceptually both singular and plural; it is singular because it functions as a 
singular unit, but it is also plural in that it is made up o f a multiplicity o f individuals” 
(Croft 2001: 128).
(104) Section 278 o f the Highways Act 1980, therefore, provides that if  a highway
authority a re  satisfied that it would be o f  benefit to the public...
(Croft 2001: 127)
Since, in the analysis presented in this thesis, it and the relative clause denote a 
set, there are also two possible conceptualizations o f this entity. In (103), this 
discontinuous description is both singular (in relation to the set) and plural (in relation to 
its members). Consequently, it is possible that while the copular verb o f the matrix 
clause shows agreement with the singular set, marked as singular by it, the verb in the 
relative clause shows number agreement with the plural members o f this set. This might
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sound opportunistic, but it is worth noting that a similar state o f affairs is shown in N P o f  
NP  constructions. In the specificational copular sentence in (105), the singular noun 
group agrees with the matrix verb while the plural noun students agrees with the verb in 
the relative clause.
(105) The group o f students that are always late is John, Suzie and Tom
If  this is the correct analysis for number agreement in z'/-clefts, we would expect 
that the extraposition o f the relative clause plays a fundamental role in the lack o f 
agreement between the initial it and the verb in the relative clause. For example, in
(106), the restrictive relative clause is given after the identification o f the members o f 
the set. This tells us that the set denoted by the discontinuous constituent is a singular set 
with plural members and allows the plural marking o f the verb in the relative clause.19 If 
this is the case, then in (106), we are saying that the restricted set (o f  
students/individuals that are always late) is comprised o f  John, Suzie and Tom.
(106) It is John, Suzie and Tom that are always late
Tellingly, there is also variation in this pattern. For some speakers, the verb in the 
relative clause can be m arked as singular (agreeing with it and the copular verb) even 
when the clefted constituent is plural. For instance, in my dialect (107) is an equally 
acceptable alternative to (106) above.
(107) It is John, Suzie and Tom that’s always late
19 Like //-clefts, w/z-clefts can also occur with plural foci. As with the it o f  //-clefts, what is inherently 
singular and shows agreement with the copular verb o f the matrix clause. However, for w/2-clefts, the verb 
in the relative clause is also marked as singular regardless o f the plurality o f members, shown in (i). 
Again, this suggests that it is the extraposition o f  the relative clause in //-clefts that leads to the lack o f 
agreement between the initial it and the embedded verb.
(i) What is on the table is an egg and a screwdriver
149
In conclusion then, number agreement is a problem for an extraposition analysis 
o f //-clefts. Nevertheless, as we have seen, agreement patterns on the whole (including 
person and case marking) seem to favour this analysis over an expletive account. 
Furthermore, the number agreement patterns gain at least a plausible explanation in the 
particular extraposition account proposed in this thesis, since the initial it and the 
relative clause together form a singular set (with an underspecified head noun). From 
what we know about the different possible conceptualizations o f collective entities, it is 
possible that while the copula o f the matrix clause shows agreement with the singular 
set, the relative clause provides restrictions on the members o f this set, resulting in plural 
marking for this verb. In §5 .2 .2 ,1 show that this analysis is able to account for the 
different agreement patterns o f specificational and predicational /¿-clefts. I provide 
historical evidence in support o f my account o f the //-cleft’s number agreement patterns 
in §7.1.3.
4.3.3 Jespersen’s (1937) critique
I have shown then that Delahunty’s (1982, 1984) constituency tests and the number 
agreement puzzles outlined above can be accounted for within my extraposition-firom- 
NP analysis o f  //-clefts. However, Jespersen (1937) raises a number o f further objections 
to an extraposition account o f //-clefts, which were originally proposed as a means of 
criticizing his earlier transposition theory (see §4.2.1). I discuss some o f these points 
here and explain that many o f  them do not represent a serious problem for my analysis. 
Aside from the number agreement issues discussed above, Jespersen’s (1937) criticisms 
lie m ainly in presenting data pertaining to the nature o f the cleft clause. For example, 
Jespersen (1937: 84) notes that the cleft clause prefers that to who or which, can occur 
without a relative marker, and is not separated from the rest o f the sentence by commas 
or pauses. On this basis, Jespersen argues that the cleft clause and postcopular element 
form a constituent. However, each o f these points is discussed in §4.1.3 where I show 
that they support the analysis o f the relative clause in //-clefts as restrictive rather than 
nonrestrictive. Consequently, they do not pose a problem for the account o f //-clefts 
proposed in this chapter.
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In fact, Jespersen (1937: 84-85) seems to be arguing against a different version 
o f the extraposition approach from that which is proposed in this thesis. For example, he 
notes that the transposition theory cannot “easily account for those cases in which it 
is...an  adverb or a similar word that follows after it is”, since (108) is not equivalent in 
meaning to (109). However, my analysis involves extraposition-ffom-NP rather than 
extraposition o f  the NP. Consequently, the ft-cleft in (108) is not analysed as a variant o f 
(109), but as corresponding in meaning to the specificational copular sentence in (110). 
As a result, Jespersen’s criticism does not apply to the analysis proposed in this chapter 
but to accounts in which the entire subject NP is extraposed.
(108) It was here that he died
(109) That he died was here
(110) The place that he died was here
However, Jespersen (1937: 84-85) does raise two important points which 
represent a problem to the analysis I have built up in this chapter. First, he notes that the 
cleft clause and the clefted constituent are always adjacent to one another. This raises the 
question: i f  the relative clause modifies the constituent it, then why can’t it occur 
immediately after the initial it in zt-clefts? Second, he notes that unlike the ordinary 
antecedents o f relative clauses, it cannot be stressed. I deal with these two issues in §7.1 
where I show that the present-day zY-cleft construction has retained an Old English 
paratactic relative clause structure. Unlike other restrictive relative clauses, the cleft 
clause has never come together with its antecedent, possibly as a result o f  information- 
structure tendencies and/or prosodic factors.
4.3.4 Connectivity effects
The final set o f difficult data involves connectivity effects. This data has been used to 
argue in favour o f a movement-based, derivational account o f cleft sentences. While it is 
beyond the scope o f this thesis to provide a constructional theory o f binding, I hope to
(Jespersen 1937: 85) 
(Jespersen 1937: 85)
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show that the connectivity data actually presents a problem, rather than evidence, for an 
analysis involving movement.
In generative and transformational theories o f grammar, binding effects represent 
clause-internal structural relations between syntactic elements. On this account, it 
follows that the clefted reflexive him self in (111) is somehow c-commanded by the 
pronoun he embedded inside the cleft clause. On the face o f  it, binding in //-clefts seems 
to support an expletive account, in which the clefted constituent is either moved out of 
the cleft clause or is coindexed with a gap inside the cleft clause. Such an analysis 
allows binding in //-clefts to work in much the same way as it does in simple noncopular 
sentences, such as (112) (see Hankamer 1974).
(111) It was him self that he hurt
(112) He hurt him self
However, Higgins (1979) raises an important problem with this analysis. He 
notes that the same connectivity effects are found not only in //-clefts, but in all types o f 
specificational copular sentence. For example, in the w/z-cleft and the noncleft 
specificational sentence below, the reflexive yourse lf in the matrix clause is governed by 
the pronoun you  embedded inside the restrictive relative clause.
(113) W hat you should try instead is shaving yourself in the evening
(114) The approach you should try instead is shaving yourself in the evening
(examples from Higgins 1979: 56)
Higgins therefore calls for a unified account o f specificational copular constructions. 
Since noncleft examples such as (114) cannot be derived from simple noncopular 
sentences (such as you should try shaving yourself in the evening), Higgins claims that
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the use o f reflexive pronouns in specificational sentences requires an independent 
explanation from syntactic c-command.20
In specificational copular sentences then, reflexives in the focal XP are not c- 
commanded by the elements on which they depend for their interpretation; that is, the 
two pronouns are not located within the same clause. The connectedness in 
specificational sentences therefore raises interesting questions about how and where 
binding is licensed.
O f course, specificational sentences are not the only examples which challenge 
the claim that binding relies on structural c-command. For example, in the noncopular 
sentence in (115), John  does not c-command the reflexive himself. Such sentences 
involve “backward binding” into the subject NP. For Williams (1983, 1994), a 
proponent o f the inverse analysis o f  copular constructions, binding in specificational 
sentences works in much the same way. On the inverse account, specificational 
sentences, such as the w/z-cleft in (116), are derived via movement from subject- 
predicate structures such as (117). W illiams therefore claims that although binding in 
(116) superficially runs from left to right, it is nevertheless derived from a structure 
involving backward binding into the (now postcopular) subject.
(115) A picture o f  himself; upset John; (Heycock and Kroch 1999: 369)
(116) W hat he; promised was to reform himself; (Heycock and Kroch 1999: 368)
(117) To reform himself; was what he; promised
However, Heycock and Kroch (1999: 369) argue that backward binding does not present 
a viable explanation for the binding effects o f specificational copular sentences. They 
note that while the connectivity effects in specificational sentences are categorical, 
backwards binding appears to be optional (see Heycock and Kroch 1999: 369-370).
It seems then that connectivity in specificational copular sentences cannot be 
satisfactorily accounted for by movement-based analyses. Alternative explanations for
20 Higgins (1979) frames this discussion in response to Akmajian (1970), who claims that while //-clefts 
are derived from their pseudocleft sources via extraposition, these are in turn derived from simple 
noncopular sentences which conform to standard reflexivization rules.
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these connectivity effects include the question-in-disguise theory o f pseudoclefts 
championed by Den Dikken et al. (2000) and Schlenker (2003), the semantic accounts o f 
Jacobson (1994), Sharvit (1999, 2003) and Heller (2002, 2005) and the information- 
structure based accounts o f  Heycock and Kroch (1999, 2002) and Lahousse (2009).
It is beyond the scope o f  this thesis to review these alternative theories in detail 
here. However, as I see it, a problem with the “concealed question” analysis is that it 
stipulates enormous amounts o f  elided material which does not seem to be 
independently motivated or supported by agreement factors.21 Likewise, most semantic 
accounts, which use higher-order semantics rather than syntactic c-command to license 
connectivity, are based upon the premise that specificational sentences are identity 
statements (see for example, Sharvit (1999, 2003) and Heller (2002, 2005)).22 1 have 
already presented a num ber o f reasons for rejecting an equative analysis o f 
specificational sentences in §3.2. Finally, the information-structure based account 
proposed by Heycock and Kroch (2002) struggles to account for the difficult data for 
which it was intended. These authors claim that canonical order specificational 
sentences share the same ‘focus/ground’ information structure as noncopular simple 
sentences, which in turn accounts for their shared connectivity effects. However, the 
explanatory power o f this analysis is dependent upon the claim that reverse 
specificational sentences have a different information structure involving topicalization. 
This is not supported by the analysis o f specificational sentences argued for in this 
thesis.23
21 An important advantage o f the question-in-disguise or “ellipsis” approach is that it can account for the 
licensing o f  negative polarity items in examples such as (i) by examining them in relation to w/i-clefts 
with sentential foci, such as (ii), in which the NPI is licensed by a c-commanding pronoun. However, as I 
explain in §8.2, examples such as (ii) are instances o f  a separate ‘presentational’ wh-cleft construction. 
Consequently, this structure should not be used as the basis for an analysis o f w/2-clefts in general.
(i) W hat he didn’t buy was any wine
(ii) What he didn’t buy was, he didn’t buy any wine
22 Jacobson (1994) frames her semantic account o f connectivity within the inverse analyses of Williams 
(1983) and Partee (1986). In theory then, this analysis should be broadly compatible with my own 
predicational account o f  specificational sentences. However, Heycock and Kroch (2002: 380f) argue that 
“Her approach seems instead to require the equative analysis that we propose”.
23 Heycock and Kroch (2002) attempt to account for the differing connectivity properties o f canonical and 
reverse specificational sentences (shown below) by suggesting that while reverse specificational sentences
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I have shown that the exact nature o f these connectivity effects is elusive and I 
do not attempt to propose a constructional theory o f binding here. However, it is my 
belief that the analysis o f specificational meaning provided in this thesis is not at odds 
with the connectivity data and could actually help to make sense o f it. In what follows, I 
sketch a very simple account o f reflexivization in //-clefts and other specificational NP  
be NP  sentences which, crucially, explains why these connectivity effects are not found 
in predicational N P be N P  sentences.
We can start with the very simple premise that the participant roles o f a predicate 
must be reflexively marked if  they correspond to the same entity. In the //-cleft in (118), 
the embedded verb hurt takes two participant roles, an agent and a patient. The purpose 
o f this specificational sentence is to identify the patient, described by the discontinuous 
definite NP {the one that he hurt). In other words, the postcopular element provides the 
referent which matches the NP-intem al participant o f the embedded verb hurt. Since the 
patient and the agent roles are performed by the same individual, a reflexive in the 
postcopular position is expected.
(118) It was him self that he hurt
This same kind o f  semantic analysis can be extended to account for other 
specificational copular sentences. For example, the specificational wh-cleft in (119) 
identifies a property o f  Sarah rather than a ‘participant’. Nevertheless, this example can 
be accounted for by the same set o f  assumptions i.e. that nouns can only assign theta- 
roles within the NP (see Francis 1999a, b) and that connectivity effects result ultimately 
from the semantics o f specification. In (119), the noun burden assigns participant roles
can have a focus/ground information structure, the precopular NP is often discourse old, resulting in a 
topic/focus information structure. There are two problems with this analysis. First, their account predicts 
that if  (ii) is used to answer the question what did he miss the most?, resulting in primary stress on the 
head noun dog, then the co-reference reading should not be possible. This, however, is not the case. 
Second, I have argued in §3.3 that reverse specificational sentences always have a focal subject. 
Otherwise, the result is a non-specificational instance o f the predicate nominal construction.
(i) What he*i/j really missed was Johnfs dog
(ii) Johnfs dog was what he^ really missed (examples from Heycock and Kroch 2002: 119)
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within the postcopular NP. It is a “participant nominalization”, meaning that the noun 
burden incorporates the participant role o f agent as well as assigning the patient role to 
herself (see Francis 1999b).
(119) W hat S arah  is is a burden to herse lf [specificational wh-cleft]
On this account then, binding is internal to the NP. The only remaining question is how 
do we identify the agent participant, (the one who is) a burden, with Sarah? This comes 
about via the identification o f the postcopular referent with the head noun o f the 
precopular description (what). Since what is marked as denoting a property by the 
restrictive relative Sarah is x, it follows that in (119), Sarah is classified as a burden.
This relatively simple, semantic account o f reflexivization explains why the same 
connectivity effects are not found in predicational copular sentences, such as (120). On 
this predicational reading, what Sarah is, refers to a property, such as being a 
perfectionist, which is described or classified as a burden to her. Here, the proper noun 
Sarah and the non-reflexive pronoun her co-refer. This suggests that these entities are 
not both participants o f  the same predicate nominal.
(120) W hat S arah  is is a burden to her/*herself [predicational w/i-cleft]
As in (119) above, burden is a participant nominalization which incorporates the role o f 
agent. By classifying the referent what Sarah is as a burden to her, both the entity 
referred to in the precopular NP and the agent participant in the postcopular NP are 
identified as the same individual. However, the agent and patient participants o f the 
postcopular NP (what Sarah is and Sarah) do not correspond to the same entity (shown 
in (121)). As a result, the second participant cannot be marked as reflexive.
(121) Thatj is a burden to herj/*herselfi [predicational NP be NP]
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On this semantic account o f  reflexivization, binding in both specificational and 
predicational copular sentences is internal to the NP. While the class-membership 
predication relation may give the appearance o f syntactic connectivity across clauses, 
this is simply caused by matching a referent to the NP-intemal participant o f a 
predicative element. These predicative NPs correspond to simple noncopular sentences. 
For example, the participant nominalizations a burden to herself and a burden to her in
(119) and (120) above correspond to she bothers herself and that bothers her, 
respectively. This analysis therefore explains why there is a perceived difference in 
connectivity between specificational and predicational copular sentences (see Sharvit 
1999), but also manages to provide them with a unified analysis.
4.3.5 Summary and interim conclusions
Throughout § 4 .3 ,1 have shown that while the analysis o f fr-clefts and specificational 
copular sentences proposed in this thesis may leave some questions unresolved, much o f 
the difficult data can be accommodated into this account. On the whole, I believe that 
my analysis has many important advantages over alternative accounts and not too many 
disadvantages. For example, one advantage is that my analysis o f //-clefts has 
explanatory power, maximizing motivation from the language system. In the next 
chapter, I highlight the areas that are beyond the limits o f what can be explained as a 
consequence o f inheritance from the wider specificational copular construction. I ask 
whether these seemingly idiosyncratic properties can be shown to be motivated in some 
other way, thereby extending the scope o f my analysis.
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5. EXTENDING THE CONSTRUCTIONAL ACCOUNT
Over the previous two chapters, I have shown that /7-clefts can be integrated into an 
analysis o f  specificational copular sentences. In chapter 3 , 1 argued that specificational 
meaning arises from a nominal predication relation involving definite noun phrase 
predicates. In chapter 4 , 1 brought /7-clefts into this account, arguing for a “discontinuous 
constituent” analysis, in which the initial it and the cleft clause work together to make a 
definite description. I showed that many o f the /7-cleft’s properties are inherited from the 
wider specificational construction. For example, the pragmatic properties o f focus, 
existentiality, exhaustiveness, contrast and givenness were explained either as the 
product o f  specificational meaning or as deriving from the behaviour o f definite noun 
phrases. Likewise, the cleft clause was shown to be neither a non-modifying predicate 
(behaving like a relative clause as a result o f  analogy) nor a structurally unique form of 
relative clause (exhibiting both nonrestrictive and restrictive characteristics). Instead, by 
assuming that the cleft clause modifies the constituent it, its behaviour was shown to be 
consistent with a restrictive relative clause analysis.
Although this analysis has therefore been shown to have explanatory adequacy, it 
is nonetheless incomplete. By focusing on the properties that the /7-cleft shares with the 
other members o f  the family o f specificational copular constructions, the discussion so 
far has centred on what I will refer to here as the ‘prototypical’ /7-cleft subtype, that is it- 
clefts that have a specificational meaning, contain nominal foci, and involve given 
information in the relative clause. However, in chapter 1 o f this thesis, I noted that there 
are in fact several different subtypes o f /7-cleft, including predicational and proverbial it- 
clefts, non-NP focus /7-clefts and ‘informative-presupposition’ /7-clefts. For now, I 
assume that such examples represent non-prototypical subtypes o f an overarching /7-cleft 
schema. I explore this idea in chapters 7 and 8 o f this thesis, where I use historical 
evidence to explain this family resemblance story.
In this chapter, I examine how these non-prototypical /7-cleft subtypes are treated 
in the cleft literature and show that many analyses cannot accommodate them. I claim 
that an important advantage to m y own analysis, outlined in §4.1, is that it can
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incorporate all o f  the different types o f //-cleft. However, although my analysis can 
accommodate the full range o f ¿/-cleft data, it cannot, as yet, explain it. Throughout this 
chapter, I show that predicational ¿/-clefts, non-NP focus ¿/-clefts and informative- 
presupposition ¿/-clefts all exhibit properties that cannot be explained as a result o f 
inheritance from the wider specificational copular construction. I ask whether we can 
find motivation for these properties that goes beyond inheritance from the specificational 
schema. I claim that while we can provide motivation for predicational and proverbial it- 
clefts owing to inheritance from the predicate nominal construction discussed in §3.3.3, 
we m ust look outside o f  the present-day language system to explain the range o f  ¿/-cleft 
foci and the information-status o f the cleft clause.
In §5.2, m y discussion focuses on predicational and proverbial clefts. Here I 
show that expletive analyses o f ¿/-clefts cannot handle this data, I show that these 
examples can be integrated neatly into my account and I show how my account 
compares favourably to other attempts at accommodating these examples into an ¿/-cleft 
analysis. In §5.3 I turn to non-NP focus ¿/-clefts and in §5.4 I discuss the informative- 
presupposition subtype. In the next section, §5 .1 ,1 provide an introduction to each o f 
these non-prototypical types o f  ¿/-cleft and present a fuller description o f the contents o f 
this chapter.
5.1 The different types of /f-cleft
In chapter 4 , 1 focused on ¿/-clefts that share the maximum number o f  properties with 
specificational N P  be NP  sentences containing definite noun phrase predicates. For 
example, the ¿/-cleft in (1) is specificational, identifying the therapist as the person that 
killed her. Likewise, it contains a focal NP the therapist, which is used here as a 
referring expression. Finally, the relative clause expresses discourse-old information; 
that is, we know from the context that a woman has been murdered by someone. As I 
explained in §4.1.2.5, this property can be traced back to the semantics o f definite noun 
phrases: since they involve existential commitment, whereby the entity described is 
assumed to exist, definite NPs are associated with given or shared information. 
Consequently, all three o f these properties (specificational meaning, NP foci and given
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information in the relative clause) are shared with specificational NP be NP  sentences 
containing definite descriptions.
(1) A: Is he the murderer?
B: No. It was the therapist that killed her
However, there are other types o f  //-cleft which do not necessarily exhibit all o f 
these three properties. These include predicational and proverbial //-clefts, non-NP focus 
//-clefts and informative-presupposition //-clefts.
5.1.1 Non-specificational it-clefts
There are //-clefts that have a predicational rather than a specificational meaning. These 
are known as predicational //-clefts and proverbial //-clefts. In these examples, the 
postcopular element provides descriptive rather than identifying information. For 
instance, (2) describes the man that left as a tall man. Likewise, the proverbial example 
in (3) tells us that a road that has no turning is a long road.
(2) It was a tall man that left [predicational //-cleft]
(3) It is a long road that has no turning [proverbial //-cleft]
As I explain in §5.2.1, such sentences have often been regarded as forming a 
structurally distinct sentence-type, which is only superficially related to the 
specificational //-cleft. However, I identify a number o f problems with this claim and 
argue that these sentences should be integrated into a unified analysis o f //-clefts. In 
§5 .2 .2 ,1 show that m y own particular analysis o f //-clefts and o f the specificational- 
predicational distinction is able to accommodate the predicational examples as well as 
providing an explanation as to why //-clefts permit both specificational and predicational 
readings.
In §5 .2 .3 ,1 compare my analysis to that o f Han and Hedberg (2008), who also 
extend their account to cover predicational (including proverbial) clefts. Like me, these
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authors propose a “discontinuous constituent” analysis o f  the /7-cleft. However, they 
suggest that the definite-like description and the postcopular element are both referring 
expressions. In this section, I present further objections to the claim that specificational 
sentences are semantically equative and show that my own “predicational” account o f 
specificational constructions is better at explaining the different behaviour o f 
specificational and predicational /7-clefts.
5.1.2 It-c/effs with non-NP foci
Another domain o f variation concerns the range o f  elements that can occur as the 
complement o f  be. While noun phrases are the most common category to occur in the 
focal position, other possible categories include prepositional phrases and adverb 
phrases, among others.
(4) I t’s in December that she’s coming [PP-focus /7-cleft]
(5) It was just here that we met [AdvP-focus /7-clefit]
These non-NP /7-clefts are discussed in §5.3. Here, I show that the same range o f 
potential foci is not shared by other kinds o f specificational copular construction and 
therefore cannot be explained by inheritance. As a result, I claim that the /7-cleft foci 
make up a construction-specific category and require an independent explanation. Since 
the factors that sanction and restrict the range o f /7-cleft foci do not apply wholesale to 
major syntactic categories, it follows that any attempt to define this construction-specific 
category in terms o f  general syntactic rules is unlikely to succeed. Instead, I argue in 
favour o f a semantic description o f /7-cleft foci and suggest that historical evidence may 
help us to explain both what the boundaries o f this construction-specific category are 
and how it has developed over time.
5.1.3 It-clefts with new information in the cleft clause
The final domain o f variation o f interest to us here concerns the discourse status o f the 
cleft clause. As I noted above and in §4.1.2.5, the relative clause in z7-clefts typically
161
expresses given, or hearer-old, information. However, some //-cleft examples contain 
hearer-new information in the relative clause. For instance, the /'/-cleft in (6) is used 
discourse initially. In this example then, the information in the relative clause is not 
given by the previous discourse and the proposition, that someone once said  ‘laws are 
silent at times o f  war \  is not even assumed to be shared knowledge.
(6) (Start o f  lecture)
It was Cicero who once said. ‘Laws are silent at times o f w ar’
I discuss these examples, which are commonly referred to as informative-presupposition 
/'/-clefts, in §5.4. Here, I show that the ability o f  the cleft clause to express hearer-new 
information cannot be inherited from the wider specificational copular construction, or 
in fact, from definite noun phrases -  a claim which contrasts with the arguments of 
Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (2001). Instead, I suggest that these examples form a 
sub-construction that has emerged via extension from the prototypical /'/-cleft. 
Consequently, I argue that these examples require a diachronic explanation.
5.2 Predicational /f-clefts
Predicational (and proverbial) examples present a particularly tricky analytical problem. 
Because they are less common than their specificational counterparts, predicational (and 
proverbial) /'/-clefts are rarely discussed in the cleft literature. As a result, for many 
authors, /7-clefts are inherently specificational or identifying. For example, Gundel 
(1977: 547) suggests that the specificational-predicational distinction is not applicable to 
/7-clefts, which “can only have an ID [identifying] interpretation”. The question 
therefore arises, how do these predicational examples fit in with specificational /7-clefts?
There are two possible solutions to this problem. One option is to continue to 
maintain that /7-clefits are inherently specificational and to analyse the predicational 
examples as forming a distinct and unrelated sentence type. The other option is to 
acknowledge that /7-clefts can have either a specificational or predicational meaning and 
to provide a unified analysis o f both types o f  /7-cleft.
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I adopt the second o f  these strategies. In §5 .2 .2 ,1 claim that, just as N P  be NP  
sentences allow both specificational and predicational interpretations, so too do //-clefts. 
I outline an account in which predicational //-clefts inherit from the predicate nominal 
construction rather than from the specificational copular construction. I suggest that 
specificational and predicational //-clefts together form an overarching //-cleft schema, 
with the proverbial examples forming a subtype o f the predicational //-cleft. I then go 
on, in §5.2.3, to explain how m y analysis o f the specificational-predicational distinction 
in //-clefts is more intuitive and economical than that proposed by Han and Hedberg 
(2008).
However, before I present my unified analysis o f //-clefts, I review the accounts 
o f those authors that choose the alternative strategy o f providing non-specificational 
examples with a separate analysis from that o f specificational //-clefts. In §5 .2 .1 ,1 
explain that since the expletive analysis o f //-clefts cannot be extended to accommodate 
predicational examples, scholars who adopt this approach are forced to treat some or all 
predicational examples as forming an unrelated sentence-type. After outlining a number 
o f problems with this reasoning, I conclude that the existence o f the predicational 
subtype presents an important problem for expletive analyses o f //-clefts.1
5.2.1 The expletive approach to predicational clefts
W hile Ball (1977), Declerck (1983) and Lambrecht (2001) all discuss non- 
specificational examples, they nevertheless maintain the claim that //-clefts are 
inherently specificational. For Ball (1977), predicational (including proverbial) clefts are 
“syntactically unrelated” to specificational //-clefts. Likewise, although Lambrecht 
(2001) discusses only the proverbial examples, he claims that they cannot be analysed as 
true “cleft” sentences. Declerck (1983) provides a somewhat different analysis, in that 
he distinguishes between proverbial and non-proverbial predicational clefts. Declerck 
(1983) argues that although proverbial clefts are superficially similar to the //-cleft 
proper, they actually form a structurally distinct sentence type. As for non-proverbial 
predicational clefts, Declerck (1983) claims that these can be integrated into his //-cleft
1 The material in §5.2 was originally presented at the Cleft08 workshop in Berlin (see Patten 2008).
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analysis; he treats them as “borderline cases”, in which predicational information is 
contained within an otherwise specificational cleft.
For all o f  these authors then, we do not have a single //-cleft construction which 
permits both specificational and predicational readings. Instead we have an inherently 
specificational //-cleft and a separate, unrelated construction. In what follows, I explain 
some o f  the reasoning behind this claim. I show that the arguments in favour o f a 
separate analysis for non-specificational examples are circular and originate from the (as 
I see it, incorrect) assumption that specificational //-clefts require an expletive analysis. I 
conclude that the lack o f  agreement between Ball (1977) and Declerck (1983) over how 
to analyse “borderline” non-proverbial predicational //-clefts calls for a unified analysis 
o f  all cleft types.
Although Ball (1977), Declerck (1983) and Lambrecht (2001) do not provide 
formal analyses o f  the grammatical structure o f the //-cleft, they nevertheless adopt an 
expletive approach, in which the cleft clause is understood to be related in some way to 
the postcopular constituent. As I noted in §3.1, the expletive approach to //-clefts 
emphasizes the relationship between //-clefts and their noncopular subject-predicate 
counterparts. For example, the //-cleft in (7) is understood to express the same semantic 
content as its canonical counterpart in (8); that is, the clefted constituent is treated as the 
preposed argument o f the embedded verb. For Ball, Declerck and particularly 
Lambrecht, //-clefts are therefore considered foremost as information-structure variants 
o f noncopular sentences.
(7) It was [Howard]; that [Sarah k issed  ;] [//-cleft]
(8) Sarah kissed Howard [canonical]
As I noted in §4.1.3, if  the cleft clause is understood in relation to the 
postcopular constituent, as it is in the expletive accounts, it is shown to exhibit an 
interesting mixture o f properties common to both restrictive and nonrestrictive relative 
clauses, thereby evading classification. For example, like restrictive relatives, the cleft 
clause is commonly introduced by that and can also occur without an overt relative
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pronoun. However, the assumed antecedent to the cleft clause can be a proper name. 
Since proper names are full noun phrases, they cannot be further modified by restrictive 
relatives, shown in (11). This suggests that the relationship between the cleft clause and 
its immediate “antecedent” is different from that found with restrictive relative clauses 
in other constructions.
(9) It was Howard th a t/0  Sarah kissed [//-cleft]
(10) The guy th a t/0  Sarah kissed works there [restrictive relative]
(11) *Howard that Sarah kissed works there [restrictive relative]
In light o f these unusual properties, these authors differ as to how they analyse 
the cleft clause. For instance, Lambrecht (2001: 473) argues that it is a special type of 
nonrestrictive relative, unique to cleft sentences, Declerck (1983:12) states that the that- 
clauses o f clefts are not genuine relative clauses, whereas Ball (1977: 58) suggests that 
their internal structure is like a restrictive relative clause, but claims that they have “no 
apparent head” . Despite this, what these authors all agree upon is that the cleft clause is 
not a normal restrictive relative clause.
However, unlike specificational zY-clefts, proverbial examples do not correspond 
in meaning to their noncopular counterparts. Instead, these authors agree that they are 
paraphrased most closely by predicational copular sentences, such as (14).
(12) It’s a long road that has no turning [proverbial cleft]
(13) A long road has no turning [canonical]
(14) The/A road that has no turning is a long one/road [predicational paraphrase]
This fact alone is enough for Lambrecht (2001: 503) to conclude that the proverbial 
examples have a “noncleft status”. For him, the concept “cleft” is inextricably tied to the 
correspondence o f these examples to simple noncopular sentences.
Proponents o f the expletive analysis are therefore forced to examine 
specificational and proverbial examples in relation to two different constructions. As a
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result, Ball, Declerck and Lambrecht are obliged to analyse the relative clauses o f 
specificational and proverbial clefts differently. While in specificational //-clefts, the 
cleft clause is related in some way to the postcopular constituent, proverbial clefts 
cannot be accommodated into this analysis. Instead, Ball, Declerck and Lambrecht 
provide proverbial clefts with an analysis that corresponds to that o f their predicational 
NP be N P  paraphrases. Since sentences such as (14) above clearly involve restrictive 
relative clauses, which modify the head noun within the subject NP, these authors agree 
that the “cleft clause” o f  proverbial clefts is also a restrictive relative.
To recap then, Ball (1977), Declerck (1983) and Lambrecht (2001) examine 
specificational and proverbial clefts in relation to two very different constructions 
(noncopular simple sentences and predicational N P be NP  sentences, respectively). As a 
result, they provide the sentence-final clauses o f these cleft types with two different 
analyses: proverbial clefts are said to contain restrictive relative clauses while the cleft 
clause in specificational //-clefts is understood to be o f a type that is unique to this 
construction.
In a circular line o f argumentation, the status o f the cleft clause is then used as 
evidence that the proverbial examples form a structurally distinct sentence type from 
specificational //-clefts. Declerck (1983: 14) says, “ [proverbial clefts] are not really cleft 
sentences but represent a type o f  sentence that is homophonous with clefts. They differ 
from clefts in that they involve a true restrictive relative clause” . However, as we have 
seen, these so-called differences in the status o f the cleft clause are a consequence of 
relating specificational and proverbial clefts to two different constructions. 
Consequently, the status o f  the cleft clause cannot be used as a valid argument for 
treating proverbial clefts as a separate construction from specificational //-clefts.
There is also an important problem with setting up a sharp distinction between 
specificational //-clefts and proverbial “cleft-like” examples: that is, the status o f non- 
proverbial predicational //-clefts. W hile Lambrecht (2001) does not discuss these 
examples, Ball (1977) and Declerck (1983) classify them with proverbial and 
specificational //-clefts, respectively. However, as I go on to explain in the remainder o f
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this section, these non-proverbial predicational clefts seem to bridge the gap between 
specificational and proverbial examples, thereby calling for a unified analysis.
For Ball (1977: 61), predicational clefts such as (15) should be analysed in the 
same way as the proverbial sentences, since they too correspond to predicational N P be 
NP  sentences.
(15) It was a tall man that left [predicational cleft]
(16) The man that left was a tall man [predicational paraphrase]
However, there is less reason to assume that non-proverbial predicational examples are 
unrelated to the specificational /7-cleft construction. For example, Declerck (1983: 15) 
notes that, like other proverbs, proverbial clefts are “reminiscent o f an older stage o f the 
language”. He uses this claim to assert that these examples share only a superficial 
similarity to the modern-day specificational /7-cleft. However, this argument cannot be 
made for non-proverbial predicational clefts. In addition, non-proverbial predicational it- 
clefts are often difficult to distinguish from their specificational counterparts, with the 
same example allowing for both specificational and predicational interpretations.
As a result, Declerck (1983) incorporates these non-proverbial predicational 
examples into his analysis o f  /7-clefts. However, in order to maintain the claim that it- 
clefts are “essentially specificational in nature”, he suggests that these examples “are 
really borderline cases” in which predicational information is contained within an 
otherwise specificational cleft (Declerck 1983: 18). For instance, in Declerck’s account, 
the example in (17) involves a predicational adjective, but a specificational head noun. 
He notes that “If  we leave out the predicational modifier, what remains must be a good 
specificational cleft” (Declerck 1983: 31).
(17) It was a charming woman that got the job [“borderline” cleft]
(18) It was a woman that got the job [specificational cleft]
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However, Declerck acknowledges that for some examples the head noun cannot 
be given a speciflcational interpretation; here the entire focal noun phrase can be nothing 
other than predicational. For instance, in (19) and (20), the use o f the degree modifier 
such and the negative marker no indicate that the head noun idiot is clearly a 
predicational element.
(19) It was such an idiot that wrote this
(20) It was no idiot that wrote this
For Declerck (1983: 38), these are treated as “exceptional” examples, in which “the 
essentially specificational nature o f the cleft construction” has been “overruled” . 
Nevertheless, the existence o f  true predicational /7-clefts means that the claim that cleft 
sentences are inherently specificational cannot be maintained. The status o f these 
“borderline cases” therefore poses a problem for accounts that seek to separate 
proverbial examples from true specificational clefts. I f  predicational //-clefts are 
possible, why should proverbial examples, which also have a predicational meaning, 
require a separate analysis?
In conclusion then, the claim that //-clefts are inherently specificational cannot be 
maintained. Instead, there are both specificational and predicational (including 
proverbial) //-clefts, which require a unified analysis. However, as we have seen, non- 
specificational examples cannot be successfully integrated into an expletive analysis o f 
//-clefts. In such accounts, the clefted constituent is treated as the preposed argument o f 
the cleft clause. Since predicational and proverbial examples cannot be interpreted in 
this way, I claim that this data poses a problem for the expletive approach. In other 
words, the fact that the expletive analysis cannot accommodate the full range o f  data 
raises the question o f  whether it should be employed to handle the subset o f 
specificational //-clefts.
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5.2.2 Integrating predicational and proverbial clefts into my analysis
In the previous section then, we have seen that expletive accounts o f //-clefts are unable 
to provide a unified analysis which encompasses specificational, predicational and 
proverbial clefts. The reason for this is that, for these authors, the cleft clause in 
specificational //-clefts is understood to be related in some way to the postcopular 
element. As a result, this clause cannot be classified as a normal restrictive relative. 
From this, it follows that the specificational //-cleft construction has a different structure 
from non-specificational clefts, which are consistently analysed as containing restrictive 
relatives.
However, in § 4 .1 ,1 argued in favour o f a particular type o f extraposition account 
o f //-clefts, in which the constituent it and the cleft clause are treated together like a 
discontinuous definite description. One important advantage to this approach is that, by 
analysing the cleft clause as modifying the constituent it, rather than the complement of 
be, the cleft clause can be unambiguously classified as a restrictive relative. In this 
analysis, specificational //-clefts, like predicational and proverbial clefts, are understood 
in relation to corresponding copular paraphrases, shown in (21) and (22). As a result, all 
cleft types can be given a unified analysis. For instance, the predicational and proverbial 
clefts in (23) and (25) are likewise treated as involving discontinuous definite 
descriptions.
(21) [It] was Howard [that left]
(22) [The one that left] was Howard
(23) [It] was a tall man [that left]
(24) [The man that left] was a tall man
(25) [It]’s a long road [that has no turning]
[specificational //-cleft] 
[specificational copular paraphrase] 
[predicational //-cleft]
[predicational copular paraphrase] 
[proverbial //-cleft]
(26) [The road that has no turning] is a long road [predicational copular paraphrase]
In this analysis then, specificational //-clefts are treated foremost as 
specificational copular sentences, rather than as information structure variants o f their 
noncopular counterparts. As Hedberg (1990, 2000) and Han and Hedberg (2008)
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observe, the existence o f specificational and predicational //-clefts becomes predictable 
in an account which views clefts as copular constructions, since noncleft NP be NP  
sentences also exhibit the specificational-predicational distinction. For instance, while
(27) identifies the referent Sam, (28) ascribes a property to the murderer.
This contrasts with Declerck’s approach, in which predicational examples are 
effectively “hidden”. For Declerck, only sentences that are overtly marked in a way that 
disallows a specificational interpretation are permitted into the “exceptional” class o f 
true predicational clefts. All other predicational examples are integrated into a 
specificational analysis o f //-clefts. For instance, Declerck analyses examples such as
(18), repeated here as (29), as specificational, since they permit a reading in which the 
noun phrase (in this case a woman) is understood to denote a specific referent. Likewise, 
examples such as (30) are classified as “borderline” cases, which contain both 
predicational and specificational components.
(29) It was a woman that got the job [specificational cleft]
(30) It was a charming wom an that got the job [“borderline” cleft]
A unified analysis, on the other hand recognizes that example (29) can also allow 
a predicational reading where the postcopular indefinite noun phrase a woman is 
understood to describe a class or kind rather than referring to an individual (see Hedberg 
1990: 55). On this purely predicational reading, the gender o f the referent is at issue, 
rather than her identity. Although this sentence does not contain any disambiguating 
markers, the very fact that it can (shown in (3 1)) indicates that a predicational reading is 
possible for the unmodified postcopular NP in (29).
(31) It was certainly a woman that got the job [predicational cleft]
(27) The m urderer is Sam
(28) The m urderer is a doctor
[specificational copular sentence] 
[predicational copular sentence]
170
Also, by accepting that //-clefts are not inherently specificational, we do not have to 
classify examples such as (30) above as “borderline” cases. Given the analysis o f 
specificational meaning outlined in §3.3, it does not make sense to speak o f 
specificational and predicational “components”, since specificational meaning is the 
result o f  a special type o f  nominal predication relation. Instead, examples such as (30) 
are acknowledged to have a fully predicational reading, corresponding to noncleft 
predicational copular sentences such as (32).
(32) The woman that got the job  was a charming woman
Consequently, an important problem with Declerck’s (1983) approach is that by 
incorporating predicational examples into an essentially specificational analysis o f //- 
clefts, the specificational-predicational distinction is dismissed rather than explained. In 
contrast, using the discontinuous constituent analysis advocated here, we are able to 
recognize the distinction in meaning between specificational and predicational 
(including proverbial) clefts, while at the same time integrating them into a unified 
account o f the //-cleft construction.
The next step then is to ask how these different interpretations for //-clefts come 
about. Crucially, this depends on how we analyse the distinction between specificational 
and predicational copular constructions. In what follows, I show that the relationship 
between specificational and predicational meaning as it is outlined in §3.3 is particularly 
good at both explaining why //-clefts exhibit the specificational-predicational distinction 
and accounting for the predicational //-cleft data.
In § 3 .3 ,1 argued that specificational meaning arises from a reinterpretation o f the 
nominal predication relation associated with definite noun phrase predicates. In §4 .1 ,1 
integrated specificational //-clefts into my analysis o f specificational copular 
constructions, arguing that the constituent it and the relative clause function as the 
definite NP predicate. In this analysis, specificational //-clefts, such as (33), and their 
corresponding copular paraphrases, such as (34), involve a non-referring definite 
description and a postcopular referential NP. These noun phrases enter into a class-
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membership predication relation, in which the referent is understood to be a member o f  a 
set. In such constructions, the set described by the definite NP is so restricted that the 
referent makes up the complete membership o f this set. Consequently, a specificational 
meaning ensues, whereby the referent, which is in focus, is identified as the sole member 
o f  the restricted set.
(33) It was John that won the prize
(34) The one that won the prize was John
In order to provide an analysis for predicational //-clefts, we first need to return 
to the semantics o f  definite noun phrases detailed in §3.3.2. From a Russellian 
perspective, definite noun phrases are semantically descriptive, non-referring 
expressions. However, definite noun phrases can o f course be used referentially, to pick 
out a particular individual. According to Grice (1969), this usage is a pragmatic, rather 
than a semantic phenomenon, involving the exploitation o f speaker and hearer 
assumptions.
In predicational //-clefts, we have the same basic composition as specificational 
//-clefts, which comprise o f a discontinuous definite description and a postcopular NP. 
However, these elements perform different roles in the predication relation. For 
example, in the predicational //-cleft in (35) and its paraphrase in (36), the definite 
description it (the one) that won the prize  is used referentially. In other words, the 
Gricean reasoning outlined above has gone through. In contrast, the postcopular element 
a woman is understood to denote a class or kind. These two noun phrases enter into a 
nominal predication relationship, such that the referent the one that won the prize  is 
understood to be a member o f the general set woman. In such constructions, the 
predicate nominal is located in the postcopular (focal) position. In (35) and (36) then, the 
property o f being a woman is attributed to the one that won the prize.
(35) It was a woman that won the prize
(36) The one that won the prize was a woman
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This same analysis can also be extended to proverbial clefts. In such cases, the definite 
description is used to refer to a hypothetical entity. For example, in the //-cleft in (37) 
and its predicational copular paraphrase in (38), the mental referent the mother that has 
such children is described as a happy mother.
(37) It is a happy m other that has such children
(38) The mother that has such children is a happy mother
In predicational and proverbial //-clefts, the postcopular element is always 
nominal. However, in many cases, the postcopular NP contains a premodifying 
adjective. For instance, in (37) above, the adjective happy bears the main focal stress, 
while the noun mother is given information. In such examples, the head noun of the 
postcopular NP provides us with a value for the underspecified head noun contained 
within the constituent it. For instance, in the NP be NP  paraphrase in (38), the head noun 
(or “background set”) o f the initial definite description matches the head noun o f the 
postcopular NP.
I suggest that predicational //-clefts, o f  which the proverbial examples form a 
subtype, inherit from the predicate nominal construction outlined in §3.3.3. While 
specificational //-clefts inherit the subject-be-complement syntactic structure o f the 
(canonical) specificational copular construction, non-specificational examples inherit the 
subject-be-predicative complement structure o f the predicate nominal construction (see 
Figure 5.1). This accounts for the fact that indefinite noun phrases can have a predicative 
function in //-clefts such as (35) and (37) above. As I explained §3.3.3, the predicate 
nominal construction provides indefinite noun phrases with a predicative semantics via 
coercion (or construal). In contrast, indefinite noun phrases cannot be readily interpreted 
as predicates in the specificational copular construction unless they share characteristics 
with definite noun phrases, which are inherently set-denoting (see §3.3.4).
2 This fact alone provides support for my analysis o f specificational //-clefts as involving a type of 
nominal predication relation; it shows that all types o f  //-cleft (both specificational and predicational) 
involve nominal (as opposed to any other type of) predication.
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The predicate nominal construction
The predicational it-cleft construction
This unified account o f zi-clefts analyses both specificational and predicational 
(including proverbial) ¿/-clefts as involving nominal predication. For specificational it- 
clefts, the discontinuous definite description functions as the semantic predicate, while 
in predicational ¿/-clefts this discontinuous constituent is treated as an act o f reference. 
The specificational-predicational distinction in ¿/-clefts therefore falls out from an 
analysis in which it and the relative clause are treated as a discontinuous definite 
description. Since definite noun phrases are semantically descriptive, but nevertheless 
allow a referential usage, we would expect that both readings are possible for the 
discontinuous constituent in ¿/-clefts.
My analysis is further supported by differences in the specificational and 
predicational ¿/-cleft data. As pointed out by Ball (1977), specificational ¿/-clefts with
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plural foci are always introduced by a singular cleft pronoun. For example, while the 
postcopular NP in (39) is comprised o f two individuals John and Karl, the cleft is 
nevertheless introduced by the singular pronoun it. Likewise, (41) is introduced by it 
even though the postcopular element is a plural noun (wolves). As shown in (40) and 
(42), these specificational clefts cannot be introduced by the plural pronoun they.
(39) It was John and Karl that got fired
(40) *They were John and Karl that got fired
(41) It’s wolves that are m y favourite
(42) * They’re wolves that are my favourite3
In contrast, predicational //-clefts with plural nouns in the postcopular position can be 
introduced by a plural pronoun, shown in (43) and (44).
(43) They are nice shoes you’re wearing
(44) They’re wolves that you can hear howling
This data indicates a semantic difference in the discontinuous definite descriptions o f 
these two different types o f cleft. Consequently, these examples provide support for the 
account o f  //-clefts presented in this thesis, in which the definite-like NP of 
specificational //-clefts is analysed as a non-referring set description while that of 
predicational //-clefts acts as a referring expression.
Furthermore, m y analysis goes some way to explaining this data. I have argued 
that the discontinuous definite description o f specificational //-clefts always denotes a 
set. This property is shared with other noncleft NP be NP  specificational sentences
3 Example (42) cannot be given a predicational reading because we cannot interpret my favourite things as 
a referring expression in this context. For instance, (i) below will always be read as a specificational 
sentence, with my favourite things acting as the definite NP predicate. This specificational interpretation 
makes much more sense than the predicational reading, which describes all o f my favourite things as 
wolves.
(i) My favourite things are wolves
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containing definite NP predicates. However, in §4 .3 .2 ,1 noted that specificational it- 
clefts behave differently from specificational sentences with overt nominal heads. For 
example, both the NP be NP  sentence (or //7-cleft) in (45) and the //-cleft in (46) contain 
plural foci in the postcopular position. While the subject NP in (45) contains a nominal 
head ones which is also marked as plural, the constituent it and the copular verb o f (46) 
are marked as singular.
(45) The ones that travel by train are John, Suzie and Tom
(46) It’s John, Suzie and Tom that travel by train
In §4 .3 .2 ,1 suggested that a plausible explanation for these number agreement 
patterns lies in the analysis o f  the cleft it as performing the functions o f both the definite 
article and the head noun o f  the description. Since this “head noun” is underspecified, 
the discontinuous definite description denotes a singular set, but does not mark the 
membership o f  this set as either singular or plural. I suggested that this property o f  17- 
clefts could play an important role in manufacturing the interesting number agreement 
patterns which are found in //-clefts but are not shared by other kinds o f specificational 
copular construction. I concluded that in specificational //-clefts with plural foci, such as
(46) above, a singular set (o f  co-workers that travel by train) is identified as having 
plural members (John, Suzie and  Tom). From this, it follows that the definite-like 
description in //-clefts will always be introduced by a singular pronoun, since it denotes 
a singular set without indicating the plurality o f its members.
In specificational //-clefts then, the discontinuous definite description denotes a 
singular set. However, in predicational //-clefts, the discontinuous definite description is 
used to refer to the individual or individuals that are the member(s) o f some set. In this 
analysis, the use o f the plural pronoun they to introduce predicational clefts with plural 
foci is therefore expected.
In conclusion, while the predicational //-cleft data is at odds with the expletive 
approach to //-clefts (which cannot provide a unified analysis o f specificational, 
predicational and proverbial clefts), I have shown that it can be successfully
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accommodated by, and therefore provides support for, the analysis o f //-clefts presented 
in this thesis. Here, //-clefts are understood in relation to specificational and 
predicational N P be N P  sentences, both o f  which involve nominal predication. As a 
result, both predicational and specificational //-clefts are analysed as involving a 
discontinuous definite description which enters into a class-membership predication 
relation with the postcopular NP. The interpretation o f this discontinuous constituent as 
either a referring expression or as a description o f a set therefore plays a crucial role in 
manufacturing the predicational and specificational distinction in //-clefts.
However, this is not to say that all “predicational” accounts o f specificational 
copular sentences are equally successful at explaining the relationship between 
predicational and specificational //-clefts. For example, Heggie (1988) and Mikkelsen 
(2005) both assume inverse analyses o f specificational NP be NP  sentences; that is, they 
argue that such sentences are derived via a movement operation resulting in the 
predicative NP preceding the underlying subject NP (see §3.2.2). However, when it 
comes to specificational //-clefts, neither author recognizes that these too involve 
nominal predication. Instead, they suggest that the cleft clause is predicated o f the 
clefted constituent, with the initial it either acting as a semantically dummy element 
(Heggie 1988) or as a property-denoting pronoun which is bound cataphorically to the 
cleft clause (Mikkelsen 2005: 121).
W hile neither o f these authors discuss //-clefts with a predicational meaning, it is 
difficult to see how their analyses could account for them. If  we take the postcopular NP 
o f these //-clefts to be the semantic predicate, then what is it predicated of? How can the 
sentence-final clause be interpreted as a referring expression? Without analysing the 
initial it and the cleft clause as forming a discontinuous definite NP, these authors cannot 
integrate //-clefts into a unified analysis o f NP be NP  sentences.4 As a result, they do not 
predict that //-clefts will display the specificational-predicational distinction.5
4 1 discuss the problems with Heggie’s (1988) account o f //-clefts in §3.1 and in §4.1.1. Although Heggie 
assumes an inverse analysis o f specificational NP be NP  sentences, she nevertheless proposes an expletive 
analysis o f //-clefts.
5 However, it does not follow that the inverse approach to specificational copular sentences cannot be 
extended to account for the specificational-predicational distinction in //-clefts. For example, Den Dikken 
(2009) assumes that while the initial it o f specificational //-clefts is a (meaningless) pro-predicate (which
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In conclusion then, the particular analysis o f z7-clefts presented in this thesis is 
able to both accommodate /7-clefts containing predicative foci and explain their 
relationship to specificational clefts. In this analysis, /7-clefts can be reduced to NP be 
NP  sentences containing definite noun phrases. Just as noun phrases can function both as 
referring expressions and as predicates, so to can the focal NP and the definite-like 
description in /7-clefts. The analysis presented in this thesis is therefore an improvement 
on the expletive analyses (see §5.2.1) and on other accounts that do not integrate /7-clefts 
into an analysis o f NP be N P  sentences (including Heggie 1988 and Mikkelsen 2005).
5.2.3 Specification and predication or equation and predication?
In this section, I compare my analysis to that o f Han and Hedberg (2008), who also 
extend their account to accommodate predicational /7-clefts. Like me, these authors 
suggest that both specificational and predicational /7-clefts contain a discontinuous 
definite description. However, Han and Hedberg (2008) advocate an equative, rather 
than a predicational, analysis o f specificational copular sentences, arguing that both the 
discontinuous constituent and the focal element are semantically referring. Given that 
both Han and Hedberg’s (2008) and my analysis have a number o f things in common, 
this comparison allows me to focus on comparing an equative account o f specificational 
sentences to a predicational one. I use this opportunity to raise further objections to the 
equative approach outlined in §3.2.1, and go on to show that my predicational analysis 
o f specificational meaning is better at explaining the behaviour o f specificational and 
predicational /7-clefts. I conclude that my understanding o f specificational meaning as 
involving a nominal predication relation results in a more economical analysis for the z7- 
cleft than that proposed by Han and Hedberg (2008).
has undergone inversion), the it of predicational ¿'/-clefts is a referential pronoun. Unlike the analysis 
proposed in this thesis, Den Dikken argues that the relative clause in specificational //-clefts is not a 
restrictive relative, but a (base-generated) right-dislocated constituent containing a null-head which enters 
into a concord relationship with the focal element. Although Den Dikken does not explicitly address the 
nature o f the relative clause o f predicational //-clefts, such examples could be accommodated into this 
analysis. Nevertheless, I reject Den Dikken’s (2009) account for two reasons. First, the positing of 
phonologically null elements is against the principles that underlie a constructional analysis and secondly, 
I believe that there is more evidence in favour o f a restrictive relative analysis of the cleft clause than a 
free relative analysis (see §4.2).
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Like me, Han and Hedberg (2008) argue that //-clefts should be analysed in 
relation to N P be NP  sentences. However, while I claim that specificational copular 
sentences involve a nominal predication relation, Han and Hedberg adopt Heycock and 
Kroch’s (1999) analysis o f copular constructions. These authors assume that there are 
only two types o f  copular sentence: equative and predicational. As a result, all types of 
specificational sentence are analysed as equative structures, involving two arguments o f 
the same semantic type.
For Han and Hedberg (2008) then, both the //-cleft in (47a) and its ordinary 
copular paraphrase in (47b) contain a two-place equative predicate. Since the proper 
name Ohno is a referring expression, the (discontinuous) definite description, it (the one) 
who won, must also be treated as referential in order for them to be equated.
(47) a. It was Ohno who won
b. The one who won was Ohno
c. THEz [won(z)] [z = Ohno] (Han and Hedberg 2008: 349)
In contrast, predicational //-clefts, such as (48a), and their corresponding copular 
sentences, such as (48b), do not involve noun phrases o f the same semantic type. Here, 
the (discontinuous) definite description is again treated as a referring expression, but the 
post-copular element is property-denoting. These constructions therefore involve a 
predication relationship, ascribing a property to the definite noun phrase referent.
(48) a. It was a kid who beat John
b. The one who beat John was a kid
c. THEz [beat(z, John)] [kid(z)] (Han and Hedberg 2008: 349)
While Han and Hedberg’s (2008) semantic analysis o f predicational //-clefts is 
therefore the same as that argued for in §5.2.2, their analysis o f specificational //-clefts is 
very different. In what follows, I show that the relationship between predicational and 
specificational //-clefts cannot be satisfactorily explained by Han and Hedberg’s (2008)
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analysis. However, first, I argue that the analysis o f copular constructions employed by 
Han and Hedberg (and outlined originally by Heycock and Kroch (1999)) is 
fundamentally flawed.
Heycock and Kroch (1999: 374) argue that analysing specificational sentences as 
semantically equative has an “economy advantage”, since examples such as (49), which 
involve two equally referential arguments, do not require a separate analysis. For these 
authors, the taxonom y o f  copular sentences is therefore reduced to just two types: 
equative and predicational.
(49) Cicero is Tully [equative]
(50) Cicero is an orator [predicational]
However, in order to accommodate specificational copular sentences into an 
equative analysis, Heycock and Kroch (1999) provide them with a semantic 
interpretation which, they recognize, is counterintuitive. For instance, in discussing the 
wh-cleft presented here as (51), Heycock and Kroch (1999: 383) note that although what 
Fiona bought seems to denote a set o f individuals, “a set cannot be directly equated with 
an individual” . As a result, they conclude that this free relative actually denotes “the 
maximal individual” or “a plural individual”.
(51) W hat Fiona bought was that ancient dictionary
Heycock and Kroch (1999: 373) therefore recognize that the initial NP of 
specificational copular sentences is frequently “less referential” than the postcopular NP; 
an observation supported by M ikkelsen’s (2005) pronominalization results (see §3.2.2). 
Nevertheless, this asymmetry is explained away and the data is coerced to fit in with the 
equative analysis. Aside from the economy advantage, it is difficult to find justification 
for this. For instance, i f  economy is our only goal, then it must be equally acceptable to 
argue that there are in fact no true equative sentences and that all copular constructions 
involve an asymmetric predication relation.
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Indeed, this is what Partee (1986), a proponent o f the inverse analysis o f 
specificational sentences, suggests. Formalizing the semantic analysis proposed by 
W illiams (1983), Partee (1986) argues that be takes two arguments, one referential (type 
e) and one predicative (type <e,f>), which can appear in either order. Just as Heycock 
and Kroch make use o f  semantic operators to obtain a referential reading for the initial 
NP, Partee (1986: 356) draws on type-shifting principles in order to accommodate 
“apparent identity statements” into her analysis.6 For example, Partee makes use o f the 
‘ident’ operation to get a predicative reading from the referential proper name Mr. Smith 
in the example given here as (52). This operation converts a type e expression into a type 
<e,f> expression, therefore enabling (52) to be reanalysed as a predicational sentence.
(52) John is Mr. Smith (Partee 1986: 356)
e <e,t>
Despite their different approaches then, both Heycock and Kroch (1999) and 
Partee (1986) advocate unified analyses o f specificational and equative copular 
sentences. However, while this may result in a more economical taxonomy, I believe 
that it is a false economy. For one thing, it is not supported by our intuitions. As 
Heycock and Kroch (1999: 381) acknowledge, specificational copular sentences “are 
asymmetric in interpretation in a way that “true equatives” are not” . Secondly, by 
subsuming equative and specificational sentences under the same analysis, we end up 
sacrificing economy elsewhere in the system.
For example, like Partee (1986), Den Dikken (2006) argues that there are only 
two types o f  copular sentence, canonical and inverse, both o f which involve predication. 
W hile Den Dikken recognizes that identity statements are semantically equative, he
6 A problem with invoking type-shifting principles is that while they inform us that the semantic 
denotation has changed, they do not provide an explanation as to why speakers type-shift. For this reason, 
I have made use o f Gricean reasoning to explain how a semantically non-referring definite NP can, in 
many constructions, be used as a referring expression. This pragmatic explanation prioritizes the role of 
the interlocutors and is supported by Mikkelsen’s (2005) pronominalization data. Similarly, in §5 .5 ,1 
argue that type-shifting does not provide an adequate explanation for why ri-clefts permit non-NP foci. 
Consequently, in later chapters, I make use of the more explanatory concept o f ‘coercion’.
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nevertheless categorizes them with “inverse” specificational sentences, arguing that they 
have an asymmetrical structure.7 However, in order to provide equatives like (53) with a 
unified asymmetrical syntax, Den Dikken (2006: 72) has to posit an enormous amount 
o f phonologically empty structure, involving three separate stages.
First, he must assume that equative sentences contain a small clause structure 
(labelled RP  for Den Dikken) with a phonologically null ‘pro-predicate’, which is 
associated with a reduced relative clause. Together, these components form a free 
relative. This is shown in (54), in which the underlying structure o f Cicero in (53) is 
analysed as a free relative, much like what Cicero is. The reduced free relative Cicero is 
then predicated o f the subject Tully as part o f another small clause structure, shown in 
(55). Finally, the predicate undergoes inversion and is raised to SpecTP, resulting in a 
uniform analysis with specificational copular constructions.
(53) Cicero is Tully
(54) [PRO-PREDICATE0 [Cp Op, [C0 [RP Cicero [RELATOR0 /;]]]]]
(55) [ r p  Tully [RELATOR [pred PRO-PREDICATE0 [Cp Op\ [C0 [RP Cicero [RELATOR0
A]]]]]]]
(56) [ t p  [pred PRO-PREDICATE0 [Cp Op\ [C0 [ r p  Cicero [RELATOR0 ¿ i ] ] ] ] ] j  [T+ RELATORk 
=be [rp Tully [tk tj]] (Den Dikken 2006: 72-73)
Consequently, in order to achieve a unified analysis o f equative and specificational 
sentences, Den Dikken provides equatives with a complex asymmetric structure which
7 Like Den Dikken (2006), Heggie (1988) also claims that while equative sentences such as (i) contain two 
referring expressions, all types o f copular sentence involve the same subject-predicate configuration at D- 
structure. In order to make this work, Heggie treats equatives as “naming” sentences. For example, she 
claims that the postcopular proper name in (i) is a syntactic predicate and is therefore “treated as a label” 
(Heggie 1988: 10). However, Heggie conflates two very different readings o f (i) in her account. On the 
equative reading, that man over there is identified as the same person as the individual we know as Jack 
Jones. On the “identificational” reading, paraphrased in (ii), we are told the name of that man over there; 
it is only on this reading that Jack Jones behaves like a label or naming device (see Higgins 1979).
(i) That man over there is Jack Jones (Heggie 1988: 98)
(ii) That man over there is called Jack Jones
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seems unmotivated given their simple surface form. As a result, the advantages o f an 
economical system are countered by a complicated underlying structure.8
Likewise, in what follows, I show that the equative analysis o f specificational 
sentences adopted by Han and Hedberg (2008) is unable to provide an explanatory and 
economical account o f  the relationship between specificational and predicational it- 
clefts. As I indicated above, Han and Hedberg (2008) assume that the discontinuous 
definite description o f both specificational and predicational zf-clefts is always 
referential. The interpretation o f an zf-cleft as specificational (their equative) or 
predicational therefore depends solely upon whether the postcopular element is 
understood to be a referring or a property-denoting expression. However, structurally, 
“equative” and predicational zf-clefits are very different. Han and Hedberg (2008) assume 
that equative and predicational z'f-clefts contain two different forms o f the copular verb; 
while the “equative copula” is a predicate taking two arguments, the “predicational 
copular” tree involves a nominal predicate and a single argument.
There are several problems with this analysis which are not shared by the 
account proposed in §5.2.2. First, Han and Hedberg (2008) cannot explain Ball’s (1977) 
observation that only predicational clefts can be introduced by the plural pronoun they. 
They note, “W hy equative clefts require singular cleft pronouns when they contain a 
plural clefted constituent does not follow from our theory and remains a puzzle” (Han 
and Hedberg 2008: 372). As I noted above, this difference in behaviour between 
specificational and predicational clefts indicates a semantic difference in the 
discontinuous definite descriptions o f these two interpretations. This is not present in the 
analysis o f Han and Hedberg, who argue that the discontinuous constituents o f both 
equative and predicational clefts are referential.
8 In §3.3.3,1 claimed that equative and specificational sentences have a different semantics but a common 
syntactic structure. The constmctional framework I adopt does not require me to have a complex syntactic 
architecture in order to establish maximum isomorphism between syntax and semantics. In my analysis, 
the predication relation in specificational sentences is derived compositionally from the semantics. Unlike 
Den Dikken’s (2006) minimalist account, I can therefore analyse specificational and equative 
constructions as having the same structure without assuming that the latter is underlyingly predicational. 
Consequently, my analysis does not reduce economy elsewhere in the system.
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As well as finding it difficult to accommodate and explain the full range o f data, 
Han and Hedberg’s (2008) analysis is less economical than that proposed in §5.2.2. As 
noted above, Han and Hedberg claim that equative and predicational clefts are 
structurally very different, involving two distinct kinds o f copular verb. In contrast, in 
the analysis outlined in §5.2.2, both specificational and predicational //-clefts involve 
nominal predication. Consequently, there is no need to assume that these different types 
o f cleft involve different forms o f  the copular verb or radically different structures. 
Instead, the distinction between specificational and predicational meaning in //-clefts 
depends crucially on the interpretation o f the discontinuous definite description (// and 
the restrictive relative clause). In turn, this rests on the Russellian-Gricean relationship 
between the non-referring semantics and referential usage o f definite noun phrases.
In conclusion then, predicational //-clefts can be more successfully integrated 
into an account o f  copular N P  be NP  sentences that analyses specificational meaning as 
involving nominal predication. The predicational //-cleft data therefore provides further 
evidence against an equative analysis o f  specificational copular sentences.
Over the last three sections, I have shown that a comprehensive analysis o f 
predicational and proverbial clefts falls out from the accounts o f specificational 
meaning, definite noun phrases, and //-clefts developed throughout this thesis. I have 
argued that while predicational //-clefts have much in common with specificational //- 
clefts, they inherit from the predicate nominal construction rather than the (canonical) 
specificational copular construction. However, not all types o f (specificational) //-cleft 
can be dealt with by inheritance from the language system.9 In the following two 
sections, I discuss //-clefts with non-NP foci and ‘informative presupposition’ //-clefts, 
respectively. As I explain, the range o f  //-cleft foci and the discourse status o f the cleft 
clause are construction-specific properties, requiring an idiosyncratic description. I go 
on to show that they can only be explained by looking for motivation, not within the 
language system, but in the construction’s development over time.
9 In keeping with the cleft literature, I continue to use the term ‘//-cleft’ as a convenient shorthand for 
‘specificational //-cleft’. In the remainder o f this thesis, I explicitly indicate where the discussion turns to 
predicational //-clefts or relates to the overarching //-cleft schema which encompasses both o f these 
subtypes.
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5.3 Non-NP focus /f-clefts
Most authors writing about //-clefts centre their discussion on examples containing noun 
phrases in the postcopular position. This is understandable, since //-clefts with non-NP 
foci are particularly puzzling and often pose a problem for analyses that seem to work 
well with the NP-focus //-cleft data. Fortunately, as I go on to show, non-NP //-clefts can 
be integrated fairly neatly into the analysis proposed in this thesis. Nevertheless, 
describing and explaining the exact range o f elements which make up the list o f  possible 
//-cleft foci is not straightforward from the analysis developed so far. As I explain, this 
can only be achieved if  we take historical evidence into consideration, a proposal which 
I follow up in chapter 7 o f  this thesis.
M any o f  the //-cleft analyses proposed in the literature cannot accommodate the 
full range o f //-cleft foci. For example, in §4 .2 .5 ,1 showed that extraposition accounts 
framed within a transformational theory o f grammar (including Akmajian 1970, Gundel 
1977 and W irth 1978) assume that //-clefts should allow the same range o f focal 
elements as their pseudocleft sources (or at least a proper subset o f them). However, not 
all //-cleft examples have pseudocleft counterparts. For example, certain prepositional 
phrases will only be permitted as the focal element o f an //-cleft, as shown in (57).
(57) a) It is with great pride that I accept this award
b) *How I accept this award is with great pride (Gundel 1977: 548)
As I explained in §4.2.5, these examples cannot be successfully accounted for in an 
extraposition analysis formulated within the transformational tradition.10 Consequently, 
in order to account for the full range o f //-cleft foci, Pinkham and Hankamer (1975) 
argue that //-clefts with non-NP foci are derivationally distinct from those with noun 
phrases in the postcopular position. They claim that only NP-focus //-clefts can be 
derived by extraposition (forming “deep-clefits”); //-clefts with non-nominal clefted
10 Not without positing an unlikely source structure and extremely stipulative transformations (see 
Emonds 1976 and the discussion in footnote 17 o f §4.2.5).
185
elements are derived from their corresponding noncopular sentences via extraction o f the 
focus element (forming “shallow-clefts”).
Expletive /7-cleft analyses also have difficulties with incorporating the full range 
o f possible focal elements. For example, as I explained in §3.1, Chomsky (1977) claims 
that the focal element is coindexed with a gap, generated by w/z-movement, in the cleft 
clause. However, this analysis pertains only to /7-clefts with NP and PP foci, which can 
(sometimes) be treated as preposed arguments o f the verb embedded in the cleft clause. 
As a result, Chomsky suggests that /7-clefts with adverbial foci require a separate 
syntactic derivation. Likewise, Delin (1989) also provides two different syntactic 
analyses for the /7-cleft. She claims that the cleft clause in /7-clefts with nominal foci is a 
restrictive relative. However, since restrictive relative clauses cannot modify non- 
nominal antecedents, she argues that non-NP focus /7-clefts instead contain a “sentential 
complement” . For Delin then, /7-clefts with nominal and non-NP foci are structurally 
distinct (see §4.1.3).
However, there is no real evidence to suggest that /7-clefts with different types o f 
focal element should require a separate analysis11. Consequently, as I see it, an important 
advantage with m y own analysis o f  /7-clefts is that it can accommodate the full range o f 
/7-cleft foci. As I explained in §4 .1 .3 ,1 assume that the cleft clause is connected to the 
initial it, rather than to the complement o f be. With this analysis in place, the cleft clause 
can be consistently analysed as a restrictive relative regardless o f the category o f  the 
clefted constituent, contra Delin (1989). As a result, /7-clefts with all categories o f foci 
are shown to make up a single construction.
Furthermore, unlike the transformational analyses o f Akmajian (1970), Gundel 
(1977) and Wirth (1978), the particular extraposition analysis put forward in this thesis 
is non-derivational. As a result, a lack o f isomorphism between /7-clefts and other 
specificational copular constructions is not problematic for this account. As I explained 
in §4.2.5, the construction grammar framework I adopt tolerates and anticipates 
idiosyncratic, construction-specific information. In this model, constmctions are
11 See for example Gundel (1977), who disagrees with Pinkham and Hankamer’s (1975) judgments 
regarding the relative acceptability o f NP and non-NP focus ¿/-clefts in environments involving extraction.
186
recognized as independent linguistic objects rather than epiphenomena. This, together 
with default inheritance (which allows overrides), means that on a constructional 
account, /7-clefts can exhibit properties not shared by other subtypes o f copular 
construction, despite the fact that they all inherit from the same basic schema. I claim 
that the range o f /7-cleft foci is a property specific to this construction, which therefore 
requires an independent explanation
//-clefts with all categories o f focal element can therefore be accommodated 
straightforwardly in m y constructional account. However, as yet, I have not put any 
restrictions in place which limit the range o f  focal elements to produce only grammatical 
/7-cleft examples. M any o f the analyses put forward in the cleft literature restrict the 
range o f /7-cleft foci by syntactic means. For example, as I noted in §4.2.5, Akmajian 
(1970) and W irth (1978) suggest that their transformational rules o f extraposition apply 
only to structures with NP (and, for Akmajian, PP) foci. However, on this account, as for 
many others, the range o f /7-cleflt foci is grossly underestimated.
In contrast, Delahunty (1982, 1984) makes it his priority to present an analysis 
which accommodates the full range o f  /7-cleft foci (including noun phrases, prepositional 
phrases, adverbial phrases, particles, adjective phrases and quantifier phrases) and 
excludes all other constituents from occurring in the postcopular position. As I noted in 
§4.3.1, Delahunty claims that the clefted constituent and the cleft clause are syntactic 
sisters within VP. Using Jackendoff s (1977) rules for the projection o f V, Delahunty is 
able to sanction the full range o f possible /7-cleft foci while at the same time explaining 
why certain syntactic categories are excluded from occurring in the postcopular position. 
For example, Delahunty argues that the nonexistence o f phrase structure rules such as 
VP —> V  VP S' accounts for the absence o f /7-clefts with VP foci, shown in (58).
(58) *[s It [Vp [v  is] [v p  swum the ocean] [s' that Michael has]]]
However, in many ways, Delahunty’s phrase structure rules are too general.
Since these rules apply wholesale to each o f the phrasal categories outlined above, they 
do not predict that some members o f these categories will be more acceptable as cleft
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foci than others. For instance, while both (59) and (60) are examples o f  adverb-focus it- 
clefts, they nevertheless differ in acceptability.
(59) ?It was slowly that M ary dressed to go out
(60) It w asn’t only slowly that M ary dressed, but carefully too (Delahunty 1984: 80)
In order to explain why some members o f  a syntactic category are less suited to 
occurring in the focal position than others, Delahunty appeals to the h-cleft’s pragmatic 
properties. He notes that example (59) is not as acceptable as (60) because the latter 
enhances the h-cleft’s uniqueness and exhaustiveness implicatures through negation and 
the use o f a focusing adverb (Delahunty 1984: 80).12
This begs the question, if  we ultimately need to provide a pragmatic and/or 
semantic explanation for limiting the range o f  possible foci, what do we need the 
syntactic phrase structure rules for? From this, it seems that the range o f h-cleft foci 
cannot be satisfactorily defined in terms o f general syntactic rules or major syntactic 
categories.
12 In addition, Delahunty (1984: 73) notes that his phrase structure rules do not explain why /7-clefts only 
very rarely permit multiple foci, as shown in (i). Delahunty attempts to account for this by appealing to the 
/7-cleft’s pragmatic properties. He notes, “Because the focal constituent is that constituent of which the 
clause is uniquely and exhaustively true...there may be only one such constituent” (Delahunty 1984: 73). 
However, this generalization cannot explain attested counterexamples such as (ii).
(i) *It was Tom on Saturday that stole the money
(ii) It was at Knock a century ago that the Virgin appeared to local peasants (Delahunty 1984: 73)
I argue that, once we analyse the /7-cleft as a subtype o f specificational copular sentence, this data 
can be given a simple explanation. As shown in (iii) and (iv), the /7-clefts above correspond to NP be NP 
sentences which show the exact same level o f acceptability.
(iii) *The person and day that stole the money was Tom on Saturday
(iv) The place and time that the Virgin appeared to local peasants was at Knock a century ago
This suggests that, contra Delahunty (1984), it is the semantics o f the head noun in the definite 
description, rather than the /7-cleft’s pragmatic properties, which govern the occurrence of multiple foci. 
W hile the concepts place  and time are both adverbial nouns, requiring a restrictive relative clause without 
an overt gap, person  and day cannot be coordinated within the same NP, since only the former requires a 
subject gap in the relative clause. The fact that the distribution of multiple foci in /7-clefts patterns with the 
NP be NP  data supports the main claims of this thesis: that the /7-cleft is a subspecies o f specificational 
copular sentence containing a discontinuous definite description with an underspecified head noun.
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So how should we describe and explain the range o f /7-cleft foci? One option is 
to examine the semantic function o f the focal element in cleft sentences. As a 
specificational copular construction, the //-cleft involves nominal predication (see 
§3.3.3). That is, the (discontinuous) definite NP is predicated o f the referring expression 
contained within the postcopular slot. It is plausible then that the range o f //-cleft foci is 
governed by semantic-pragmatic criteria: we would expect that only those elements that 
can be given a referential interpretation can occur in the postcopular, focal position. O f 
course, this approach cannot explain why //-clefts have a different range o f  foci from 
other specificational copular constructions. Nevertheless, it helps us to understand why 
some items are more likely to occur in the focal position than others.
One advocate o f this approach is Partee (1986). She claims that since non-NP 
items typically denote properties, rather than objects, they are not well-suited to the 
referring function. In order to accommodate specificational sentences with non-NP foci, 
such as the wh-cleft in (61), Partee makes use o f type-shifting principles. She claims 
that, in this example, the adjective unusual is nominalized via the type-shifting operation 
‘nom ’. This operation “maps a (predicative) property on to its individual correlate”, 
converting unusual from a type <e,t> expression into a type e referring expression 
(Partee 1986: 357).
(61) W hat John is is unusual (Partee 1986:363)
Davidse (2000) provides a similar analysis, which focuses on //-clefts. She claims that 
the postcopular position is a “strictly ‘nom inal’ slot” ; all o f  the non-NP elements that 
occur in the postcopular position must be “rankshifted” into this category via 
nominalization (Davidse 2000: 1116).
However, I am skeptical o f the type-shifting and rank-shifting approaches o f 
Partee (1986) and Davidse (2000). While I agree that the postcopular item in //-clefts is a 
referring expression, I see no evidence that non-nominal //-cleft foci are “reclassified” as
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noun phrases.13 For instance, Partee (1986) observes that, in cleft sentences, non-NP foci 
do not display the same morphological markings as other nominalized forms. Discussing 
the wh-cleft given in (61) above, Partee (1986: 363) asks “why is the form here unusual 
rather than unusualness?” While Partee leaves this question unanswered, the data 
suggest that nom inalization is not involved in sanctioning non-NP focus //-clefts.
Instead, it appears that while the meaning o f the non-NP element remains the same, its 
function is altered, and it is in this way that the item becomes a referring expression. I 
return to the construal o f non-nominal //-cleft foci in chapter 7, where I invoke the 
concept o f  ‘coercion’.
A better explanation for the range o f //-cleft foci is provided by E. Kiss (1998). 
She argues that the focal element in “identificational” (our specificational) sentences 
must denote an individual. Since verb phrases and predicative elements do not denote 
individuals, E. K iss’ account explains why these items do not make acceptable //-cleft 
foci. Nevertheless, these items can sometimes be “individualized” and made into more 
discrete entities via listing. E. Kiss (1998: 262) provides the example presented here as 
(63), “where a two-member set o f properties (including tired  and sick) is established as a 
domain o f  exhaustive identification” (italic original). This technique allows the adjective 
sick  to be accommodated into the focal position, creating a much more acceptable 17- 
cleft than its counterpart in (62).
(62) *It’s sick that he was
(63) It’s not sick that he was but tired (E. Kiss 1998: 262)
By providing semantic rather than syntactic categorial constraints, E. Kiss’ analysis 
correctly predicts that the range o f //-cleft foci will not be comprised o f complete phrasal 
categories.
13 In Davidse’s (2000) / 1 -cleft analysis, the focal element is the antecedent to the relative clause. This may 
be one reason for Davidse’s claim that the postcopular position is a “strictly ‘nominal’ slot”. However, in 
the analysis provided in this thesis, the restrictive relative clause modifies the constituent it. As a result, 
non-nominal focal elements are not a problem to this analysis and we do not need to invoke type-shifting 
operations such as nominalization to accommodate them.
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However, given this set o f assumptions, we cannot yet explain why /7-clefts have 
a different range o f foci as compared with other specificational copular constructions.14 
As 1 go on to show in §8.2, the wh-cleft construction is in many ways more relaxed than 
the /7-cleft about what can be accommodated into the referential slot, allowing a greater 
variety o f predicative, property-denoting foci (including adjective phrases and verb 
phrases) to enter in the postcopular position. An example o f this can be seen here by 
comparing the ungrammatical AP-focus /7-cleft in (62) with the perfectly acceptable AP- 
focus wh-cleft in (61). I suggest that one way to account for these differences is to 
examine how these constructions have developed over time.
In § 8 .2 ,1 show that although /7-clefts and w/z-clefts inherit from the same basic 
specificational schema, they have nonetheless undergone separate historical 
developments, acquiring construction-specific properties and functions over time. This 
discussion is based in part on the diachronic investigation o f /7-clefts outlined in §7.2. 
Here I show that /7-clefts were at one time restricted to NP foci. As the /7-cleft gradually 
accommodates non-nominal elements into the postcopular position via a series o f 
incremental stages, the constructional schema becomes more abstract; that is, it loses a 
syntactic constraint. Instead, all that remains is a referentiality requirement; the 
perimeters o f  which are specific to the /7-cleft construction and are dependent upon the 
/7-cleft’s peculiar discourse-functional properties.
5.4 ‘Informative-presupposition’ (IP) it-clefts
The final type o f  (specificational) /7-cleft that I discuss in this chapter is the 
‘informative-presupposition’ /7-cleft. In such examples, the relative clause expresses 
discourse-new, or unfamiliar, information. Since the cleft clause is usually associated 
with expressing discourse-old information and is sometimes said to contain a 
“familiarity presupposition”, IP /7-clefts are treated by many authors as atypical or 
marked examples. In what follows, I explain that there is good reason for this. While it-
14 For E. Kiss (1998) however, /7-clefts are not expected to exhibit the same range o f foci as other 
specificational copular sentences. E. Kiss claims that “identificational focus” is dependent upon a 
particular syntactic configuration which, in English, is specific to the /7-cleft construction. I strongly 
disagree with this aspect o f  E. K iss’ analysis, as shown in §4.1.2.3.
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clefts containing discourse-old information are shown to inherit this property from other 
constructions, IP //-clefts require an independent explanation.
The association o f the cleft clause with discourse-old information is predictable 
if we assume that //-clefts are a type o f specificational copular sentence. Over the 
previous two chapters, I have made two important claims. First, I have argued that 
specificational meaning results from a special type o f nominal predication relation 
involving definite noun phrase predicates. And secondly, I have advocated an analysis o f 
//-clefts in which the constituent it and the relative clause function together as a 
discontinuous definite description. From this, it follows that //-clefts will inherit 
properties from the wider specificational copular construction and, consequently, from 
definite noun phrases in general.
It is well-known that definite noun phrases, like the relative clauses in //-clefts, 
are associated with familiar information. In §4.1 .2 .5 ,1 claimed that the reason for this is 
that definite noun phrases involve existential commitment. It is not such a large step to 
assume that if  the speech participants can assume that the set described by the definite 
noun phrase exists, then they are likely to be familiar with that set.
The association o f the cleft clause with discourse-old information can therefore 
be traced back to the inherent semantics o f  definite noun phrases. But how can we 
explain the behaviour o f  //-clefts such as (64), in which the relative clause expresses 
discourse-new information that is not already known to the intended audience? Does this 
type o f example, labelled the ‘informative presupposition’ //-cleft by Prince (1978), also 
inherit its behaviour from definite noun phrases?
(64) (Start o f  lecture)
It was Cicero who once said. ‘Laws are silent at times o f w ar’
For Hedberg (2000) and Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (2001), the existence o f 
the IP //-cleft falls out straightforwardly from the behaviour o f definite descriptions.
Like me, these authors claim that the constituent it and the cleft clause in //-clefts 
function together as a definite-like expression. However, they argue that while definite
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noun phrases are often claimed to be associated with familiar information, this 
generalization is not true in a large number o f cases. For example, Gundel, Hedberg and 
Zacharski (2001) find that 44%  o f the definite article phrases in their corpus are in fact 
classifiable as ‘nonfam iliar’. They conclude that the condition on the use o f  definite 
article phrases is that the referent described must be ‘uniquely identifiable’ rather than 
‘fam iliar’. This means that, at the very least, the addressee has to “be able to assign a 
unique representation to the phrase as soon as he or she has finished processing it” 
(Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski 2001: 274).
Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (2001) claim that a parallel account can be 
provided for cleft sentences. Citing the corpus-based studies o f Delin (1989) and 
Hedberg (1990), they note that the frequency o f it-clefts containing new or inferable 
information in the cleft clause is relatively high, ranging between 49 and 72%. They 
conclude that, like definite noun phrases, the cleft clause is always uniquely identifiable, 
but does not have to be familiar. For these authors then, so-called IP /7-clefts are not 
marked or exceptional uses. The fact that the cleft clause in /7-clefts exhibits variation 
between discourse-old and discourse-new information is therefore expected and can be 
traced back to the behaviour o f  definite noun phrases in general.
There some important benefits to the analysis o f IP /7-clefts put forward by 
Hedberg (2000) and developed by Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (2001). For one 
thing, it allows a truly unified analysis o f /7-clefts with familiar and nonfamiliar 
information in the relative clause. Furthermore, this account is maximally explanatory; if  
we take a constructional perspective, we can say that both types o f /7-cleft inherit their 
behaviour from definite article constructions. As a result, IP /7-clefts do not require an 
independent explanation.
Nevertheless, despite its appeal, there are methodological problems with this 
approach which, to my mind, cannot be overlooked. First, Hedberg (2000) and Gundel, 
Hedberg and Zacharski (2001) investigate the information status o f definite noun 
phrases in a wide variety o f contexts and do not focus on those occurring in 
specificational copular sentences. These authors are correct that when definite noun 
phrases are used referentially, the hearer may not always be familiar with that referent
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(see also Donnellan 1966). For example, (65) can be uttered without the addressee 
having had any contact with, or explicit knowledge of, the dog next door. However, the 
definite-like expression in specificational /7-clefts is not used referentially. Instead, it 
functions as the definite NP predicate o f  a specificational NP be NP  sentence.
(65) The dog next door kept me awake (Hedberg 2000: 895)
Therefore, in order to ascertain whether IP /7-clefts inherit the property of 
expressing hearer-new information in the cleft clause, we need to examine them in 
relation to corresponding specificational copular sentences containing definite 
descriptions. W hile the IP //-cleft in (64) above is a perfectly acceptable way to 
introduce a discourse, the corresponding N P be NP  sentence in (66) seems strange and 
suggests that we should already know that someone once said  ‘laws are silent at times o f  
w a r \  This suggests that while //-clefts can occur with hearer-new information in the 
relative clause, this property is not inherited from the wider specificational copular 
construction and is not predictable from the behaviour o f definite noun phrases.
(66) (Start o f  lecture)
#The one/man who once said, ‘Laws are silent in times o f w ar’ was Cicero
A further problem  with the conclusions o f Hedberg (2000) and Gundel, Hedberg 
and Zacharski (2001) is that their concept o f ‘nonfam iliar’ encompasses both new and 
inferable information. For instance, (67) is cited as containing a definite NP which has 
the status o f  ‘uniquely identifiable’ rather than ‘familiar’. Nevertheless, the existence o f 
the referent the bride is inferable from the familiar script or frame of wedding. That is, 
we know from experiential or cultural knowledge that weddings include a bride (see also 
Clark and Haviland (1977) on ‘bridging inferences’) .15
15 Likewise, the existence of the dog next door in (65) is consistent with our cultural knowledge that dogs 
are common household pets.
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(67) I ’ve just been to a wedding. The bride wore blue.
(Lyons 1999: 7; as cited in GHZ 2001: 280)
It is not always clear where the boundary lies between given and new 
information. However, I suggest that by conflating the concepts ‘new ’ and ‘inferable’, 
these authors fail to notice an important difference in the behaviour o f /¿-clefts and other 
copular constructions. W hile all types o f specificational copular sentence can occur with 
inferable information in the definite NP predicate, only /¿-clefts allow brand-new 
information to be expressed by the relative clause. For example, in (68), the 
specificational NP be N P  sentence is introduced by a definite NP subject containing 
inferable information. Likewise, the corpus data o f Prince (1978) and Collins (1991a) 
suggests that w/z-clefts with inferable information in the relative clause are particularly 
common (see also §8.2).16
(68) I ’ve just been to a wedding. The bride was Susan Aldridge.
In contrast, Prince (1978) and Collins (1991a) find that wh-clefts do not occur with 
brand-new information in the relative clause. This, coupled with the unacceptability o f
(66), suggests that IP /¿-clefts such as (64) require an independent explanation.
The distinction between ‘new ’ and ‘inferable’ therefore seems to be particularly 
important for distinguishing between different types o f specificational copular sentence. 
This calls into question Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski’s (2001) use o f the data 
provided by Delin (1989) and Hedberg (1990). Since these frequency counts conflate it- 
clefts with both new and inferable information, they cannot be used as evidence that 
informative-presupposition /¿-clefts (defined by Prince (1978) as containing brand-new, 
rather than inferable, information) are unmarked or especially common.
As a result, the conclusions o f Hedberg (2000) and Gundel, Hedberg and 
Zacharski (2001) are not supported by this reexamination o f the data. The IP /¿-cleft does
16 Other corpus studies o f  present-day English cleft sentences include Breivik (1986), Erdmann (1986), 
Geluykens (1988), Gomez-Gonzalez (2004), Hasselgard (2004), Hedberg and Fadden (2007), Johansson 
(2001) and Nelson (1997).
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not inherit its information-structure from the wider specificational copular construction 
and does not conform to the behaviour o f definite noun phrases in general. 
Consequently, this type o f  ¿/-cleft requires an independent explanation. In § 7 .2 ,1 show 
that the IP ¿/-cleft has emerged via extension from ¿/-clefts with discourse-old 
information in the cleft clause. This involves the accommodation (or coercion) o f new 
information into an inherently presuppositional constructional schem a.17 My diachronic 
story therefore explains where this construction-specific property comes from as well as 
offering a unified account o f all types o f  ¿/-cleft as emerging from a single source. The 
historical evidence therefore argues against accounts which claim that IP ¿/-clefts make 
up a separate construction from the ¿/-cleft proper.18
5.5 Chapter summary
Throughout this thesis, I have claimed that ¿/-clefts are foremost specificational 
sentences. I argued that by maximizing inheritance from the wider specificational 
copular construction, we obtain the most explanatory analysis o f ¿/-clefts. However, in 
this chapter, I have highlighted three different types o f ¿/-cleft which exhibit properties 
that cannot be motivated by inheritance from this more basic construction: predicational 
¿/-clefts, non-NP focus ¿/-clefts and informative-presupposition ¿/-clefts.
I have shown that predicational ¿/-clefts can be accommodated fairly neatly into 
my account. Rather than inheriting their semantics from the specificational copular 
construction, predicational (and proverbial) ¿/-clefts inherit from the predicate nominal 
construction. As I explained in §3.3, specificational meaning is really just a special type
17 This contrasts with the main claim o f Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (2001) which states that since 
‘nonfamiliar’ information is so common in /7-clefts and definite NPs in general, such examples are not 
exceptional and do not result from a process o f ‘accommodation’, as defined by Lewis (1979) and Heim 
(1982).
18 For example, Ball (1991, 1994a) claims that the IP fr-cleft developed out o f a merger between several 
distinct constructions rather than via extension from existing /7-cleft constructs. In §7 .2 ,1 show that this 
account is not supported by the historical evidence. Likewise, Gundel (1985) claims that since /7-clefts are 
associated with given information, IP z7-clefts form a separate construction with a different thematic 
structure. In §8 .2 ,1 show that it is precisely this association between /7-clefts and discourse-old, rather than 
inferable, information that lends itself to pragmatic accommodation. Finally, Declerck (1984a) argues that 
IP /7-clefts such as (64) above have an emphasizing rather than specifying function. However, in §8 .2 ,1 
show that while these examples have additional discourse functions, they nevertheless retain a 
specificational meaning.
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o f nominal predication relation. From this, it follows that //-clefts with nominal foci can 
be given two different interpretations. If  the discontinuous definite description is 
analysed as the semantic predicate, a specificational reading ensues. However, if  the 
focal NP is analysed as the semantic predicate and the definite-like element is used as a 
referring expression, then the result is a predicational //-cleft.
The specificational-predicational distinction in //-clefts is therefore inherited 
from other copular constructions. However, I have shown that the range o f //-cleft foci 
and the information status o f  the cleft clause are construction-specific properties which 
are not inherited from the language system. In § 7 .2 ,1 undertake a diachronic 
investigation into the development o f  non-NP focus //-clefts and IP //-clefts. Here, I 
show that historical evidence can be used to provide motivation, and an explanation, for 
their idiosyncratic properties.
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6. THE ADVANTAGES TO A CONSTRUCTIONAL ACCOUNT OF IT-CLEFTS
Over the last three chapters, I have outlined a synchronic analysis o f it-clefts and have 
shown how this compares favourably to the alternative accounts proposed in the 
literature. In this chapter, I reflect on how the theoretical framework o f construction 
grammar has played an instrumental role in shaping my analysis. In § 6 .1 ,1 reintroduce 
some o f the principles and concepts that are specific to a constructional, usage-based 
theory o f  grammar and show how I have made use o f them. In § 6 .2 ,1 go on to compare 
my analysis to other so-called “constructional” //-cleft accounts proposed in the 
literature. As I explain, the analysis put forward in this thesis is more in keeping with the 
basic claims that underlie the constructional framework and makes better use o f the 
m achinery that provides a constructional approach with explanatory adequacy. I 
conclude that the analysis presented in this thesis is therefore more “constructional” than 
alternative //-cleft analyses.
In § 6 .3 ,1 ask what the advantages are to conducting an analysis o f //-clefts 
within the framework o f  construction grammar. I argue that a constructional approach is 
better suited to describing and explaining the //-cleft’s properties than other frameworks, 
including both generative and transformational theories o f grammar. Finally, §6.4 
provides a constructional hierarchy o f cleft and specificational sentences based upon the 
familial relationships identified in previous chapters. This serves as a summary o f  our 
progress so far and highlights the areas that are outside the scope o f inheritance. These 
as yet unexplained properties provide the basis o f the diachronic study undertaken in 
chapters 7 and 8.
6.1 What is constructional about my account?
As I explained in chapter 2, construction grammar was developed with a mind to 
providing full and explanatory analyses o f specialized linguistic patterns, which cannot 
be accounted for by appealing to highly general rules. In order to achieve this goal, each 
linguistic pattern is realized as a separate node within a taxonomic network o f 
constructions. By viewing the grammar as a network, rather than as a set o f fixed and
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finite rules, constructional theories offer a unique way o f viewing the relationship 
between the different units o f grammatical knowledge. This network o f constructions 
has a hierarchical structure, showing that some linguistic patterns are more basic or 
general than others. Much o f the explanatory power o f construction grammar comes 
from the premise that lower level constructions inherit attributes from higher-level, or 
more schematic, constructions. The theory is that the more properties that are inherited 
from the language system, the more “motivated” that construction is. In other words, if  a 
construction fits well into the overall linguistic system, we have an explanation as to 
why this particular construction, with these particular form-meaning correspondences, 
should exist.
The analysis built up throughout chapters 3, 4 and 5 aims to maximize 
motivation for the //-cleft construction. Starting from the premise that //-clefts are 
specificational copular sentences, I provide an analysis that makes important 
generalizations in an inheritance hierarchy. In § 4 .1 ,1 advocated an extraposition-from- 
NP analysis o f //-clefts in which the initial it and the sentence-final clause operate 
together like a discontinuous definite description. This allows me to analyse all 
specificational copular sentences, including the //-cleft, as involving a nominal 
predication relation and explains how the shared pragmatic characteristics o f 
presupposition, exhaustiveness, contrast, and discourse familiarity result ultimately from 
the inherent semantics o f  definite noun phrases. In this analysis, the //-cleft is therefore 
firmly situated within a family o f related constructions and the maximum number o f  its 
properties are explained as being inherited from the more general specificational copular 
schema.
This analysis therefore shows that while the //-cleft construction is noticeably 
marked with respect to highly general rules o f grammar, many o f its attributes can be 
explained if  we examine how //-clefts relate to structurally similar constructions in the 
network. However, construction grammar recognizes that not all o f  the properties o f a 
given construction are inherited from more schematic linguistic patterns. This represents 
a m ajor distinction between construction grammar and the movement-based theories o f 
the generative tradition. In movement-based theories, the assumption is that surface
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idiosyncrasies (or mismatches) are derived from underlying structures which behave in 
expected ways and conform to more general rules o f grammar (see §2.4). In contrast, 
construction grammar, which does not rely on a hard and fast system of rules, permits 
and expects construction-specific properties. An important advantage to this philosophy 
is that construction grammar does not need to explain away idiosyncrasies via complex 
and counterintuitive derivations; psychologically, the constructionist concern is for 
reducing demands on processing rather than on creating a maximally economical system 
(see Goldberg 1995: 74; Croft and Cruse 2004: 278).
The architecture o f constructions as signs, that is, as form-meaning pairs, makes 
construction grammar particularly adept at incorporating idiosyncratic information into 
the grammar. In this model, the symbolic relations which link units o f form and meaning 
are internal to the construction, rather than imposed by general rules. As a result, 
information in the construction m ay ‘override’ inheritance from more general patterns o f 
correspondence, creating ‘m ism atch’. I make use o f this property in the analysis o f 
specificational sentences given in §3.3.3, where I argue that they involve a nominal 
predication relation. In canonical specificational sentences, such as (1), the semantic 
predicate precedes the referring expression.
(1) The murderer is John
In this construction then, we have a mismatch between the syntax and the semantics.
The generalization that the syntactic subject and its complement correspond to the 
semantic argument and predicate, respectively, is pervasive. However, in the canonical 
specificational copular construction, the syntactic subject is also the semantic predicate. 
In contrast to the movement-based inverse analysis outlined in §3.2.2, a monostratal 
constructional account does not provide such examples with an underlying structure that 
conforms to the subject-predicate pattern. Instead, the specificational construction 
simply overrides this generalization.
By accepting idiosyncrasies in the grammatical system, construction grammar 
does not lose any o f its explanatory force. In fact, as shown by the analysis o f fr-clefts
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put forward in §4.1, it is often what allows a constructional account to make the relevant 
generalizations. For example, my analysis assumes that the //-cleft contains a non­
standard use o f the pronoun it, which functions both as the determiner and nominal head 
o f a definite description. Likewise, by assuming that the sentence-final clause 
restrictively modifies the constituent it, I overlook the strong tendency for restrictive 
relative clauses to modify an immediate antecedent and the fact that the pronoun it 
cannot be restrictively modified outside the context o f the //-cleft construction. However, 
providing these properties with a construction-specific analysis enables my account to 
recognize the similarities between //-clefts and not only other specificational copular 
sentences, but also definite noun phrases and restrictive relative clauses as well. As I 
have shown, the explanatory significance o f  the inheritance relations I identify far 
outweighs the untidiness o f acknowledging a handful o f idiosyncrasies in the //-cleft 
construction.
Furthermore, while idiosyncrasies are tolerated in a constructional model o f 
language structure, every effort is made to provide them with a proper description and 
explanation. Goldberg (2003: 120) notes that “W hat imbues a constructional approach 
with explanatory adequacy is a further desideratum that each construction must be 
motivated” (italics original). W hile construction-specific properties cannot be motivated 
by inheritance, m otivation can be provided by factors external to the grammar. In 
chapters 7 and 8 ,1 go on to show that historical evidence can help to provide motivation 
for and explain the construction-specific properties o f the //-cleft. As I explain below in 
§6.3, one o f the advantages o f  usage-based constructional theories, is that they are able 
to intersect with and work alongside theories o f language change.
6.2 What makes a good constructional account?
In the previous section, I have shown that my analysis o f //-clefts and specificational 
copular sentences conforms to the principles o f construction grammar and makes full 
use o f the concepts and mechanisms that make it up. In this section, I compare my 
account to other //-cleft analyses that claim to be “constructional” in some sense, namely 
Lambrecht (2001), Davidse (2000) and Pavey (2004). I show that while each o f these
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accounts makes reference to some o f the basic claims that underlie the constructional 
framework, none o f  them is successful at meeting the explanatory objective that for each 
construction, motivation must be maximized (Goldberg 2003: 120). I conclude that the 
analysis o f /¿-clefts sketched in this thesis is more compatible with the fundamental 
principles o f construction grammar.
6.2.1 Lambrecht (2001)
Lambrecht (2001) proposes a constructional account o f /¿-clefts that is largely based on 
Jespersen (1937). To recap from §3.1, Jespersen (1937) provides an analysis which 
emphasizes the relationship between /¿-clefts and their noncopular counterparts. For 
example, according to Jespersen’s (1937) analysis, the /¿-cleft in (2) has the same 
underlying predication relationship as the subject-predicate sentence in (3).
(2) [It was] Howard [that] left
(3) Howard left
For Jespersen then, the only difference between these two examples lies in their 
information structure. In (2), the informational content is “cleaved” or split up by the 
addition o f  the semantically empty elements it, be and that, with the result that the 
referential subject is placed in a syntactically marked focal position.
In keeping with construction grammar’s monostratal architecture, Lambrecht 
dismisses the derivational aspects o f Jespersen’s analysis, suggesting that the 
postcopular element is not an underlying subject. However, Lambrecht (2001: 472) 
agrees with Jespersen’s claim that the sequence it is and the connective marker “do not 
enter fully into the semantic composition o f the sentence” . For Lambrecht then, despite 
its biclausal syntax, the /¿-cleft expresses a simple subject-predicate proposition. He 
suggests that the semantic subject is expressed by the gap in the sentence-final clause, 
which is “coindexed with the predicative argument o f the copular” (Lambrecht 2001: 
467), as shown in (4).
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(4) [[It was [Howard],] [th a t j left]]
In Lam brecht’s analysis, the postcopular focal element is therefore the 
antecedent to the cleft clause. Since the sentence-final clause in h-clefts does not modify 
its antecedent, Lambrecht classifies it as a special type o f nonrestrictive relative. As I 
explained in §4.1.3, the cleft clause exhibits a number o f properties that pose a problem 
for a nonrestrictive relative clause analysis. However, rather than claiming that the cleft 
clause patterns exactly like other nonrestrictive relatives, Lambrecht (2001) simply 
argues for a unitary analysis o f relative clauses which can encompass those found in 
cleft sentences.1 He notes, “I take as the fundamental property o f all RCs that they are 
p r e d ic a t e s ” (Lambrecht 2001: 473; emphasis original). Under this extremely broad 
definition, the cleft clause can be classified as an, albeit non-modifying, relative, which 
is predicated o f the postcopular semantic subject.
Lam brecht’s analysis is therefore a non-derivational and monostratal variant o f 
the expletive approach. As I explained in §3.1, such analyses prioritize the relationship 
between the postcopular focal element and the sentence-final clause, with most authors 
assuming that the cleft clause is directly predicated o f the clefted constituent. Since, in 
this approach, the constituents it and be do not enter into the semantics o f the utterance, 
expletive accounts emphasize the correspondence between /7-clefts and noncopular 
subject-predicate sentences. As a result o f  this, Lambrecht (2001: 472) assumes that the 
zY-cleft’ s main function is as a syntactic focusing device, with it and be providing the 
pragmatic role o f “focus m arker” . In particular, Lambrecht (1994, 2001) suggests that 
clefts provide an alternative way o f marking ‘argument-focus’. For example, (5) 
involves the prosodic focus marking o f the argument Howard, whereas the cleft in (6) 
places the argument in a syntactically marked focus position.
(5) Howard left
(6) It was Howard that left
1 Lambrecht’s (2001: 273) “unitary” analysis is formulated in response to (what he believes is) the 
widespread assumption that relative clauses are “restrictive by definition”.
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Following Declerck (1988), Lambrecht (2001: 496) assumes that argument-focus is the 
same thing as specificational meaning. For example, using Declerck’s (1988) ‘value- 
variable’ terminology, both (5) and (6) can be said to provide the value Howard  for the 
variable in x left (see also Declerck 1988 and the discussion o f his work in §3.2.3).
Lambrecht claims that his analysis conforms to the basic principles o f 
construction grammar. He notes that the big advantage o f this particular grammatical 
theory is that it allows for noncompositional linguistic patterns (Lambrecht 2001: 466). 
Consequently, construction grammar does not in principle rule out the highly 
idiosyncratic analysis o f  /¿-clefts that Lambrecht proposes. For example, although 
Lambrecht does not use this term, his analysis involves a complexity mismatch. Francis 
and M ichaelis (2003: 5) define a ‘complexity m ism atch’ as occurring when there is no 
one-to-one correspondence between the formal elements and the semantic components 
o f a construction (see §2.4). For Lambrecht (2001: 466), the construction is syntactically 
complex but semantically simple, involving a number o f dummy elements; he claims 
that cleft sentences “express a simple proposition via biclausal syntax” .
Likewise, although Lambrecht does not discuss this issue in detail, his analysis 
presupposes a clausal constituent that is unique to cleft sentences. As I explained in 
§4.1.3, there are different criteria which characterize restrictive and nonrestrictive 
relative clauses. I f  the antecedent to the cleft clause is understood to be the complement 
o f be, as it is in Lam brecht’s (2001) expletive account, then the sentence-final clause in 
/¿-clefts patterns with neither o f these relative clause types. Therefore, while Lambrecht 
(2001: 472) claims that the cleft clause is a type o f  relative, it must nevertheless be 
distinct from both restrictive and nonrestrictive relative clauses occurring outside o f the 
/'¿-cleft construction. Consequently, although Lambrecht (2001) does not make this claim 
directly, his analysis requires the stipulation o f  a type o f clause that, in terms o f its 
relationship to its antecedent, is unique to the /'¿-cleft construction.
In addition, although Lambrecht acknowledges that /'¿-clefts contain existential 
and exhaustiveness presuppositions, he does not explain either how these properties 
come about or which o f the /'¿-cleft’s components contribute to them. If  these meanings 
cannot be attributed to any o f the individual components, we must assume that they are
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associated with the construction as a whole. The existence o f  noncompositional meaning 
of this sort does not pose a problem for construction grammar. As I explained in §2.5, in 
this grammatical theory, symbolic relations, which link units o f form and meaning, are 
internal to the construction. As well as linking say, the form o f a single lexical item to a 
single component o f  meaning, symbolic relations also link the construction’s complete 
structure to aspects o f the construction’s conventional meaning. This means that a 
construction can have meaning that is associated with the constmction as a whole but 
which cannot be attributed to any one o f its individual elements.
Lam brecht’s analysis is therefore constructional in the sense that he believes, as 
I do, that the concept and architecture o f the grammatical construction is extremely 
useful for configurations, like the //-cleft, which exhibit properties that are not 
predictable from highly general rules o f the grammar. However, despite this, 
Lambrecht’s //-cleft analysis is hugely different from my own constructional account. 
The reason for this is that while Lambrecht treats the //-cleft as a construction, he does 
not try to ensure that this construction is fully “motivated” and situated in relation to the 
rest o f  the language system. For example, Lambrecht (2001: 466) claims that 
constructions, such as the //-cleft, which contain properties that are not predictable from 
universal grammatical rules, “require independent explanation” . However, by studying a 
linguistic pattern in isolation and providing a highly idiosyncratic analysis, little or no 
explanation is provided as to why this particular configuration should exist in a language 
that otherwise seems not to support it.
In his 1994 book, Lambrecht does provide some explanation for the //-cleft 
configuration in the form o f general principles o f information-structure. For example, he 
notes that there is a strong tendency for the subject o f a sentence to express given, or 
discourse-old, information. Lambrecht (1994: 22) comments, “The pragmatic function 
o f the clefiting structure is to create an additional postverbal argument position in which 
the focus NP m ay appear, preventing it from occurring in sentence initial position” . 
However, information-structure principles cannot alone explain why this particular 
construction, with these particular form-meaning correspondences, is used to mark 
focus. For example, it isn ’t clear from this analysis why the constituents it, be and that
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should be present in the syntax if  they do not contribute to the construction’s meaning. 
W hy should the elements it and be in particular be used as focus markers? How did the 
construction develop exhaustiveness and existential presuppositions? W hy does this 
construction exhibit a unique type o f relative clause?
Lam brecht’s (2001) analysis therefore leaves so many questions unanswered and 
stipulates so many construction-specific properties that it becomes a largely descriptive, 
rather than explanatory, account. While Lambrecht makes use o f the concept and 
architecture o f the grammatical construction, he does not discuss the organization o f the 
language system as a hierarchical network. As I go on to show in §6.2.4, the expletive 
account advocated by Lambrecht is not supported by the way that constructional 
taxonomies are organized. Therefore, I conclude that Lambrecht’s (2001) analysis is 
only loosely “constructional” and does not achieve the main goal o f construction 
grammar: to provide full and explanatory accounts o f specialized linguistic patterns.
6.2.2 Davidse (2000)
Davidse’s (2000) constructional account differs considerably from Lam brecht’s (2001) 
analysis. Unlike Lambrecht, Davidse does not assume that //-clefts are semantically 
equivalent to their noncopular subject-predicate counterparts. Instead, she claims that 
both the matrix clause and the cleft clause contribute to the //-cleft’s representational 
semantics. For Davidse, the matrix clause is an “identifying clause”; in other words, it 
functions as a specificational copular sentence. In Davidse’s analysis then, the matrix 
clause o f  the //-cleft in (7) has the same analysis as the N P be NP  specificational 
sentence in (8)2.
(7) [It was Howard] that left
(8) It was Howard
2 Davidse (2000) assumes, as I do, that example (8) is an NP be NP  specificational sentence introduced by 
the semantically meaningful pronoun it. However, for authors who analyse //-clefts as containing an 
expletive pronoun, such sentences are often analysed as “truncated clefts” (see §4.1). From this 
perspective, example (8) is an //-cleft whose relative clause is “recoverable” from the discourse context.
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Using Halliday’s (1967) terminology, Davidse (2000) labels the pronoun it as the 
‘identified’ and the postcopular element (in this case Howard) as the ‘identifier’. In 
many ways, the ‘identifier-identified’ relationship is akin to Declerck’s (1988) ‘value- 
variable’ relation (see §3.2.3). As Davidse (2000: 1121) comments, “The identified can 
be likened to the unknown “x” in a mathematical equation and the identifier to its actual 
value in that equation” .
In addition, Davidse (2000) claims that the constituent it performs a quantifying 
role in the matrix clause. She argues that since it is an inherently definite pronoun, it 
“conveys quantificational exhaustiveness” (Davidse 2000: 1121). By equating the 
universally quantifying it with the postcopular constituent, the matrix clause imposes an 
exhaustively specifying value onto the complement o f be (Davidse 2000: 1125). In this 
way, Davidse accounts for the exhaustiveness presupposition o f  zY-clefts. The relative 
clause then takes this complement (which has been exhaustively quantified) as its 
antecedent, incorporating it into a value-variable relation, as defined by Declerck (1988). 
In other words, the postcopular referring expression constitutes the specific ‘value’, or 
total set o f instances, for the ‘variable’ or “entity involved in the situation designated by 
the relative clause” (Davidse 2000: 1125).
For Davidse, the cleft clause is neither a restrictive nor nonrestrictive relative 
clause. She notes that while restrictive relatives modify and restrict the “type 
specification” o f  the head noun o f a noun phrase, the cleft clause incorporates a full NP 
antecedent into a value-variable relationship. On the other hand, like restrictive relatives, 
the cleft clause can be introduced by that or zero, elements which cannot introduce a 
nonrestrictive relative clause (see §4.1.3). Furthermore, as I noted in §5.5, Davidse 
(2000: 1116) claims that, while nonrestrictive relatives can have non-nominal 
antecedents, the antecedent to the cleft clause is always an NP “either as such or as the 
result o f  the reclassification o f non-nominal units” . That is, while ft-clefts allow a range 
o f elements to occur in the postcopular position, Davidse (2000: 1116) argues that they 
are nominalized into what is essentially a “strictly ‘nominal’ slot”. Davidse (2000: 1128) 
therefore concludes that the relationship between the cleft clause and its antecedent has a 
“special status” .
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Like Lambrecht (2001) then, Davidse (2000) assumes that the antecedent to the 
cleft clause is the complement o f be. However, rather than claiming that //-clefts express 
the same semantic content as their noncopular counterparts, she relates //-clefts, as I do, 
to other specificational copular sentences. As a result, Davidse provides the //-cleft with 
a much more compositional structure than Lambrecht (2001). For instance, while 
Lambrecht’s analysis involves a complexity mismatch between the syntax and the 
semantics o f the //-cleft construction, Davidse assigns a semantic function to each o f its 
syntactic elements. In an analysis similar to m y own, Davidse (2000: 1121) argues that 
the pronoun it is not a semantically empty element and instead performs an important 
quantificational role. She notes, as I do, that the initial it in //-clefts behaves in a similar 
way to the definite article in //z-clefts; both it and the involve proportional (or universal) 
quantification, providing the cleft sentence with its exhaustiveness presuppositions (see 
§4.1.2.3). This contrasts with Lambrecht (2001), who assumes that the cleft pronoun is 
semantically empty and does not provide any explanation as to where the exhaustiveness 
o f  //-clefts comes from.
On the surface then, Davidse’s account appears to be more explanatory than 
Lam brecht’s. However, in many ways, her analysis is just as idiosyncratic and also 
suffers from a number o f  inconsistencies. For example, although Davidse views the 
matrix clause o f  //-clefts in relation to other “identifying clauses” (or specificational NP  
be NP  sentences) she nevertheless comes up with an analysis o f the relative clause that is 
unique to cleft sentences. I f  this type o f clause (which incorporates its antecedent into a 
value-variable relation) is not inherited from more general constructions in the language 
system, then where does it come from and how is it motivated?
In addition, Davidse’s analysis is unnecessarily complex. As I explained above, 
Davidse’s account does not conform to the major principles associated with the 
expletive approach. However, it is also distinct from extraposition accounts, including 
the analysis presented in this thesis. She notes that while extraposition-ffom-NP analyses 
reduce //-clefts to monoclausal specificational sentences, her analysis assumes that //- 
clefts are biclausal, with each clause entering into a different semantic relationship with 
the postcopular element. Davidse (2000: 1127) suggests that this is advantageous, since
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the function o f  z't-clefts is not simply to express specification, but to specify “ in s t a n c e s  
AS VALUES c o r r e s p o n d in g  TO A v a r ia b l e ”  (emphasis original). For Davidse then, the 
exhaustive specification o f the postcopular element is the function o f the matrix clause, 
while the relative clause incorporates it into a value-variable relationship.
However, to my mind, it seems that Davidse chooses a complex analysis over a 
simple one without adding anything to the explanatory significance o f  her account. As I 
showed in §4.1, if  we analyse z7-clefts as specificational sentences containing 
discontinuous definite descriptions, we are able to account for the construction’s 
identifying meaning and exhaustiveness presuppositions, among other properties. Since 
this simple analysis is m aximally explanatory, why do we need the more complex 
account that Davidse proposes? On Davidse’s account, specificational meaning is 
marked twice: once by the identifying matrix clause and once by the value-variable 
relationship expressed by the relative clause. Aside from being uneconomical, this is 
also unnecessary, since it increases the complexity o f the //-cleft structure in a way that 
is not supported by inheritance from the language system.
Davidse’s account also suffers from an important inconsistency. She assumes 
that the constituent it exhaustively quantifies over the postcopular element before it 
serves as the antecedent to the relative clause. However, if  the quantifying it does not 
have scope over the relative clause, then how can quantification in the matrix clause lead 
to exhaustiveness presuppositions in the value-variable relationship o f the relative 
clause? As Pavey (2004: 76) comments, “Davidse repeats several times that the 
ordering, or scope, o f  the two semantic relationships she posits is significant but she 
does not explain this ordering” . Furthermore, while Davidse (2000: 1121) claims, as I 
do, that the it in /7-clefts performs a similar quantificational role to the definite article, 
her analysis actually requires that the cleft pronoun and the definite determiner behave 
differently. For example, while the definite article has scope over the head noun and its 
modifiers, including relative clauses, the cleft pronoun in Davidse’s analysis only 
operates on the postcopular element (Pavey 2004: 76). Consequently, despite Davidse’s 
claims, her analysis o f  z7-clefts is not supported (or motivated) by the behaviour o f 
definite noun phrases in other identifying clauses.
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6.2.3 Pavey (2004)
Unlike Lambrecht (2001) and Davidse (2000), Pavey does not conduct her analysis in 
the framework o f  construction grammar. Nevertheless, there are a number o f  reasons for 
including Pavey (2004) in a review o f constructional fr-clefit analyses. For one thing, 
Pavey’s account is formulated within a Role and Reference Grammar framework. Like 
construction grammar, this is a non-derivational, monostratal, parallel architecture 
theory, which allows for the intersection o f syntactic, semantic and pragmatic 
representations. In addition, and most importantly for our purposes, Role and Reference 
Grammar makes use o f  the concept o f the construction as a unit o f  grammatical 
knowledge3. As a result, this theory permits and expects the grammar to contain 
idiosyncratic information. As Pavey (2004: 246) comments, construction-specific 
properties and conditions are stated in the constructional template.
The framework in which Pavey conducts her analysis therefore shares a number 
o f  similarities with construction grammar. In addition, and partly as a result o f  this, 
Pavey’s analysis shows a strong resemblance to the constructional accounts o f 
Lambrecht (2001) and Davidse (2000). For instance, Pavey (2004:76) notes that 
“Davidse’s constructional approach makes useful advances and begins to bear 
similarities to the way a Role and Reference Grammar analysis would interpret the [it- 
cleft] construction” . As a result, I include Pavey (2004) in my review o f  “constructional” 
zi-cleft analyses. W hile it is unfair to criticize Pavey’s account for not conforming to the 
basic claims and principles o f  construction grammar, my aim here is to show how her 
analysis differs from m y own.
Pavey (2004) is heavily influenced by Declerck’s (1988) understanding o f  it- 
clefts and other specificational sentences. As I explained in §3.2.3, Declerck argues that 
specificational meaning involves a value-variable relationship. For instance, in
3 There are, o f  course, a number o f  important differences between Role and Reference Grammar and 
construction grammar. For instance, while in Role and Reference Grammar, the syntax is separate from 
the lexicon, construction grammar views all items of linguistic knowledge, including lexical items as 
constructions. In this way, all grammatical knowledge has a uniform representation and is stored in the 
same hierarchical system (see §2.3). As I go on to show in chapter 7, this aspect o f the constructional 
framework means that it is well-suited to historical language study; it predicts that there is a continuum 
between the syntax and the lexicon, which is empirically supported by work in grammaticalization.
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specificational N P be N P  sentences, such as (9), the subject NP contains a variable x (as 
in the x  who committed the murder) for which the postcopular NP {John) specifies the 
value.
(9) The one who committed the murder was John
Likewise, for Declerck, //-clefts too involve a value-variable relation. However, 
Declerck (1988: 185) notes that //-clefts differ from NP be NP  specificational sentences 
because they do “not express the variable NP completely” . For instance, in (9) above, 
the variable x is explicitly represented by the head noun o f the subject NP (in this case, 
one). However, while Declerck claims that this same variable is presupposed to exist in 
the corresponding //-cleft in (10), the x variable is not represented in its syntactic form. 
In //-clefts then, the postcopular element provides the value for the variable described 
by the sentence-final clause.
(10) It was John who committed the murder
Pavey builds upon this analysis o f //-clefts and presents it within a Role and 
Reference Grammar framework. Following Davidse (2000), Pavey claims that while the 
cleft clause has the same internal structure as a restrictive relative, it differs in its 
external relationship to the rest o f the sentence. She notes that since the immediate 
antecedent to the cleft clause is a full noun phrase, this clause does not function as a 
restrictive modifier. Pavey represents this syntactically by “linking” the cleft clause to 
the matrix core (shown in Figure 6.1). Like Lambrecht (2001) and Davidse (2000) then, 
Pavey provides a construction-specific analysis o f the cleft clause. She notes that “the 
relationship between the cleft clause and the rest o f  the //-cleft construction results in a 
“sens global particulier” [unique overall meaning] that will be characterized differently 
from both restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses” (Pavey 2004: 201).
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It was Howard that left
Figure 6.1 Pavey’s Role and Reference Grammar analysis (adapted from Pavey 2004: 207)
For the matrix clause, Pavey adopts a simple predicational structure. In Role and 
Reference Grammar, each clause contains both a ‘syntactic nucleus’ (n u c ) and a ‘core 
argum ent’. The syntactic nucleus is reserved for the semantically predicative element. 
For example, in (11), the predicate nominal a doctor is the syntactic nucleus and its 
semantic argument John  is placed in the ‘core argument’ slot. As shown in Figure 6.2, 
the copular verb he is labelled as an auxiliary.
(11) John is a doctor
However, this clause structure is not well-suited to the matrix clause in //-clefts, 
since the postcopular constituent is a semantically referring expression, rather than a 
predicative element. In order to get around this, Pavey claims that Declerck’s ‘value- 
variable’ relation is a type o f pragmatic predication relationship. Pavey observes that 
while in noun phrases, the function o f a restrictive relative clause is to assist the hearer 
in identifying the referent o f the head noun, the opposite relationship is found in //-clefts. 
She notes that the postcopular “value ‘m odifies’ the variable expressed by the cleft 
clause [and]... assists the hearer in making a full identification o f the underspecified
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argument in the cleft clause” (Pavey 2004: 200). On this basis, Pavey claims that the 
postcopular value element acts as a kind o f “pragmatic predicate” . Extending the 
interpretation o f the nucleus node (NUC) to “encompass the notion o f ‘pragmatic 
predicate’”, Pavey (2004: 268) places the referential postcopular element o f the //-cleft 
in a syntactic position which was previously reserved for semantically predicative 














Figure 6.2 Layered structure o f the clause with a nominal predicate and be as auxiliary (adapted 
from Pavey 2004: 100)
The cleft pronoun is placed in the ‘core argument’ slot, a syntactic position 
typically filled by the semantic argument o f the predicative element (see Figure 6.2). 
Since on her analysis, the constituent it is not a semantically referring expression and is 
in fact altogether absent from the semantic representation o f the construction, Pavey’s 
analysis presents yet another mismatch between the syntax and the semantics. 
Nevertheless, Pavey argues that the pronoun it in //-clefts is not entirely meaningless. 
She claims that the cleft pronoun reflects the main specificational function o f the
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sentence -  a relationship that is specified in the constructional template along with other 
idiosyncratic information4.
Pavey’s (2004) analysis o f the //-cleft construction is therefore highly 
idiosyncratic. For instance, like Lambrecht (2001) and Davidse (2000), she stipulates a 
special type o f syntactic and semantic relationship between the cleft clause and its 
antecedent which is not found outside o f the //-cleft construction. In addition, Pavey’s 
analysis is m arked by the fact that it contains massive amounts o f mismatch. She notes 
that her analysis highlights “an overriding mismatch, or lack o f  iconicity, between the 
semantic representation and syntactic form o f the construction” (Pavey 2004: 289). For 
instance, despite her claim that there is no semantic predication relationship in the 
matrix clause, Pavey nevertheless provides it with a syntactically predicational clause 
structure. In order to incorporate the postcopular referring expression into a syntactic 
position reserved for predicative elements, Pavey provides an ad  hoc story in which she 
labels it “pragmatic predicate” . As Pavey (2004: 254) comments, “The matrix clause 
contains no verbal predicate; the nucleus contains a referring expression and the only 
argument (the cleft pronoun) is non-referring.. .These idiosyncrasies o f the construction 
require special conditions and these are stated in the constructional template” .
Pavey’s (2004) reliance on mismatch and construction-specific phenomena is 
somewhat unexpected since her account originates from the same starting point as my 
own analysis: with the premise that //-clefts are a subtype o f specificational copular
4 This aspect o f Pavey’s analysis stems from her discussion of there-clefts. Pavey (2004: 155) claims that 
there-clefts serve to introduce the postcopular referent rather than identify it as the value for a variable. 
She concludes that while //-clefts are specificational, there-clefts are existential and argues that the 
purpose o f the cleft pronoun is therefore to reflect the main semantic/pragmatic function o f the sentence 
(Pavey 2004: 157). However, Pavey’s analysis o f //¡ere-clefts is based upon the wrong set o f data and 
includes the existential sentence given in (i). Here, a tall man who constantly fa lls  over is asserted to exist 
in the yoga class. Therefore, in this example, the relative clause restrictively modifies the antecedent noun. 
Such sentences should not be conflated with there-clefts. As Keams (2000: 81-85) comments, since 
definite NPs are already presupposed to exist, existential sentences only allow indefinite NPs into the 
postcopular position. Consequently, these examples represent a separate construction from there-clefts 
such as (ii). As I explained in §4.1.2, there-clefts are specificational; they differ from //-clefts only in the 
fact that they are not exhaustive.
(i) (All kinds o f  new people have signed up for my yoga class...)
There’s a tall man who constantly falls over... (Pavey 2004: 170)
(ii) Well, there’s John and Mary that are available to work Saturday...
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sentence. For instance, Pavey (2004: 184) notes that the /7-cleft should be viewed “as 
one o f  a ‘fam ily’ o f copular constructions, and as a specificational construction in 
particular” . However, while I have argued that specificational copular sentences involve 
a special type o f  nominal predication relation, Pavey assumes Declerck’s (1988) account 
o f specificational meaning as involving a value-variable relationship. As I explained in 
§4.1, my analysis o f specificational meaning leads me to argue for an extraposition- 
from-NP analysis o f /7-clefts. In contrast, Declerck (1988) argues that while /7-clefts 
share the same value-variable relationship as their corresponding noncleft specificational 
sentences, they are formally distinct. For instance, as I noted above, Declerck claims that 
the variable x  in /7-clefts is not syntactically realized. Pavey (2004: 187) concludes that 
all “specificational constructions share a ‘pragmatically predicational’ function while the 
/7-cleft construction is distinguished by its syntactic form”.
The analyses o f  Declerck (1988) and Pavey (2004) therefore fail to integrate it- 
clefts into a truly unified account o f  specificational copular sentences. Rather than 
explaining how the /7-cleft’s formal properties are motivated, Pavey’s analysis highlights 
the idiosyncratic and noncompositional nature o f /7-clefts. Only the functional 
correspondences between /7-clefits and other specificational constructions are 
emphasized. As I explain in §6.2.4, “families” o f constructions are based upon formal 
resemblances. Therefore, Pavey’s (2004) “constructional” account is not supported by 
the organization o f  the grammar in constructional theories.
6.2.4 A good constructional account?
Over the previous three subsections, I have discussed the /7-cleft analyses o f Lambrecht 
(2001), Davidse (2000) and Pavey (2004). I have shown that each o f  these authors 
makes reference to the basic claims and concepts that underlie the construction grammar 
framework. For instance, in these accounts, the /7-cleft is acknowledged as having the 
status o f  a construction; that is, it is treated as a conventional unit o f linguistic 
knowledge containing construction-internal mappings between form and meaning. In 
this sense then, the analyses o f Lambrecht, Davidse and Pavey can be labelled 
“constructional” . However, despite this, not one o f  these analyses shows a strong
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similarity to the account o f  //-clefts argued for in this thesis. In what follows, I explain 
that the reason for this is that Lambrecht, Davidse and Pavey do not acknowledge or 
address the methodological objective for which construction grammar was designed: to 
provide full and explanatory accounts o f  both general and specialized linguistic patterns.
The analyses proposed by Lambrecht (2001), Davidse (2000) and to some extent 
Pavey (2004) make use o f  construction grammar primarily as a theory that tolerates 
idiosyncratic structures. For these authors, the term ‘construction’ is therefore 
synonymous with linguistic patterns consisting o f form-meaning correspondences not 
found in other areas o f the grammar and encoding constructional meanings that cannot 
be attributed to their component parts. However, although idiosyncrasies and exceptions 
are permitted in construction grammar, the explanatory power o f  the framework is based 
upon the organization o f  the language system as a hierarchical network o f constructions. 
These constructions are related to one another via inheritance links, with specific 
constructions inheriting properties from more general patterns. The more properties a 
construction inherits, the more it can be said to be motivated by the language system.
Surprisingly, Lambrecht, Davidse and Pavey do not exploit inheritance in their 
analyses. O f course, this is not to say that these authors study //-clefts in complete 
isolation from other constructions5. For example, as shown in §6.2.1, Lambrecht’s 
(2 0 0 1 ) expletive analysis views //-clefts in relation to truth-conditionally equivalent 
subject-predicate sentences. However, Lam brecht’s approach is not supported by the 
way that constructional taxonomies are organized. Goldberg (1995: 108) says that 
inheritance links are only posited between constructions that are formally related. 
Consequently, despite the similarity in meaning between clefts and their noncopular 
counterparts, this relationship is not represented in the grammatical system. This means 
then that the expletive approach is not supported by the framework o f construction 
grammar. In contrast to Lambrecht, Pavey (2004) argues, as I do, that //-clefts are
5 As a further example o f this, Lambrecht, Davidse and Pavey add weight to their analyses by applying 
them to other types o f  cleft sentence, including wA-cleft and //z-cleft examples (Lambrecht 2001) as well 
as clefts introduced by there (Davidse 2000 and Pavey 2004). However, since these constructions are 
superficially just as puzzling and peripheral as the //-cleft, such patterns o f correspondence are not, on 
their own, helpful in providing motivation for the //-cleft construction.
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members o f the family o f  specificational copular constructions. However, as I noted in 
§6.2.3 above, Pavey only emphasizes functional, rather than formal, correspondences 
between ¿/-clefts and other specificational sentences.
A truly constructional account o f ¿/-clefts seeks to maximize motivation for the 
¿¿-cleft construction. For instance, m y extraposition-from-NP analysis emphasizes both 
formal and functional correspondences between ¿¿-clefts and the specificational copular 
schema. Like noncleft specificational sentences, I analyse ¿¿-clefts as involving a 
nominal predication relation involving a (discontinuous) definite NP predicate. 
Consequently, from m y analysis, it follows that the ¿¿-cleft construction can be firmly 
situated within the language network. In other words, we have an explanation as to why 
the ¿¿-cleft construction should exist in the language. Only after examining ¿¿-clefts in 
relation to the rest o f the grammar are the exceptional or truly construction-specific 
characteristics isolated. As Goldberg (2003: 118) comments, “a given construction often 
shares a great deal with other constructions that exist in a language; only certain aspects 
o f its form and function are unaccounted for by other constructions” .
Because they don’t use inheritance, or look for significant pattern resemblances 
between constructions, Lambrecht, Davidse and Pavey stipulate enormous amounts o f 
idiosyncratic information. For example, Lambrecht (2001) and Pavey (2004) argue that 
the ¿¿-cleft is a noncompositional structure exhibiting complexity mismatch. While 
Lambrecht (2001) argues that the ¿¿-cleft expresses a simple semantic proposition via 
biclausal syntax, Pavey (2004) claims that the semantic “head noun” o f the variable 
expression has no syntactic representation. As I explained in §2.5, noncompositionality 
is not, contrary to popular belief, a fundamental requirement for positing an independent 
construction. M ost constructional linguists now recognize that the majority o f even 
specialized linguistic patterns are compositional; that is, they can be broken down into 
units o f  meaning which can be attributed to individual formal elements. Instead, 
idiosyncratic information typically pertains to the mapping between form and meaning. 
In such cases, a unit o f  form is linked to a unit o f  meaning with which it is not associated 
outside o f the construction. M y analysis o f ¿¿-clefts reflects this aspect o f the 
constructional philosophy. I have presented a largely compositional analysis (with all
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but the copula corresponding to a particular unit o f  semantic meaning) which recognizes 
the construction-specificity o f form-function mappings such as the use o f it as encoding 
definite-like quantification rather than denoting a referent.
The so-called “constructional” accounts o f Lambrecht (2001), Davidse (2000) 
and Pavey (2004) therefore capitalize on some of the largely unfounded, popular 
misconceptions about construction grammar (see Goldberg 1995: 222). They assume 
that a constructional framework permits and perhaps encourages highly idiosyncratic 
analyses o f noncompositional structures. However, as I have shown, these analyses 
overlook the main objective o f construction grammar: to provide a maximally 
explanatory account. As a result, I conclude that while the analysis put forward in this 
thesis conforms to the basic principles o f construction grammar, the alternative accounts 
o f Lambrecht, Davidse and Pavey are not actually supported by the constructional 
framework.
6.3 What are the advantages to a constructional account?
Throughout this chapter, I have noted that construction grammar was developed with 
specialized linguistic patterns in mind. The //-cleft construction is a specialized linguistic 
pattern. Regardless o f how the //-cleft’s structure is analysed or derived, we are still 
presented with a nonstandard configuration in which aspects o f meaning and use are 
unpredictable from the independent conventions associated with its component parts. In 
this section, I compare m y constructional analysis to accounts formulated within the 
generative and transformational traditions. I conclude that the //-cleft’s properties can be 
most satisfactorily accounted for and explained within a constructional framework.
One important advantage to examining cleft sentences from a constructional 
perspective is that it encourages a comprehensive analysis o f all aspects o f the //-cleft’s 
structure and function. As I explained in §2.1, construction grammar does not organize 
grammatical knowledge into separate components (such as syntax, semantics and so on) 
which are mediated by highly general linking rules. Instead, mappings between form and 
meaning are internal to the construction. As a result o f this, distinct “levels” o f  linguistic 
knowledge cannot be studied in isolation from one another. This means that the object o f
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linguistic study for the construction grammarian is not only the syntactic configuration, 
but the construction-specific integration between form and meaning. A constructional 
approach therefore requires that all o f  the /¿-cleft’s properties are worthy o f description 
and explanation, culminating in a fully comprehensive analysis.
Derivational theories o f grammar, on the other hand, tend to focus on form rather 
than meaning. In this model, a single configuration may have different (underlying) 
levels o f syntactic structure. Therefore, in contrast to the axiom held by m ost functional 
linguistics (see especially Bolinger 1977), derivational theories predict that a difference 
in form is not necessarily accompanied by a difference in meaning. Accounts based on 
this set o f  assumptions leave a number o f questions unresolved. For example, in §3 .2 .2 ,1 
showed that the inverse analysis o f specificational sentences (developed in generative 
theories such as minimalism and P&P) fails to explain why canonical and inverse word 
orders have distinct predicational (descriptive) and specificational (identifying) 
meanings. Likewise, in § 3 .1 ,1 noted that few proponents o f the expletive account o f it- 
clefits (which assumes that they are derived from, or otherwise related to, noncopular 
subject-predicate sentences) tackle the issue o f how this construction acquires its 
pragmatic properties . 6  Finally, the transformational analyses outlined in §4.2 cannot 
account for the /¿-cleft’s construction-specific semantic and discourse-functional 
properties, which differ from those o f  their pseudocleft “sources” . Consequently, these 
syntax-based analyses present an incomplete picture o f the /¿-cleft and other 
specificational constructions.
Another advantage to the constructional framework is that the organization o f 
grammatical knowledge as a hierarchical network provides an alternative way o f 
capturing linguistic generalizations. As we have seen, much o f the /¿-cleft’s structure and 
use cannot be predicted from highly general rules. However, as shown in §6.2, the 
constructional framework does not support a wholly idiosyncratic analysis. Likewise, it 
does not advocate positing a long list o f complicated and unmotivated transformations 
from underlyingly rule-governed structures. Neither o f these approaches provides an
6 Among the expletive accounts, an exception to this generalization is E. Kiss (1998). However, in this 
case, the pragmatic property o f exhaustivity is dealt with as a syntactic phenomenon (see §4.1.2.3).
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explanation for why the specialized linguistic pattern, in this case the /'/-cleft, has the 
particular structure and function that it does. Instead, by representing linguistic 
knowledge within a hierarchical network, the constructional approach finds explanations 
at a more local level. For example, when examined in relation to a small family o f 
related constructions, the /'/-cleft quickly loses its mystique and is shown to fit in well 
with the rest o f  the language system.
Finally, a constructional approach is useful in the study o f the /7-cleft because it 
allows for the grammar to contain idiosyncratic information. Obviously, if  we label a 
large proportion o f the /'/-cleft’s properties as construction-specific, then our analysis 
loses its explanatory value. However, construction grammar simply states that while 
most properties o f a given construction are inherited from more general patterns o f 
correspondence, it is normal for some aspects o f its form or function to be construction- 
specific. As I explained in §6.1, by factoring out some idiosyncratic properties, our 
analysis o f /'/-clefts becomes far more straightforward, allowing the relevant 
generalizations to be made. Furthermore, by recognizing the existence o f idiosyncratic 
properties, the constructional framework asks us to explain or provide motivation for 
them. This represents an important advantage over theories that do not explicitly predict 
or allow idiosyncratic information to enter into the grammar. For such accounts, the only 
options are either to ignore construction-specific properties completely, thereby 
presenting an incomplete analysis o f the construction, or to provide a complex and 
elaborate derivational story in which the construction is ultimately traced back to an 
underlyingly rule-governed and predictable structure.
The way that construction grammar provides motivation for idiosyncratic 
properties is by looking for an explanation outside o f the synchronic language network. 
As a usage-based model, the version o f construction grammar adopted in this thesis is 
designed to intersect with and work alongside theories o f language learning and 
language change7. In the remainder o f this thesis, I examine whether historical evidence 
can provide an explanation for some o f the construction-specific properties that /'/-clefts
7 As I explained in chapter 2, this thesis makes use o f  a usage-based constructional framework which 
argues for a default inheritance model of language in which information is stored redundantly. However, 
not all versions o f construction grammar share these properties.
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display. Contra Roberts and Roussou (2003), I go on to show that construction grammar 
lends itself to integration with grammaticalization theory better than the minimalist 
framework.
In conclusion then, the constructional approach encourages an all-encompassing, 
explanatory analysis which highlights the maximum level o f correspondence with other 
constructions. At the same time, construction grammar prevents the stipulation o f over­
complex and ad hoc derivations by allowing for idiosyncratic information to enter into 
the grammar. M otivation for specialized linguistic patterns is provided either by the 
structured inventory o f the language system or by language external factors. Finally, and 
o f  particular importance to the analysis o f //-clefts argued for in this thesis, construction 
grammar has a greater level o f diachronic applicability than alternative compositional 
(i.e. non-constructional) frameworks.
6.4 A hierarchy of constructions
The topic o f this chapter has been the framework in which my analysis is conducted. I 
have explained what is constructional about my approach, how it compares to other so- 
called “constructional” accounts o f //-clefts, and why construction grammar is 
particularly suited to the study o f  such specialized linguistic patterns. In this section, we 
come to the end o f  m y synchronic account o f //-clefts. This is as far as most authors 
writing about cleft sentences go. However, as I have noted in §6.3, one o f the advantages 
to the constructional framework is that it encourages us to look for explanations further 
afield and provides us with the tools to do so. As a result, in chapters 7 and 8 , 1 turn my 
attention to the historical development o f the //-cleft construction. As a precursor to this, 
in this section, I highlight some o f the questions that my synchronic account has yet to 
provide answers for. These will form the basis o f my diachronic investigation. However, 
first, I review the inheritance links which have formed the basis o f my analysis so far 






















































M y synchronic analysis began with the premise that ft-clefits are a variety o f 
specificational copular construction. After examining specificational NP be NP  
sentences, I claimed that specificational meaning results from a reinterpretation o f  the 
class-membership relation which is found in predicational N P be NP  sentences (see 
§3.3). That is, both sentence types involve the same type o f predication relation, in 
which the referring expression is categorized as a member o f the class or set described 
by the predicate nominal. W hile in predicational NP be NP  sentences, this class- 
membership relation is used to describe or attribute a property to the subject referent, in 
specificational N P be NP  sentences, it functions to identify the (typically complete) 
membership o f  a restricted set.
There are two possible configurations for specificational NP be NP  sentences: 
canonical and reverse. I have argued that reverse specificational sentences form a sub­
construction o f  the larger predicate nominal construction (see Figure 6 .3 ) . 8  Such 
sentences inherit all o f  the properties o f the more general predicational NP be NP  
schema, including syntactic elements, semantic components and the symbolic links 
between them. However, the reverse specificational construction is a more specialized 
linguistic pattern, stipulating that the semantic predicate is a definite noun phrase 
(providing the prerequisite restrictive set) and exhibiting an additional information- 
structural requirem ent (such that the precopular referent is in focus).
In canonical specificational sentences, the restricted set (the predicate) is 
presented before the identification o f any o f its members. I have claimed that this 
construction involves mismatch, overriding the pervasive generalization that the 
syntactic subject functions as a semantic argument. In other words, the symbolic links 
between the syntactic elements and the semantic components are not inherited, but are 
specific to the canonical specificational construction. I account for this in the following 
way. Canonical specificational sentences exhibit the same syntactic structure as the 
equative construction, which is underspecified for predicative complement status.
8 In Figure 6.3, the predicate nominal construction inherits its structure from the subject beXcom p  
construction. ‘Xcomp’ is a label, borrowed from LFG, meaning predicative complement. In this hierarchy, 
I have suggested that the subject be Xcomp structure is a less schematic variant o f the underspecified 
subject be complement construction.
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Instead, the nominal predication relation comes about compositionally as a result o f  the 
inherent semantics o f definite noun phrases. According to a Russellian-Gricean analysis, 
definite noun phrases are semantically quantificational, involving the universal 
(proportional) quantification o f a restrictive and existentially presupposed set. 
Consequently, when a definite noun phrase is compared with a referring expression, a 
class-membership predication relation ensues9, resulting in a specificational sentence.
In § 4 .1 ,1 claimed that /7-clefts with a specificational (or identifying) meaning are 
a subtype o f  specificational copular construction . 1 0  In order to maximize motivation for 
the /7-cleft, I advocated a discontinuous constituent analysis. From this perspective, the 
/7-cleft is reduced to an N P  be N P  sentence, displaying a class-membership predication 
relation. This, in turn, explains why /7-clefts have a specificational function. In addition,
I have shown that a number o f the /7-cleft’s pragmatic properties, such as a fixed focus 
position, existentiality, exhaustiveness, contrast and givenness are inherited from the 
wider specificational schema and can often be explained as originating from the inherent 
semantics o f  definite noun phrases. Likewise, this analysis enables the cleft clause to be 
unequivocally classified as restrictive relative (which forms part o f the discontinuous 
definite description), thereby reducing the number o f construction-specific properties 
that the /7-cleft displays.
As well as having a specificational function, /7-cleflts can also occur with a 
predicational (descriptive) meaning. Given m y analysis o f /7-clefts as akin to simple NP  
be NP  sentences, this is to be expected. Predicational /7-cleflts have the same syntax, 
semantics and information structure as specificational /7-clefts. This is illustrated in 
Figure 6.3, with predicational and specificational /7-clefts inheriting construction-
9 1 have explained, in §3.3.4, that since indefinite noun phrases involve cardinal, rather than proportional 
quantification, they denote an individual member, rather than a set or subset. As a result, they very rarely 
occur as the predicate o f a specificational sentence and are permitted (via coercion) only if  the indefinite 
NP assumes the qualities o f a definite description. However, since this coerced interpretation creates its 
own set o f  discourse functions, specificational sentences with indefinite NP predicates could perhaps form 
a distinct sub-construction in the speaker’s mind. However, this is not represented in the over-simplified 
hierarchy given in Figure 6.3. Likewise, the there-cleft construction (which is a non-exhaustive variant o f 
the /7-cleft) is also absent.
10 As shown in Figure 6.3, w/z-clefts and ¿///-clefts are also subtypes o f  the specificational copular 
construction. 77/-clefts are not recognized as a distinct construction in this hierarchy since they cannot be 
clearly separated from “noncleft” NP be NP  sentences (see §4.1.1).
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specific properties from a common //-cleft abstraction. However, as I explained in §5.3, 
these sentence types differ in their internal form-function mappings; in predicational //- 
clefts the syntactic subject functions as a referential argument expression and the 
postcopular NP is the semantic predicate. As shown in Figure 6.3, this property is 
inherited from the predicate nominal construction.
These constructional correspondences and inheritance relations are sketched in 
the constructional taxonomy illustrated in Figure 6.3. However, this temporary network 
is incomplete and leaves a number o f questions unresolved. For example, it does not tell 
us how the //-cleft’s semi-substantive and construction-specific structure is motivated. 
W hy does the constituent it not function as a fully referential pronoun? How can a 
pronoun be modified by a restrictive relative clause to form a definite-like description? 
How is the extraposition o f  the restrictive relative clause motivated? W hy do we not 
have non-extraposed forms o f the //-cleft in which it and the relative clause form a 
“continuous constituent”? In addition, the constructional taxonomy only deals with 
structures containing NP foci. How do non-NP specificational //-clefts relate to this 
family o f  constructions and how are they motivated? Finally, we have not yet placed 
informative-presupposition //-clefts, which occur with new information in the relative 
clause, within this hierarchy. As I explained in §5.5, this property is not shared with 
other specificational copular constructions. So how is it motivated?
These questions form the basis o f the diachronic investigation undertaken over 
the next two chapters. Here, I show that historical evidence can help to provide 
motivation for the //-cleft in two different ways. First, it provides us with a picture o f  the 
language system at earlier periods o f  the language. As we have seen, some o f the //- 
cleft’s formal properties cannot be traced back to more general constructions in the 
present-day language system. However, this does not mean that these properties were 
not, at one time, inherited. As I go on to show, historical investigation can identify the 
existence o f formally related constructions at earlier periods o f the English language 
which can help to explain the //-cleft’s unusual configuration. In addition, diachronic 
corpus research shows how the //-cleft has developed over time. While the //-cleft may 
be formally and functionally related to a family o f constructions, language change does
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not always happen on such a grand scale. As a result, historical data can show how 
construction-specific properties develop over time. Combined with a theory o f  language 
change, such as grammaticalization, we can begin to get a picture o f why the /¿-cleft has 
developed these idiosyncratic properties and what effect this has on its m odem  day 
distributional potential.
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7. A HISTORICAL INVESTIGATION OF IT-CLEFTS
In chapter 6 , 1  showed that the analysis o f //-clefts argued for in this thesis maximizes 
motivation for the construction; in other words, it provides an explanation as to why this 
particular construction with these particular properties should exist in the language. In 
this account, specificational and predicational //-clefts inherit many o f  their properties 
from more basic constructions including the (canonical) specificational copular 
construction, the predicate nominal construction and the definite noun phrase 
construction. In this way, a large number o f the //-cleft’s formal and functional 
properties are provided with an explanation. Nevertheless, on this account, there are still 
aspects o f the //-cleft’s structure and use that remain unexplained.
In this chapter, I show how, once we look beyond inheritance from the present- 
day language system, we can find an explanation for many o f the //-cleft’s construction- 
specific properties. Here, I undertake a historical investigation into the //-cleft’s origin 
and subsequent diachronic development, showing how and why the //-cleft acquired its 
idiosyncratic characteristics. The historical evidence integrates in several important 
ways with the synchronic //-cleft analysis developed over previous chapters. First, my 
extraposition-from-NP account o f //-clefts captures the diachronic facts much more 
straightforwardly than an expletive analysis. As a result, I am able to provide a much 
simpler story o f the historical development o f the //-cleft than Ball (1991, 1994a), whose 
work dominates the somewhat limited literature on this topic. This, in turn, provides 
additional support for an extraposition-from-NP analysis o f //-clefts. Together, my 
synchronic and diachronic analyses add up to a maximally explanatory account o f the 17- 
cleft construction.
There are two different ways in which I make use o f historical evidence in this 
chapter. First, in § 7 .1 ,1 examine //-cleft examples from earlier periods o f English in 
relation to the synchronic language system o f the time. This allows me to identify some 
inheritance relations that are no longer productive in the constructional hierarchy. I show 
that while aspects o f the //-cleft’s structure are left unexplained when examined in 
relation to the present-day language system, they were at one time motivated by
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constructions that have subsequently fallen out o f  use or which have undergone changes 
to their formal properties. In this section, I make use o f  and reanalyse Ball’s (1991) Old 
English and Early M iddle English data. I find that //-clefts were, from the very 
beginning, more amenable to the extraposition-ffom-NP analysis argued for in this thesis 
than the expletive analysis adopted by Ball (1991). This leads me to propose an 
alternative origin story for the specificational //-cleft, dating back to Old English. I show 
that the //-cleft construction was, at this time, fully motivated by inheritance from the 
language system.
The second way that I make use o f  historical evidence is by examining the 
effects o f language change on the //-cleft construction. As I explained in §6.1, in 
construction grammar, motivation for a construction can be provided not only by 
inheritance relations that are internal to the structured inventory o f  the language, but also 
by factors external to the grammar, including processing, acquisition and language 
change (see Goldberg 2003: 121). In § 7 .2 ,1 undertake a diachronic investigation into the 
development o f  the //-cleft construction throughout Late Middle English and Early 
M odem  English. Here, I show that over time the //-cleft construction gradually sanctions 
a w ider variety o f instances which override more general patterns o f correspondence. As 
I go on to explain, these changes are in keeping with the unidirectional tendencies o f 
‘grammatical constructionalization’ which have been outlined within grammaticalization 
theory. I conclude that the //-cleft’s emergent idiosyncratic properties are motivated by, 
and obtain an explanation from, general principles o f language change.
7.1 The it-cleft and the language system of earlier periods of English
Throughout this thesis, I have argued for an analysis which treats the //-cleft as a subtype 
o f N P  be N P  sentence. I have shown that once we analyse the initial it and the cleft 
clause as a discontinuous (restrictively modified) definite description, we are able to 
explain the specifying (or, for predicational clefts, the ascriptive) function o f the 
construction as well as its shared behaviour with definite noun phrases and restrictive 
relative clauses. However, there are aspects o f the //-cleft’s structure that remain a 
puzzle on this account. How is it possible that a restrictive relative clause modifies a
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pronominal element, such as the initial if!  How is this motivated? If the initial it and the 
cleft clause form a semantic constituent, then why can they never be adjacent to one 
another? W hy must the cleft clause always occur in sentence-final position and what 
motivates this extraposition-from-NP? Finally, why doesn’t the embedded verb in the 
relative clause always show number agreement with the initial it!
In this section, I show that these construction-specific formal properties have 
their sources in constructions that we haven’t yet considered; I argue that they were 
originally inherited from syntactic configurations which no longer exist (or are no longer 
productive) in the language system. I show that while the //-cleft’s structure has 
remained largely unchanged since Old English, what has changed is the language system 
in which the //-cleft construction is situated. This idea, that irregularity is sometimes the 
relic o f  fossilized historical regularity, is well-understood. For example, irregular past 
tense forms such as stand/stood  are the entrenched relics o f a once productive pattern o f 
strong verbs. Likewise, as I explained in §2.5, idioms such as kith and kin (meaning 
friends and fam ily) and with might and main (meaning with a lot o f  strength) contain 
words which are no longer found outside o f  these formulaic expressions (see Fillmore, 
Kay and O ’Connor 1988).
In §7 .1 .1 ,1 provide evidence that the discontinuous constituent o f the //-cleft is 
an instance o f  a once productive construction in which pronouns are modified by 
restrictive relative clauses (the ‘determinative pronoun construction’). As part o f this 
discussion, I examine early zY-cleft examples taken from Ball (1991). While these 
examples pose a problem for Ball’s expletive analysis, they are accommodated neatly by 
m y extraposition-from-NP account and provide unequivocal support for it. This suggests 
a much simpler origin story for the specificational //-cleft than that argued for by Ball 
(1991). In §7 .1 .2 ,1 show that the sentence-final position o f the relative clause was the 
norm in Old English, arguing that the //-cleft configuration represents a reflex o f the 
older pattern. Finally, in §7 .1 .3 ,1 claim that the cleft pronoun it has more in common 
semantically with the Old and Early Middle English lexeme it than with the present-day 
pronoun. I claim that with this analysis in place, we can better understand the //-cleft’s 
unusual agreement patterns. A summary o f  my findings is given in §7.1.4.
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7.1.1 How can a pronoun be restrictively modified?
In m y account o f  the ¿/-cleft construction, the cleft clause is analysed as a restrictive 
relative which modifies the initial it. However, a potential problem with this account is 
that relative clauses do not normally modify pronominal elements. Nevertheless, at 
earlier periods o f  the language, pronouns could function as the antecedents to restrictive 
relative clauses. Although no longer productive, such patterns exist in formulaic sayings 
such as ( l ) . 1 Here, the pronoun he and the following relative clause function as a definite 
description, akin to the one who laughs last.
(1) He who laughs last laughs longest
Following Declerck (1988) and Ball (1991) among others, I label the pronouns which 
are modified in this way ‘determinative pronouns’. In what follows, I use historical 
evidence to build up a case for analysing the cleft it as a determinative pronoun. I argue 
that although the restrictive modification o f it is now an entrenched and idiosyncratic 
part o f the ¿¿-cleft schema, it was, at one time, a property inherited from the then 
productive ‘determinative pronoun construction ’ . 2
Discussing proverbial predicational ¿¿-clefts, Declerck (1988) provides evidence 
for the claim that, in this particular type o f  ¿¿-cleft, the initial it is a determinative 
pronoun, modified by a restrictive relative clause. For one thing, Declerck (1988: 155) 
notes that the initial it in these examples can sometimes be replaced by other 
determinative pronouns, like he or she. Such examples, including (3) below, show that it 
is possible for the restrictive relative clause which modifies the determinative pronoun to 
be located in an extraposed position. This provides support for our extraposition-from- 
NP analysis o f the corresponding ¿¿-cleft given in (2).
1 In addition, indefinite pronouns can be restrictively modified in contemporary English. For example, in 
the NP someone who lives here, the relative clause restricts the very general type specification someone. 
Furthermore, for some speakers, definite pronouns can be followed by reduced relatives in expressions 
such as them round the corner and him next door.
2 Curme (1931) analyses determinative pronouns differently from other authors. He suggests that the 
clausal component in /7-clefts and other determinative pronoun constructions is a “subject clause” rather 
than a restrictive relative. On this account, the cleft it and other determinatives serve as “anticipatory 
subject[s], pointing to the following subject clause” (Curme 1931: 188).
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(2) It is a fortunate voyager who finds many friends
(3) .. .and the best that we find in these travels is an honest friend. He is a fortunate 
voyager who finds many. (Kruisinga 1932: 505; cited in Declerck 1988: 155)
Furthermore, Declerck observes that, along with he and she, the pronoun it could 
at one time function as a determinative pronoun in contexts outside o f the cleft 
construction. As noted by Poutsma (1928: 730) (cited in Declerck (1988: 156)), the 
pronoun it in the following example from Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night is “used as a kind 
o f determinative” .
(4) I would have men o f  such constancy put to sea, that there business might be
everything and there intent everywhere, for that’s it that always makes a good 
voyage o f  nothing. (Twelfth Night; Act 2 Scene 4)
In this predicate nominal construction, the restrictive relative clause immediately follows 
the pronoun it. Together these elements make up a definite-like description (with the 
m eaning the thing/quality that makes a good voyage come to nothing) which is 
predicated o f  the anaphoric subject that.
O f course, in this example, the postcopular noun phrase is predicated o f an 
inanimate referent. I f  we want to provide //-clefts such as (2) with a determinative 
pronoun analysis, then we need to provide an explanation for the fact that the non­
human it is the head o f a noun phrase which has a human referent, in this case the 
voyager that fin d s  many friends. In response to this challenge, Declerck (1988: 156) 
notes that in former times, it and he/she were largely interchangeable. He cites the 
following example from Visser (1970: 41) in which the pronoun it is used as the subject 
o f a predicational sentence to refer to what must be a human referent (a bishop).
(5) Hit is an biscop (c971, The Bickling Homilies, 43.33)
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Taken together, this historical evidence shows that (a) in proverbial expressions, 
pronouns other than it can be modified by restrictive relative clauses, which are 
sometimes extraposed; (b) it could at one time function as a determinative pronoun in 
nonclefit contexts; and (c) although pronominal it can now only refer to non-human 
entities, at earlier stages o f English, it could have a human referent. On the basis o f  this 
evidence, Declerck concludes that the initial it in proverbial predicational clefts is a 
determinative pronoun. In such sentences then, the pronoun it and the cleft clause form a 
discontinuous definite description which functions as the referring expression within a 
predicate nominal construction (see §5.2). As Declerck (1988: 157) notes, a 
determinative pronoun analysis for these examples is supported by the fact that, as 
proverbs, they “are reminiscent o f an earlier stage o f  the language”.
Declerck (1988) therefore limits his determinative pronoun analysis to proverbial 
predicational clefts. However, in the remainder o f  this section, I show that historical 
evidence also provides support for a determinative pronoun (or extraposition-ffom-NP) 
analysis o f  both specificational and non-proverbial predicational /7-clefts. I conclude that 
it is not only the individual proverbial tokens which are entrenched in the language 
system; in fact, the entire z7-cleft schema has remained largely unchanged since Old 
English, and retains residual patterns which are no longer productive outside o f  the cleft 
construction. In what follows, I discuss early examples o f /7-clefts taken from Ball’s 
(1991) data set but, crucially, I do not always agree with her analyses.
As part o f her investigation into the historical development o f the /7-cleft, Ball 
(1991) identifies an Old English cleft configuration o f the form bls/bAiT/HrT b e o n  n p  
r e l -c l a u s e . The Old English cleft data is extremely instructive, since, at this stage o f 
the language, all nouns are marked for gender. We therefore have an additional means 
with which to identify the structure o f these early cleft sentences. Tellingly, in Ball’s 
bis/bvET/HiT b e o n  NP REL-CLAUSE examples, the relative pronoun shows gender 
agreement with the initial pronoun (hit, poet or pis)  rather than with the postcopular NP. 
From this, we can conclude that these Old English cleft tokens require a determinative 
pronoun analysis, in which the relative clause restrictively modifies the subject pronoun.
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For example, in the Old English predicational pcet-cleft given here as (6 ), the 
neuter relative pronoun pcet agrees with the subject pronoun rather than with the 
masculine noun journey. Ball (1991: 59) notes that “The gender o f the relative pronoun 
suggests that [the initial] pcet is the head o f  the relative clause” . She therefore provides a 
determinative pronoun (extraposition-from-NP) analysis for this example.
(6 ) wiste his fingra  geweald on grames grapum. Pcet woes geocor sid
DEM-n.n.s was grievous joum ey-m . 
pcet se hearmscapa to Heorute ateah! {Beowulf, 764b-766)
REL-n.s. DEM-m.n.s despoiler to Heorot took (Matsunami 1961: 7)
‘[he] knew his fingers’ power to be in a hateful grip. That was a painful journey 
that the loathsome despoiler had made to Heorot.’ (Ball 1991: 35, 54)
Adopting Culicover and Rochemont’s (1990) account o f 20thC English extraposed 
relative clauses, Ball (1991: 63) claims that, in Old English predicational clefts, the 
relative clause is base-generated in an extraposed position adjoined to IP and is 
coindexed with the neuter subject pronoun {hit, pcet or pis).3 Ball provides present-day 
predicational //-clefts and demonstrative clefts with the same analysis. She concludes 
that the structure o f  the predicational //-cleft has remained relatively unchanged since 
Old English.
The same gender agreement patterns are found in Ball’s non-predicational 
bls/biCT/H lT BEON NP REL-CLAUSE tokens, such as the hit-cleft given here as (7). As is 
shown in M itchell’s (1985: 102) gloss, neuter pcet does not agree with either Petrus or 
cengel, both o f which are masculine. This leads both Mitchell (1985: 102) and Ball 
(1991: 67) to conclude that the initial pronoun hit is the antecedent to the relative clause.
3 However, Ball (1991:55) notes that the meaning o f (6) is not ‘that which the loathsome despoiler had 
made to Heorot was a painful journey’. As with present-day predicational clefts, the postcopular noun 
provides the hearer/reader with the required interpretation for the underspecified subject pronoun (see 
§5.2.2). The meaning o f (6) is therefore ‘the journey that the loathsome despoiler had made to Heorot was 
a painful journey'.
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(7) pa  cwcedon p a  geleafullan, ‘Nis hit na Petrus pcet peer cnucad, ac is
Not-is it-n. not Peter-m. REL-n. there knocks but is 
his cengel. ’ {ALlfric, Catholic Homilies, vol. I, 517-18.1)
his angel-m. (Mitchell 1985: 102)
‘Then the faithful said: It isn’t Peter who is knocking there, but his angel.’
(Ball 1991:39)
In this example, the faithful mistake St. Peter, who they believe to be in prison, for his 
angel; that is, they (wrongly) identify his angel as the one who is knocking there. I 
suggest that these non-predicational Old English /zfr-clefts represent early instances o f 
the specificational z7-cleft construction. Such examples provide unequivocal evidence 
that, from the very beginning, the specificational fr-cleft requires an extraposition-from- 
NP analysis, therefore supporting one o f the main claims o f this thesis.
The Old English cleft data therefore shows that the structure o f present-day 
specificational and predicational //-clefts (and demonstrative clefts) derives from a 
period o f the language when determinative pronouns were much more comm on . 4  
Originally then, the //-cleft inherited its structure from the then productive determinative 
pronoun construction, in which pronouns function as the antecedents to restrictive 
relative clauses. W hile the basic structure o f the //-cleft has remained unchanged, 
determinative pronouns are now largely restricted to proverbial expressions, such as ( 1 ) 
above. From this, we can conclude that although the modification o f  the initial it by the 
cleft clause is now a construction-specific property, it represents the entrenchment o f a 
schema which was at one time motivated by the language system.
However, this simple diachronic story is dependent upon an extraposition-from- 
NP analysis o f the present-day //-cleft. Ball (1991), who adopts an expletive analysis o f
4 Tellingly, restrictively modified pronouns could at one time serve as the definite NP predicate o f other 
types o f specificational sentence. For instance, in the following Middle English token, the pronoun he is 
modified by the adjacent relative clause, forming a definite description which is predicated o f the 
referential subject. In this example, the referent ye is identified as the one (or ‘he’) that killed Marhaus. 
This type o f reverse specificational sentence was later replaced by //¡-clefts introduced by the one.
(i) Truly, said Bleoberys, I  am ryght gladde ofyou, fo r  ye  are he that slewe Marhaus the knisht....
(1485 M alory’s Le Morte d ’Arthur (Cx), 217.2; cited in Ball 1991: 231)
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the specificational //--cleft, presents a very different account o f the diachronic data. In 
what follows, I outline Ball’s analysis and the reasoning behind it. I show that an 
expletive //-cleft analysis is unable to accommodate all o f  the diachronic facts. This 
leads Ball to put forward an unnecessarily complex and fundamentally flawed account 
o f the early //-cleft data. Again, this discussion provides support for the analysis o f 
specificational //-clefts argued for in this thesis and shows how my diachronic story 
improves on the existing literature.
From the outset, Ball assumes an expletive analysis o f the specificational //-cleft, 
in which the cleft pronoun is a dummy element and the cleft clause is a type o f headless 
restrictive relative. However, the Old English cleft data presents a problem for Ball since 
her expletive analysis cannot accommodate it. As shown above, the gender agreement 
pattern found in these tokens calls for an extraposition-ffom-NP account. Ball (1991: 39- 
40) comments that, given her expletive analysis o f the present-day specificational 17- 
cleft, “This is a surprising fact: if  these are true clefts, in which the focus is the logical 
antecedent o f the relative pronoun, we should expect gender agreement with the focus.” 
In order to get around this problem, Ball claims that the non-predicational /«//-cleft 
examples are not in fact early instances o f  the specificational //-cleft; instead, they make 
up an entirely different construction.
Ball attempts to substantiate this claim by invoking Higgins’ (1979) distinction 
between specificational and identificational copular sentences. For Higgins, examples 
such as ( 8 ) have two possible readings. On the specificational reading, the person Mary 
Gray is identified as matching the description the girl who helps us on Fridays. On the 
identificational reading, we are told the name (M ary Gray) o f the person referred to by 
the definite NP the girl who helps us on Fridays.
( 8 ) The girl who helps us on Fridays is M ary G r a y  (Higgins 1979: 265)
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We have seen that, in specificational NP be NP  sentences, the syntactic subject is a 
definite NP predicate and the postcopular NP is a referring expression (see §3.3 ) . 5  
However, for identificational copular sentences, Higgins (1979: 264) notes that the 
subject NP is a referring expression and the postcopular NP is ‘identificational’; in other 
words, it is a label or naming device. As I explained in §3.2.3, the category o f 
identificational copular sentences is not well-defined and Mikkelsen (2005) has argued 
that H iggins’ examples can be accommodated into the tripartite taxonomy of 
predicational, equative and specificational sentences . 6
Despite this, Ball sets up a categorial distinction between specificational and 
identificational meaning, arguing that her Old English non-predicational /»¿-clefts are 
actually identificational, rather than specificational, copular sentences. For example, she 
claims that in (7) above, “there is an otherwise established entity in the context [the one 
knocking at the door] which lacks only a name” (Ball 1991: 64). However, this cannot 
be right. In (7), what is at issue is not the name o f the referent (as Peter or his angel) but 
the referent itself. This example clearly conforms to our understanding o f specificational 
meaning as involving the identification o f the referent which uniquely matches the 
definite description. Indeed, Ball (1991: 6 6 ) herself acknowledges that the Old English 
/»7-clefts allow a specificational reading; she admits that “these tokens could also be 
read as specificational” and concludes that “There is a fine line between identification 
and specification” .
Tellingly, Ball only makes use o f the specificational/identificational distinction 
when discussing the Old English data. For subsequent periods in the history o f the it- 
cleft, Ball finds it difficult to implement this distinction as a means o f classification and 
consequently abandons it. She notes that “Specificational and identificational /¿-clefts 
are classed together here because o f  the difficulty o f reliably distinguishing 
them .. .W hile the distinct semantics o f  the predicational cleft continue to set it apart, the
5 However, for Higgins (1979), specificational sentences contain ‘superscriptional’ subjects and 
‘specificational’ complements. See §3.2.3 for a review o f Higgins’ proposal.
6 Assuming a tripartite taxonomy o f copular sentences, the identificational reading o f (8), involving a 
referential subject and a postcopular naming device, must, in fact, be predicational. Such sentences contain 
a referential subject and a predicative complement. On this account, the identificational reading o f (8) is 
an elliptical version o f the girl who helps us on Fridays is called Mary Gray.
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other two types are close both in interpretation and function” (Ball 1991: 220). This 
seriously undermines Ball’s claim that together predicational and identificational clefts 
form a separate construction, with a distinct structure, from the specificational //-cleft. It 
seems to me that if, as Ball suggests, there is a real distinction between specificational //- 
clefts, which require an expletive analysis, and identificational //-clefts, which require an 
extraposition-from-NP analysis, then Ball would make more o f an effort to separate the 
progress o f  these two very different constructions.
Ball’s inconsistent use o f the ill-defined distinction between specificational and 
identificational meaning is therefore, quite obviously, just a (very unsuccessful) means 
o f getting around the problem that her expletive analysis cannot accommodate the Old 
English data. It is only when the system o f  gender marking (and therefore gender 
agreement) breaks down that Ball can argue for an expletive analysis o f the 
specificational //-cleft examples. This leads Ball to argue that the origin o f the 
specificational //-cleft is an Early Middle English development. She provides the 
following example from The South English Legendary, which she argues is the first 
specificational /z//-cleft in the corpus.
(9) ‘A -bidez,’ quath f)is holie man: ‘ore louerd is guod and freo. 
j)e deuel it is t>at bringuth Jus w edur... ’
(1280-90, The South English Legendary, 63 (St. Edmund), 370) 
[As St. Edmund was preaching, it became overcast, a terrible wind began to 
blow, and it grew dark. People began to leave.] ‘Stay, said this holy man, our 
Lord is good and free. The devil it is that brings this w eather... ’ (Ball 1991: 158)
Rather than developing from the Old English “identificational” examples, Ball 
claims that the primary source construction for this new sentence type was the Old 
English NP BEON REL-CLAUSE configuration, an example o f which is given in (10) below. 
Such sentences can be translated as present-day //-clefts but, as Ball (1991: 51) notes, 
they are formally akin to reverse pseudoclefts, since the focal NP is the grammatical
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subject . 7  The only difference is that, in these tokens, the predicate complement is a 
headless relative ((the one) that glorifies me). In Old English, relative clauses without 
overt heads often occurred as the complement o f  beon (Ball 1991: 27).
(10) ...min feeder isp e  me wuldrad (ALlfric, Catholic Homilies, vol. II, 234.4)
.. .my father is that me glorifies
‘It is my father that glorifies m e’ (Ball 1991: 27)
Ball suggests that, during the Early Middle English period, some o f these examples 
acquired expletive subjects, resulting in the origin o f the specificational //-cleft. She 
claims that “the focused subject...becom es the predicate complement, and dummy hit 
appears in its place. The resulting structure is superficially similar to [the OE 
identificational hit-deft]  except that the complement is within the VP, and this hit is 
expletive” (Ball 1990: 6 8 ).
B all’s adoption o f the expletive account o f specificational //-clefts therefore has a 
significant effect on the way that she categorizes and analyses the historical data. It leads 
her to discount important Old English tokens and to provide an unnecessarily complex 
story for the origin o f  the specificational //-cleft. In contrast, the extraposition-from-NP 
analysis argued for in this thesis can accommodate all o f  the historical data and suggests 
a much more straightforward diachronic story. I have shown that the present-day //-cleft 
(both specificational and predicational subtypes) can be traced back to Old English. 
During this period, the //-cleft’s extraposition-firom-NP structure was motivated by the 
then productive determinative pronoun construction.
7.1.2 Why is the restrictive relative clause extraposed?
In the previous section, I showed that the //-cleft’s structure has remained relatively 
unchanged since Old English. O f particular note, is the fact that, from the very 
beginning, the restrictive relative clause in //-clefts is extraposed and is never found in a
7 In support o f this claim, Ball (1991: 27) notes that these tokens are often translations o f Latin 
pseudoclefts. For example, (10) is an English translation o f  the Latin original ...est Pater meus, qui 
glorificat me.
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position adjacent to the antecedent it. As I explained in §4.3, the fact that the cleft clause 
always follows the defied  constituent, rather than the initial it has been regarded by 
many as a valid argument against an extraposition-from-NP analysis (see for example 
Jespersen 1937: 84-85). However, in this section, I show that there is a perfectly 
reasonable, historical explanation for the //-cleft’s extraposed structure.
Since the particular //-cleft analysis argued for in this thesis is non-derivational, it 
does not require a non-extraposed source construction. Nevertheless, the question 
remains, w hy is the cleft clause never adjoined to the antecedent //? The Old English hit- 
clefts seem to provide us with a suitable answer. Although the extraposed position o f the 
restrictive relative is atypical in relation to the rest o f the present-day language system, 
relative clauses were often found sentence-finally in Old English. As Ball (1991: 60) 
notes, “it is commonly held that OE relative clauses originated as paratactic structures, 
which gradually became more integrated with the sentences to which they were 
attached” (see for example O ’Neil 1977). It seems then that this now idiosyncratic 
property o f  the //-cleft construction was at one time motivated by the general behaviour 
o f Old English relative clauses. Ball (1991: 60) comes to this same conclusion for the 
predicational //-cleft; she suggests that unlike other relative clauses, the cleft clause 
“never came together with its antecedent, but remained in fixed clause-final position.”
The obvious question then, is why didn’t changes to the wider language system 
have similar consequences for the //-cleft construction? One reason seems to be that 
while the extraposition o f the cleft clause is no longer motivated by highly general 
linguistic patterns, it is motivated by information structure principles, such as the 
tendency for heavy constituents to occur near the end o f the clause. Findings from 
Prince’s (1978: 8 8 6 ) corpus study suggest that, on average, “the presupposed string [the 
cleft clause] is nearly twice as long as the focused string” . This, accompanied by the fact 
that new or focal information is placed within the cognitively preferred clause-final 
position, makes the cleft structure well suited to linguistic generalizations brought about 
by processing demands.
In addition, prosodic factors may well provide another reason for the obligatory 
sentence-final position o f the cleft clause. As shown in example (4) above, the
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determinative it in noncleft constructions could be modified by an adjoining relative 
clause. However, in this case, the definite-like description is in the postcopular 
predicative position rather than in initial subject position. Tellingly, Ball (1991: 263) 
notes that “for whatever reason, it + relative clause is not attested in first position” . This 
suggests that the reason why the cleft clause cannot occur immediately after initial it is 
part o f  a more general phenomenon affecting the determinative pronoun. Bolinger
(1977) provides us with a possible explanation for this restriction, attributing it to the 
prosody o f  English. He notes that “It is normally stressless, but in initial position 
followed by an obligatory stressless that it would have to be stressed” (Bolinger 1977: 
76).
We can conclude then that while the extraposed position o f the cleft clause is 
atypical in relation to the present-day language system, this was not always the case. At 
earlier stages o f  English, the behaviour o f the cleft clause was consistent with that o f 
other restrictive relatives, which frequently occurred in sentence-final position. As the 
external structure o f relative clauses has changed, leading to more integration between 
the relative and its antecedent, the //-cleft has remained the same. Now, the extraposition 
o f  the cleft clause is motivated purely by information structure principles and/or 
prosodic factors.
However, although the extraposed relationship between the cleft clause and its 
antecedent is now specific to the //-cleft, the internal structure o f the cleft clause is 
nevertheless inherited from the restrictive relative construction. Again, this is supported 
by historical evidence. Ball (1994b) undertakes a comparative study o f the relative 
markers in NP-focus //-clefts and restrictive relative clauses. She finds that the cleft 
clause and other restrictive relatives have undergone parallel diachronic developments.
Focusing on clauses in which the gap functions as the subject o f the embedded 
verb, Ball shows that in both //-clefts and restrictive relatives, that is the preferred 
complementizer up until the 18th century, when there is a sharp increase in the use o f 
w/z-pronouns. However, Ball notes that while the pronoun which undergoes a rise in the 
18th century, it never achieves the same high frequency as who. Ball interprets this data 
as evidence o f a paradigmatic shift in the system o f relative markers (see also Ball
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1996). She notes that during the 17th century, who replaces personal which, leading to a 
distinction in the restrictive relative paradigm between personal and non-personal 
antecedents. This is followed by the assignment o f  that to the non-personal category. As 
a result o f  the decline in that with personal antecedents, who has become the dominant 
form for cleft clauses and restrictive relatives with personal subject antecedents, at least 
in standard written English. On the other hand, non-personal which remains in 
competition with that and so is not subject to the same rate o f  increase.
Ball argues that //-clefts and restrictive relative clauses undergo these same 
changes at roughly the same time and at the same rate. She notes that “the rate o f 
decrease in that with personal antecedents is not significantly different in clefts and 
restrictive relatives, a finding which supports the hypothesis that cleft complements and 
restrictive relative clauses share a syntactic structure” (Ball 1994b: 196). As a result, the 
historical evidence suggests that while the extraposition o f the cleft clause is reminiscent 
o f an earlier stage o f  the language, it is nevertheless a fully-fledged restrictive relative 
which inherits its internal structure from the more productive construction.
7.1.3 Why does the it-cleft display unusual agreement patterns?
We have seen then, that an extraposition-ffom-NP analysis o f  the //-cleft is supported by 
the historical data. On this account, the early //-cleft construction inherits from both the 
determinative pronoun construction and the OE paratactic restrictive relative clause 
construction. However, for many authors, the //-cleft’s number agreement patterns pose 
an inexorable problem for extraposition-from-NP analyses. Nevertheless, in § 4 .3 ,1 
argued that while number agreement does not behave in the way we expect given the 
type o f analysis argued for in this thesis, it can nevertheless be given an adequate 
explanation. In this section, I show how this particular pattern o f  agreement came about 
and provide historical evidence in support o f the explanation given in §4.3.
Assuming an extraposition-from-NP analysis o f //-clefts, the construction has an 
unusual pattern o f number agreement. While relative clauses typically agree with their 
nominal antecedents, the verb embedded in the cleft clause shows number agreement 
with the focal NP, rather than the initial it. For example, in (11), the subject pronoun and
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the matrix copula are marked as singular, while the focal NP (John and Sally) and the 
embedded verb (are) are both plural. So what is the history o f  this unusual number 
agreement pattern?
(11) It is John and Sally who are responsible
First, we need to look at the history o f  agreement in the matrix clause. According 
to Ball’s (1991) study, throughout Old English and well into Middle English, the matrix 
copula showed agreement in number with the focal NP. For example, the excerpt in (12) 
contains two //-clefts. In the first, the form o f  the copula is agrees with the singular 
referent your own spirit. However, in the second instance, the matrix verb and the 
postcopular NP are both marked as plural.
(12) ... when it is bin owe svirite pa t spekip pees iueles, or it ben bees oper iuel
spirites p a t speken hem in pee. (el 5th, A Tretis o f  Discrescyon o f
Spirites, 88.4)
‘.. .when it is your own spirit that speaks these evils, or it are these other evil 
spirits that speak them in you’ (Ball 1991: 286)
By the early 15th century, we begin to get the situation we have today, with the copular 
verb agreeing with the subject pronoun. Example (13), which is from a slightly later 
m anuscript o f  the same text, shows the more m odem  pattern. Here, the postcopular NP 
is plural but the matrix verb is in the singular form.
(13) ...or it is pees oper iuel spirites...(mid 15th, A Tretis o f  Discrescyon o f  Spirites)
‘.. .or it is these other evil spirits... (Ball 1991: 286)
So how do we account for the //-cleft’s early agreement pattern and what can it 
tell us about the present-day //-cleft? Once we relate this data to the synchronic language 
system o f the time, the matrix-clause agreement in (12) gains a simple explanation. As
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Ball (1991: 154) notes, during Old English and Early Middle English, the pronoun hit 
could be used with plural reference. For example in (14), hit (it) is used alongside ha 
(they) to refer to the plural referent, the clever and wise words.
(14) ... witti ant wise w[o]rdes hit weren j e f  ha neren fa lse ...
(1200-25 Seinte Katerine (B), 114)
‘...c lever and wise words they would be if  they weren’t false’ (Ball 1991: 154)
In (12) then, it is not just the focal NP that the matrix copula agrees with. Instead, 
number agreement is consistent across the whole configuration, including the subject 
pronoun it.
The early English data therefore shows that, at one time, the pronoun it was 
m aximally underspecified; that is, it could describe or refer to plural as well as singular 
individuals and to human as well as non-human referents (see example (5) above). The 
historical flexibility o f the pronoun it provides an explanation for some o f  the present- 
day //-cleft’s more idiosyncratic properties. For example, although the pronoun it in 
present-day English is restricted to denoting nonhuman, singular individuals, it is well- 
noted that the //-cleft permits both human and plural foci; that is, the discontinuous 
description headed by the initial it can describe (or be predicated of) plural and/or 
human referents. This suggests that while the cleft it is now morphologically singular, it 
is nevertheless reminiscent o f an earlier stage o f the language when the pronoun it was 
maximally underspecified. Undoubtedly, it is this property o f the initial it that enables 
the //-cleft to be so very productive. I come back to this issue in §8 .2 .
The diachronic data therefore supports an analysis o f the present-day //-cleft in 
which the initial it is semantically underspecified and, although formally marked as 
such, is not limited to describing nonhuman and singular referents. However, the fact 
remains that the cleft it is now m orphologically singular, with the agreeing matrix verb 
consistently occurring in the singular form. It should therefore follow that if  it is the 
antecedent to the cleft clause, then the embedded verb should show agreement with it.
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As shown in (11) above, this is not the case. So how do we explain this irregular 
agreement pattern?
On first appearances, the diachronic evidence does not seem overly helpful.
Ball’s (1991) data indicates that throughout the entire history o f  the //-cleft, the verb in 
the cleft clause agrees with the focal NP, rather than with the initial it. However, there is 
an interesting exception to this rule which, along with Ball’s account o f it, is especially 
relevant both to the particular //-cleft analysis argued for in this thesis and the 
explanation o f num ber agreement given in §4.3. Ball identifies seven //-cleft examples 
with plural foci within her Late Middle English corpus. For all but one o f these tokens, 
the verb in the cleft clause agrees with the focal NP. The exception to the rule is given 
here as (15). In this example, the pronoun ye is formally plural but the embedded verb 
hath is marked as singular.
(15) Truly, syre, she sayd, I  trowe hit be not y e  that hath slavne my husband, fo r  he 
that dyd that dede is sore wounded, and  he is neuer lyckly to recouer, that shal I  
ensure hym. (1485 M alory’s Le Morte d ‘Arthur (Cx), 152.9)
‘...i t  is not you that has slain m y husband ...’ (Ball 1991:307)
Ball explains this agreement pattern in the following way. She notes that while the 
pronoun ye is formally plural, in this example, it has singular reference. As a result, she 
concludes that “the embedded verb agrees in number with the referent o f  ye” (Ball 1991: 
307).
This suggests that, rather than relying on formal, morphosyntactic agreement 
between the embedded verb and the focal NP, number agreement in //-clefts can be 
governed by semantic factors. This supports the semantic explanation for number 
agreement given in §4.3. Here, I argued that, as a collective entity, the discontinuous 
description in specificational //-clefts with plural foci has two possible 
conceptualizations: on the one hand, it denotes a singular set, while on the other, it 
denotes the plural members o f this set. W ith this analysis in place, number agreement in 
specificational //-clefts works as follows: while the matrix copula agrees with the subject
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as denoting a singular set, the verb embedded in the cleft clause agrees with the 
membership (singular or plural) o f the described set.
In truth then, it is not really the focal NP with which the embedded verb shows 
agreement, but the referent(s) that make(s) up the membership o f the set described by 
the discontinuous definite description. Unlike for noun phrases introduced by a 
determiner-noun combination, such as the one or the ones, the cleft it is underspecified 
for num ber (that is, it can describe a set with one or more members). As a result, the 
membership o f  the set is specified by the postcopular expression. It is this that gives the 
impression o f  morphosyntactic agreement between the focal NP and the embedded verb.
Therefore, from the historical evidence, it seems that agreement is dependent 
upon the num ber o f  referents rather than the morphosyntactic marking o f  either the 
pronoun it or the focal NP. From this it follows that, as a semantic phenomenon, number 
agreement in zY-clefts does not present an inexorable obstacle for extraposition-from-NP 
accounts . 8
8 In this section, I have used historical evidence to show that number agreement does not necessarily pose 
a problem for the extraposition-from-NP analysis argued for in this thesis. However, at first sight, the 
history o f person agreement in ¿Z-clefts seems to argue in favour o f an expletive account. As I explained in 
§4.3, person agreement in the present-day cleft supports an extraposition-from-NP account, since, for most 
speakers, the focal NP is in the objective case and the embedded verb is consistently 3rd person. However, 
when non-3rd person foci first appeared in the LME period, these pronouns were always nominative and 
the verb embedded in the cleft clause could sometimes show person agreement with the clefted constituent 
(Ball 1991: 308-309). For example, in (i), the focal NP is nominative and the embedded verb haue agrees 
with the first person pronoun I.
(i) Wherefore it is onely I  that haue offenced. (1531 Elyot Gouemour II, 140)
(Ryden 1966: 316; cited in Ball 1991: 309)
The earlier agreement pattern seems to provide evidence in favour o f an expletive analysis, in which the 
focal NP functions as the underlying subject to the verb embedded in the cleft clause. However, there is 
additional evidence which goes against this hypothesis. For one thing, during this same period, the 
postcopular referring expression in simple copular sentences was also in the nominative case (Ball 1991: 
14-15). In such sentences, it is not possible to construe the focal NP as the subject o f some additional 
clause. Furthermore, Ball (1991: 310) notes that lack o f person agreement was very common between 
relative clauses and their determinative pronoun heads (see also Ball 1999). She provides the following 
example o f a reverse pseudocleft with a determinative pronoun functioning as the head o f the predicative 
NP. Here, the embedded verb shows person agreement with the subject o f the matrix clause rather than 
with the 3rd person determinative pronoun he.
(ii) Y am  he that haue svnned, and Y dide wickidli... (al420 W ycliffiteLater Version (A), 24.17)
‘I am the one that have sinned, and I acted wickedly... ’ (Ball 1991: 311; Ball 1999)
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7.1.4 Summary and interim conclusions
The historical data offers a new data set with which to readdress the questions left 
unresolved from analysing present-day //-cleft examples. Over the last three sections, I 
have shown that, once we examine the //-cleft in relation to the language system of 
earlier periods o f  English, many o f its construction-specific structural properties are 
shown to have been, at one time, inherited from more general linguistic patterns. In 
particular, the restrictive modification o f the pronoun it, the extraposition o f the relative 
clause and the //-cleft’s number agreement patterns were originally motivated by more 
schematic constructions including the determinative pronoun construction, the restrictive 
relative clause construction and the semantically underspecified pronoun it. While these 
higher-order constructions have since fallen out o f productive use (such as the 
determinative pronoun construction) or have undergone significant changes (such as the 
external syntax o f restrictive relatives and the restriction o f  it to non-human, singular 
individuals) their influence has become entrenched within the //-cleft schema. The 
historical evidence therefore provides internal motivation (via inheritance) for properties 
which are specific to an extraposition-from-NP account o f  //-clefts. This supports the //- 
cleft analysis argued for in this thesis and, in turn, confirms its explicatory merits.
7.2 The it-cleft and constructional change
In § 7 .1 ,1 made use o f historical evidence to identify inheritance relations which are no 
longer productive in the constructional hierarchy. The evidence suggests that although 
the structured inventory o f the language has changed, the //-cleft’s configuration has 
been largely unaffected. W hile §7.1 therefore focuses on properties that have become 
entrenched within the //-cleft schema, in this section I investigate the ways in which the 
(specificational) //-cleft construction has developed and changed over time.
As I explained in §5.3 and §5.4, the range o f possible //-cleft foci and the ability 
for new information to be expressed in the relative clause are construction-specific 
properties which are not shared by other types o f specificational copular sentence. The
The earlier agreement pattern in the /7-cleft is therefore indicative o f  larger generalizations affecting 
copular constructions and determinative pronouns. As a result, this historical data does not necessarily 
support an expletive analysis o f /7-clefts.
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question o f  how the //-cleft has acquired these idiosyncratic properties is the topic o f  this 
section. As part o f her investigation into the historical development o f  the //-cleft, Ball 
(1991) finds that the most common type o f  //-cleft in present-day English (those with 
nominal focal elements and given information in the relative clause) are also the oldest, 
and that //-clefts with non-NP focal elements and //-clefts which permit new information 
in the relative clause are later developments, having their origins in the Late Middle 
English period.
In what follows, I present a number o f problems with Ball’s interpretation o f this 
data and go on to reexamine the development if  the //-cleft from the perspective o f 
grammaticalization theory. I show that the gradual expansion o f the //-cleft schema 
(involving the accommodation o f  a wider range o f  focal elements and new information 
in the cleft clause) is consistent with the unidirectional changes typical o f ‘grammatical 
constructionalization’. I undertake this diachronic investigation in §7.2.2 after providing 
some background information on the relatively new field o f diachronic construction 
grammar and its integration with grammaticalization theory in §7.2.1 , 9
7.2.1 Construction grammar and grammaticalization
Grammaticalization is m ost commonly defined as the change through which lexical 
items become grammatical items and already grammatical items go on to become more 
grammatical. However, this atomistic view has been recently revised to accommodate 
the current understanding that changes to the grammaticalizing element are largely 
dependent upon a particular linguistic context. For example, Traugott (2003: 645) 
defines grammaticalization as the “process whereby lexical material in highly 
constrained pragmatic and morphosyntactic contexts is assigned grammatical function, 
and once grammatical, is assigned increasingly grammatical, operator-like function” . 
W hile this characterization o f  the grammaticalization process is widely accepted, it 
nevertheless raises some important theoretical questions. I f  changes to the 
grammaticalizing element are governed by a particular linguistic context then how has
9 The discussion in §7.2.1 has formed the basis for parts o f a chapter written for The Oxford handbook o f  
grammaticalization (see Gisborne and Patten forthcoming).
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this context (or ‘construction’) changed? What is the proper unit o f study in 
grammaticalization? Is it the grammaticalizing element or the surrounding construction?
In response to such questions, a handful o f grammaticalization theorists have 
redefined grammaticalization as a process affecting constructions (that is, multiword 
linguistic patterns) rather than individual lexical items. For example, Himmelmann 
(2004: 31) argues that “the unit to which grammaticization properly applies are 
constructions, not isolated lexical items” (italic original); see also Bybee (2003). 
Himmelmann (2004: 32) defines grammaticalization as “a process o f context-expansion” 
whereby the construction allows a wider range o f components to enter into it (called 
“host-class expansion”) and occurs in a broader variety o f larger syntactic and/or 
semantic and pragmatic contexts. However, the notion o f the grammaticalizing lexical 
item is still important to this definition; Himmelmann (2004: 32-33) notes that 
“grammaticization applies only to the context expansion o f  constructions which include 
at least one grammaticizing element” .
Despite appearances then, Him melm ann’s (2004) definition o f 
grammaticalization is still centred on an atomic grammaticalizing element, but brings 
the surrounding context into view as well. Himmelmann considers the 
grammaticalization o f the individual element to be dependent upon the schematicity (or 
generality) o f  the surrounding construction. As a result o f  context-expansion, the fixed 
grammaticalizing element occurs alongside “a growing class o f items which enter into 
this construction” and consequently becomes “the increasingly general construction 
m arker” (Himmelmann 2004: 38). From this perspective, traditional diagnostics o f 
grammaticalization, including semantic bleaching, phonological erosion and so on, are 
treated as epiphenomena.
Such issues in grammaticalization theory are especially topical when considered 
in relation to construction grammar. W ithin this framework, the construction (defined 
here as a form-meaning pair) is understood to be the basic (and in fact, the only) unit o f 
linguistic knowledge. From this, it follows that the framework calls for a construction- 
based model o f language change. Relevant questions to the field o f diachronic 
construction grammar include: how do new constructions emerge? How do existing
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constructions change? And how does the organization o f the constructional taxonomy 
change? In what follows, I examine how a construction-based model interrelates with 
the preexisting accounts o f  language change developed within grammaticalization 
theory.
W ith the rising interest in diachronic construction grammar “there have been 
more and more attempts to explore the relationship between patterns o f constructional 
change, and existing accounts o f  grammaticalization” (Trousdale 2008c). Although 
grammaticalization theory traditionally focuses on changes to atomic lexical items, in 
construction grammar, lexical items are also classed as constructions; that is, they are 
symbolic units o f form and meaning. From this, it follows that changes which apply to 
substantive, simple constructions should also affect more schematic and complex 
constructions. I f  lexical items can grammaticalize, larger, less substantive constructions 
should also be subject to grammaticalization, not only as the surrounding context for a 
grammaticalizing morpheme, but as the actual grammaticalizing element (Trousdale 
2008b: 33-34).
However, if  we accept a constructional model o f language structure, then our 
definition o f grammaticalization must change. For one thing, construction grammar does 
not recognize a distinction between the lexicon and the grammar. W ithin this 
framework, all units o f grammatical knowledge, including lexical items, are given a 
unified representation as constructions and are located within the network that represents 
a speaker’s grammar. This begs the question then, given the organization o f  the 
constructional taxonomy, what does it mean to say that a construction becomes more 
lexical or more grammatical? And how can we represent these directional changes?
According to Traugott (2007), Trousdale (2008b) and Fried (2008), the 
hierarchical network o f  constructions provides a useful means o f identifying and 
accounting for directional changes. Within this network, specific linguistic patterns 
inherit properties from more basic constructions. The grammaticalization o f 
constructions (or ‘grammatical constructionalization’) originates in language use with 
actually occurring utterances. As new tokens emerge, the speaker generalizes over these 
instances (or constructs) to create a new level o f abstraction. This in turn can have
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repercussions higher up in the taxonomy as existing schemas become more abstract in 
order to accommodate (or sanction) these new lower-level constructions (Trousdale 
2008b: 55).
W ithin the framework o f construction grammar, grammaticalization is therefore 
a process o f  schematization, in which the construction becomes a more abstract, higher- 
level category and its internal composition becomes less fixed. On this account, the cline 
from lexical to grammatical status is re-envisaged as a hierarchy from more substantive 
to more schematic constructions. As Trousdale (2008a: 170-171) comments, “The more 
schematic the construction, the more productive it will be (thus such constructions 
become aligned with what is usually called ‘syntax’ and ‘productive m orphology’); the 
more substantive the construction, the less productive it will be (i.e. it will become more 
associated with the ‘unproductive morphology’ and the ‘lexicon ’ ) ” . 1 0
The construction grammar model o f language structure therefore offers a new 
way o f thinking about language change. However, in many ways, this new approach 
shares many o f the same assumptions as, and incorporates many o f the findings of, 
grammaticalization theory. For instance, a constructional approach to language structure 
assumes a usage-based model o f language change (see chapter 2). In this model, 
language change originates in language use and proceeds in incremental stages, 
following a directional pathway. As noted above, grammatical constructionalization is 
initiated in the actual utterances that speaker’s produce, rather than in the abstractions 
developed within the speaker’s mind. The change then proceeds upwards throughout the 
constructional hierarchy, as speakers inductively generalize over instances to form 
schemas, leading to the creation o f new constructions and the reconfiguration o f existing
10 In addition to becoming increasingly schematic and productive, Traugott (2007) and Trousdale (2008a, 
b) suggest that as a construction grammaticalizes, it also becomes less compositional. For these authors, 
‘compositionality’ refers to the extent to which the construction’s meaning is predictable from the 
meanings associated with its component parts. However, as I explained in §2.5 and §6.2.4, an important 
advantage to the it-cleft analysis argued for in this thesis is that it is ‘compositional’ in the sense that the 
construction’s meaning can be broken down and attributed to its component parts. As a result, in this 
thesis, I prefer to talk about the outcome o f grammatical constructionalization as involving the 
development o f construction-specific meaning and mismatched correspondences, rather than a loss of 
compositionality. This practice actually allows us to be more precise about the exact nature of 
constructional change in the h-cleft’s development.
250
ones. In this way, constructional change is both gradual (proceeding in incremental 
steps) and directional.
Construction grammar as a theoretical framework is therefore able to intersect 
with and work alongside theories o f language change. This represents an important 
advantage over parameter-based theories o f grammar, such as minimalism. For example, 
while Roberts and Roussou (2003) attempt to accommodate the findings o f 
grammaticalization theory into a minimalist account o f syntactic change, they 
nevertheless acknowledge that an account based upon parameter setting is difficult to 
reconcile with the empirical evidence for pathways o f change.
The Principles and Parameters theory o f grammar assumes that language change 
happens across generations, during the acquisition process. Once the speaker has 
acquired their language (through param eter setting) their core grammar is fixed and is 
not susceptible to change. However, a child may acquire a different grammar from their 
parents depending upon their linguistic input. The parameter setting account therefore 
assumes that language change is both abrupt and random (see Lightfoot 1979, 1999). 
However, the diachronic evidence suggests otherwise. As Roberts and Roussou (2003:
4) comment, “the phenomena o f grammaticalization provide ample evidence o f  just such 
pathways or tendencies, and thus syntactic change must -  at the very least at the 
descriptive level -  be in a significant sense non-random.”
The basic assumptions o f  the P&P framework are therefore at odds with the 
findings o f  grammaticalization theory. As a result, while Roberts and Roussou (2004) 
attempt to reconcile their model o f  language change with the empirical evidence, 
proposing a theory o f  markedness which creates “basins o f attraction” within the 
param eter space, their effort focuses on how they can make grammaticalization fit into 
minimalist theory rather than how their theory o f  grammar might be o f use to those 
working on grammaticalization. The construction grammar framework, on the other 
hand, offers a new perspective from which to view grammaticalization changes while 
retaining the fundamental principles upon which the diachronic theory is based. For 
instance, according to Trousdale (2008c), a constructional approach allows us to capture
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generalizations which are not apparent from the traditional atomistic view o f  the 
grammaticalization process. He provides the following example o f the English modals.
Viewed from the perspective o f the atomic lexical items, the English modals are 
the product o f individual changes which conform to the well-established 
grammaticalization cline: lexical verb > modal verb. However, W arner (1993) claims 
that this development was far from straightforward. He finds that, during the transition 
from Old to Middle English, the modals actually developed more verb-like properties 
(such as the development o f  new present tense forms). As Trousdale (2008c) comments, 
W arner’s (1993) findings therefore seem to contradict the unidirectionality hypothesis.
In contrast, a constructional approach treats the grammaticalization o f  each verb 
as the creation o f a new construction. As more and more verbs develop modal uses, a 
new overarching abstraction (the modal construction) emerges. As the modal category 
expands, sanctioning new subtypes, this in turn has implications for the higher-order 
auxiliary construction, which becomes a more basic and distinctive category (see 
W arner 1993 and Hudson 1997 on the “strengthening” o f the auxiliary and modal 
categories). On this account, unidirectionality (which is understood here as relating to 
the creation and reconfiguration o f constructions within a network) is preserved; 
although individual items may have acquired more verb-like characteristics, the modal 
and auxiliary constructions undoubtedly became more schematic and productive over 
time. As Trousdale (2008c) notes, while “the standard conceptualization o f the cline” is 
itself a generalization, it focuses on the development o f the atomic lexical item, and so 
“fails to consider the larger constructional changes within which such micro-changes are 
embedded”.
An additional advantage to the constructional approach is that it allows us to be 
more precise about what we mean by the terms “more lexical” or “more grammatical” . 
Grammaticalization theorists often find it difficult to draw a sharp line between items 
that are properly in the lexicon and items that are located in the grammar (Himmelmann 
2004: 25). Indeed, the very concept o f  grammaticalization as a change which makes 
lexical items more grammatical argues against a theory o f language structure which 
rigidly separates the lexicon from the grammar. In construction grammar, we have the
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natural extension o f  this idea: grammatical constructions (as units o f  form and meaning) 
have the same status as lexical items, both o f which are incorporated into the 
hierarchical network which makes up a speaker’s knowledge o f their language. Within 
the hierarchical taxonomy o f  constructions, “more lexical” and “more grammatical” are 
measured in degrees o f  productivity and schematicity. This more accurately corresponds 
with the notion that change is gradual and directional, progressing in incremental stages 
along a continuum.
Therefore, once we examine grammaticalization changes in relation to the 
constructional taxonomy, the process is reinterpreted as ‘schematization’ or ‘expansion’. 
In this way, the constructional model o f change overlaps considerably with the accounts 
o f  grammaticalization provided by Bybee (2003) and Himmelmann (2004). The question 
o f  whether grammaticalization theory should be entirely subsumed by a constructional 
model o f change or w hether the term ‘grammaticalization’ should be reserved for 
changes affecting only atomic elements remains an open issue . 11 Nevertheless, what is 
clear is that there is a relationship (o f some sort) between constructional changes and 
traditional grammaticalization phenomena.
I return to this issue in chapter 8 . In the next section, §7 .2 .2 ,1 show that the 
gradual emergence o f  new subtypes o f  //-cleft conforms to the expected pattern for 
grammatical constructionalization. In § 8 .1 ,1 identify well-known diagnostics for 
grammaticalization in these changes and ask what the diachronic development o f  the //- 
cleft can tell us about the nature o f  constructional change and its relationship to 
grammaticalization.
7.2.2 A diachronic investigation of non-NP it-clefts and IP it-clefts
As I noted above, Ball (1991, 1994a) finds that //-clefts with non-NP foci and zY-clefts 
with new information in the cleft clause have their origins in the Late Middle English 
period. Ball speculates that this development involved a series o f mergers between
11 For example, Noel (2007) argues that while the processes o f schematization (or constructionalization) 
and grammaticalization often intersect, they should nevertheless be treated as separate developments. He 
claims that, while the schematization o f larger constructions often leads to the grammaticalization of 
simple atomic elements, these are two different types o f change.
253
multiple configurations including the existing NP-focus /7-cleft, an Old English 
impersonal construction and the reverse pseudocleft. In this section, I identify a number 
o f  problems with Ball’s interpretation o f  the diachronic data. I show that Ball’s expletive 
account o f  the present-day //-cleft leads her to select an unnecessarily complex and 
implausible analysis over an intuitively simple one. Using data from the Penn Parsed 
Corpora o f Historical English, I reexamine the development o f  the //-cleft as a 
straightforward example o f grammatical constructionalization. Non-NP //-clefts and 
informative-presupposition (IP) //-clefts are shown to originate by extension from 
existing //-cleft constructs, overriding more general patterns o f correspondence. The 
upshot is that the overarching specificational //-cleft construction becomes increasingly 
schematic and productive over time.
The section is structured as follows. In §7.2 .2 .1 ,1 present and criticize B all’s 
account o f  the development o f //-clefts with non-NP foci before providing my own 
evidence for a grammatical constructionalization story in §7.2.2.2. In §7 .2 .2 .3 ,1 discuss 
Ball’s account o f the development o f the informative-presupposition //-cleft before
• 19outlining m y own analysis o f the corpus data in §7.2.2.4.
7.2.2.1 Ball (1991, 1994a) and the AdvP/PP it-cleft
Ball (1991, 1994a) treats //-clefts with prepositional phrase and adverb phrase foci 
together, as making up a construction (the AdvP/PP //-cleft) which is separate from the 
NP-focus //-cleft. She suggests that this new kind o f //-cleft evolved from an Old English 
sentence-type with beon/wesan, which is traditionally classified as an impersonal 
construction. Ball notes that these impersonals could sometimes occur with adjuncts; for 
instance, in (16), the string not long afterward  is not an obligatory component o f  the 
sentence. Such examples show a superficial similarity to m odem  day //-clefts with 
adverb phrase and prepositional phrase focal elements, which often express relations 
such as time or place, as in (17).
12 Large parts o f  the material in §7.2.2 are to appear in Patten (in press).
254
(16) Was hyt nat long aftyrward,
He fyll yn a sykenes hard. (cl400 , Mannyng, HS(B), 5459)
‘Not long after that, he fell into a grave sickness’ (Ball 1994a: 612)
(17) A: How long has he been feeling this way?
B: Well, he lost his job six months ago and it was shortly after that that we
noticed a distinct change in his temperament.
However, despite their apparent similarity, these impersonal examples are not it- 
clefts. In the impersonal construction, the verb is not the copular be that we find in cleft 
sentences; instead it has a full meaning, which can be glossed as something like 
‘happen’ or ‘come to pass’ (Ball 1994a: 611). So, for example, the meaning o f B all’s 
example presented here as (16), is something like ‘Not long after, it happened that he 
fell into a grave sickness’. That Late Middle English examples such as (16) are 
impersonals and not clefts is supported by the fact that they have variants with other 
happen-class verbs, such as fa llen . For example, (18) can be glossed as ‘At the end o f 
twelve months, it befell that his companions went to the m ountain’.
(18) Fyl hyt at Jje twelue monej} ende,
Hys felaus to J)e mounteyne gun wende, (cl400, Mannyng, HS(B), 10765)
‘At the end o f  twelve months, his companions went to the m ountain’
(Ball 1994a: 612)
Ball recognizes that these impersonals do not require a cleft analysis, but 
suggests that during the Late Middle English period they underwent a partial merger 
with the existing NP-focus /7-cleft, resulting in a new and separate construction, the 
AdvP/PP /7-cleft. At this point, we begin to get examples with non-NP focal elements 
which are clearly clefts rather than impersonals, such as (19).
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(19) O f hym is all, for he is creatour,
Be hym it is J)at all Jung is susteyned,
In hym is all jnng kyndely conteyned. (el5 th , Walton tr., Bo, 4.preface.2.5)
‘Everything is from him, for he is creator; it is by him that all things are
sustained; all things are naturally contained in him .’
(Ball 1994a: 613; my translation)
In support o f a cleft analysis for this example, Ball (1994a: 613) notes that the 
prepositional phrase by him  is not quite as optional as the adjuncts found in impersonals. 
She argues that if  we remove this element, the remaining sentence in (20) does not really 
express a well formed proposition. The reason for this is that in (19), the prepositional 
phrase focal element is much more important to the understanding o f  the sentence, since 
it expresses agency rather than time or location.
(20) ??All things are sustained (Ball 1994a: 613)
Ball’s (1991, 1994a) explanation o f  how the AdvP/PP /7-cleft originated is not 
unreasonable, since, as we have seen, the impersonal construction shows a strong 
superficial similarity to the z7-cleft. However, a much more straightforward hypothesis is 
that /7-clefts with non-nominal foci simply represent an extension o f the existing NP- 
focus z7-cleft and were not directly influenced by the Late Middle English impersonals. 
Nevertheless, as a result o f  her particular assumptions about the present day zY-cleft 
construction, Ball does not even consider this as a possibility.
Although Ball’s (1991, 1994a) focus is exclusively diachronic, she nevertheless 
subscribes to a particular synchronic account o f the present-day z7-cleft. As I explained 
in §7.1.1, Ball assumes an expletive analysis, in which the focal element is interpreted in 
relation to the gap in the cleft clause and the constituents it and be are semantically 
empty. For Ball (1994a: 605) then, zY-clefits represent information-structure variants of, 
but are nevertheless equivalent in meaning to, their corresponding noncopular 
counterparts.
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(21) It was [[the therapist]; [th a t ; killed her]]
(22) The therapist killed her
[NP-focus //-cleft] 
[canonical counterpart]
Ball analyses the cleft clause in NP-focus //-clefts as a restrictive relative . 1 3  
However, for //-clefts with non-nominal foci, Ball (1994a: 605) claims that “there is 
little support for a restrictive relative analysis o f the subordinate clause” . Ball follows 
Delin (1989) in suggesting that these examples contain a “sentential complement” rather 
than a relative clause. This analysis is supported by the fact that the that-clause in non- 
NP //-clefts often expresses a complete sentence, without a perceptible gap, as in (23). 
From this, it follows that the present day //-cleft is not a unified construction for Ball and 
that //-clefts with non-nominal focal elements make up a separate construction from the 
NP-focus //-cleft.
(23) It’s in December that she’s coming [PP-focus //-cleft]
By adopting this synchronic perspective, Ball is forced to find a historical 
explanation for examples with non-NP focal elements that goes beyond the simple 
extension o f a single //-cleft construction. By incorporating impersonals into her 
analysis, Ball can argue that adverb phrase and prepositional phrase focus //-clefts were, 
from the very beginning, a separate construction. Since impersonals have the function o f 
presenting a complete sentence, with or without an optional adjunct, this can explain 
why the //za/-clause o f  non-NP focus //-clefts should be analysed as a sentential 
complement rather than as a relative clause.
B all’s historical explanation is therefore in some way dependent upon, or is at 
least motivated by, a particular synchronic analysis. However, a more important 
criticism is that Ball’s account o f the development o f the AdvP/PP //-cleft also suffers
13 However, as Ball (1994a: 640f) observes, “A relative clause analysis for the complement o f the NP- 
focus it-cleft is not imcontroversial” on an expletive account, since the focal NP in z't-clefts can be a proper 
noun or pronoun, elements which cannot normally be modified by a restrictive relative clause (see §4.1.3). 
For this reason, Ball (1977, 1991) claims that while the cleft clause is structured internally like a 
restrictive relative, it is a “headless relative” which does not modify its immediate antecedent (see §5.2.1 
and §7.1.1).
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from a lack o f  plausibility. A problem with Ball’s story is that it is not immediately clear 
why the impersonal construction and the Late Middle English //-cleft would merge in the 
first place. It is true that these impersonals show a superficial similarity to modem day 
adverbial and prepositional clefts. However, before this particular type o f  //-cleft existed, 
it is difficult to see what the two constructions share.
The impersonal construction and the NP-focus //-cleft are very different, both in 
terms o f structure and meaning. In the superficial relationship that Ball exploits, the 
focal noun phrase o f the //-cleft corresponds to the adjunct in the impersonal examples. 
However, these adjuncts are made up o f non-nominal word classes. Furthermore, they 
are purely optional, are not focal elements, and indeed have very little bearing on the 
sentence. As indicated above, although both constructions involve forms o f be, that 
found in impersonals is not the copula o f  cleft sentences, but is a verb o f full meaning. 
Likewise, the sentence-final relative clause o f  the NP-focus //-cleft, containing a gap, is 
structurally distinct from the syntactically complete sentential component present in the 
impersonal constmction.
These elements also differ in information status. The relative clause o f all types 
o f  //-cleft is presupposed and, for NP //-clefts in the pre-modem period in particular, is 
largely restricted to expressing given information. In contrast, the sentential component 
in impersonals is not presupposed and in fact makes up the main informational content 
o f the construction. These two sentence types therefore differ in function: while clefts 
are well known for packaging information in a marked way, impersonals represent a 
neutral way o f  presenting information. Consequently, for Ball, the only similarity that 
NP-focus //-clefts share in terms o f function with impersonals, is an expletive it. 
However, this property o f  clefts is peculiar to the particular present day analysis that 
Ball subscribes to. Since I have argued against an expletive analysis for //-clefts 
throughout this thesis, for me, //-clefts and impersonals have even less in common.
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1 .2 2 .2  A constructionalization story for the development of non-NP it-clefts
In contrast to Ball, I do not assume that m odem  day //-clefts with non-nominal foci 
make up a separate constmction from those with noun phrases in the postcopular 
position. Rather than relating //-clefts to simple noncopular sentences, I assume that 17- 
clefts correspond closely to other specificational copular constructions. This has led me 
to argue in favour o f  an extraposition-ffom-NP analysis o f //-clefts. As I explained in 
§4.1.3 and §5.3, once we analyse the initial it as the antecedent to the cleft clause, there 
is no problem with incorporating a relative clause structure into clefts with focal 
elements that resist restrictive modification in other constmctions. Regardless o f whether 
there is a perceptible gap in the relative clause or not, all types o f //-cleft can be analysed 
in the same way. For instance, the prepositional phrase focus //-cleft in (24) is 
interpreted as containing a defmite-like description, akin to that in the specificational NP  
be N P  sentence given in (25).14 From this, it follows that all //-clefts, regardless o f focus 
category, form part o f a single construction.
(24) [It] is in December [that she’s coming] [PP-focus //-cleft]
(25) [The time/date [that she’s coming]] is in December [NP be NP  sentence ]
This unified account o f  the present-day //-cleft supports a historical analysis 
whereby non-nominal focal elements were gradually accommodated into the //-cleft 
constm ction via coercion. I provide evidence for this grammatical constructionalization 
story using data from the Late Middle English texts in the Penn-Helsinki Parsed Corpus 
o f  Middle English second edition (PPCME2) and from the complete Penn-Helsinki 
Parsed Corpus o f Early M odem English (PPCEME ) . 1 5  Frequency counts o f  //-clefts with 
different categories o f focal element are given in Table 7.1. The data is separated into 
time periods recognized by the Penn-Helsinki Parsed Corpus which rely on composition
14 The example in (25) has both a specificational reading, such that the time is/equals in December, and a 
predicational reading, such that the time is located in December. The specificational reading is what is 
relevant here.
15 The data was retrieved by searching for the syntactically annotated it-cleft structure using the 
CorpusSearch 2 program. See § 1.5 for information regarding the size and makeup o f the corpora.
259
dates (where known ) . 1 6  This table indicates both raw numbers and frequencies 
normalized to a corpus o f 500000 words (shown in parentheses). The numbers given 
here are quite conservative; I have only included clear cases o f  specificational /7-clefts. 
For example, predicational clefts, existential sentences and instances which prefer an 
impersonal reading are not included in these frequency counts . 1 7  These examples require 
a separate analysis . 1 8
16 The PPCEME is separated into 3 time periods (E l, E2 and E3), which are represented in Table 7.1. For 
the PPCME2, the corpus is divided into subcorpora indicating both composition and manuscript date. In 
Table 7 .1 ,1 conflate these subcorpora to indicate only the time o f composition. However, while for the 
PPCME2 directory, the period M2 ranges from 1250-1350,1 only include texts during the LME period 
from 1300-1350.
17 Existential sentences at this time could occur with it as well as there. For instance, the rhetorical 
question below asks what is there (or what exists) that a man can do to another man which cannot be 
done, in turn, to him. The expected answer to this question is o f course nothing. The follow-up sentence 
gives an example o f this generalization by reminding us that Busiris, who frequently killed his guests, was 
in turn killed by one o f his guests -  Hercules.
(i) To go further, what is it that any many may do to another, which another may not do again to 
him? We are told that it was the Custom o f Busiris to kill his Guests, and himself at last was 
killed by Hercules his Guest. (Preston’s Boetius (Boethpr), 1965)
While such sentences are superficially similar to specificational ¿/-clefts, they are pragmatically distinct. 
Existential sentences question rather than presuppose the existence o f the entity described in the that- 
clause (Ball 1991: 269). Consequently, I have excluded these tokens from my specificational //-cleft data­
set.
18 In addition, I have omitted eleven tokens introduced by the pattern I  it am from the PPCME2 search 
results. Ten o f these, shown below, are from a single passage o f the same text.
(i) .. .ofte tymes oure lorde Ihesu sayde to me, “I it am that is hiaste. I it am that Jjou luffes. I it am
that thowe lykes. I it am that ¡jowe serves. I it am {rat Jjou langes. I it am that fow e desyres. I it 
am that thowe menes. I it am fa t is alle. I it am that haly kyrke preches the and teches the. I it am 
that schewed me are to the”. (Julian o f Norwich’s Revelations o f Divine Love, cl450)
‘.. .often times our lord Jesus said to me, “I am the one that is the highest. I am the one that you 
love. I am the one that you like. I am the one that you serve. I am the one that you long (for). I am 
the one that you desire. I am the one to whom your attention is directed. I am the one that is all. I 
am the one that holy church preaches to you and teaches you. I am the one that showed myself to 
you before.’”
Although these tokens look like focus-first specificational ¿/-clefts, they are instead examples o f a 
predicate nominal construction. The function o f  these tokens is to tell us more information about the 
subject referent (Jesus), rather than to identify the referent described by the definite-like description. Here, 
the initial p ro n o u n /is  the subject, which shows agreement with the copular verb am. The sentence-final 
relative clause modifies the pronoun it to form a definite NP predicate. According to Ball (1991: 71) the 
configuration I  it am is therefore equivalent to Ia m  he. As Watson and Jenkins (2006: 206) comment, in 
the example above, the use o f I  it am  rather than I  am he may be a way o f deemphasizing the maleness of 
Jesus at a time when the gender-neutral construction /  am the one had not yet developed.
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Table 7.1 The frequency of\\-defts with a range of foci throughout LME and EME
NP PP AdvP CL
(because)
Total
M2 (1300-1350) 3 (10.5) 3 (10.5)
M3 (1350-1420) 11 (11.3) 1 (1.0) 12 (12.3)
M4 (1420-1500) 16 (30.2) 16 (30.2)
E l (1500-1569) 24 (20.8) 1 (0.9) 1 (0.9) 26 (22.6)
E2 (1570-1639) 37 (28.3) 2 (1.5) 39 (29.8)
E3 (1640-1710) 73 (64.6) 18 (15.9) 8 (7.1) 1 (0.9) 100 (88.5)
There are several characteristics o f  this data that suggest that non-NP //-clefts are 
extensions o f the existing NP-focus //-cleft rather than the result o f  a merger between the 
//-cleft and the impersonal construction. First, the earliest examples o f  //-clefts with 
prepositional focal elements do not contain temporal or spatial adjuncts, but express 
relations such as agency, as in B all’s example given in (19) above, or cause, such as the 
PPCME2 example in (26). Tellingly, these relations can also be expressed by NP-focus 
//-clefts during the Late M iddle English period, shown in example (27).
(26) Me trowep p a t by be prayers o f  bis holy mavde it is p a t p a t place was never 
Me believes that by the prayers o f this holy maid it is that that place was never 
3 // detstroyed. (John o f  Trevisa’s Polychronicon, a l387)
yet destroyed
‘I think that it was by the prayers o f  this holy maiden that that place was never 
destroyed’
(27) It es pride in paim  p a t hyes paim. (Rule o f St Benet, al425)
It is pride in them that highs them
‘It is pride that elevates them ’
Like (19), (26) cannot be given an impersonal interpretation because the phrasal element 
(underlined) contributes the most important information; it cannot be removed from the
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sentence and still leave the essential meaning intact. For instance, in (26), the writer 
expresses his thoughts that Ethelberga’s prayers prevented the destruction o f  the abbey. 
I f  (26) was interpreted as an impersonal, with an optional adjunct, we would be left with 
something like (28), which expresses a doubt about whether it is a fact that the abbey 
was never destroyed. This is a far less intuitive gloss o f (26), which seems instead to 
presuppose the fact that the abbey was never destroyed.
(28) I think it happened that that place was never destroyed.
This suggests that examples such as (19) and (26) are more likely to have developed as 
extensions o f the NP-focus /7-cleft and were not directly influenced by the impersonal 
construction.
Examples which contain temporal and spatial foci and which are clearly non-NP 
/7-clefts, despite allowing an impersonal reading, do not appear until the second half o f 
the Early M odem  period. In such cases, exemplified by (29), it is the context that reveals 
that they are clearly presuppositional clefts. This prevents an impersonal reading for
(29), such as the possible paraphrase in (30). I f  impersonals really were the driving force 
behind the appearance o f non-NP /7-clefts, we would expect examples such as (29), 
which are ambiguous in form, but disambiguated by context, to be the very earliest to 
occur. However, as indicated above, this is not the case.
(29) Lee. and Mr. Ireland upon Saturday Night came to my M aster’s H ouse. ..
L.C.J. W hat time and what Year was it?
Lee. It was in 78; but I am not certain o f the Day o f the Month: It was on a 
Saturday he came (Oates, 1685)
(30) It happened, on a Saturday, that he came to my m aster’s house
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Furthermore, we find NP-focus //-clefts expressing temporal and spatial relationships 
during this same time period, shown in (31). This suggests that NP-focus //-clefts and 
non-NP //-clefts are instances o f a single construction.
(31) It was, as near as I can remember, the 3d o f August, that he went out o f Town.
(Oates, 1685)
I argue that by allowing a wider range o f elements into what was previously a 
strictly nominal position, the //-cleft becomes a more schematic construction. In other 
words, the construction loses a syntactic constraint, with the focal position no longer 
specifying for an NP. Nevertheless, the semantic condition for the postcopular element 
is still in force; that is, only elements which can perform a referential function will be 
allowed into this position (see §5.3). Since some syntactic categories are better suited to 
performing a referring function, and furthermore, some members o f these categories 
fulfill this role better than others, this explains why changes to the focus category in 17- 
clefts are gradual, occurring in incremental stages.
Tellingly, in both Ball’s data and m y own, the only clear cases o f  non-nominal //- 
cleft in the Late M iddle English period involve prepositional phrases. As shown in Table 
7.1 above, the adverb phrase focus //-cleft seems to be a later development and can only 
be placed, with empirical support, as originating at the end o f the Early M odem era. The 
fact that prepositional phrases are amongst the earliest to be permitted into this position 
is unsurprising, since as Borkin (1984: 136) comments, there is a semantic overlap 
between the phrasal categories o f NP and PP; although prepositional phrases typically 
express relations, such as location and quality, they nonetheless relate to nominal 
concepts such as time, place and manner.
For example, when occurring as the focal element o f an //-cleft, Bolinger (1972) 
notes that prepositional phrases lose their relational properties. In (32), the meaning is 
not that the time is located in the winter, but that the time is/equals ‘in the winter’. In this 
example then, the relational prepositional phrase is coerced into performing a referential
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function . 1 9  Consequently, these kinds o f z7-cleft have little difference in meaning from 
those with NP-focus, as in the example given in (33).
(32) If it bee in the winter that your Hawke batheth, when no sunne shineth, you may 
then drie her as well by the gentle aire o f the fire as otherwise. (Markham, 1615) 
‘If it is in the winter that your hawk bathes, when no sun shines, you may then 
dry her as well by the gentle air o f the fire as otherwise’
(33) and if  this be done in November, it will preserve the Trees for that whole year, 
with that once doing, it being the winter time only that they will feed upon the 
bark. (Langford, 1696)
An important advantage to this diachronic account is that it is able to explain the 
continuing development o f  the construction, as it goes on to accommodate a much wider 
range o f focal elements. In contrast, Ball’s analysis is very much restricted to the Late 
Middle English period, and she has to invoke an increasing number o f  outside pressures 
to speculate about the subsequent history o f  the AdvP/PP-focus /7-cleft. For example, 
Ball (1994a: 614) notes that, “From the LME period onwards, the /7-cleft construction 
has taken in a greater variety o f non-NP foci, possibly in response to the decline o f some 
alternatives and functional change in others (e.g. preposing)” .
A grammatical constructionalization story for the /7-cleft is also compatible with, 
and explains, ongoing coercion effects in present-day English. For instance, as I 
explained in §5.3, E. Kiss (1998: 262) notes that phrasal categories which are less suited 
to performing a referring function can be “individualized” and made into more discrete 
entities via listing. This allows the adjective sick  to be accommodated into the focal 
position o f (34), creating a much more acceptable /7-cleft than its counterpart in (35).
19 Note too that some prepositional phrases can have a referential function in other constructions, such as 
the passive sentence given below. Again, this helps to explain why prepositional phrases were the earliest 
non-nominal category to occur in the focal position and why they are still the most frequent non-nominal 
category among present-day /7-clefts.
(i) Under the stairs was painted first
264
(34) It’s not sick that he was but tired
(35) *It’s sick that he was
(É. Kiss 1998: 262) 
(É. Kiss 1998: 262)
Likewise, Borkin (1984: 127) comments that focusing adverbs, such as ju s t  and alone 
can be used to “underscore the correctness o f  the identification” and “make explicit the 
reason for focusing” . This explains why the inclusion o f ju s t  improves the acceptability 
o f  the clausal-focus cleft in (36).
(36) It’s [just] that he’s so annoying that bothers me
Analysing the gradual emergence o f non-NP /7-clefts as a case o f “host-class 
expansion” (see §7.2.1) is further supported by the historical development o f /7-clefts 
with nominal foci. In the Late Middle English data o f the PPCME2, 24 out o f  the 30 
examples o f  NP-focus /7-clefts involve proper names and pronouns. This suggests that 
the /7-cleft originally showed a preference for focusing the most referential and discrete 
o f entities.20 W hen more abstract nouns, which do not denote discrete physical objects, 
begin to appear with more frequency in the Early M odem period, we find that listing and 
focusing adverbs are used to accommodate these foci in the same way as they are in 
modem day clausal and adjectival clefts. For instance, 7 out o f the 22 examples o f Early 
M odem /7-clefits focusing abstract nouns involve listing, such as (37), while a further 8 
examples, including (38) below, contain focusing adverbs.
(37) .. .that it was not the pure knowledg o f  nature and vniuersality.. .which gave the
occasion to the fall; but it was the proude knowledge o f good and eu ill.. .which 
was the fourme o f the temptation; (Bacon, 1605)
(38) ‘Tis use alone hardens it and makes it more able to endure the cold,
20 Ball (1991: 272) finds this same preference in her own LME data. She notes that 89 out of 111 NP- 
focus /7-clefts contain animate foci.
(Locke, 1685)
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From this evidence, we can therefore conclude that by allowing a wider range o f 
elements into the focal position, the //-cleft construction undergoes gradual, and perhaps 
continual, grammaticalization (or grammatical constructionalization), showing increased 
schematicity. The construction loses a syntactic constraint, with the focal position losing 
its NP specification and becoming an open slot which any phrasal category (XP) can fill. 
However, the //-cleft retains the semantic condition that the focal element must be 
referential and it is this property which governs the course and rate o f  the //-cleft’s 
development. In line with M ichaelis’ (2003, 2004) work on mismatch phenomena 
(introduced in §2.4), we m ight say that as non-NP and less discrete elements are 
accommodated into this referential slot via coercion, their nominal characteristics are 
emphasized and relational or situational properties are lost.
1.2.2.3 Ball (1991. 1994a) and the IP it-cleft
According to Ball (1991, 1994a), the development o f the informative-presupposition //- 
cleft, in which new information is presented in the relative clause, is also influenced by 
the Late Middle English impersonal construction. Ball assumes that since the sentential 
complement o f  impersonals contains new information, this property is carried into the 
new AdvP/PP //-cleft. This construction then merges with the existing NP-focus //-cleft, 
resulting in another new and separate construction: the NP-focus IP //-cleft. However, 
Ball recognizes an important problem with this analysis: the frequency o f the new 
AdvP/PP //-cleft is way too small during the LME period to influence the already 
established NP-focus //-cleft. As a result, Ball concludes that other constructions must
also have played a role in this development, likely candidates being the impersonals
21again as well as perhaps the reverse pseudocleft.
Ball’s analysis o f this development seems to be greatly influenced by Prince’s
(1978) article, which identifies two separate types o f modem day //-cleft: the stressed-
21 Ball (19 9 1 ,1994a) uses the term ‘pseudocleft’ to cover w/j-clefts as well as NP be NP  sentences 
introduced by the one that... In Late Middle English, the language had not yet developed these 
constructions. Nevertheless, Ball uses this same term to refer to their precursors, which include 
specificational copular sentences introduced by restrictively modified determinative pronouns, such as he 
that... ‘Reverse pseudoclefts’ show the opposite alignment, with the restrictively modified NP occurring 
in postcopular position.
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focus //-cleft, with given information in the relative clause, and the often overlooked 
informative-presupposition //-cleft. Ball (1994a) emphasizes the functional contrast 
between these two types o f cleft and consequently suggests that the IP //-cleft originated 
as a distinct construction from the SF //-cleft. That is, she assumes that the IP //-cleft is 
the result o f  m ultiple constructions conspiring together and is not a simple extension o f 
the existing //-cleft construction. Tellingly, Ball acknowledges that her analysis is 
somewhat ad hoc. She notes that, “It is unlikely that we shall ever be able to pinpoint the 
cause o f  the appearance o f the IP NP-focus //-cleft, but the two constructions together 
[the clefit/impersonals and the reverse pseudocleft] will have provided a sufficient 
condition for this development” (Ball 1994a: 621).
However, the main problem with Ball’s theory is that it cannot explain the 
“known-fact” effect. Even when the information in the relative clause o f  //-clefts is not 
known to the intended audience, there is still a sense that this information is presupposed 
and is assumed to be true. For example, in (39) below, the audience is not aware that 
someone once sa id  ‘laws are silent at times o f  war ’, but they are nevertheless expected 
to accept this information as a fact. As Prince (1978: 899-900) comments, these IP //- 
clefts “ m a r k  a  p ie c e  o f  in f o r m a t io n  a s  f a c t , known to some people although not yet 
known to the intended hearer” (emphasis original).
(39) (Start o f  lecture)
It was Cicero who once said, ‘Laws are silent at times o f w ar’. [IP //-cleft]
I f  impersonals really were the driving force behind this change, it is difficult to see why 
the information in the relative clause would be marked in this way. In §7 .2 .2 .1 ,1 
presented a number o f arguments that the impersonal construction did not directly 
influence the development o f the AdvP/PP //-cleft. In particular, unlike the relative 
clause o f //-clefts, the sentential complement o f the impersonal construction is not 
presuppositional. Consequently, it is unlikely that impersonals could have played an 
important role in enabling the //-cleft to occur with new, but presupposed information in 
the relative clause.
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In contrast, Ball’s speculation that the reverse pseudocleft may have influenced 
the development o f the IP //-cleft is much more plausible, since these are both 
specificational copular constructions containing a presupposed relative clause. However, 
as Ball (1994a: 618) comments, it is difficult to find a “motivation in LME for a transfer 
o f functions, since the cleft and the pseudo-cleft co-existed for hundreds o f  years before 
the first IP clefts appear” . Furthermore, on closer inspection, Ball’s examples o f reverse 
pseudoclefts containing discourse-new information may not even be specificational. For 
instance, Ball (1994a: 616) notes that “Where the subject NP is not contrastive, the 
inverted pseudo-cleft has long been used to present information that is not Old or 
Inferrable from the context” . However, if  the subject NP is not contrastive and presents 
an individual that is already the topic o f conversation, it is difficult to separate these 
examples from ordinary subject-predicate (topic-comment) sentences, as shown in (40).
(40) (a) This is John. He is a doctor.
(b) This is John. He is my best friend.
(c) This is John. He is the person/one that mends my shoes.
For copular sentences with a definite noun phrase predicate, the example will only be 
interpreted as having a specificational (or identifying) meaning when the subject is 
marked as the focus, as in (41).
(41) (a) A: Who is your best friend? B: John is my best friend.
(b) A: Who stole the money? B: John was the one that took it.
In the absence o f  prosodic clues, B all’s comment that the subject NP o f  her
examples is not contrastive suggests that this element m ay be the topic rather than the 
focus o f the sentence. For instance, Ball provides the following Old English example, in 
which the propositions expressed by the relative clauses are not given by the previous 
discourse but are nonetheless known information.
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(42) Hlyst nu placida. Ic eom hælende cris t.. .and ic eom se 5e gesette dagas. and tida. 
and gear, and ic eom se ôe man o f  eorôan gehiwode. and for manncynnes hælo. 
ic com to eorôan... (L S  8, St. Eustace, 59)
‘Listen now, Placidas. I am Jesus Christ. ..and I am the one who set days and 
seasons and years. And I am the one who formed man out o f  the earth, and for 
m ankind’s salvation I came to earth ... ’ (Ball 1994a: 617)
As Ball (1994a: 616) comments, in this example “Christ appears to Placidas and uses 
inverted pseudo-clefts to identify h im self’. However, identifying, or providing more 
information about, a topical referent is not a specificational function. In specificational 
sentences we have the reverse situation, with the focal entity serving to identify the 
unknown referent described by the definite noun phrase. The pseudoclefits given in (42) 
therefore have much in common with the predicate nominal examples given in (40).22 
Consequently, Ball’s examples o f reverse pseudoclefts with discourse-new information 
in the relative clause m ay not share the same function as the specificational /7-cleft.
As I explained in §5.4, discourse-based studies o f  clefts, such as Prince (1978) 
and Collins (1991a), have found that while specificational pseudoclefts are commonly 
associated with expressing inferable (as opposed to discourse-old information), they do 
not occur with brand-new information in the relative clause. For instance, the /7-cleft 
example given in (39) above, expresses a discourse-new presupposition which is not 
assumed to be known to the intended audience and is not inferable from the speech 
situation. The corresponding pseudoclefts, on the other hand, are not quite so acceptable 
in discourse-initial position, as shown in (43) and (44).23 Here, the suggestion is that the 
audience should already know that someone once sa id  ‘laws are silent at times o f  w ar’.
21 They also share a great deal with the Middle English examples introduced by I  it am discussed in 
footnote 1 8 .1 classify this sentence type as a predicate nominal construction. Ball (1991: 41), on the other 
hand, labels these examples ‘pscudoclefts’ because of their formal similarity to reverse specificational NP  
be NP  sentences.
23 However, pseudoclefts can occur discourse-initially i f  the information in the relative clause is inferable 
from the speech situation (see Prince 1978). For example, in (i) below, the fact that the lecture is on some 
topic is inferable from our existing knowledge o f  how lectures work and is therefore present in the 
hearer’s consciousness.
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(43) (Start o f  lecture)
#The one who once said, ‘Laws are silent at times o f w ar’ was Cicero.
(44) (Start o f  lecture)
#Cicero was the one who once said ‘Laws are silent at times o f w ar’.
This suggests that the development o f the IP ¿/-cleft requires an independent explanation 
and is not entirely dependent upon analogy with other specificational copular 
constructions.
1 .2 .2 A  A constructionalization story for the development of the IP /f-cleft
I agree with Lam brecht’s (1994) proposal rather than Ball’s (1991, 1994a). Lambrecht 
argues that IP //-clefts do not form a separate construction from ¿/-clefts with given 
information in the cleft clause. Instead, he assumes that these examples represent “an 
extension” o f the ¿/-cleft construction “via conventionalized pragmatic accommodation” 
(Lambrecht 1994: 71). Lambrecht explains that by using an expression requiring a 
presupposition, such as an ¿/-cleft, to present information that is not shared knowledge, 
the expression itself forces that presupposition and the hearer accommodates it as such.
Lam brecht’s (1994) hypothesis ties in well with my synchronic analysis o f the 
present-day ¿/-cleft construction. Since I assume that the relative clause and the 
constituent it function together like a discontinuous definite description, for me the it- 
cleft construction, like other definite noun phrases, must be inherently presuppositional 
(see §3.3.2). However, as I explained in §4.1.2.5, definite noun phrases are also 
associated with expressing given information. The reason for this is that in order to 
successfully presuppose the existence o f some entity, the speaker typically has to assume 
that the hearer is familiar with this description. I suggest that in ¿/-clefts, this general 
pattern o f correspondence between presupposed and familiar information is overridden, 
allowing nonfamiliar information to be expressed in the cleft clause.
(i) (Start o f lecture)
What I ’m going to be talking about today is how focus can be marked in English
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Historical data from the PPCME2 and the PPCEM E seems to support this 
diachronic explanation. These corpora provide several examples o f //-clefts in which the 
information in the relative clause is not discourse-old. In particular, I found 2 examples 
in the Late Middle English corpus where the information in the relative clause is not 
given by the previous discourse, but is nonetheless shared knowledge, such as (45). In 
this example, the proposition that someone leant against C hrist’s chest has not been 
m entioned before but is in the context o f a discourse about the part o f  the Bible that this 
event is from. The purpose o f this extract is to remind us o f this scene (and so assumes 
that we know it), even though this particular event is not given by the previous 
discourse.
(45) Abid a while, I prey j?e, and taak good kep ho it is ]aat lene{) hym so 
Abide.IM P a while, I pray thee, and take good keep who it is that leans him so 
boldely to Cristes brest and slepj) so sauerly in his lappe.
boldly to Christ.GEN breast and sleeps so surely in his lap.
(Aelred o f  Rievaulx's De Institutione Inclusarum, Vernon ms. c l 400) 
‘Stay a while, I pray you, and take good note o f who it is that leans so boldly 
against Christ’s chest and sleeps so confidently in his lap.’
In addition, 3 examples o f //-clefts from the LME corpus can properly be called 
informative-presupposition //-clefts. For instance, the relative clause in (46) contains 
discourse-new information which is not necessarily shared knowledge. However, such 
examples are still presuppositional, giving the impression that they express facts known 
to a third party. Consequently, it is perhaps unsurprising that they all belong to the genre 
‘history’.
(46) It was he Jiat graunted Kyng Herri jie Secunde to go into Yrlond and tum e hem 
It was he that granted King Henry the Second to go into Ireland and turn them 
to f>e feith,
to the faith (Capgrave’s Chronicle, a 1464)
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By the end o f the Early M odem  period, we begin to see examples where the 
constraints are even freer. In (47), the information in the relative clause is only partly 
new. Here, it is given that Dunne is baulked and confused, and therefore that something 
baulks thy Understanding, but the rest o f the proposition, that something baulks thy 
Honesty, is new to the discourse. In this example, the Lord C hief Justice manipulates the 
sense o f presupposition in this constmction to include his own personal opinion that 
Dunne is deliberately being dishonest. In this way, the use o f  the cleft structure allows 
the speaker’s opinion to be presented as uncontroversial fact.
(47) Dunne. M y Lord, I am so baulked. I do not know what I say myself; tell me what
you would have me say, for I am cluttered out o f  m y Senses.
L.C.J. Why, prithee Man, there’s no body baulks thee but thy own self; thou art 
asked Questions that are as plain as any thing in W orld can be: it is only 
thy own depraved naughty Heart that baulks both thy Honesty and 
Understanding, if  thou hast any; (Lisle, 1685)
Although the data is quite small, these examples would seem to indicate a 
gradual progression in the //-cleft constm ction from expressing only given information 
in the relative clause, to expressing shared but non-salient information, to the inclusion 
o f information that is factual or is assumed to be factual in some sense, before finally 
permitting creative uses where even opinion can be accommodated into the constmction. 
This suggests that the //-cleft constm ction has become increasingly schematic and 
productive over time, sanctioning new types o f  instances and developing a wider range 
o f  discourse functions. The new IP //-cleft subtype is a mismatch constmction, 
overriding the general pattern o f correspondence between presupposed and familiar 
information. The upshot is that particular requirements regarding the discourse status, 
saliency, or familiarity o f  the information that is accepted into the relative clause are 
now almost non-existent. As Borkin (1984: 125) notes for present-day //-clefts, 
“ ‘Presupposed’, when used with respect to cleft sentences, then, means ‘non-asserted’ or 
‘assumed to be true’, and no more than that”.
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7.2.3 Summary and interim conclusions
In §7 .2 .2 ,1 used data from the PPCME2 and the PPCEM E to show that the non-NP //- 
clefit and the IP //-cleft have developed by extension from pre-existing //-cleft constructs. 
This diachronic development conforms to the principles o f  grammatical 
constructionalization outlined in §7.2.1. Over time, the //-cleft has undergone gradual 
“host-class expansion”, allowing an increasing range o f  non-nominal foci into what was 
originally a strictly nominal position and accommodating new information into the 
presuppositional definite-like description. As a result, the //-cleft has developed into a 
more schematic and productive construction.
The historical data therefore explains how the more idiosyncratic //-cleft 
subtypes, which override inheritance from more basic constructions, have emerged 
gradually via conventional pathways o f change. Therefore, while the //-cleft’s 
construction-specific focus category and the ability for new information to be expressed 
in the relative clause are not inherited from more general patterns o f correspondence, 
they are nevertheless motivated by general principles o f language change. I discuss this 
issue in more detail in chapter 8, where I ask what the development o f the //-cleft can tell 
us about the nature o f  constructional change and its relationship with 
grammaticalization.
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8. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRESENT DAY ENGLISH IT-CLEFT
In chapter 7 , 1 made use o f historical evidence in order to provide motivation for the //- 
cleft’s construction-specific properties. First o f  all, I showed that some o f these 
attributes were at one time inherited from more basic constructions in the language 
system o f earlier periods o f  English. Secondly, I showed that the remaining idiosyncratic 
properties have emerged over time as a consequence o f the general principles governing 
constructional change. In this chapter, I examine how this historical evidence can help us 
to further understand the nature o f the present-day //-cleft construction. I show how once 
we integrate historical evidence into the extraposition-from-NP analysis argued for in 
previous chapters we obtain a maximally explanatory account o f  the //-cleft 
construction.
In § 8 .1 ,1 ask what the historical development o f the //-cleft tells us about the 
nature o f constructional change and go on to identify traditional diagnostics for 
grammaticalization in the //-cleft’s formal and functional behaviour. From this 
discussion, I show how the present-day //-cleft construction is structured like a radial 
category, with more and less prototypical members. Over time, the //-cleft has developed 
extensions from the prototype; these emerging subtypes are mismatch constructions, 
which override general patterns o f correspondence and are therefore “less prototypical” . 
Ultimately, these new subtypes are conventionalized, which in turn has implications for 
the overarching //-cleft schema.
In § 8 .2 ,1 compare the development o f  the //-cleft to that o f other specificational 
copular constructions, drawing especially from the literature on w/z-clefts. I argue that 
these related sentence-types must have undergone similar, yet construction-specific, 
changes which have enabled them to acquire their own unique and useful assortment o f 
discourse functions. From this perspective, the wider specificational copular 
construction is also interpreted as a radial category, with each o f its members radiating 
outwards along their own pathways o f change.
Section §8.3 concludes our focus on the historical development o f the //-cleft. 
Here I show how the historical evidence can be successfully integrated into the
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synchronic analysis developed so far to form a m aximally explanatory account o f  the //- 
cleft construction. I revisit, and complete, the constructional inheritance hierarchy 
outlined in §6.4, mapping the no longer productive inheritance relations as well as the 
ensuing changes which followed the emergence o f  less prototypical //-cleft subtypes. I 
conclude that the analysis o f //-clefts developed throughout this thesis conforms to the 
principle objective o f construction grammar, providing a full and explanatory account o f 
this specialized linguistic pattern, which both tolerates construction-specific properties 
and maximizes m otivation for the //-cleft construction.
8.1 The grammaticalization of the it-cleft construction
In this section, I ask what the diachronic development o f the //-cleft tells us about 
constructional change and its integration with grammaticalization theory. I show that, in 
addition to the rate and direction o f  the change, the resulting //-cleft construction also 
exhibits well-known characteristics o f grammaticalization, such as ‘pragmatic 
strengthening’ (Traugott 1988) and the ‘layering’ o f polysemous items, whereby the 
original and the emergent forms coexist (Hopper and Traugott 2003: 124-126). Since 
most versions o f  construction grammar make use o f default inheritance (and so assume 
that categories have a non-classical structure), they are well-suited to m odeling the 
development o f constructional polysemy. I conclude that a construction grammar 
framework is therefore a useful way o f depicting grammaticalization changes to both 
complex and atomic (lexical) constructions.
In what follows, I reexamine the development o f  //-clefts with non-NP foci and 
instances with new information in the cleft clause as changes affecting the //-cleft as a 
constructional category. I show that the //-cleft construction is a category with a non- 
classical structure, in which certain instances are “better” (or more motivated) members 
than others. Furthermore, the //-cleft is structured like a ‘radial category’; that is, non- 
prototypical members are categorized by extension from the prototype (see Lakoff 
1987).1 I suggest that the changes to the //-cleft construction outlined in §7.2.2 have
1 Other constructions which have been argued to have a radial category structure include there- 
constructions (Lakoff 1987), resultatives (Goldberg and Jackendoff 2004) and ditransitive sentences
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resulted in the development o f these prototype-extension relations and the creation o f a 
radial category structure for the /7-cleft. By changing the membership o f  the /7-cleft 
category, this in turn has consequences for how speakers conceptualize the /7-cleft 
construction.
The prototypical //-cleft contains nominal foci and expresses given or familiar 
information in the cleft clause. Such examples make up the earliest attested instances o f 
the construction and represent the most frequent subtype o f //-cleft in present-day 
English. The reason for this is that this type o f //-cleft conforms to more general patterns 
o f  correspondence in the language system. For instance, as a specificational construction 
involving a nominal predication relation, the //-cleft must contain a referring expression 
in the postcopular position (see §3.3 and §4.1). According to Croft (1991: 67), the 
semantic class o f ‘objects’ is the typological prototype o f  referring constructions. Since 
noun phrases typically denote objects, they are therefore the phrasal category most 
suited to performing a referring function. Likewise, as with other definite noun phrases, 
the discontinuous description in //-clefts exhibits an existential presupposition. In order 
to successfully presuppose the existence o f some entity, the speaker usually has to 
assume that the hearer is familiar with the description given. As a result, information 
which is presupposed is typically also given or known to the hearer.
The development o f non-NP //-clefts and IP //-clefts therefore involves extension 
from the prototype. As I explained in §7.2.2, these emergent //-cleft subtypes are formed 
via coercion, in which non-nominal elements and information which is hearer-new are 
accommodated into the construction. This process is gradual since, as Goldberg (1995: 
159) comments, coercion is governed by the extent to which there is relationship 
between the inherent meaning o f the coerced item and the interpretation which it is
(Goldberg 1995). For example, Goldberg (1995: 31) argues that the central or basic sense o f the 
ditransitive form involves the successful transfer o f an object to a recipient, as in (i) below. However, 
there are also less central but related senses which do not strictly imply a successful transfer. For example, 
the sentence in (ii) signals only that the agent intends for the recipient to receive the object. Goldberg 
(1995: 33) concludes that the ditransitive form is therefore “associated with a set o f systematically related 
senses”; that is, it is a radial category with a prototypical sense and non-central extensions from the 
prototype.
(i) Chris gave Jan a cake
(ii) Chris baked Jan a cake
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given by the construction. For example, in §7.2.2.2, we saw that prepositional phrases, 
which often relate to nominal concepts such as time and place, are the earliest non- 
nominal category to occur in the focal position. In contrast, adjective phrases, which 
denote properties rather than objects, are not easily accommodated into the referential 
slot. Likewise, as I explained in §7.2.2.4, changes to the information status o f the cleft 
clause proceed in incremental steps from expressing given information, to non-salient 
but shared information, to information that is factual or known to a third party, before 
finally accommodating the speaker’s opinion. Over time then, the speaker is able to 
further manipulate what sort o f  information can be marked as presupposed or “assumed 
to be true” .
In accordance with Him melm ann’s (2004) definition o f  grammaticalization, the 
diachronic development o f  the //-cleft construction is therefore a process o f gradual 
expansion. It involves both “host-class expansion”, whereby the construction allows a 
wider range o f components to enter into it, and “semantic-pragmatic context expansion”, 
whereby the construction develops new pragmatic functions. Such “pragmatic 
enrichment” is also a diagnostic o f the traditional element-based view of 
grammaticalization. As Traugott (1982, 1989) observes, grammaticalization often 
involves a shift towards increasingly subjective meanings; that is, the grammaticalized 
word or string o f  words comes to express the speaker’s beliefs and attitudes. Tellingly, 
changes to the //-cleft’s information structure also involve a move towards 
subjectification. Originally, the //-cleft’s only function was specificational, identifying 
the referent that matches a familiar description. However, over time, this construction 
has developed additional uses, reminding the hearer o f  relevant but non-salient 
information, informing the audience o f facts they may not already know and finally as 
an indirect way o f communicating the speaker’s opinion (see §7.2.2.4). The historical 
development o f the //-cleft therefore involves a change in perspective from what the 
hearer knows to how the speaker feels.
Changes affecting the range o f  //-cleft foci and the information status o f the cleft 
clause therefore proceed in a direction outwards from the prototype, with instances 
deviating increasingly from the prototype over time. Each stage in the development
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therefore involves the emergence o f  new constructs which are “less good” and “less 
motivated” members o f  the category o f //-clefts. These instances override general 
patterns o f correspondence as well as overriding inheritance from the existing //-cleft 
schema. This is why default inheritance is so important for a constructional model o f 
language change, since without it, it would not be possible for new instances to override 
inheritance from the //-cleft schema. As Hudson (2003: 366) explains, default 
inheritance assumes a “best-fit”, rather than absolute, model o f categorization and 
therefore allows for conflict between the inheriting and the dominating constructions.
Constructional change therefore originates in language use at the level o f  the 
construct. However, the discrepancy between the //-cleft schema and its less-prototypical 
members is resolved as the overarching category changes to suit its new membership. In 
other words, as the new instances become conventionalized, the speaker inductively 
generalizes over both the original and the emergent subtypes to form a more abstract and 
schematic //-cleft construction. As Traugott (2007: 549) comments, “If speakers adopt 
an innovating mismatch, by conventionalizing it, they are likely to creatively reanalyze 
it as a partial match that adds to the repertoire o f  the language” . For instance, as //-clefts 
occur with non-nominal foci, the overarching //-cleft schema looses a syntactic 
constraint, with the postcopular position losing its NP specification and becoming an 
open slot which any phrasal category (XP) can fill. Likewise, as the //-cleft 
accommodates new information into the cleft clause, it acquires additional discourse 
functions which, over time, have become conventionalized uses for the //-cleft 
construction. I illustrate this stage in the development o f  the IP //-cleft by comparing 
examples in Early M odem  English to those found in present-day English.
In the Early M odem example given here as (1), the speaker creatively exploits 
the presuppositional //-cleft construction for stylistic effect in order to present his own 
opinion (that Dunne is being dishonest) as uncontroversial fact (see §7.2.2.4 for a more 
comprehensive analysis o f this example). The rhetorical device employed here is 
therefore “assertion by presupposition” .
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(1) Dunne. M y Lord, I am so baulked, I do not know what I say myself; tell me what
you would have me say, for I am cluttered out o f my Senses.
L.C.J. Why, prithee Man, there’s no body baulks thee but thy own self; thou art 
asked Questions that are as plain as any thing in W orld can be: it is only 
thy own depraved naughty Heart that baulks both thy Honesty and 
Understanding, if  thou hast any; (Lisle, 1685)
W hile this example strikes us as an exceptional use, the stating o f opinion under the 
guise o f presupposition appears to have become a more conventionalized function for 
the /7-cleft construction, as shown by the following examples from the British 
component o f the International Corpus o f English (ICE-GB). Example (2) functions in 
many ways like a factual IP /7-cleft, since we are told that it was Reyner Bannon  who 
made a particular comment in the press. However, in this case, the factual information is 
presented as a follow-up to the /7-cleft, with the relative clause expressing the speaker’s 
approval o f it.
(2) And it was Reyner Bannon who got it absolutely snot on: he commented in the 
press.. .that the architect has been driving architectural journalists mad by 
steadfastly refusing to release any pictures o f what the Fun Palace will actually 
look like (S2A-040 094, 095)
Likewise, in the adverb phrase focus /7-cleft in (3), the relative clause presents opinion 
as established fact. This example is particularly interesting, since I fe a r  does not qualify 
the assertion that others are led astray here, but the presupposition that she risks leading 
others astray.
2 For a more comprehensive and quantitative study o f present-day /7-cleits in the ICE-GB see Gomez- 
Gonzalez (2004), Hasselgard (2004) and Nelson (1997).
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(3) And it is here, I fear, that my right honorable friend increasingly risks leading
herself and others astray in matters o f substance as well as o f style (S2B-050
036)
Over time then, the ¿/-cleft construction has gained a new function as a fairly 
standard, yet indirect way, o f  communicating, or asserting, the proposition expressed in 
the cleft clause (Lambrecht 1994:71). At this stage, the ¿/-cleft construction is 
polysemous, with different types o f  instance conveying subtle yet distinct nuances o f 
meaning. The development o f the /7-cleft therefore conforms to Croft’s (2001: 127) 
constructional account o f  grammaticalization. He notes that, as a construction 
grammaticalizes, it is “extended to a new function”; over time, this new semantic use 
becomes conventionalized as “one o f its normal functions” with the result that “the 
construction is polysemous with respect to its original meaning” (Croft 2001: 127).
The coexistence, or layering, o f  original and emergent functions is a common 
outcome o f  the grammaticalization o f  lexical items, at least in its early stages (Hopper 
and Traugott 2003: 124-126). This is to be expected under a constructional model o f 
language structure, which does not assume a strict division between the syntax and the 
lexicon. As Goldberg (1995: 31) comments, “since constructions are treated as the same 
basic data type as morphemes, that they should have polysemous senses like morphemes 
is expected” . This provides support for the claim that, like lexical items, larger 
constructions can also be subject to grammaticalization and suggests that the 
construction grammar framework, which is well-suited to modeling the development o f 
constructional polysemy, can also be usefully employed in representing 
grammaticalization changes to atomic, lexical items.
3 Likewise, Lehmann (2008: §3.1.2) concludes that “To the extent that pragmatic accommodation o f the 
proposition presupposed by the extrafocal clause is conventionalized in the cleft sentence, the construction 
becomes more grammaticalized”. However, for Lehmann, the outcome o f  grammaticalization in this case 
is the “levelling out” o f the contrast between the presupposition (in the cleft clause) and the assertion (in 
the focal position). As I have shown, presuppositional meaning is a property inherent to the definite-like 
description in ¿/-clefts; while it may be manipulated, with the result that new information is marked as 
presupposed, it is not in any way reduced or lessened. As a result, I do not subscribe to Lehmann’s (2008) 
view that changes to the ¿/-cleft construction result in the “levelling out” o f contrasts in information 
structure.
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Once conventionalized, the final stage in the grammaticalization process is for 
the original and emergent forms to become independent from one another. For example, 
with atomic elements, the lexical item in its new function gains a different distribution 
and/or a reduced phonological form which is not shared by the lexical item in its original 
function. In other words, the original and emergent forms become so distinct that the 
speaker will not form a single abstraction over them. Croft (2001: 127) suggests that this 
same stage in the grammaticalization process also holds for larger, more complex 
constructions, whereby the construction in its new function gains formal independence. 
He notes that “syntactic, morphological and phonological changes.. .occur only to the 
construction in its new function, thereby m aking it distinct from the old construction in 
its original meaning” (Croft 2001: 127). However, evidence o f  this last step in the 
grammaticalization process is not found in the development o f  the /7-cleft construction. 
For this constructional category, more and less prototypical /7-cleft instances have the 
same basic structure and share the same specificational function. In other words, they are 
similar enough for the speaker to form a coherent schema, or higher-order abstraction.
The diachronic development o f the /7-cleft construction therefore provides good 
evidence for the claim that complex constructions can function not only as the 
surrounding context that causes the grammaticalization o f  an atomic component, but 
also as an actual grammaticalizing element (see the discussion in §7.2.1). As with other 
cases o f grammaticalization, the /7-cleft undergoes a series o f  incremental and 
unidirectional micro-changes, gaining a more subjective function which coexists with its 
original meaning. From the perspective o f  the constructional taxonomy, these changes 
originate in language use at the level o f  the construct. New types o f  instance are formed 
by extension from the prototype, creating a radial category structure. Both the prototype 
and the extension are subsumed by an overarching /7-clefit schema, which becomes more 
abstract and productive as it sanctions a wider variety o f different types o f construct. 
Assuming a construction grammar model o f language structure then, grammaticalization 
is a process o f extension (or expansion) which results in (re)categorization.
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8.2 A comparison with other specificational copular constructions
In § 8 .1 ,1 showed that the diachronic development o f the //-cleft involves extension from 
the prototype. Over time, non-NP items are accommodated into the referential slot and 
nonfamiliar information gains a coerced interpretation, being marked as presupposed. 
However, as I explained in §4.1, m ost types o f  specificational copular construction 
contain a referring expression and a definite NP predicate (with an existential 
presupposition). From this, we might expect that the different kinds o f  specificational 
sentence would undergo this same diachronic development. Nevertheless, as I explained 
in §5.3 and §5.4, the exact range o f  //-cleft foci is construction-specific and other 
specificational copular constructions cannot occur with brand-new information in the 
relative clause. In this section, I identify some o f  the subtle semantic and pragmatic 
properties which have instigated and shaped the //-cleft’s construction-specific historical 
development. I frame my discussion in a comparison o f //-clefts and w/z-clefts (a topic 
which has received considerable interest in the cleft literature).
Despite their close familial relationship, //-clefts and w/z-clefts exhibit a number 
o f  different structural and discourse-functional properties. For example, certain 
prepositional phrases can occur as the focus o f an //-cleft, but are not permitted in the 
w/i-cleft configuration. On the other hand, while w/i-clefts commonly occur with verbal 
and adjectival foci and permit a full range o f  clausal foci, //-clefts cannot occur with 
verb phrase and non-factive clause foci and can only accommodate adjective phrases 
into the focal position under specific circumstances. Unlike w/j-clefts, //-clefts can occur 
with brand-new information in the relative clause. Furthermore, while the //-cleft has 
developed a specialized performative function, the wh-cleft has acquired a construction- 
specific use as a presentational device.
In what follows, I explain that every one o f  these structural and discourse- 
functional differences results ultimately from two, very subtle differences in the 
constructions’ semantic and pragmatic properties. First, we have the difference in 
meaning between the initial it o f  //-clefts and the what o f  w/z-clefts (or what-clefts). As I 
explained in §7.1.3, the cleft it is semantically underspecified. This means that the head 
noun o f the definite-like description in //-clefts can be given any possible interpretation.
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On the other hand, while what has a very general meaning, it is nevertheless specified as 
synonymous with the thing.4 The second, pragmatic difference is that, while both it- 
clefts and w/z-clefts are associated with expressing given information in the relative 
clause, the two constructions nevertheless have a subtly different information structure; 
that is, while the information in the relative clause o f /7-clefts is typically discourse-old, 
that found in w/z-clefts is normally inferable (see Prince 1978). Together, these two 
(related) domains o f  variation mean that the z7-cleft and the wh-cleft have subtly 
different prototypes, which govern and shape their construction-specific pathways o f 
change.
I deal with z7-clefts and w/z-clefts in §8.2.1 and §8.2.2, respectively. In §8 .2 .1 ,1 
add an additional level o f  detail to the diachronic account given in §8.1. Here, I focus on 
what caused the z7-cleft to acquire this particular range o f foci and to develop an 
informative-presupposition subtype. I compare this to the development o f the wh-cleft 
outlined in §8.2.2. Here, I make use o f  the findings from both diachronic and discourse- 
based synchronic studies o f specificational w/z-clefts.
8.2.1 The \t-cleft’s construction-specific development
As I noted above, the initial it in zY-clefits is semantically underspecified; it can be given 
a whole host o f possible interpretations, some o f  which cannot be expressed by other 
NPs. This explains why the z7-cleft is such a useful and productive construction and why 
it can sometimes contain foci which cannot easily be classified by predicative nouns. For 
example, the zY-cleft in (4) is much more acceptable than the corresponding wh-cleft and 
th-cleft given in (5) and (6).
4 The distinction is made particularly apparent in predicational clefts. As Ball (1991: 58) notes, 
predicational /7-clefts often have a “more restrictive interpretation” than predicational what-clefts. For 
example, while the /7-cleft in (i) in understood to mean the dress that she wore was wonderful, the what- 
cleft in (ii) tells us that the thing she wore was a wonderful dress. In this example then, the initial it in it- 
clefts is interpreted as having a much more specific meaning than the thing, gaining its semantic 
interpretation from the postcopular noun (see §5.2.2). This shows that the cleft pronoun it is therefore 
underspecified, rather than truly general, preferring a specific (or restrictive) interpretation.
(i) It was a wonderful dress that she wore
(ii) What she wore was a wonderful dress
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(4) It was with great determination that he climbed to the top
(5) *How he climbed to the top was with great determination
(6) *The way that he climbed to the top was with great determination
Here, the prepositional phrase with great determination does not quite fall within the 
semantic scope o f how  or the adverbial noun way, which typically denote ‘instrum ent’ or 
‘m eans’. As a result, in these examples, the referring expression does not match up with 
the head noun o f  the definite description. On the other hand, since the cleft it is 
semantically underspecified, it covers “the same ground as the adverbial nouns and 
much more” (Bolinger 1972: 122; emphasis added).5
However, while the cleft it is maximally underspecified, the interpretation it is 
given is usually specific. In other words, the discontinuous constituent in /7-clefts 
uniquely describes the postcopular referent. This explains why ‘listing’ is an effective 
coercion strategy for accommodating items which denote properties into the referential 
slot (see §7.2.2.2). As Declerck (1984b: 144) comments, “properties are not mutually 
exclusive: if  X has property A, there is no reason why it should not have other properties 
as well” . For example, in (7a) and (8a) the thing that he was and the thing that he is do 
not uniquely describe the adjective phrase sick  and the predicative noun a secretary. 
However, by contrasting sick  with tired  in (7b), the property sick  is established as a 
member o f  a restricted set o f  possible ailments. Likewise, in (8b), the predicative NP a 
secretary is contrasted with the profession that uniquely matches the more restrictive 
description the thing that I ’d  wanted to be.
(7) a) *It’s sick that he was
b) It’s not sick that he was but tired (E. Kiss 1998: 262)
5 A similar explanation can be provided to account for the difference in acceptability between the ¿/-cleft 
in (i) and the corresponding ¿/¡-cleft in (ii). While for Huddleston (1984: 461) these examples are 
problematic for an extraposition-ffom-NP analysis o f /¿-clefts, they are easily accommodated into our 
account. Although the prepositional phrase to Ed  cannot be classified by the head noun person, it can 
nevertheless be described by the semantically underspecified cleft pronoun.
(i) It was to Ed that she was referring (Huddleston 1984: 460)
(ii) *The person that she was referring was to Ed
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(8) a) * It’s a secretary that I am
b) They made me a secretary, but it w asn’t a secretary I ’d wanted to be
(Ward, B im er and Huddleston 2002: 1418).
Nevertheless, not all predicative elements can be ‘individualized’ in this way. For 
example, restricting the set description and listing possible alternatives in (9b), does not 
make the verb phrase eat much more acceptable than in (9a). For the semantic class o f 
‘actions’ to fill the referential slot o f the /2-cleft, they must become more noun-like, as 
with the gerund eating in (9c). This example is closer to the prototypical zY-cleft 
instances, which contain nominal foci denoting discrete entities (see §8.1).
(9) a) *It’s eat that she does
b) *It’s eat that she likes to do best, not shop
c) It’s eating that she likes best, not shopping.
In addition to the restrictions on verb phrase foci, /2-clefts cannot occur with non- 
factive clauses in the postcopular position (see Delahunty 1984; Delin 1989). For 
example, (10a) contains the non-factive verb say. Here, the proposition that he never 
replied to her letters is not assumed to be true since it is attributed to the thoughts and 
beliefs o f  the person who said it and could therefore involve conjecture or falsehood. 
(10b), on the other hand, contains the factive verb regret. Here, the clausal complement 
is understood to express a true proposition. In other words, he regretted the fa c t  that he 
never replied to her letters.
(10) a) *It was that he had never replied to her letters that he said
b) It was that he had never replied to her letters that he (most) regretted
Again, the reason for this difference in acceptability seems to lie in the fact that 
sentences such as (10b) are closer to the /2-cleft prototype. Here, the factive clause refers 
to an actually occurring event. In such sentences, the that-clause can be replaced by
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other noun-like elements, such as gerunds (his insistence that he was in the right) and 
adjectival nominalizations (his carelessness) (see Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970). 
However, these nominal constructions cannot replace the that-clause complement o f 
non-factive verbs. It makes sense then, that when presented with that-clause foci, the 
hearer automatically interprets them as referring to existentially presupposed events, 
rather than to some abstract concept such as the words somebody said. Therefore, in 
example (10a) above, the non-factive verb say  conflicts with our prior assumption that 
the proposition expressed in the postcopular clause is true.
As I explained in §8.1, the zY-cleft prototype is associated not only with NP foci, 
but also with expressing given information in the cleft clause. What is more, the 
information in the relative clause is normally discourse-old. As a result then, the h-cleft 
construction is understood as providing the unknown referent that uniquely matches a 
pre-existing description. In other words, as Hedberg (1990: 123) observes, h-clefts have 
the function o f providing the correct “answer” to an already established “question”. In 
support o f this, Bolinger (1977: 71) finds that, in h-clefts, the specifying relationship 
between the focal element (or ‘value’) and the definite-like description (or ‘variable’) 
must have a prior basis. He provides the following examples which differ in 
acceptability.
(11) A: W hen will we know?
B: It’s tomorrow that w e’ll know
(12) A: When will you tell me?
B: #It’s tomorrow that I ’ll tell you (Bolinger 1977: 71)
The discourse in (11) would be entirely appropriate if  speakers A and B are waiting for 
exam results which are to be made available on tom orrow’s date. As a result, in this 
example, the time o f  knowing has been previously established. In (12), on the other 
hand, the time o f  telling has no prior basis and is decided by the speaker there and then. 
Consequently, an ft-cleft is not the best choice for expressing this information.
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The early association between //-clefts and the presentation o f  pre-established 
facts provides a plausible explanation as to why the //-cleft, as opposed to any other kind 
o f specificational sentence, has developed an informative-presupposition subtype. As I 
explained in §7.2.2.4, the IP //-cleft expresses new, as opposed to given, information in 
the cleft clause. Nevertheless, such examples have the function o f expressing this 
information as uncontroversial fact, signaling for the hearer to accept it unchallenged 
(see Delin 1992). The //-cleft configuration therefore provides a useful way to reduce the 
speaker’s responsibility in the information expressed; as Prince (1978: 900) comments, 
IP //-clefts “function like traditional footnotes in that they seem to say: ‘D on’t argue 
with me -  I didn’t invent this -  and I’m  aware that I didn’t invent th is’” .
This idea, that //-clefts have the effect o f downplaying the speaker’s role, also 
helps to explain why the //-cleft has developed a performative function, which is unique 
among the family o f  specificational copular constructions. According to Prince (1978: 
903), examples such as (13) below downplay the speaker’s position o f  power, while at 
the same highlighting their emotional response (with great pleasure).6
(13) It is with great pleasure that I present to you this award
6 Los (2009) interprets the function o f  performative clefts differently. She uses these examples to build up 
a case that the it-cleft has developed in response to the loss o f verb-second in English. Los (2009: 111) 
claims that the resulting SV word order has “compromised the ways that were available to the language 
user to structure information”. One such effect is that the pre-subject position (involved in preposing) has 
become pragmatically marked as expressing prominent information. According to Los, the //-cleft 
provides us with a useful strategy to avoid positioning adverbials in too prominent a position. She 
provides the following examples which differ in acceptability.
(i) #W ith great pleasure, we can inform you that your application was successful
(ii) It is with great pleasure that we can inform you that your application was successful
(examples from Los 2009: 114)
Since I view the zZ-cleft primarily as a specificational copular construction, I am skeptical o f  Los’ wholly 
information-structural diachronic story. Furthermore, Los’ analysis is fundamentally flawed. She claims 
that the function o f the IP //-cleft in (ii) is to “place with great pleasure in end-focus position to make it 
less marked” (Los 2009: 114; italic original). O f course, this is paradoxical, since the //-cleft is a focusing 
construction and is not a neutral way o f presenting information. Although Los (2009: 114) recognizes this, 
she claims that “nothing else appears to explain the awkwardness o f the more literal translation”.
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In this instance, the actual presentation o f  the award  is backgrounded, or taken for 
granted, in order to show deference or politeness to the addressee. Since this 
construction is so commonplace in ceremonial contexts, the (now) formulaic device also 
acts as an anticipatory signal to the audience that the ritual has begun.
8.2.2 The what-cleft’s construction-specific development
As I explained in §7.2.2, /7-clefts were originally restricted to occurring with noun 
phrases in the focal position. This supports the claim that examples with NP foci make 
up the prototypical /7-cleft subtype. However, according to Traugott’s (2008) recent 
exploratory work, the early wh-cleft instances do not share this same property. She finds 
that the specificational wh-cleft did not emerge until the late 17th century, at a time when 
other specificational copular constructions, including the /7-cleft, were already well 
established. From her data, it appears that the early what-cleft could occur not only with 
NP foci, but also with a range o f  clausal foci (including both factive and non-factive 
clauses) and verb phrase foci (such as fo-infinitives).7
From the very beginning then, the wh-cleft could occur with categories o f  foci 
which are not acceptable in the /7-cleft. For example, the wh-cleft in (14), containing a 
non-factive clause focal element, is perfectly grammatical.
(14) W hat he said was that he had never replied to her letters
There are two possible reasons for this. First, since w/z-clefts are not associated with 
nominal foci, the that-clause will not necessarily be interpreted as a noun-like concept, 
such as an actually occurring event (see §8.2.1). Second, w/z-clefts have a different linear
7 Traugott (2008) suggests that w/i-clefts with infinitival foci may have developed from non- 
specificational tokens. Originally, examples such as (i) had only a purposive meaning (the thing I  do is in 
order to please you). With the emergence o f the specificational w/i-cleft, such examples could be 
reanalysed. On this new reading, the fo-infinitive is identified as the thing that I  do rather than my purpose 
in doing it. The independence o f  this new meaning from the original purposive construction is 
accomplished by the fact that to finally becomes an optional element, allowing bare infinitive foci, shown 
in (ii).
(i) What I do is to please you
(ii) What I do is please you
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order to //-clefts, which contain extraposed relative clauses. In example (14) then, the 
non-factive verb sa id  is given prior to its clausal complement, marking it as non­
presupposed. As a result, the hearer cannot misinterpret the focal clause as factive.8
The reason why w/?-cIefts are more open to non-nominal categories than //-clefts 
lies in the semantic difference between the constructions’ introductory elements. While 
the initial it in //-clefts is semantically underspecified, the what o f  w/taZ-clefts is 
specified as synonymous with the thing. In the w/z-cleft, this very general concept is 
extended to cover not just objects, but also actions and properties. As I explained in 
§8.2.1, these sorts o f entities are not mutually exclusive and as a result, the noun phrase 
headed by the semantically general what does not always provide a description which is 
unique to the postcopular referent. For example, in (15), (16) and (17) below, there is not 
only one possible thing that John is or Sarah was or that she can do. Nevertheless, these 
property-denoting foci can be accommodated into the wh-cleft without requiring the use 
o f  coercion strategies, such as listing (see §8.2.1).
(15) W hat John is is stupid
(16) W hat Sarah was was an idiot
(17) W hat she can do is eat
In wh-clefts then, there is not always the sense that we are giving the correct 
“answer” to a specific “question” . Instead, in this construction, there is a certain 
flexibility which allows the speaker to choose between different, but equally correct, 
alternatives. As a result o f  this, the wh-cleft emphasizes the speaker’s role in the 
specificational process. For example, in (15) and (16) above, the speaker selects the 
characteristic which they believe appropriately sums up the individual in question. In 
doing this, the speaker is able to express their own opinions about that individual.
8 The linear order o f the predicative and referring elements cannot be the only reason for the 
grammaticality o f  w/i-clefts with non-factive foci. Otherwise, we could not explain why reverse w/2-clefts 
are deemed slightly more acceptable than their corresponding /i-clefts (see also Delin 1989: 97).
(i) ?That he had never replied to her letters was what he said
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Likewise, in (17), the speaker selects an activity which she does well. By highlighting 
one particular activity over many possible others, the speaker is able to make a comment 
about the individual in question, for example, that she is greedy.
Therefore, unlike the ft-cleft, the wh-cleft is not associated with presenting 
factual, or pre-established, information. This explains why the wh-cleft has never 
developed an informative-presupposition subtype. In such sentences, new information is 
given the status o f fact; that is, the ft-cleft construction is employed for the purpose o f 
reducing the speaker’s responsibility for the information in the cleft clause. However, as 
we have seen, w/2-clefts have acquired a very different function, which highlights the 
speaker’s role in the act o f  specification. Furthermore, unlike the ft-cleft, the w/z-cleft 
construction is not associated with expressing discourse-old information in the relative 
clause. For instance, Traugott (2008) finds that, from the very beginning, w/2-clefts were 
associated with inferable information, just as they are today (see §5.4). As Prince (1978) 
comments, information is ‘inferable’ if  it is appropriate to the speech situation and can 
therefore be assumed to be either already in the hearer’s consciousness or easily 
constructible from the discourse context. The function o f w/z-clefts then, is not to 
provide the correct “answer” to an already established (or discourse-old) “question” . 
Instead, as Hedberg (1990: 123) comments, the wh-cleft is used “to both ask and answer 
a question” .
Such properties explain why the wh-cleft has developed a presentational 
function. In these examples, the focal element expresses the main informational content 
o f the sentence and the definite-like description simply functions as a presentational 
device. For instance, in (18), the initial description and the copular verb function as a 
unit which introduces the postcopular proposition.
(18) W hat I ’m  saying is, you shouldn’t let her boss you about
Here, the initial description is inferable, since, according to Prince (1978: 891), “the 
speaker’s relevant thoughts, observations [and] opinions...are taken to be the constant 
appropriate concern o f the hearer” . Because o f this, the initial description, and indeed
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the specifying relationship between it and the postcopular referent, is secondary to the 
proposition expressed in the focal position. Tellingly, the clausal focus is presented here 
as a complete sentence; that is, unlike the clausal foci o f  //-clefts, it does not have to be 
introduced by that.9 Bolinger (1977: 11) notes that the word that is inherently 
anaphoric. The lack o f  that in (18) therefore indicates that the postcopular clause is a 
brand-new assertion. Prince (1978: 891) says, “such WH-clefts are often used not simply 
for clarifying previous assertions, but also for remaking them ”.
In these presentational w/z-clefts, the proposition expressed in the focal clause is 
more informative than the specifying relationship between the focal element and its 
description. According to Koops and Hilpert’s (2009) diachronic study, the w/z-cleft has 
come to be introduced by increasingly general descriptions over time. For example, 
while the highly general verb do was often found in the precopular phrase o f early w/z- 
clefts (see also Traugott 2008) they are now also common with the even less specific 
verbs happen and be. Koops and Hilpert (2009) note that while the verb do requires that 
the agent o f  the dynamic event is specified (what he d id  was...), the verb happen does 
not (what happened was...)', in turn, the verb be is “m aximally general” since it can 
encompass both dynamic and stative events (what it was was...).
According to Hopper (2001), presentational w/z-clefts play a significant role in 
conversational turn-taking. He notes that the precopular description serves to delay the 
delivery o f the main assertion, “by adumbrating (foreshadowing) the continuation in 
general terms without giving away the main point” (Hopper 2001: 114). This has the 
dual purpose o f  informing the reader that what follows is worthy o f attention as well as 
buying time for the speaker to formulate the postcopular assertion, therefore enabling
9 Such examples provide support for the claim made by Den Dikken, Meinunger and Wilder (2000) and 
Schlenker (2003) that NPI connectivity in w/z-clefts can be accounted for by invoking ellipsis. The 
canonical wh-cleft is the only specificational construction that licenses negative polarity items in the focal 
position, shown in (i). As I explained in §4.3, i f  we assume that such sentences are in some way related to 
w/z-clefts with sentential foci, such as (ii), then NPI connectivity in w/z-clefts is explained. However, since
examples with sentential foci are a later development, forming a separate ‘presentational’ subtype, an
ellipsis approach is not a valid analysis for all wh-cleft instances, contra Schlenker (2003).
(i) What he didn’t buy was any wine
(ii) What he didn’t buy was he didn’t buy any wine
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them to “hold the floor” .10 In w/i-clefts then, the specificational relationship between the 
precopular description and the postcopular referent is often completed “online”, decided 
by the speaker during the course o f the utterance. Hopper (2001) goes on to show that in 
some cases, this specifying relationship is actually left incomplete.
Over time then, the wh-cleft has developed a new discourse function in which the 
act o f  specification is so general that it functions only as a simple presentational device. 
Indeed, for some speakers it seems that the construction no longer has a specificational 
meaning at all. This explains the purpose o f  the “double is” construction, exemplified by 
(19), which contains two instances o f  the matrix copula.
(19) W hat it is is, is that I just can’t see the point o f  doing it
In such sentences, the initial description (in this case, what it is) functions as a unit with 
the first matrix copula be (see Brenier and M ichaelis 2005). Since this initial unit o f 
information functions only as a formulaic presentational device, a further copula is 
provided after the intonation break to reinforce the specifying relationship between the 
postcopular clause and the initial description. This construction has a further turn-taking 
function, providing even more “down tim e” for the speaker to formulate their main 
assertion.
8.2.3 Summary and interim conclusions
Throughout § 8 .2 ,1 have shown that while the //-cleft and the wh-cleft are both members 
o f the family o f specificational copular sentences, and therefore require a similar 
analysis (see §4.1), they have nevertheless undergone construction-specific diachronic 
developments, expanding in different directions. From the very beginning, the //-cleft 
construction was associated with presenting factual information, whereby the correct 
referent is identified as matching a specific, and discourse-old, description. This explains 
why the //-cleft construction developed an informative-presupposition subtype, in which
10 See also Schmid (2001: 1536) on the use o f definite NPs with abstract head nouns, such as the thing is, 
as “a useful hesitation device”.
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new and even subjective information is given the status o f  fact. In contrast, the what- 
cleft extends to encompass all those semantic categories that can be classified as things, 
including actions and properties. Since such elements do not represent discrete, mutually 
exclusive entities, the descriptive component o f  the what-cleft is highly general, leading 
to a new discourse function as a presentational device. Therefore, despite the fact that //- 
clefts and w/i-clefts inherit from the same basic construction, they have nevertheless 
developed their own unique radial category structures1 ’. This, in turn, serves to make the 
overarching specificational copular schema a more open (or schematic) and productive 
category.
8.3 An updated inheritance hierarchy
As I explained in §2.2, construction grammar assumes that a speaker’s linguistic 
knowledge is made up o f  constructions which are organized within a hierarchical 
network. By examining how one construction relates to other similar constructions, the 
linguist is effectively showing how a small subsection o f  the speaker’s grammatical 
network is m ost likely organized. In § 6 .4 ,1 sketched a diagrammatic representation 
based on the observations made and the analyses developed throughout chapters 3, 4 and 
5 (see Figure 6.3). This hierarchy o f copular constructions illustrates the inheritance 
links through which /¿-clefts are related to other more schematic constructions. In 
particular, it shows that the different types o f  //-cleft inherit their specificational and 
predicational meanings (both o f which involve the same classifying, nominal predication 
relation) from the wider canonical specificational and predicate nominal constructions.
However, as I noted in §6.4, this interim inheritance hierarchy is incomplete. For 
one thing, it does not explain how the //-cleft configuration, involving a restrictively 
modified pronoun and an extraposed relative clause, ever came into being. Since these 
structural properties are specific to the //-cleft construction, they are not supported by 
inheritance from the present-day English language system. As Goldberg (2003: 120-1) 
comments, if  we cannot explain why a construction should exist in the language, then
11 Croft and Cruse (2004: 319) point out that distinct constructions often emerge from specific instances of 
existing constructional schemas, expanding in their own directions. See also Israel (1996) on the way- 
construction.
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we do not yet have a fully explanatory account o f that construction. However, once we 
incorporate the historical evidence from §7.1, our inheritance hierarchy gains a 
diachronic dimension and the /7-cleft’s more irregular structural properties are identified 
as the historical remnants o f once regular patterns.
As I explained in §7.1, the analysis o f /7-clefts outlined in §4.1 is supported by 
the historical evidence; that is, it is in keeping with what we know about the language 
system o f earlier periods o f English. For example, in this thesis, I have argued that the it- 
cleft construction contains a nominal predication relation with the initial it and the 
sentence-final relative clause functioning together as a definite NP predicate. Although 
restrictive relatives cannot normally m odify pronouns, this linguistic pattern was a much 
more general phenomenon in Old and Middle English (see §7.1.1). At earlier stages in 
the /7-cleft’s history then, the restrictive m odification o f the pronoun it was motivated 
by, and inherited from, the no longer productive determinative pronoun construction.
In the account o f /7-clefts argued for in this thesis, the cleft clause is therefore 
analysed as an extraposed restrictive relative. As I explained in §4.3, those who criticize 
extraposition accounts often ask why this restrictive relative clause cannot occur in a 
position adjacent to its pronominal head. Again, the historical evidence provides us with 
the answer. W hile the extraposition o f a restrictive relative clause is atypical in present- 
day English, relative clauses were often found sentence-finally in Old English (see 
§7.1.2). Rather than deriving from non-extraposed configurations, many authors claim 
that the OE relative clause originated as a paratactic structure (see Ball 1991: 60). For 
the early /7-cleft then, the lack o f  a non-extraposed variant is to be expected. W hile the 
relative clause construction has undergone important changes, with present-day 
instances typically forming syntactic units with their antecedents, the /7-cleft 
construction has remained unchanged (possibly due to information-structural and/or 
prosodic factors (see §7.1.2)).
Historical evidence also helps to explain the behaviour o f the cleft pronoun.
In m y analysis o f /7-clefts, the initial pronoun it is not semantically empty. Instead, it 
performs an important quantifying role and functions as the head noun o f a definite-like 
description. However, the present-day English lexeme it is inherently singular and it
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marks the referent as non-human. How then can we explain the occurrence o f //-clefts 
with human and/or plural foci? Well, as I explained in §7.1.3, the lexeme it in Old and 
Middle English is m aximally underspecified for both number and animacy. Therefore, 
although the cleft pronoun is now morphologically singular, it nevertheless retains the 
original semantic properties o f the Old English lexeme. This, in turn, provides support 
for the explanation o f the //-cleft’s unusual num ber agreement patterns outlined in §4.3. 
Here, I claimed that while the matrix verb agrees with the singular set denoted by the 
pronoun it, the verb embedded in the cleft clause shows agreement with the membership 
o f this set (which may be plural or singular).
At the point o f  origin then, the //-cleft configuration was fully motivated by the 
language system o f the period, inheriting properties from the determinative pronoun 
construction, the (paratactic) relative clause construction and the lexeme it (see Figure 
8.1). W hile these constructions have either fallen out o f productive use or have 
undergone important changes, their influence remains entrenched within the //-cleft’s
19now idiosyncratic structure. As a result, in Figure 8.1, these inheritance relations are 
depicted by dashed lines, indicating that they are representative o f an earlier stage o f the 
language.
Figure 8.1 Motivation for the it-cleft configuration: no longer productive inheritance relations
12 In order to model this diachronic development, we need a constructional inheritance hierarchy in which 
information is stored redundantly. In this model, the information inherited from the dominating 
construction is also specified in the inheriting construction (see §2.2).
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The historical evidence therefore provides motivation for the //-cleft’s 
construction-specific structural properties; that is, it provides an explanation for the 
construction’s existence in the language. In essence then, this evidence also provides us 
with an origin story for the //-cleft. We might speculate that the Old English //-cleft 
developed from instances o f  the canonical specificational construction with the 
pronominal subject //. For example, in the specificational N P be NP  sentence in (20), the 
initial hit is a full anaphoric NP with the meaning the one that was standing there.
(20) .. .scede poet Petrus peer stode. pa  geleaffullan eweedon pcet hit ncere Petrus,
...sa id  that Peter there stood the faithful said that it not-were Peter 
ac wcere his engel. (PElfric, Catholic Homilies, vol. II, 382.21)
but were his angel
‘[Rhoda] said that Peter was standing there. The faithful said that it w asn’t Peter, 
but was his angel. ’ (Ball 1991: 24)
Once we add a paratactic relative clause (in accordance with the determinative pronoun 
construction), we obtain a specificational zr-clefit, as in (21). Here, the initial hit is 
restrictively m odified by the sentence-final clause and functions as the definite article 
and the underspecified head noun o f  the definite-like description it (the one) that is 
knocking there.
(21) p a  eweedon p a  geleafullan, ‘N is hit na Petrus pcet peer cnucad, ac is his cengel.’
Not-is it not Peter that there knocks but is his angel 
(JElfric, Catholic Homilies, vol. I, 517-18.1) 
‘Then the faithful said: It isn’t Peter who is knocking there, but his angel.’
(Ball 1991: 39)
The historical evidence therefore suggests that the //-cleft originated by extension from 
the already existing canonical specificational N P be N P  construction. As Ball (1991: 24)
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comments “it is plausible that a language could have the simple copular sentence 
without having the cleft” .
By incorporating the historical evidence from §7.1, the inheritance hierarchy 
outlined in Figure 6.3 therefore gains a diachronic dimension, depicting inheritance 
relations which existed at earlier periods o f the language (see Figure 8.1). However, in 
some ways Figure 6.3 already illustrates an earlier stage o f  English. For example, the 
hierarchy does not cover non-NP /7-clefts or informative-presupposition /7-clefts -  
subtypes which only began to emerge hundreds o f years after the /7-cleft’s origin. In 
what follows, I show how once we incorporate the diachronic data from §7.2, the 
inheritance hierarchy gains an added complexity, representing a m aximally explanatory 
account o f  the /7-cleft construction.
In § 7 .2 ,1 showed that the informative-presupposition /7-cleft emerges by 
extension from the existing /7-cleft prototype. I argued, in §8.2, that because the earliest 
instances o f  this construction are associated with expressing factual information (with 
the proposition in the cleft clause having a discourse-old information status), the 
construction gradually acquires a new discourse function. Over time, hearer-new 
information is incorporated into the cleft clause and is marked as uncontroversial fact. 
This historical development is illustrated in Figure 8.2. Here the specificational /7-cleft at 
t l  (indicated by dashed lines) is extended to form a new sub-construction: the IP /7-cleft. 
The speaker abstracts over the instances sanctioned by the specificational /7-cleft at tl 
and the instances which make up the new IP /7-cleft (shown by the two upward arrows). 
As a result, the specificational /7-cleft has become a more schematic and productive, and 
therefore a higher-order, construction.
Finally, the temporary inheritance hierarchy outlined in Figure 6.3 assumes that 
all o f  the copular constructions depicted are N P  be N P  sentences. There are several 
reasons why we began with this assumption. First, the cleft literature centres on 
examples with NP foci, which are by far the most common subtype in present-day 
English. Secondly, the literature on specificational copular sentences treats them as 
having an NP be N P  configuration (see §3.2.2). In addition, these more prototypical 
examples helped to clarify the inheritance relation between /7-clefts and the canonical
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specificational construction as well as the relation between predicate nominal sentences 
and their “inverse” (canonical specificational) counterparts.
Specificational //-cleft 
-----------7ww~-----------
Specificational //-cleft Informative-presupposition //-cleft
Figure 8.1 The emergence of the IP it-cleft and the schematization of the specificational it-cleft
In § 7 .2 ,1 showed that //-clefts with non-NP foci originated by extension from the 
existing NP-focus //-cleft. However, unlike the IP //-cleft, which seems to have 
developed a unique discourse function, it is unlikely that non-NP //-clefts form a distinct 
construction (see Figure 8.3). Instead, I assume that the speaker abstracts over instances 
with NP foci as well as the instances with non-NP foci, with the specificational //-cleft 
becoming a more schematic construction; that is, the //-cleft changes from an It be NP  
relative clause construction to an It be X P  relative clause construction. However, while 
the focal slot is syntactically underspecified, the range o f  possible foci is dependent 
upon the semantic referentiality requirement.
Once we bring non-NP //-cleft instances into the inheritance hierarchy, we can no 
longer assume that the //-cleft inherits from a higher-order N P be NP  construction. 
Instead, and as shown in Figure 8.3, the specificational //-cleft inherits from the 
canonical specificational construction which has a subject be complement syntax and a 
‘classifying’ semantic predication relation (containing an XP referring expression and a 
predicate nom inal).13 Therefore, the updated inheritance hierarchy in Figure 8.3 does not 
provide any restrictions on the range o f  elements that can fill the referential (XP)
13 It is possible that speakers abstract over the canonical specificational and predicate nominal 
constructions, recognizing that they contain the same semantic (class-membership) predication relation. 
However, as Croft and Cruse (2004: 308) note, speakers “may not have the most schematic constructions 
represented in their minds”. As I result, this level o f  abstraction is not represented in Figure 8.3.
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position o f these copular constructions. Instead, this is understood to be dependent upon 
construction-specific factors which are reflected in the construction’s own historical 
development (see §8.2).
The updated inheritance hierarchy illustrated in Figure 8.3 therefore incorporates 
both the patterns o f correspondence identified in the synchronic parts o f this thesis and 
the historical evidence uncovered in the diachronic study o f  //-clefts. This hierarchy 
represents a full, explanatory account o f  the //-cleft construction, depicting no longer 
productive inheritance relations (indicated by dashed lines) as well as the relatively 
recent, and increasingly idiosyncratic, //-cleft subtypes.14 In addition to the IP //-cleft, 
the performative //-cleft, the proverbial //-cleft and the presentational wh-cleft are 
represented in Figure 8.3 (and indicated in bold). Although these constructions are 
unproductive and formulaic, since they are made up o f a limited set o f highly entrenched 
instances, they nevertheless have distinct discourse functions and therefore need to be 
recognized as constructions in their own right.
In conclusion then, while the interim hierarchy in Figure 6.3 emphasized the 
familial correspondences between //-clefts and other copular constructions, the updated 
hierarchy in Figure 8.3 also represents the idiosyncratic information which cannot obtain 
a satisfactory explanation on a purely synchronic account. Over the last two chapters, I 
have shown that while a number o f the //-cleft’s properties are construction-specific, 
they were nevertheless at one time motivated either by the language system at earlier 
periods o f  the language or by the general principles governing language change. As I 
explained in §6.3, a constructional approach is one which tolerates idiosyncratic 
information but nevertheless aims for explanatory adequacy. By undertaking a 
synchronic and diachronic analysis o f the //-cleft construction, I have provided a full 
account o f the specialized linguistic pattern, which both tolerates construction-specific 
properties and maximizes motivation for the //-cleft construction.
14 However, in some ways, the hierarchy o f  copular constructions outlined in Figure 8.3 is still incomplete. 
For simplicity, I have omitted demonstrative clefts, there-clefts and specificational sentences with 


















































9. SUMMARY AND FINAL CONCLUSIONS
9.1 Summary
This thesis has examined the structure and function o f the English //-cleft configuration 
within the framework o f  construction grammar. My analysis began in chapter 3 with the 
claim that //-clefts are a subtype o f specificational copular sentence. From this starting 
point, I asked the fundamental question: what is a specificational copular sentence? I 
showed that neither the ‘equative’ nor the ‘inverse’ analysis o f specificational structures 
can account for the full range o f data and I concluded that the concept o f ‘specification’ 
is not well understood. As a result, I outlined my own analysis o f specificational N P be 
N P  sentences. Here, I argued that specificational meaning is brought about by a 
reinterpretation o f the class-membership relation involving definite NP predicates, 
whereby the referent is identified as the unique member o f  a restricted and existentially 
presupposed set.
Like the inverse analysis, my account assumes that specificational sentences 
involve a nominal predication relation. This accounts for the asymmetric interpretation 
o f  specificational sentences and explains M ikkelsen’s (2002, 2005) pronominalization 
evidence. However, unlike the inverse account, my analysis is primarily semantic rather 
than syntax-centred and so is not dependent upon movement or linear order. As a result, 
m y analysis can accommodate reverse specificational sentences and provides an 
explanation for the restrictions on indefinite NP subjects. This original account o f 
specificational N P be NP  sentences is therefore able to accommodate and explain a 
wider range o f data than alternative analyses.
In addition to contributing to the literature on specificational sentences, the 
analysis outlined in chapter 3 provided the basis for the account o f  //-clefts given in 
chapter 4. Here, I claimed that if  specificational sentences contain definite NP 
predicates, then the //-cleft should also have this semantic structure. This led me to argue 
in favour o f a non-derivational extraposition-ffom-NP analysis o f //-clefts, in which the 
pronoun it and the cleft clause (analysed here as a restrictive relative) function together 
as a discontinuous definite description. I showed how, once we take this step, many o f
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the ¿/-cleft’s seemingly idiosyncratic properties are inherited from the wider 
specification construction and can be explained either as resulting from the semantics o f 
definite noun phrases or as a product o f  specificational meaning. I concluded that the 
analysis put forward in this thesis, in which the initial it performs a definite-like 
quantificational role, therefore has much more explanatory power than the ‘expletive’ 
accounts o f ¿/-clefts, in which it is analysed as a semantically inert element.
The particular analysis o f ¿/-clefts argued for in chapter 4 improves upon the 
existing ‘extraposition’ and ‘discontinuous constituent’ accounts that have been 
proposed in the cleft literature. M ost importantly, m y analysis is integrated into an 
original account o f  specificational sentences which recognizes the crucial role that 
definite descriptions play in creating specificational meaning. It is this that provides the 
m ost compelling support for a discontinuous constituent analysis o f  ¿/-clefts. 
Furthermore, while several authors have identified patterns o f  correspondence between 
¿/-clefts and definite noun phrases, I have applied classic philosophical work on definite 
descriptions to the ¿/-cleft data, thereby explaining exactly how these properties come 
about.
In chapter 5 , 1 established the scope o f  m y unified analysis o f specificational 
copular constructions. I showed how, once we analyse specificational sentences as 
involving nominal predication, the relationship between specificational and predicational 
N P be N P  constructions, and consequently the relationship between specificational and 
predicational ¿/-clefts, becomes straightforward. Since predicational ¿/-clefts are 
particularly problematic to expletive ¿/-cleft analyses, this represents an important 
advantage to m y analysis. Finally in chapter 5 ,1 acknowledged the limits o f m y unified 
account, showing that the range o f ¿/-cleft foci and the information status o f  the cleft 
clause are construction-specific properties which require an independent explanation.
In chapter 6 , 1 compared my account to other constructional ¿/-cleft analyses 
proposed in the literature. Here, I showed that my account is more in keeping with the 
basic claims that underlie the constructional framework and makes better use o f  the 
machinery that provides a constructional approach with explanatory power. In addition 
to serving as an interim summary o f my analysis, this discussion contributes to the
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literature on construction grammar. It illustrates how the constructional framework is 
often misinterpreted as promoting highly idiosyncratic and ad  hoc analyses (by both 
critics and supporters alike) and outlines the true advantages o f a constructional 
approach for work on specialized linguistic patterns.
The analysis developed in chapters 3, 4 and 5 focused on maximizing motivation 
for the /7-clefit construction via inheritance from higher-order constructions in the 
language system. While this account was shown to have explanatory adequacy, certain 
aspects o f the /7-cleft’s structure and use remained unexplained. In chapter 7 , 1 made use 
o f historical evidence in order to find motivation for the z7-cleft’s more idiosyncratic 
properties. I found that (a) much o f  the /7-cleft’s structure is reminiscent o f an earlier 
stage o f  the language and (b) the /7-cleft’s construction-specific range o f  foci and 
discourse functions have emerged over time as a result o f  general principles o f language 
change. This chapter contributes to the somewhat limited literature on the history o f the 
English /7-cleft, providing an original account o f the specificational /7-cleft’s origins and 
its subsequent diachronic development.
In chapter 8 , 1 showed how the historical evidence can help us to further 
understand the nature o f the present-day /7-cleft construction and its relationship to other 
types o f  specificational copular sentence. As part o f  this discussion, I asked what the 
development o f the /7-cleft can tell us about the nature o f  constructional change. As a 
result, this chapter contributes to the recent literature on diachronic construction 
grammar and grammaticalization theory. I concluded this chapter by showing how the 
historical evidence can be used to both inform and support my synchronic analysis o f  the 
/7-cleft, resulting in a m aximally explanatory account o f the English /7-cleft construction.
9.2 Final conclusions
This thesis offers a comparatively simple account o f the structure and function o f the 
English /7-cleft. It argues in favour o f a straightforward extraposition-from-NP analysis 
which views /7-cleflts in relation to other specificational copular constructions. However, 
the analysis is based upon an original semantic account o f  specificational meaning as 
involving an asymmetric predication relation which is dependent upon the inherent
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semantics o f definite noun phrases (rather than syntactic movement). By exploring and 
explaining the role that definite descriptions play in the creation o f specificational 
meaning, the extraposition-from-NP (or discontinuous constituent) analysis o f //-clefts 
gains considerable support and we are able to explain, rather than simply observe, the 
numerous similarities between //-clefts and definite noun phrases. Unlike most analyses 
o f //-clefts, the account proposed in this thesis contains a historical component. This is in 
keeping with the fundamental objective o f  construction grammar that while motivation 
must be maximized, idiosyncrasies are nevertheless tolerated. Rather than explaining 
away the //-cleft’s construction-specific attributes with a convoluted and 
overcomplicated synchronic account, this thesis makes use o f historical evidence to 
explain how and why the //-cleft developed idiosyncratic properties, thereby informing 
and supporting an otherwise simple and intuitive analysis o f the English //-cleft.
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